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VABSTRACT
In this study of contemporary politics and political change in 
Chuave, Simbu province, Papua New Guinea, I document how the nature of 
local level leadership has changed since Europeans first entered the 
area in 1933 and examine how current big men co-operate and compete in 
everyday political affairs within and beyond their own clan or village.
To a great extent my analysis focuses on the effects of super­
imposing a state organization on a traditional political system lacking 
formal leadership offices and representative institutions. The 
introduction of administrative officials, local government councils 
and, more recently, village courts has forced people to alter their 
conception of political authority and has provided big men with new 
opportunities to achieve influence in political arenas incorporating 
former enemy groups. Government elections are highly competitive 
affairs which highlight rivalries between individual big men and 
traditional socio-political groups. I show how people's perceptions of 
government institutions and officials are coloured by their allegiance 
to particular political groups and describe the problems leaders 
confront when attempting to fulfill the duties of elected offices.
Contemporary politics is in no a way confined to state derived 
political processes. Christian missions have well established systems 
of village leadership. Big men also achieve prominence by manipulating 
wealth in ceremonial exchanges that include both traditional and modern 
valuables. Furthermore, men now gain recognition as entrepreneurs 
within the western sector of the Chuave economy. In short, the ways in 
which a man obtains recognition as a leader are extremely diverse. 
Traditional-style big men compete with church leaders, store owners 
or government officials. Chuave women have remained peripheral to 
mainstream political affairs. But they have created a separate 
organization that allows them to achieve public recognition and 
political power at the local level.
My thesis, then, traces the development of new institutions and 
organizations that have arisen since contact. At the same time I 
detail the persistence of traditional beliefs and behaviours that 
continue to influence current political action. In doing so I analyse 
how both men and women emerge as leaders within a framework of 
traditional socio-political groups and state political arenas.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago an expedition led by M.J. Leahy, explorer and gold 
prospector, crossed the Mount Elirnbari ridge - a massive limestone 
formation that marks the boundary between the Siane and Chuave culture 
areas. Leahy's patrol passed through territory belonging to the Duma 
tribe before making camp for the night. A few Duma men from Kaupagam 
clan travelled the short distance to the Leahy camp where they saw pigs 
traded for pearl shells, far superior in quality to their own. They 
watched Leahy's carriers effortlessly chop firewood with axes of 
'strong stone' (that is, steel). The following day, after the light 
skinned men had broken camp, Kaupagam men gathered shavings from the 
firewood. They took them to their village, bundled them together in 
pandanus leaves, and hung them from the rafters above one of two fires 
that perpetually burned in the men's house. Later they used the 
shavings to rub their own stone axes so that their blades, too, would 
be strong.
Today Kaupagam men laugh with glee when they hear any of the 
several versions of that story. They laugh at their own ignorance and 
gullibility before the white man and gavmen (government) arrived, 
before they came to know the Law - and the word of God. Men delight in 
showing their battle scars from wars fought prior to pacification, 
while stressing that pre-contact life was harsh and, according to many, 
evil. In a world where Toyota trucks carry people to coastal towns 
hundreds of kilometres away, and where young educated men debate the 
merits of United States presidential candidates, the past seems 
distant, clouded and elusive.
In this society, living with Kaupagam clan, I began 22 months of 
fieldwork in July 1979. Dr. Marie Reay initially suggested Chuave as a 
field location for my study of contemporary local level politics and I 
agreed wholeheartedly with her choice. Chuave had not yet been the 
subject of anthropological research, though there were excellent 
ethnographic and other research material available for neighbouring 
areas in Simbu province.^ The Chuave area had undergone prolonged 
economic and political change and was beset by problems of law and 
order which are inextricably mixed with politics in the New Guinea 
highlands. Thus, the area seemed ideal for my study of modern political
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institutions and processes. In Chuave, Pidgin is the language of 
politics, being commonly used in local government council meetings and 
village courts. With rare exceptions, all men below the age of 45 and 
women below the age of 40 are fluent in Pidgin. Moreover, any man who 
strives to be a government official is expected to be extremely 
proficient in this lingua franca. I therefore conducted my fieldwork 
in this language, while eliciting vernacular categories and expressions 
for a wide range of topics.
An incident that occurred very early in my fieldwork illustrates a 
few of the difficulties I confronted while studying political change.
The death and burial of an aged sorcerer-magician had just occurred 
and, reminiscing about his life, several old men came to wax poetic 
about former times. Seated in the men’s house, my eyes watering from 
the smoke, I inquired about past mortuary practices; but my questions 
produced very discrepant answers. Men could not agree on whether the 
corpse of a big man^ was treated differently from those of lesser 
men, on precisely how people were buried, or on whether graves were 
marked or unmarked. One old man even refused to discuss the topic, 
saying that the remote past was ’Satan's time', and that missions had 
taught them the correct way to bury their dead. Finally, Maki, a close 
age-mate of the deceased, responded. In solemn tones befitting the 
occasion, he explained that men buried a portion of the deceased's 
valuables - shell pieces and stone axes - with the corpse. They then 
killed, cooked and distributed his pigs to maternal and affinal 
kinsmen. When the deceased was a big man, Maki added, the mortuary 
feast would be very large; on such occasions, they killed many pigs and 
piled beer high in the men's house! Amidst much laughter at the 
mention of beer, all present agreed that the substance of Maki's 
account was true.
Such anachronisms, common in Chuave, are always the source of 
great amusement. Folktales, for example, sometimes contain references 
to cash or speak of the 'land of the dead' as heaven - a place where 
sheet metal roofs and vehicles abound. Anachronisms, however, are 
often symptomatic of a deeper problem the analyst must face: not only
do people inadvertently inject the past with the present, but they also 
alter or interpret the past to suit present needs.
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It is questionable, for instance, how unintended was Maki's 
reference to beer. Because beer has become an important social gift, 
it is not only appropriate but also, according to Maki and others, 
essential to make lavish gifts of beer to celebrate a big man’s death. 
But on this occasion the deceased’s son, Bobiange, was a fervent 
follower of a fundamentalist mission that prohibited beer at mortuary 
feasts and discouraged displays of grief. Therefore, Maki's reference 
to beer, however accidental, also reminded listeners of the differences 
he had with Bobiange, and of the tension existing between the two 
village factions they represented.
This particular episode presented no major difficulties for my 
study. But it was not always easy for me to ascertain whether or not 
men were manipulating the past; that is, whether or not informants’ 
statements constituted historical fact or fiction. Current big men, 
for instance, sometimes bemoaned their lack of authority by speaking 
of past leaders as very powerful if not omnipotent. But others argued 
that it was only present-day leaders who were truly powerful and who so 
quickly resorted to the threat or use of punishment to ensure orders 
were obeyed. Likewise, accounts of past wars or pre-contact 
settlements varied greatly. In short, past events, past political 
victories and group histories were inexorably tied to present-day 
political contests between groups and rival big men.
The terms ’traditional’ or ’traditional culture’ are no longer 
fashionable in some academic circles. This is simply because an 
awareness of change as a fundamental fact of life has made researchers 
wary of implying that any society, at any point in time, is static or 
unchanging. For example, it is undoubtedly true that, in the high­
lands, innovations in military tactics, modifications in ritual and 
exchange, or adaptations in group structure were part of the ebb and 
flow of pre-contact life. But given what I have already said, it is 
not surprising that I was unable to document these types of change to 
my satisfaction. Thus, I could not always determine whether, for 
instance, differences in informants' accounts of a now defunct ritual 
were indications that multiple changes had occurred, were the result of 
variation in behaviour, were the product of faulty recall, or were due 
to selective altering of the past to suit current situations.
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The analyst must establish some baseline even to begin speaking 
about change. In Chuave, the best-remembered temporal demarcation 
point is Leahy's 1933 patrol - an event which people themselves use to 
distinguish between the 'ancestors' time' and events occurring 'after 
the white man came up'. But problems still arise because men often 
confuse many early patrols - even those occurring as late as 1940 - 
with their first contact with whites. Nonetheless, I use 1933 as the 
baseline for my study of change. I use 'traditional culture', 
therefore, for people's condensed version of pre-contact life; that is, 
for the consensus I found in informants' statements about their culture 
as it existed prior to the somewhat problematic date of 1933.
Difficulties in reconstructing the past are not, of course, always 
insurmountable. By relying on a wide range of informants, both within 
and beyond Kaupagam clan, as well as verifying statements by asking 
people to repeat their accounts on several different occasions, I 
believe I was able to formulate a reasonably accurate picture of 
traditional and early post-contact society. Wherever differences in 
informants' statements about traditional life have a bearing on the 
degree or type of change occurring since 1933, I have noted them and 
tried to resolve the discrepancies. What I am describing, however, is 
a model of traditional society that contains many gaps, and is based on 
a pre-literate people's impoverished and occasionally distorted 
perceptions of the past.
If present needs or ambitions often colour views of the past, it 
is also true that the past leaves its mark on the present. I have 
recourse in my study to analyse current behaviours, symbolic forms, and 
political processes which, in bold terms, show continuity with 
traditional Chuave culture. For example, during feasts leaders often 
force-fed beer to men who were quarrelling. After inquiring about the 
reason for this, I was told that traditionally big men pacified men by 
forcing them to eat pork fat - an act that people say 'calms a man's 
stomach'. Although the modern method of social control is perhaps more 
dangerous - encouraging intoxication sometimes creates further 
disturbances - this behaviour is a simple example of continuity in 
change. A modern valuable has been substituted for a traditional one 
without affecting the raison d'etre for the act.
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Change, however, is rarely so cosmetic or so simply understood.
As I show in chapter four, the use of beer in ceremonial exchange has 
entailed fine adjustments in patterns of distribution which have 
implications for how men manipulate wealth to enhance their reputations 
or obtain political influence. Moreover, the use of beer or other 
consumer goods in political contests is a mere fragment of the study of 
political and economic change. More generally, I had to try to 
understand how the shift to a cash economy, or changes in patterns of 
production, influenced the nature of leadership, or conversely, how 
political competition has accelerated or restricted the pace of 
economic change.
Both continuity and change in Chuave politics, I believe, are best 
understood as the product of a clash between two political systems.
Prior to contact, for example, the limits of the polity were small 
clan-villages. After contact these small-scale political units were 
subsumed under the umbrella of a larger, dominant political system 
represented by the Australian colonial administration. My thesis, 
therefore, concerns what Bailey has called the process of encapsulation 
(1969: 146-148). At the most general level, I am concerned with 
demonstrating how Chuave people reacted or adapted to changes imposed 
from outside their political environment by the encapsulating system. 
Thus, I show how the imposition of administrative officials, elections 
and local government councils transformed local political processes.
The year 1975 brought independence to Papua New Guinea and, 
consequently, a transformation of the encapsulating system. Yet, the 
imposition of political institutions and policies has continued; 
witness the introduction of village courts and provincial government.
1 regard the encapsulating system, therefore, as the dependent variable 
in my study of change: as the source of the major and most dramatic
political transformations that have occurred in Chuave (ibid.). This 
too, corresponds to people’s perceptions. They are apt to 
underestimate the importance of local innovations, and instead, see 
themselves as simply having responded to changes that external agencies 
have forced upon them, often without prior consultation with local 
leaders.
This is not to imply that local populations are totally passive; 
indeed, continuity in change is often a matter of their resistance to
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outside pressures. Nor do I mean to suggest that change is uni­
directional or that the two political systems exist independently of 
each other. The very idea of encapsulation means that it is often 
difficult to disentangle one political system from another. Thus, a 
leader may simultaneously be a big man in a rural village and a 
politician in Port Moresby. His experience in either political arena 
necessarily influences his behaviour, colouring political processes at 
both the national and local level. Administrative policies are also 
modified to meet local conditions and, ultimately, local pressures can 
force the structure of the encapsulating system to change.
This raises questions concerning the limits of my study. Because 
my view of politics is village-based, I am content to treat the 
encapsulating system as homogenous and to a certain extent unchanging.
I am more concerned with how people perceive higher government than 
with policy-making decisions made within these institutions, and more 
concerned with a leader’s use of consumer goods than with the fact that 
the tax on these goods provides revenue for provincial or national 
government. Because people are at once members of small-scale political 
units - each encapsulated in larger more inclusive ones - my study of 
politics is necessarily situational. Consequently, I take pains to 
provide a frame of reference for each political situation I analyse, 
be it a feast affecting only the political goals of a single men’s house 
group or an election concerning an entire census division.
It should be clear by now that the scope of my thesis is broad.
My definition of politics is itself open-ended: politics includes all
those actions and relationships concerned with the determination and 
implementation of public goals and the differential distribution of 
power and authority within this (situational) public. This definition 
is cognate with Swartz’s (1968: 1), and similar to that of at least one 
highlands’ ethnographer (Reay 1964: 240). Power I define in the 
simplest way: the ability to determine a person's actions; in short,
to make him do what you want him to do. A power balance or imbalance, 
then, is to be found in any dyadic relationship. Where people recognize 
a leader's power as legitimate, he has the authority to act (on behalf 
of others). Legitimacy and, therefore, authority are determined by the 
values of a particular group of followers and sometimes by the society 
at large. Power and authority need not, of course, be coterminous.
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For example, at a feast men may accord a representative a degree of 
authority to speak on behalf of a particular group on the basis of his 
age or kinship rank. Yet, in other situations, this man may not 
exercise any power over a specific following.
In order to understand how people achieve their goals, it is 
necessary first to understand the processes by which individuals assume 
positions of power and authority. These processes are competitive. 
Politics then, focusses on competition for power and authority and on 
the resources necessary to obtain them. In Chuave both material and 
non-material resources are important: one leader's power may rely on
the control of cash or pigs; another's influence may rest on less 
tangible bases - oratorical skill, knowledge of the Bible, or physical 
strength. The ultimate test of power in any relationship, in fact, 
is a person's willingness to resort to the use or threat of physical 
force or coercion.
From the wide range of political behaviour available to actors, 
men repeatedly select certain options that have proved effective over 
time. In short, political behaviour becomes patterned. Occasionally 
such patterns are codified or institutionalized, as in the ranking of 
various government offices. I use the term 'political system' to refer 
to this patterning of political behaviour. When the resources used 
by people or the values that they hold change, so too does the 
political system change. The political system, therefore, is very 
fluid. It is frozen only by the analyst in an attempt to generalize 
about behaviour over time. Moreover, political competition itself 
often generates change: new ideologies or resources become accepted
because they prove valuable as a means of defeating rivals in 
particular political contests.
My approach to politics is aligned with what has been called 
'processual analysis' or 'action theory' (Swartz et al 1966; Vincent 
1978). The interaction of leaders and their followers is the central 
focus of my study. Following Van Velsen (1967) I find it particularly 
useful to describe case studies of events involving a small number of 
primary actors. Thus, I return repeatedly to the observation of a 
small number of leaders from the local community in which I resided, 
and follow their actions and people's judgement of their political
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perforraances as they strive for recognition in several political 
arenas. In other words, I use observed interaction occurring in a 
small community to illustrate political processes that recur throughout 
the entire Chuave area.
Because competition is central to ray study, a note concerning the 
diplomatic style of Chuave politics is necessary. Strict rules of 
political etiquette apply. Although leaders may silence followers or 
any younger person, they listen politely and at great length to older 
men and to their rivals. Though open confrontation between rival big 
men occurs, it is rarely sought. Thus, where leaders meet and take 
opposed stands on an issue, they carefully acknowledge the merits of 
their opponents' position and avoid any open show of hostility.
The moral concept underlying this behaviour is shame (grai). 
Generally, this includes feelings such as guilt or embarrassment that 
result from the breaking of any number of normative rules or from 
failing to meet social obligations. In this way it is similar to the 
Hagen concept, pipil, and as Andrew Strathern notes, it 'relates to 
an individual's reactions to his community relationships' (1975: 348- 
350). However, in political contexts, I would suggest that the Chuave 
and Hagen concepts seem to differ. The Hagen big man, Ongka, for 
example, describes a situation in which a man is publicly challenged 
and his statements found wrong, with the result that he feels 'small 
shame' in the eyes of those present (ibid.). But Ongka makes no 
reference to a man's political standing within this community. Chuave 
people, in contrast, argued that questions of right and wrong are by 
and large irrelevant. But they automatically link shame to people's 
respect for a man of high status. It is the very act of publicly 
confronting a big man that results in shame for both parties. Ideas 
about shame, therefore, protect established big men from frequent 
confrontation. Where status differences between ordinary men and those 
striving to prove themselves as leaders are less sharply defined, the 
risk of confrontation increases.
Consequently, men avoid confrontation even as they criticize 
leaders or attempt to discredit their political opponents. I have 
seen men sit patiently in the men's house throughout a big man's speech 
and only as he left begin to criticize his words or question his
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ability. Leaders also seek to destroy the reputations of their rivals 
by slanderous attacks upon their character. This is called ka dimoi 
denga (talk-backside-speak) in the vernacular and tokbaksait in 
Pidgin. ’Talking behind one's back', then, is an intrinsic and 
pervasive part of Simbu political life.
Characteristic of the style of Chuave politics, therefore, is the 
contrast between formality or restraint in meetings where men seek to 
mould consensus, and the political infighting occurring in less formal 
settings as leaders seek to present themselves in the best possible 
light or attack their rivals. Leaders, of course, often become aware 
of the gossip or slander their opponents use against them. When 
criticisms contain an element of truth, leaders are able to respond by 
modifying their behaviour while avoiding the loss of face that would 
occur if the accusation was public. But they remain wary of mentioning 
any rumour, however false, in confrontations with rivals. Instead, 
they manoeuvre in a self-perpetuating cycle of innuendo and intrigue in 
order to protect or enhance their reputations.
The Simbu have a passion for politics. Men's house discussions 
cover a wide range of topics: from the proper way to organize a feast
to the problems and failings of the national goverment. People 
recognize that criticisms of leaders or competition for power can be 
nothing less than intense. 'Every man', they say, 'wants to be a big 
man.' Although this statement is an exaggeration, it indicates a 
fundamental consequence of 50 years of political change: Chuave
leadership has become increasingly specialized, and avenues to political 
power increasingly diverse. Church leaders, elected officials, or 
business men all compete for political followings along with 
traditional-style big men whose authority continues to rest on 
oratorical skill or the manipulation of wealth in exchange. Like 
myself, therefore, the Simbu operate with a broad definition of 
politics. To them, the discussion of mission affairs or the purchase 
of a vehicle is as intrinsically political as a local council election: 
all concern public goals and all eventually affect the distribution of 
power within local communities. Thus, people would not tolerate the 
suggestion that I limit my study to a particular aspect of political 
behaviour; they demanded nothing less than a total study of the 
politics in Chuave.
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Alt ho ugh I necessarily regard some aspects of Chuave politics as 
more central than others, I concur with my Chuave friends' assessment 
of their political lifestyle. My thesis, then, is an ethnography of 
present-day politics and political change. In chapter two I outline the 
Chuave culture area and describe its numerous political arenas. By and 
large, these arenas correspond to corporate socio-political groups which 
place constraints on people's behaviour and which serve as frames of 
reference for much of the action I describe in subsequent chapters. I 
show how changes in village or clan organization are themselves the 
product of the process of encapsulation, and how these changes influence 
current interaction. Chapter three begins with a reconstruction of 
traditional leadership, and traces the changes in patterns of authority 
occurring under the Australian administration. I also treat a much 
neglected aspect of political change: the effect of missionization on
local political processes.
The economic basis of power and authority is the subject of chapter 
four. I first consider the transformation of the Chuave economy and 
then, for purposes of presentation, draw a distinction between the 
exchange and business economies. Both these economic sectors are linked 
by the use of cash, and men manipulate wealth in either sector in order 
to enhance their status or gain political influence. I show, however, 
that men's responses to the demands posed by both sectors serve, over 
time, to limit the degree of authority they obtain and to differentiate 
alternative types of economic leaders.
In chapter five I am also concerned with economic matters, but 
there my analysis shifts from male to female power. Chuave women remain 
peripheral to mainstream political affairs, and their powerlessness is 
in part due to their inability to manipulate wealth in exchange.
Perhaps sensing this, Chuave women began in the 1960s to organize 
themselves and to assume partial control over the wealth they produce. 
The result is a social, economic, and political movement known as 
Kafaina, through which women obtain recognition as producers and 
redress the imbalance in male-female power relations. The behaviour of 
Kafaina women is perhaps the best illustration of the blend between 
tradition and modernity existing in Chuave.
Chapter six concerns the recent implementation of village courts
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in Chuave by the Papua New Guinea government. I argue that the 
introduction of village court officials dramatically affected the 
balance of power between local leaders. The issue of law and order is 
fundamentally important to villagers. Consequently, I analyse the 
interaction between political and legal processes, and demonstrate how 
the politicization of village courts influences the nature of customary 
and western law at the local level.
My penultimate chapter is an extended case study of the first 
election of a Simbu provincial government member. For Chuave people, 
this election was the single most important event that occurred during 
my fieldwork. I use this event to highlight many of the issues and 
behaviours previously discussed throughout this thesis. In sum, I focus 
my attention on a period of concentrated political competition: on
those processes that not only underlie much of everyday political life, 
but which are also crucial to an understanding of political change in 
Chuave.
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Notes
1. Throughout this ray thesis I use Simbu rather than the colonial 
spelling of Chirabu when referring to a single province or a people 
who are linguistically and culturally related (see chapter two). 
The provincial government has adopted the name Sirabu because it is 
a phonetically accurate spelling of a traditional greeting in the 
Kuman (central Simbu) and Chuave languages. People use both 
pronunciations in everyday conversations, although Simbu is 
increasingly preferred by young men. Chuave people also shout
'simbu-u-u' at major ceremonies when accepting food or valuables 
that do not require a specific return gift.
2. Yar togara and gar wanoba are vernacular terms that translate 
literally as ’big man'. Both terms are used when addressing a 
leader or any aged man. In Pidgin people use bik man in both 
these contexts, but lida solely for a political leader 
regardless of his age. I ignore the use of 'big man’ as an age- 
marker, and use the words big man and leader interchangeably.
Chapter Two
SOCIAL GROUPS AND POLITICAL ARENAS
In this chapter, I describe the changes in group structure that 
have occurred in Chuave and stress the degree to which traditional 
groups converge with or diverge from political units created during 
the process of encapsulation. Residence patterns and descent group 
structure do not always coincide, and this has important implications 
for corporate behaviour. From the actor’s viewpoint, the conception 
of a political universe consisting of a hierarchy of inclusive and 
exclusive groups is valid in Chuave. People’s social and political 
behaviour takes place in reference to the groups in which they claim 
membership.
The emphasis that Chuave people place on groups sets them apart 
from some other highlands peoples. Wagner has used Daribi ideas of 
sociality to question the applicability of notions of groups in the 
New Guinea highlands (1974). At question in his article is the extent 
to which the anthropologist's own pre-conceptions based on corporate 
descent theory leads him to find or create groups where none exist. 
Wagner's argument, based on the Daribi who have exceptionally low 
population density,^ ignores the range of settlement patterns found 
throughout the highlands, and is not strictly applicable to other 
areas. One of Wagner's examples, for instance, contrasts sharply with 
the situation in Chuave. He notes that colonial administrative 
officers who were trained in the 'science of descent theory' found 'a 
bewildering chaos of scattered homesteads and overlapping names' in 
Daribi. And because they were committed to imposing political order 
at the local level, these officers created villages and village 
officials where none had existed.
In contrast, the traditional settlement pattern in Chuave, 
observed by Taylor (PR 1933: 110), was one of spatially bounded 
villages built on sites owned by the men of a single patrilineal group. 
Rather than imposing western notions of groups, the colonial 
administration found a pre-existing settlement pattern that sharply 
delineated a specific political unit, the clan, from other similar 
groups throughout the area. Despite dramatic changes in village 
structure, the clan remains a conceptually bounded unit which is of
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primary importance for the regulation of socio-political behaviour.
In the emphasis that Chuave people place on the definition of the 
clan as a political as well as social group they resemble the Siane, 
and differ from people to the west, specifically the central Simbu 
(Waiye census division) (Brookfield and Brown 1963: 10-12; see also A. 
Strathern 1969a: 44-45). Differences also exist, however, between the 
Siane and Chuave areas. In short, my data on socio-political groups 
reveal Chuave to be a unique blend of Siane and central Simbu 
characteristics. Subsequently, when describing Chuave descent group 
structure, although I occasionally refer to other highlands cultures, I 
focus primarily on a systematic comparison of the Siane-Chuave-central 
Simbu areas.
The Chuave culture area
I use the word Chuave in several senses, as the people themselves 
do. Chuave proper is a government station situated on the Highlands 
Highway 31 kilometres southeast of Kundiawa (capital of Simbu province) 
and 47 kilometres southwest of Goroka (capital of Eastern Highlands 
province). Established in 1939 as a base camp, Chuave was inter­
mittently manned by native police and expatriate patrol officers during 
2the 1940s. In 1953, when the highway linking Goroka and Kundiawa 
was completed, Chuave became a permanent patrol post. Since then, the 
station has grown considerably; today it has a population of 738 
persons and serves as an administrative centre for three Simbu census 
divisions: Chuave, Elimbari and Nambaiyufa, with a combined population
of 29,624 (1981 census figures, National Statistical Office).
My field site was located five and one-half kilometres south of
Chuave station along a secondary road within Chuave census division.
The area, 202 square kilometres (Howlett et al 1976: 93), has a
population of 9,612, comprising the members of eight groups which I
3call tribes (see maps) . I confined my research to this geographic 
area, but made sporadic trips to Elimbari and Nambaiyufa census divi­
sions. Most of my data on traditional culture came from informants in 
the Duma tribe. Villagers living in Chuave census division say they 
'belong to' Chuave and readily point out physical landmarks that serve 
as boundary markers between Chuave and adjacent census divisions. This
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area also serves as a provincial electorate. Individual members from 
Chuave, Elimbari, and Nambaiyufa are elected to the Provincial Assembly 
in Kundiawa. People identify their birth places by using the terms 
Chuave, Elimbari or Nambaiyufa, frequently adding the name of a tribe, 
clan, or village settlement to specify precise locations.
The beauty and splendour of Mount Elimbari dominates the entire 
Chuave area and people use the names Elimbari and Chuave inter­
changeably. Elimbari Local Government Council, located at Chuave 
station, represents the two census divisions (population 21,921) which 
together form a single culture area 443 square kilometres in size. The 
inhabitants of this area speak the Chuave language, which Wurm (1971) 
classifies as a member of the Simbu Sub-Family of the Central Family of 
the East New Guinea Highlands Stock. In areas to the west people speak 
the related languages of Sinasina, Dorn and Nomane. To the east, in 
Nambaiyufa census division and across the provincial border, people 
speak the unrelated language of Siane (Swick 1966: 46, n. 2).^
Geographic features also define the boundaries of this culture area: to 
the north the slopes of Mount Kerigomna; to the south the Tua and Waghi 
River gorges, and to the east Elimbari ridge (2,200 to 2,850 metres 
high and 19 kilometres long) which, despite mountain passes, 
effectively separates Nambaiyufa from Elimbari and Chuave census 
divisions. Only the western edge of the region is geographically 
unbounded; here only language differences distinguish Sinasina and 
Chuave groups.
Prior to contact, migrations of entire groups crossed the 
boundaries I have outlined. For example, the people surrounding the 
present Nomane station, across the Wahgi River from Chuave, speak a 
distinct language. Men's house styles and pig festivals also differ 
markedly from those found in Chuave. Some Nomane groups, however, have 
a history of migration and mythological charter that place their 
origins at Mainarao, a site only a few kilometres south of Chuave 
station. Particular aspects of social organization also resemble those 
found in Chuave (see below).^
Intermarriage and a degree of bilingualism exist among border 
populations. For example, 17 per cent of Kaupagam people (24 of 140 
adults surveyed) speak Siane fluently. Similarly, although people in
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Duma find the Sinasina language unintelligible, members of the Kebai 
and Kamara tribes are often speakers of both the Chuave and Sinasina 
languages. Nowadays men also use Pidgin to overcome such linguistic 
barriers.
In the past, groups from different culture areas also formed 
temporary alliances or fought with each other. Thus Sua and Gai, both 
Chuave villages north of the Tua River, married into, fought, or formed 
alliances with Gimi speakers in the Bella Valley south of the Tua 
(Bragginton 1978: 108). Kaupagam clan took refuge with Siane clans 
following a rout by enemies prior to the turn of the century. They 
later regained their territory after forming an alliance with these 
same clans.
Living among potentially hostile clans restricted individual 
mobility. A person regularly travelled only a few kilometres 
between village and garden sites. Nonetheless, marriage ties and 
temporary trading partnerships promoted vast exchange networks linking 
different regions. Prior to contact Duma men obtained stone axes from 
Kafetu in the Goroka Valley to the east and, in the west, from the Dorn 
quarry via Sinasina.
These factors guaranteed interaction between members of discrete 
culture areas. Despite language and geographic barriers, therefore, 
a certain degree of cultural homogeneity existed between Chuave and 
surrounding areas prior to contact.
Pan-regionalism
Before I outline the groups extant in Chuave, it is necessary 
to note how people conceptualize the limits of their political 
universe. People's awareness of the world has greatly increased during 
the past 50 years. Today individual mobility is no longer restricted 
by a concentric environment of hostile groups, but by the cost of 
transport. Wage labour begun in the 1950s has continued to the 
present; every village has part of its population residing outside the 
Chuave area. People now travel to a number of different towns to 
visit kinsmen, and youths travel to obtain higher education. Local 
entrepreneurs make frequent, sometimes fortnightly, trips to Lae to
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obtain store goods. Each day of the week., save Sunday, at least 15 
public motor vehicles (PMV) carry passengers to Goroka from the Chuave 
countryside. Nor are people's travel experiences confined to Papua 
New Guinea. A Duma student and a mission leader journeyed to the 
United States while I resided in Chuave, and men from the Chuave area 
have travelled to, among other places, Hong Kong, Australia and Israel. 
In Kaupagam clan various people had taken spouses from Nambaiyufa,
Lufa, Sinasina, Kundiawa, Goroka, Madang and Finschhafen. Such 
marriages represent only a small fraction of the total, but are 
increasingly common throughout the Chuave area.
Freedom to travel, plus improvements in radio communication, has 
promoted an awareness of the customs of other areas, and a nascent pan- 
regional movement has been developing. Villagers greatly misunderstand 
this movement which seeks to create a new government and administrative 
structure. The movement centres on the creation of a new province 
encompassing Chuave and surrounding areas. People say such a province 
might include Chuave, Elimbari, Siane, Salt-Nomane, Sinasina, Watabung 
and Lufa census divisions. The impetus behind the creation of 'Bomai' 
province stems from the complaints of a group of leaders - perhaps 80 
men - who are disenchanted with current government and who strive to 
solidify this potential cross-cultural identity. Thus, although people 
in Chuave refer to themselves as Simbu - particularly when identifying 
themselves to members of other provinces - they argue that the Simbu 
provincial government has not made any serious attempt to develop the 
Chuave area. They maintain that young educated men from the Kuman or 
central Simbu area dominate the Kundiawa public service. Chuave people 
regularly journey to Goroka rather than Kundiawa, for leisure or 
business trips and many claim that they would prefer to be a part of 
the Eastern Highlands province rather than Simbu. Many men, in fact, 
are adamantly opposed to any travel to the 'Kuman side' and describe 
Kuman speakers as not only different from themselves but also as modern 
enemies.
As yet, the parochial interests of the area's constituent parts 
have undermined this pan-regional movement. Councillors from Elimbari 
census division have threatened to withdraw from Elimbari Council 
because they believe that Chuave leaders dominate it. Similar 
accusations led in 1974 to the formation of a separate Siane Council
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after years of complaints that a council controlled by Chuave speakers 
purposely thwarted the development of Nainbaiyufa census division. 
Nonetheless, the possibility remains that this pan-regional identity 
may serve in future as the basis for group action which cuts across 
current political and administrative boundaries.
Phratry, tribe and eria
Even the most cursory reading of highlands ethnographies reveals 
the disarray in terminology anthropologists have created when de­
scribing descent groups of similar or different sizes and function.^
The variety of terras and criteria anthropologists use makes cross- 
cultural comparison difficult. The problem is especially acute for 
a comparison of the Chuave and central Simbu cultural areas.
In part the problem arises from actual differences between the 
two areas. Brown notes that informants did not always agree among 
themselves when discussing the basic three level descent hierarchy of 
tribe, clan and subclan (1972: 35). Similarly central Simbu informants 
gave two different uses of tribal names; the first includes only 
descent based groups, and the second includes these groups and an 
unrelated or immigrant group (Bookfield and Brown 1963: 92). In 
central Simbu a vast number of exceptional cases also exist: groups
simply do not regularly fit into the perceived segmentary model. In 
Chuave, by contrast, people easily rank groups in descent hierarchies 
that correspond to traditional spatial organization. Furthermore, 
people neatly explain any exceptional cases by reference to descent 
histories.
A deeper problem exists, however, because the analysts delineate 
central Simbu groups so as to include the exceptional cases. Thus, 
Brookfield and Brown note that clans 'are usually territorial, 
exogamous, named groups', but add that 'there are exceptions to each 
of these criteria'. Such cryptic statements leave one to ponder under 
what conditions the analysts include or exclude these criteria when 
defining the clan and to ask under what circumstances exceptions to 
this general rule applies. Elsewhere, the 'clan section' is described 
as a discrete unit within the clan. But this unit may also correspond 
to a second, lower level unit, the linked subclan (ibid.: 85, 92-93).
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Such flexibility in description, although presumably meant to mirror 
the loosely structured pattern of central Simbu corporate behaviour, 
compounds the problems of comparison at a group level. Subsequently 
in cross-cultural comparison, I have ignored exceptions to those 
criteria used to define central Simbu groups and show how Chuave units 
are similar or different to those found in central Simbu on the basis 
of specific criteria and specific corporate functions.
I use the term 'phratry' to denote the largest Chuave group 
sharing a putative history of common descent. Between nine and 
14 clans comprise a phratry which numbers between 2,000 and 4,000 
people and has a common or qualifying name which both members and non­
members use to identify the group. The major, named, constituent parts 
of a phratry I call tribes and these are either dispersed or proximate 
to each other. However, not all Chuave tribes are part of a larger 
phratry. The Gomia phratry (see map two) is comprised of three tribes, 
Gomia Meri (four clans), Gomia Kinogu (three clans) and Gomia Kibi 
(three clans), whose territories border each other. People say they 
belong to Gomia or, alternatively, to a particular tribe, for example, 
Gomia Meri. Today people number these Gomia One, Two and Three, 
following the example of early colonial officers. Duma tribe, in 
contrast, is part of a dispersed Duma phratry. A common history of 
descent links the tribe, consisting of nine clans, to Duma Damagu and 
Duma Yagari tribes some distance away in adjoining Elimbari census 
division. Land belonging to other, non-related tribes separates the 
Duma phratry territories. Phratry myths speak of an ancient quarrel 
involving a pair of aged brothers that led to fratricide, to a split 
between their descendants and, eventually, to warfare and the migration 
of part of the founding unit. Chuave phratries are therefore similar 
to those found in Kuma (Reay 1959: 28-29) and central Simbu (Brown 
1960: 24) and equivalent to the Hagen great-tribe (A. Strathern 1971: 
19) in providing a historical rationale for processes of segmentation 
and migration that these groups have undergone. Such high-level groups 
do not exist east of Chuave. Among the Gahuka-Gama (Read 1952: 2-3) 
despite a recognition of common cultural heritage, the tribe - 
numbering between 500 and 1,000 people - is the largest named group.
The Siane, despite the fact that some groups have a history of 
migration from the Goroka Valley, also do not place emphasis on distant 
links. Instead Siane people speak of particular tribes as always
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having existed on their present territories and of tribal ancestors who 
emerged from the ground (Salisbury 1962: 13, 70-71).
In the past, the phratry rarely united in any co-operative 
activity. For dispersed phratries the distance between constituent 
tribes prior to contact meant that interaction was minimal and the 
organization of joint enterprises impossible. The constituent tribes 
of proximate phratries sometimes combined to hold pig festivals.
Today, some politicians attempt to use common ancestry as a rationale 
for phratry solidarity. In provincial elections, for example, they 
maintain that all Gomia tribes should vote en bloc for a single 
candidate. Such appeals are at present ineffective, however, and the 
phratry remains indistinct as a political unit.
Chuave tribes are equivalent in both size and internal structure 
to those found in Siane, but origin myths concerning the tribe differ 
(ibid.: 13). Two to nine clans belong to tribes that range in 
population from approximately 600 to 2,700 people. The smallest of 
Chuave phratries, then, is equivalent in size to a large Chuave tribe 
and a functional overlap exists between these two kinds of groups.
Thus clans of a tribe regularly combine to hold their pig festival at 
the same time; representatives of each clan meet to discuss the 
synchronization of events at the tribal level. Small proximate 
phratries, however, unite to participate in this group enterprise 
normally associated with the tribe - a phenomenon easily understandable 
in Chuave where the size of group displays and demonstrations of group 
strength are important aspects of ceremonies.
Tribes are 'big names', and a visitor first learns these names 
when inquiring about groups in Chuave. Each tribe has a distinct myth 
of origin. Three tribes - Kamara, Kau and Kebai - trace their origins 
to Sinasina and ultimately, as with most Simbu groups, to Wokaraa in 
the Upper Simbu River Valley. The remaining tribes, however, trace 
their origins to the Mai River Valley in the north-east and adamantly 
deny any links to central Simbu, a point which I discuss later. Other 
stories trace the pattern of segmentation within the tribe. Thus, 
informants say the Duma tribe was once the Duma clan. Because of 
population growth and internal quarrelling, this group split after a 
(now mythical) fight - again involving fratricide - to form two clans,
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Gorukabu and Supadurumo. These two groups in turn produced additional 
clans. Supaduromo, for example, divided into Subagam, a clan that 
exists to this day, and Durumo. Durumo (a name no longer used save 
in reference to this group's history) has undergone further 
segmentation and yielded the three present clans of Kaupagam, Tabiagam, 
and Komodurumo.
Cordyline, other plants or natural landmarks such as streams or 
ridges mark the boundaries of a tribe which has a specific, continuous 
territory. People often dispute tribal borders but tribal territories 
are solid blocks and no islands of tribal land exist outside this 
area.
Because the Chuave tribe is always both a descent group and a 
discrete territorial unit, it differs from groups of similar size found 
to the immediate west. For the central Simbu, Brown found it necessary 
to distinguish between descent based groups (phratries) and local 
alliances of groups (tribes) that form political units (1960: 24-25). 
The coincidence of these two kinds of groups, the 'phratry-tribe', is 
rare in central Simbu (ibid.: 30). Similarly for the Kuma, Reay 
contrasts the phratry, an unlocalized descent group, with the parish, a 
localized political unit (1959: 25-26). Chuave tribes, in contrast, 
correspond to the central Simbu phratry-tribe and are more comparable 
to Hagen tribes as described by Andrew Strathern (1971: 20) though 
Chuave tribes are smaller in slzeJ No pairing of tribal names 
denoting a serai-permanent alliance between groups exists in Chuave as 
it does in central Simbu. In fact, permanent alliances were non­
existent in Chuave and temporary alliances occurred only between 
individual clans. Even clans belonging to the same tribe or proximate 
phratry were as likely to wage war against each other as ally 
themselves against other clans. Furthermore, all clans of a tribe 
assert common descent from an original founding unit. Traditionally, 
groups forced to flee from their territory could maintain their common 
identity by re-forming in a new location - as in the clans forming a 
phratry. But men also say that groups and individuals formerly sought 
refuge with maternal and affinal kinsmen. In some situations, 
therefore, amalgamation of groups at the level of the clan might have 
taken place. But, unlike the situation in Siane or central Simbu, no 
immigrant clans exist within Chuave tribes (cf. Brookfield and Brown
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1963: 88-89; Salisbury 1962: 13). Thus, although I often suspected 
that particular clans might have originated in other areas, people 
always linked these groups to others within the tribe by way of descent 
histories to the founding tribal unit.
Since pacification in the 1940s the coalescence of a tribal 
political identity has occurred. In the following chapter I detail 
the emergence of government leaders - the first big men who exerted 
their authority throughout the tribe. Here I note that today the tribe 
is an important political unit. People travel freely throughout their 
tribe’s territory - a pattern impossible in the past given the emnity 
between clans. Clans within the tribe combine to prepare and fence 
huge gardens (over 20 hectares in size). People of all the tribe's 
clans mourn the deaths of prominent men; they attend common church 
services; and they join together to celebrate modern holidays such as 
Independence Day. Although marriage ceremonies remain predominantly 
an affair between two corporate clans, a few men and women, often only 
the most distant of kin, from other clans within the tribe attend all 
weddings. As I show in chapter seven the shared identity of tribal 
members profoundly affects the nature and outcome of provincial 
government elections.
The village court area (Pidgin: eria) is a modern political 
unit. Eleven village court areas currently exist in Chuave with 
populations of between 1,300 and 3,000 people. Occasionally court 
areas correspond to tribal boundaries. Kebai and Kamara tribes, for 
example, each have a single court with tribal plaintiffs travelling 
twice weekly to one or two central locations and airing their 
grievances in front of magistrates selected from the various clans of 
the tribe.
OMore often, however, the eria cross-cuts tribal boundaries. 
Ei(gun) and Gomia Meri tribes, for example, originally united together 
in a single court area. Two court sites, joined by a bush path, 
existed - one in each of the tribe's territory. But the distance 
between these court locations proved too great, and conflicts arose 
between court officials from the two tribes who heard cases jointly. 
Within a year of implementation (in 1978) this court disbanded and 
reformed along new lines - totally without administration approval.
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Members of Ei tribe and two villages from Gomia Meri tribe joined the 
pre-existing Duma court. The remaining Gomia Meri clans formed a new 
eria in conjunction with Gomia Kinogu, Kibi and Kau tribesmen.
The creation of this new Duma eria is understandable given local 
conditions. A tertiary road built in the 1960s links Ei and the two 
Gomia villages to the centre of Duma territory. These non-Duma groups 
frequently travel along this road and have excellent relations with 
Duma members. Children from Ei and these Gomia villages have attended 
first mission and later government schools in Duma since the late 1950s. 
Ei and Gomia people living along the tertiary road frequently travel to 
Duma markets, and they attend a Lutheran church that ministers to the 
congregations of the entire area.
Thus, the concept of eria did not follow but preceded the imple­
mentation of village courts. In joining Duma court Ei was simply 
choosing to participate with groups with whom they had developed mutual 
interests over recent years. The development of eria, therefore, is 
the result of particular local conditions, and my example of the Duma- 
Ei eria is only one of many potential variations within the Chuave 
region.
Today village courts are central meeting places for people 
throughout the eria. Leaders and other interested parties meet at 
the court to gossip, to exchange information, and to discuss a range of 
political issues pertaining to questions of law and order or more 
generally, to the development of the eria. As such, the court serves 
as a 'consciousness raising' forum and enhances the corporateness of 
this new unit. Specifically, leaders (including some councillors) 
disenchanted with the Elimbari Local Government Council argue for the 
creation of eria or community governments similar to those imple­
mented in Kainantu in 1973 (Standish 1979a: 124-125). Prior to the 
implementation of village courts, people had previously assumed that 
each tribe might form committees responsible for governing its own 
affairs. Because village courts have succeeded in linking formerly 
unrelated groups, however, leaders now discuss the possibility of a 
local government based on existing village court erias. In 1979 and 
1980 several councillors succeeded in collecting tax money on an eria 
basis. They used this revenue for small eria projects (such as the
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purchase of coffee processors) rather than contributing it to larger 
projects that the council as a whole determined.
Villagers do no fully understand the concept of eria government 
as a potential administrative or political institution. Moreover, many 
people continue to reject the idea out of hand. This is not surprising 
given that people often confuse the term komuniti (community) with 
kumunis (communist) government and that missions have taught people 
communism is evil, 'Satan's work', and a portent of the Second Coming. 
But in 1981, leaders, spurred by the tax sharing scheme, began to see 
the full implications of this local level government and sought to 
explain it fully to villagers, frequently using the word eria instead 
of kumuniti. Thus, men often suggest that church leaders, 
entrepreneurs, councillors and magistrates could form a committee to 
govern the eria. In sura, the eria is an actual spatial grouping 
drawing together the clans of a single tribe or groups that were 
formerly unrelated. In addition the conception of the eria is an 
incipient movement which seeks to formalize and institutionalize an 
emerging identity at the local level.
Subtribe and ward
The Chuave subtribe is equivalent to those found in Siane
Q(Salisbury 1962: 13-14). It also has some similarities to small 
central Simbu phratries or subtribes as well as large exogamous clans 
(Brookfield and Brown 1963: 10-11, 92-93). Subtribe members belong 
to two or three clans, normally reside in adjacent villages, and 
believe they are related to a single founding ancestor. This group 
has no common name but the pairing or linking of clan names, as well 
as the phrase 'close people', denotes the group as a whole. Sub­
tribesmen often describe themselves as brothers. Thus men say 
Kaupagara, Tabiagam and Komodurumo clans are descended from three sons 
of a single ancestor, Kaupa. They refer to the subtribe as Kaupa-Tabia 
(gam) and, today also by the acronym KTK. These clans do not 
intermarry; rather members of all three groups select spouses from the 
six other clans in Duma or from other tribes.
Large tribes may contain more than one subtribe. In Duma, for 
instance, a second exogamous subtribe consisting of Komogara, Marime
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and Koigam clans exists. The remaining Duma clans, Gorugu, Suagu and 
Subagam, however, have only remote links to other clans and are 
themselves exogaraous units. Members of these independent clans, 
therefore, select spouses from eight Duma clans. While some subtribes 
have remained exogamous units, others have allowed intermarriage 
between the subtribe’s clans in the recent past (cf. Brown 1972: 36 
for a similar process between brother clans; Brookfield and Brown 1963: 
93 between the clan sections). Over a period of decades relaxation 
in the rule of exogamy, in combination with warfare, leads to the 
abandonment of co-operative activities and claims of brotherhood 
between clans of the same subtribe: I mentioned earlier Subagam clan
which, while related to Durumo in the past, today shares no common 
relationship to the KTK subtribe.
In Chuave, therefore, there are two distinct types of subtribes. 
One, the exogamous subtribe, resembles that found in Siane. The other 
comprises clans that share a history of common descent, collaborate 
in some corporate functions and may even be called ’brothers’ but allow 
intermarriage. This second type represents a transitional phase in 
transferring some of the functions of the subtribe to the clan.
Chuave subtribes differ from those Read (1952: 3) and Langness 
(1971: 298, 314-315) discovered in the eastern highlands. These 
sometimes act together in war or in ceremonies and yet share no common 
origins. Such alliances of proximate clans do not occur in Chuave. 
Clans have tried to establish such relations once in recent times but 
they used remote ancestral links as a rationale for the alliance.
The subtribe is both a ceremonial and political unit. Clans of 
a subtribe always co-ordinate their activities during the pig festival 
and they exchange special gifts of pork to emphasize subtribe 
solidarity. Traditionally, a single flute per subtribe, called ’the 
mother of birds', existed, and subtribe members performed special 
dances which affirmed their ties to each other.^ Similarly, the 
subtribe occasionally co-operated to plant large gardens and to 
organize massive food distributions, though particular clans could 
arrange 'first fruits' ceremonies.
Within the subtribe warfare was and is 'theoretically prohibited'
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(Salisbury 1956a: 641). People say subtribesmen should fight only with 
sticks - especially reserved for such occasions and stored in the men's 
house - and never with bows and arrows. In practice, as Salisbury has 
noted (1960: 256), people frequently broke this prohibition. In an 
unpublished paper (p. 18) Salisbury notes that members of the victim's 
subtribe had caused one-fourth of all deaths in battle which he 
recorded. Despite this prohibition, wars between clans of the same 
subtribe were exceedingly common in Chuave. Kaupagam clan, for 
example, had fought both Tabiagam and Komoduromo in the past. In one 
such war, resulting in at least six deaths, Komodurumo and Kaupagam 
men united to rout their Tabiagam 'brothers' forcing them to relocate 
at their present village site several kilometres away.
This difference between actual and ideal behaviour within the 
subtribe is glossed over in the literature - despite Salisbury's 
stipulation that the prohibition is 'theoretical'. Thus, Brown in a 
comparison of highlands cultures, lists the Siane subtribe (phratry) 
conflicts as restricted to internal 'feuding' (1971: 222-223), and 
Andrew Strathern (1969a: 45) misleadingly describes this Siane unit 
as a security circle. Such characterizations are understandable given 
the nature of warfare in other highlands cultures and, in particular, 
in the areas that these two authors have studied. For central Simbu, 
protracted fighting within the tribe was exceptional, and fighting 
within the clan (usually the exogamous unit) was confined to brief 
skirmishes (Brown 1964: 350, 353). In the Hagen area groups 'which 
remain a single exogamous unit do not apparently experience warfare 
between their constituent segments' (A. Strathern 1971: 22). In Chuave 
and Siane, however, a clan, whether itself an exogamous unit or part of 
a larger exogamous subtribe, is the war making unit - a point I discuss 
further below. Thus, in Chuave warfare occurs between clans who stand 
in either a putative affinal or agnatic relationship to each other.
The Chuave-Elimbari region includes 29 council wards. Each ward, 
with an average population of 750, elects a single councillor to 
Elimbari Council. Because the administration attempted to follow 
traditional lines when creating the council, the ward often corresponds 
to the subtribe.^ Where clans did not belong to a subtribe, the 
administration grouped two or three of these together on the basis of
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bo th population size and geographic proximity.
Each ward selects a single councillor. In the past ward members 
also elected komitis or councillors’ assistants. Today, a councillor 
chooses a komiti from unsuccessful candidates within his own clan and 
from others within the ward. In the next chapter I detail the 
councillor’s role, the limits of his authority and the council 
election process. Here it is necessary to note only that elections 
result in intense rivalry between the ward's clans which commonly vote 
as blocks for their own candidates. Komitis and councillors are 
often the greatest political opponents - particularly when they belong 
to different clans. In short, clans of a single ward often become bound 
in an antagonistic rather than a co-operative relationship with each 
other. This is true also for wards that correspond to subtribes.
Thus, the opposition between segments that arises around council 
affairs can undermine the cohesiveness of the subtribe. Rather than 
contributing to subtribe solidarity, therefore, the creation of wards 
has regularly led to the political fragmentation of this traditional 
unit.
Village and community
Before discussing the clan and its internal organization, I shall 
briefly outline the changes to settlement patterns that have occurred 
in Chuave.
Traditionally the clan was a spatially bounded unit coinciding 
with a single, continuous village Salisbury has described for Siane 
(1962: 12). A casuarina fence enclosed the village and stretched some 
600 metres along defensible ridges. A street of red clay ran the 
length of the village and was flanked by irregular rows of women's 
houses, small and oval shaped. Each house was surrounded by a fence 
providing a private space for the owner. People still announce 
themselves to the occupant before crossing the gates to these private 
yards.
In each village, two or three men's houses with their accompanying 
courtyards were the centre of ceremonial activity. In the past they 
were primary targets for night raids and were equipped with escape
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tunnels. During periods of hostility, walls (kamur kira) 10 to 15 
metres high barricaded the village's main entrance paths, and women 
and children confined their movements to gardens close to the village.
Taylor (PR 1933: 110) and later researchers remarked upon the 
differences between this Chuave-Siane settlement pattern and those to 
the west. In Sinasina Hide (1980: 209-211) has described settlements 
as 'clusters of hamlets' - distinctive groups of women's houses centred 
around a men's house. Such hamlets, which number about 45 people, were 
much smaller than Chuave villages. Hatanaka's (1972: 9, 13) inter­
pretation of traditional settlement is at odds with Hide's. She 
argues that the traditional settlement pattern in Sinasina was one of 
dispersed women's houses similar to that found in central Simbu (cf. 
Brown 1972: 29). It is clear though that both the Sinasina and central 
Simbu constructed separate ceremonial centres, whereas in Chuave the 
men's house was the centre of ceremonial activity.
The dispersed-nucleated dichotomy is in some ways imprecise.
Thus in both Chuave and Siane the hamlet pattern described by Hide for 
Sinasina was and is occasionally found. Men seem to have built hamlets 
for a variety of practical reasons. For example, when terrain was 
exceptionally rough or when garden locations were located at altitudes 
much lower than defensible sites, the village occasionally split into 
two or more hamlets. Members could then sleep in a particular hamlet 
when fencing or clearing gardens, and yet be assured of a safe refuge 
in case of attack.
Pig houses also remain scattered throughout the countryside and 
offer an alternative to village residence. As in Siane as much as 30 
per cent of the population may be absent from the village on any given 
night (Salisbury 1962: 12). Today, during coffee season this 
percentage increases as people sleep in their pig-coffee houses to 
harvest this crop. In every clan, furthermore, a small group of aged 
people (perhaps 5 per cent of the total population) prefer to reside 
permanently in their pig houses. These men and women remain totally 
peripheral to the clan's affairs and seldom contribute to ceremonies. 
In a few instances, they do not own houses within the village, and are 
in the village at irregular intervals of three months or more.
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Sett leraent patterns have changed greatly. Three phases in this 
process are distinguishable. First, beginning in the 1940s patrol 
officers established rest houses and encouraged villagers to relocate 
near these sites. Second, mission activity in the late 1940s and early 
1950s led to the splitting of several clan-villages in the Chuave area. 
Adherents of particular missions built separate men’s houses and 
accompanying women’s houses near the mission site. Within Duma, this 
sometimes meant a relocation of several kilometres. Other clan members 
often chose to stay in traditional locations near the clan's major 
garden sites. Today this process is reversed: new missions are
situated near principal settlements. Finally, a system of roads, 
constantly upgraded and expanded since the 1950s, has been built 
throughout the area. At major junctions in these roads villages - 
sometimes accommodating two or more clans - have developed.
The specific pattern of settlement created by the combination of 
these factors varies immensely in the Chuave area. In tribes that have 
territories distant from major missions or beyond existing roads, there 
are still traditional clan-villages. Some clans have managed to 
maintain distinct villages after relocation. But other villages 
incorporate two or three clans. In short, residence patterns vary 
enormously. Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of one such community,
Keu, where I lived. The diagram omits many of the women's houses but 
includes all men’s houses.
Keu community contains three villages and four clans centred on 
one road location. All these clans clashed in warfare in the past. 
Kaupagam clan and a single Koraodurumo men's house group reside in a 
single village. (Inhabitants describe the area as a single village 
despite a separation in elevation: Korowa is built 50 metres below
Aragor along the road.) A second Komodurumo men's house exists in 
another community centred on a Lutheran mission station one and a half 
kilometres east. Similarly, a single Subagam men's house group, 
Miumabnu, comprises one-half of Nudian village; additional men's houses 
of this clan are again located in Onama community. Two Komogam men's 
houses, Aidpost and Nudian, exist in separate but adjacent villages. 
When two clans share a single village, a fence divides the village into 
halves. In contrast, spatial markers never define the men's house 
groups of a single clan village.
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Today Keu community shares a common identity. Some men believe 
that a system providing for representation of clans that share a 
common location should replace the current system of selecting village 
court officials and councillors from particular clans. Interaction 
between the various clans of this community is intense. People from 
different clans meet on a daily basis to gossip, gamble or pool money 
for drinking parties. Community members are more likely to attend 
weddings and other ceremonies which take place at specific men’s 
houses, and, of course, members of the same villages (i.e. Subagam and 
Komogam members) sometimes intermarry. People of the community join 
together to attend church services and to sell produce at a single 
market.
Yet despite shared locality and increased social interaction, 
political cleavages within the community remain evident. Martin and 
Dege, for instance, were magistrates from Komodururao and Kaupagam 
clans. As the only two magistrates in this community they settled 
disputes within the entire area. But these men often stressed that 
they felt uncomfortable when venturing beyond their own clans because 
non-clansmen were apt to oppose their decisions. On many occasions 
these magistrates allowed a peace officer (from Nudian) or other 
leaders from different clans to settle court cases. In short, inter­
clan rivalry, similar to that which exists among members of a council 
ward, occurs within the community. I return in later chapters to the 
problems leaders face when they attempt to assert themselves in a clan 
other than their own. Having outlined one variant of the settlement 
patterns which exist in Chuave, I shall proceed to a discussion of the 
key political unit.
The clan
Chuave clans range in size from 80 to 488 persons with an average 
of 282 per clan. They are larger than those found among the Gahuku- 
Gama, which number about 100 (Read 1952: 3), and those in Siane which 
average 200 people.  ^ They are smaller than clans found in the west 
in Sinasina (Hatanaka 1972: 18; Hide 1980: 196) and in central Simbu. 
Brown, for example, states that clans average 600 to 700 people with a 
range of between 200 to 1,200 (1972: 36; 1960: 24).
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These numbers are deceptive, however, because unlike Brown I do
13not define the clan primarily on the basis of exogamy (ibid.)*
As previously noted, clans are occasionally linked to others within 
an exogamous subtribe. The Chuave clan is comparable in size with 
either the central Simbu clan, clan section or subclan (a unit linked 
to others to form an exogamous unit), and the Chuave exogamous subtribe 
is comparable to large exogamous clans found in central Simbu. Thus, 
if the Chuave figures were adjusted to include subtribes that remain 
exogamous units, the range in population for these groups would be 
increased to include units of over 900 people - a figure comparable 
to the upper limits for central Simbu clans.
It is possible, therefore, to discern a gradual increase in the 
size of exogamous groups moving west from the eastern highlands. Thus 
exogamous sections of Hagen tribes sometimes number as many as 3,049 
people (A. Strathern 1971: 20). Yet the range in size of these groups 
overlaps throughout this central highlands region. Just as the 
smallest of Chuave clans is comparable to those found among the Gahuka- 
Gama, the smallest of Hagen exogamous units (241 persons) is roughly 
equivalent in size to the average Chuave clan.
The Chuave clan is a named, patrilineal, virilocal group. Men 
often affix the suffix gam, meaning line or rope and sometimes 
translated as a derivative of gan or child, to the name of the found­
ing father of the group. No person, however, is capable of tracing an 
actual genealogical connection to this founding father. In this way 
Kaupagara denotes the line or children of Kaupa. Clan members may also 
refer to each other as 'one man' (towane ari). Within the clan all 
persons use kinship terms to address other members of the group, though 
today the use of personal names and nicknames predominates.
The clan consists of all adult males and their resident children 
of both sexes. Married women have close associations with both their 
father's and husband's clans. But when Chuave women are asked to 
identify their group they automatically respond by naming their 
husbands' clan. Moreover, Chuave men immediately give a new name to 
a woman who marries into their clan which they and their wives use in 
address instead of the woman's birth name. This practice is indicative 
of people's belief that a woman assumes a new identity at marriage and
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that her allegiance is to her husband’s group. Upon a man’s death any 
clan 'brother', but preferably the deceased's age-mate, is the choice 
for leviratic marriage.
Based on complete genealogical information for Kaupagam clan, only 
8 per cent of all adult males (over 18 years of age) were non-agnates. 
Because two clans may now share a common village site, exceptions to 
the rule of virilocal residence are undoubtedly greater than in the 
past. This figure is higher than Salisbury reported for Siane in 1952- 
1953 where only 2 per cent of the clan population were non-agnates but 
much lower than the central Simbu figure of 20 per cent non-agnates for 
the two equivalent units of subclan and clan in 1958-1960 (Salisbury 
1962: 14; Brown 1962: 61, 1964: 337). Brown draws a distinction 
between those non-agnates who are fully incorporated (10 per cent) and 
other 'visitors' or men of uncertain allegiance (10 per cent). As in 
Siane, residence within a particular Chuave clan leads to rapid 
incorporation of non-agnates and only 2 per cent of such men maintain 
any dual affiliation with, for example, the clan of their birth. Non­
agnates receive practically full rights to land and are expected to 
contribute to clan ceremonies.
As the main ceremonial and political unit, the Chuave clan is 
similar to Siane, Kuma and Hagen clans. In Chuave, although a person 
may belong to other, larger descent groups, he feels no enduring 
commitment to them, and the clan stands alone as a political unit. As 
a war-making unit, the clan in the past was responsible for avenging 
the death of any clan-mate. It combined also to build a war-magic 
house which was the centre of ritual activity seeking to ensure the 
clan's strength in battle by appealing to the clan's ancestors. In 
times of war all other clans were regarded as potential enemies and 
there was no anticipation of alliance with other groups. When such 
alliances emerged they were the result of circumstances particular to 
the hostilities and not the result of any jural commitment or principle 
linking the allies.
Alliance between clans occurs most often in opposition to clans 
outside the tribe. Men standing in an affinal relationship to 
particular enemies choose not to fight in any battle for fear of 
confronting close kinsmen (cf. Brown 1964). The participation of
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specific maternal or affinal kinsmen in the battles of other clans 
generates a more common alliance pattern. Thus, a man of clan A may 
choose to aid his kinsmen in clan B against an enemy clan C. If this 
man died, clan A would unite with clan B to avenge the death of their 
brother. In many battles the risk of escalation is great as kinsmen 
from several clans join in the skirmishes. Because marriages are 
dispersed, furthermore, it is possible for members of a clan peripheral 
to the main hostility to participate on different sides of the battle.
In extreme circumstances two subclans of a single clan may fight on 
opposing sides - though informants stressed that these units never 
directly confronted each other. In such cases compensation for aid 
or for ensuing deaths takes place between specific kin relations and 
is not a corporate payment between allied clans.
Moral and jural constructs also define clan boundaries. Men 
distinguish between crimes committed by their own or other clan 
members. For example, people abhor theft or adultery within the clan. 
Yet they tolerate these crimes when clan members commit them against 
other groups. Though fighting between clansmen is common there are 
strong prohibitions against aiding a clan brother in disputes which 
effectively prevent the escalation of minor quarrels into major 
confrontations that would threaten clan unity. In contrast, fights 
between men of different clans often involve large numbers as people 
join the dispute to aid their fellow clansmen. Today, of course, 
inter-clan fights sometimes result in the mobilization of clansmen from 
different communities: groups of men rush between communities when they
hear their clan mates have been physically assaulted.
Men say that traditionally the killing of a non-clansmen was a 
political act. Clan members protected the perpetrator of such 
homicides and, in so doing, risked their own lives when the deceased’s 
clan sought blood revenge. But people regarded the killing of a clan 
brother as a heinous crime; today they describe it by using the English 
word 'murder'. When such a death occurred clansmen would not touch the 
body and instead paid other clans to see to its burial. Clan 
fratricide was rare and there were no regularized means of punishing 
a murderer. Men say murderers commonly fled the village - sometimes 
accompanied by their closest agnates - to seek refuge in other groups. 
They also acknowledge that, when the murderer and victim belonged to
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different and major segmentary groups within the clan, full scale con­
frontation between these units led to clan fission. Intra-clan 
homicide, therefore, could result in the creation of new clans, that 
is, enemy groups. This idea is reflected in tribe and phratry myths 
where fratricide results in war between new political units containing 
the descendants of two aged brothers.
Today men do not explicitly distinguish between inter- and intra­
clan homicides; instead they argue that all men are brothers and that, 
ideally, murderers should be dealt with by the courts. But clan 
solidarity persists. Thus men dismissed the idea that intra-clan 
killings could ever lead to clan fission given modern conditions. But 
they readily agreed that blood revenge and full-scale war might arise 
after any inter-clan homicide.
The clan combined in the past to initiate male youths even though 
the actual initiation took place in one or more men's houses located 
in the clan. It also held specific rituals such as the parading of 
the flutes during the pig festival. Today, the clan as a whole still 
discusses and decides when to hold a pig feast. Individual men own 
garden plots but tracts of continuous clan land, dispersed throughout 
tribal territory, exist. Clansmen join together to clear, fence and 
plant these in preparation for pig feasts or 'first fruits' ceremonies 
sponsored by the clan.
There are no ceremonial occasions, however, when all members of 
the clan co-operate. People are free to contribute to particular 
ceremonies or to withhold their participation. What participation 
occurs, however, takes place along clan lines. At mortuary and marriage 
feasts, for example, clan members join together to enter a village, 
sing songs that refer to the clan and its relationsips with other 
groups, and sit together in the men's house square. Inter-clan 
prestations are corporate acts. Thus, although particular persons (for 
example, a man and his brother-in-law) actually exchange valuables, 
this exchange is mediated by representatives of two clans (see chapter 
four).
Traditionally there was no political office or position for the 
clan as a whole; rather rival big men competed for the allegiance of
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followers within the clan. However, exceptional big men sometimes 
emerged to act as spokesmen for the clan in its dealings with other 
groups. Today, councillors or village court officials, as elected 
representatives, often act as their clan's spokesmen. But as I show 
in chapter four the influence these leaders exercise in the distri­
bution of wealth varies greatly.
One idiom in particular describes the clan as a circumscribed, 
almost concrete entity. Clan members say they belong to a single men's 
house even though they may have several (cf. Salisbury 1962: 14). Men 
commonly characterize behaviour towards agnates in terms of the 
constituent parts of a men's house. This idiom relates to the two 
least inclusive descent segments: the lineage and the subclan.
Men's house groups
In order to understand the structure of lineages and subclans it 
is first necessary to outline the composition of men's house groups 
in Chuave. Men's house affiliation cross-cuts actual or perceived 
blood ties so that subclan and lineage lines become indistinct.
Because men's house residence creates bonds of friendship, it decreases 
a person's reliance on his close agnates and allows him to escape 
obligations to his lineage or subclan mates if he so chooses.
The actual men's house (yar igi) is large, oval shaped, on 
average 13 metres long (circumference 37 metres) and has usually two 
doors situated on the same side or at opposite ends of the structure. 
Its name derives from the plot of ground on which it is constructed. 
This site is the communal property of the men who occupy the house - 
unlike all other sites within the village which individual men own. 
When people say they 'belong to' or 'live at' Mamgram (house), they 
identify a particular location and the smallest group of individuals 
with whom they interact on a daily basis. The construction of the 
house mirrors the individual's place within this community setting. 
Each man who sleeps in the house is responsible for building his 
particular section of the walls and roof which is opposite to or 
borders on his bed location.
Conceptually, the men's house is a microcosm of the clan. Members
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of a single lineage may reside in different houses, but informants 
describe the lineage as one of the four structural posts of the house, 
and the two doors as the clan's subclans. Men say that when a non­
agnate first resides in the village, they give him a bed in between 
the house's four main posts. After he is accepted into the clan and 
participates in his sponsor's exchanges (that is, those of his wife's 
father or brother), he moves his bed toward his sponsor's subclan door 
and lineage post.
These statements, however, are only a conceptual charter; in 
practice, the pattern is subject to great variation. In some men's 
houses, there is a rough correlation between bed location and subclan 
and lineage membership. In others, no such pattern is discernible.
One leader, Martin, told me that he had asked the men of his house to 
rearrange their beds to destroy this arrangement: he believed that
divisions within the house led to ill-feelings among members.
Bed location sometimes corresponds to age and status. Old men 
often sleep in the centre of the house around the two fires just inside 
the doors so that 'their skins are not cold.' Young men likewise say 
that they cannot have 'soot on their skins' and sleep near the 
periphery of the house. Formerly, beds on either side of the two doors 
were reserved for big men or the 'first man' of a subclan (see chapter 
three) who were responsible for alerting others when night raids 
against the house occurred. Today many leaders are unaware of this 
custom, and men state that personal preference often distorts this 
pattern in particular situations.^  But informants always identify 
one or two men's house leaders and say they belong to the house of a 
particular leader.
Personal preference in men's house allegiance is also important. 
Young men frequently reside temporarily in several houses, sleeping 
one night or week in one house and moving on to another. This practice 
helps them choose a location where they will later settle. Men say 
that they live in a particular house because they own land nearby that 
can serve as a site for their wives' houses, because it is nearer to 
their gardens, because they like the other men of the house, because 
they followed a particular leader when the house was built, or because 
they wish to reside in a particular community. Sometimes disputes make
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co-residence impossible; a man may leave the men's house to avoid 
further confrontations. Affiliation to a men's house is not constant 
over time. In the past, men completely rebuilt villages at new 
locations and this created opportunities for re-alignments within the 
village. Only 23 per cent of all Kaupagam adult males have resided in 
the same house during their entire lives.^ But despite these 
shifts, some stability of residence exists. Only one of 100 resident 
Kaupagam men changed men's houses during the 22 months I was in the 
field. While men's house shifts are impossible to date accurately, few 
men above the age of 40 have relocated more than three times during 
their lifetimes. On average, periods of ten or more years of 
continuous residence in a single house seems to be an accurate estimate 
for the post-contact period.
Table 1 shows the correlation between lineage and subclan member­
ship and men's house affiliation for Kaupagam clan. The figures 
denote affiliation and not residence, because today men may reside in 
their wives' houses or sleep in the men's house at irregular periods.
Table 1: Kaupagam men's house affiliation
Men's house
Mamgram Aragor Korowa
Total adult 
males
Subclan one
lineage A 4 0
lineage B 0 1_
Subclan total 4 (28.6%) 1
Subclan two
lineage C 1 2
lineage D 3 1
lineage E 5 1
lineage F _5 _2_
Subclan total 14 (30.43%) 6
Subclan three
lineage G 3 0
lineage H 3 1
lineage I 4 8
lineage J _8 _ 0_
Subclan total 20 (50%) 9
3 7
6 J _
(7.1%) 9 ( (64 .3% ) 14 (100%)
4 7
11 15
4 10
_7_ 14
(13.04%) 26 (56.52%) 46 (99.99%)
2 5
4 10
2 14
_3 n _
(20.58%) 11 (29.5%) 40 (100%)
Men's house total 38 16 46 100
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Subclans are well distributed throughout the three men's houses. 
Lineages vary greatly to the extent to which they attach themselves 
to a single house. In lineage B only one of seven men resides in a 
separate house, and in lineage D four men out of eleven do. In 
contrast lineages E, F and H have one-half of their members affiliated 
with the same men's house.
A similar situation arises in individual families. Forty-three 
per cent of all men live in houses different from their fathers'. 
Salisbury saw little evidence of hostility between brothers in Siane, 
but relations between brothers are often strained in Chuave (1956b:
7, note 9). Sixty per cent of actual brothers lived in different 
men's houses.
The dispersal of lineage and subclan members in different men's 
houses is the result of individual choices and personal preferences.
But this is not how people explain it. Rather they say this dispersal 
is purposive: that some fathers actually encourage their sons to dwell
in a different house to themselves and that the movement of subclan 
members prevents the escalation of disputes by ensuring that subclans 
do not coincide with men's houses. I could not elicit any vernacular 
expression to describe this dispersal, but today men use the Pidgin 
miks miks (mixture). As a group strategy, however conscious or 
unconscious, the dispersal of close agnates is effective. I never 
witnessed a dispute or fight where men's house groups formally opposed 
each other. Quarrels between members of different subclans or men's 
houses result in people having to make particular choices: to align
themselves with the disputing parties on the basis of blood ties or to 
align themselves with relations forged by co-residence. Because 
either of these options would mean offending one litigant or another, 
men often chose a safer course. They do not choose sides; they remain 
neutral or act as mediators to the dispute. The dispersal of men 
throughout the clan, therefore, decreases the likelihood of escalation 
and aids in the quick resolution of disputes.
Chuave residence patterns differ markedly from those in Siane. 
Salisbury has described the opposition of men's house wards in disputes
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saying that when litigants are of different men's houses, these 
dispute as units (1962: 13). Little divergence between descent group 
and men's house affiliation occurs in Siane. Salisbury (personal 
communication 1981) states that only four or five instances of non- 
patrilineal men's house residence existed in 1953; informants explained 
these to him as exceptional cases. Intra-clan structure in Chuave and 
Siane are subsequently very different. For the Siane,
The relationship between all groupings are more 
concretely expressed in the spatial distribution 
of these groups. All descent groups are also 
residence groups, which means that lineages live 
next to one another in a common men's house area; 
men's houses cluster in a village; the constituent 
clans of an exogamous group are neighbours, and in 
this way set themselves off from other clans of the 
same tribe with whom they intermarry; yet the tribe 
as a whole is also a residence group. (1956b: 5)
At the level of the subtribe and tribe this statement is also 
true for Chuave - though I have noted that exceptions arise among clans 
of a subtribe following defeat in warfare. Within the clan no such 
spatial correlation between lineage and men's house exists in Chuave.
So strictly do Siane men adhere to this residence pattern that else­
where Salisbury has equated the men's house ward with a subclan (1964a: 
169). Chuave men's house groups also reside together in a local ward. 
But Chuave men's house groups and subclans constitute completely 
different units: the former is a residential group, the latter a
descent group.
Chuave men's house groups differ also from those found in central 
Simbu or Upper Simbu. There this unit is smaller and the house itself 
is a part-time residence serving men who ordinarily live in houses 
scattered throughout the surrounding area (Brown and Brookfield 1967: 
131; Criper 1967: 86-88). It is associated with a subclan or, if small, 
with a lineage.
'Half-doors' and subclan composition
The vernacular phrase koro guman koro koro, literally door-nose- 
half, best translates into English as door division, ° but the Pidgin
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term is hap dua (half-door). Men of the same subclan say they belong 
to the same hap dua and that a person of a different subclan belongs 
to 'another door'. References to doors to describe agnatic groups are 
common throughout Chuave and surrounding areas. Bragginton describes 
the Beha clan (Lufa census division, Eastern Highlands) as being 
divided into two doors but does not distinguish the further division 
of lineage-posts (1978:136-137). References to 'half-doors' also exist 
in the Salt-Nomane area and in Sinasina, but in this latter area the 
term does not seem to be used in as strict a sense as it is in Chuave 
(Hide personal communication 1981). Sinasina subclans are also named.
In Chuave some named subclans exist in Kamara, Kebai and Kau tribes, 
generally among clans with a population of over 350 people. These same 
tribes have a history of migration from the Sinasina area. Thus Chuave 
is a transitional area: to the east and south unnamed subclans exist,
to the west and throughout Sinasina and central Simbu (Brookfield and 
Brown 1963: 85) subclans are named.
The half-door idiom was not used in Siane during Salisbury's 
fieldwork (1952-1953) and Salisbury has explicitly stated that, 
although he attempted to elicit idiomatic expressions and to discover 
some sort of dualism in Siane clans, he found none (personal 
communication 1981). Today the Siane have adopted the Chuave idiom 
and use both the Pidgin hap dua and a new vernacular phrase kanu 
firinka farenka^ to refer to a mid-order group - one larger than 
the lineage and smaller than the clan.
I have no precise observational data for Siane groups at this 
level, nor did I collect genealogical information from Siane clans. 
Siane informants insisted only that the 'door' exists and that members 
of this group may reside in different men's houses, though they most 
often share the same house. Given the nature of residence patterns 
in Siane, therefore, I assume that first, the original merging of 
lineages into doors took place as the result of shared residence in 
a single men's house, and second, given the changes to villages 
throughout the Siane-Chuave region, residence within the Siane clan may 
be more irregular than in the past. It is also possible that member­
ship in the subclan is much more flexible in Siane than in Chuave. For 
Kaupagam clan, I know of no instances where men have changed their 
subclan affiliation. Informants say that this is simply impossible;
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membership, except in the case of non-agnates within the clan, is 
defined by birth.
Most Chuave clans have only two subclans, but very large clans 
of over 300 people occasionally contain three or four. In these 
exceptional clans people still speak of the clan as divided into 
halves; they simply group together subclans and refer to them as one 
of two doors. When inquiring about subclan leadership and gathering 
genealogical material, I discovered further divisions. Thus, Kaupagam 
men commonly identified only their own subclan mates and said all other 
clan members belonged to the opposite door. But they also identified 
three subclans by reference to outstanding leaders in each group. 
Subclans one, two and three (containing two, four and four lineages) 
listed in Table 1, were respectively associated with Kopon (a 
councillor), Dege (a village court magistrate), and Mama (ex-luluai). 
Men subsequently say they belong to Kopon's, Dege's or Mama's door.
More commonly two leaders, one per subclan, exist within the clan. 
Subclan leaders assume primary responsibility in exchanges and 
distributions involving their group and act as mediators in disputes 
between subclans. This person is often referred to as the 'first man' 
of the door (cf. Reay 1959: 114) and today such leaders assume many 
of the responsibilities once associated with the lineage head - a point 
I return to in the following chapter. Subclan leaders often reside 
in different men's houses from their rivals. Indeed recognized leaders 
of all types often choose to distance themselves from major rivals. 
Thus, Peter, a potential replacement for Mama as subclan leader, told 
me that he resided in Mamgrara rather than Korowa (Mama’s men's house) 
because he did not wish to appear to be attempting to force Mama's 
retirement by encroaching on men supposedly loyal to this aged leader.
The subclan is also the unit to which an incest prohibition 
applies. Men state that sexual intercourse between brothers and 
sisters of opposite doors sometimes occurs, but intercourse between 
unmarried young people of the same door is strictly forbidden; when 
such relationships become public they invariably lead to fighting and 
to large compensation payments (over K200 and several pigs). Although 
it is permissible for young people belonging to opposite doors to 
flirt, joke and be seen together at courting parties, those of the
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same door must avoid any such public behaviour. This prohibition 
contrasts to the situation in central Simbu where brown notes that 
people do not express concern about incest (1969: 81).
People describe quarrels between members of opposite doors as 
'cold' in contrast to those within the door which are 'hot'. When 
I described outbreaks of physical violence to men in the village, they 
often showed a lack of interest when the dispute involved men of the 
opposite door. When the men I was addressing belonged to the same 
subclan as the disputants, however, they immediately asked for details 
about the quarrel. Within the men's house itself, the division into 
halves may become spatially defined. Thus, although there is often 
only a loose correlation between bed location and subclan membership, 
men often retreat to one side or fire when discussions and disputes 
involving their opposite door arise. Sometimes this division becomes 
so formalized that it is as if an invisible barrier split the men's 
house in two. Men trying to act as mediators shout angrily across the 
men's house or walk to the centre of the house, admonish the litigants 
for disturbing the men's house as a whole, and return finally to their 
own subclan mates.
In joint action, men’s house affiliation often overrides subclan 
membership. As many as 20 men, for example, band together to construct 
women's houses within the village. Co-residents regularly comprise 
60 to 80 per cent of these work teams, with the remaining men belonging 
to the same subclan but to men's houses different from the man whom 
they are helping. Similarly co-residents often combine to fence garden 
plots, to maintain the upkeep of the men's house area, or to repair 
fences adjacent to the men's house.
At ceremonies however subclan membership predominates. Men say 
that at distributions, subclan members should sit together in the men's 
house or in the men's house square. In practice men seldom do this, 
but the subclan is the most important agnatic unit contributing to 
specific exchanges. All clan members may attend and contribute to any 
exchange a clan-mate sponsors, because men use modern valuables such 
as cash and beer in ceremonies, clan members are able to contribute 
small amounts to exchanges and thus affirm their ties to even the most 
distant of clan brothers. In chapter four I detail fully how men use
- 46-
wealth in ceremonial exchange. Here I note only that subclansmen raise 
the greater part of the payment. The gift of pigs, still a primary 
valuable in Chuave, forms the central component of any payment and is 
one indicator of the subclan's importance. Thus, of three marriage 
payments for which I have complete data, subclan members contributed 70 
per cent of all pigs given live or slaughtered. Lineage mates 
contributed a core payment of between 26 and 30 per cent of their 
subclan contribution. The remaining 30 per cent of the pay consisted 
of gifts from members of the opposite door or from kinsmen and affines 
outside the clan. Co-residence influences contributions, however. 
Members of the sponsor's men's house donated 42 to 63 per cent of pigs 
given at these marriages. Thus, members of a subclan who also share 
common residence form the core contribution of between 40 and 50 per 
cent.
This pattern of contribution is recent in origin. Men state that 
formerly, as in Siane (Salisbury 1962: 94), the lineage was the princi­
pal pooling unit for exchanges. Lineage mates gave contributions with 
no expectation of return. But with the inflation of exchanges after 
contact, the lineage soon found it impossible to raise the valuables 
needed in intra- and inter-clan prestations. Men state that today they 
do not expect any return on valuables given to subclansraen and some men 
argue that aid from clansmen should be 'free'. Informants are explicit 
about the burdens of large exchanges saying that before they gave to 
their lineage post, today they give to their door, and that if the 
inflation of exchanges continues, they will give to their clansmen 
without expectation of return.
The relationship between exchange and the definition of groups is 
important throughout Melanesia. In speaking of Hagen marriage 
prohibitions, Marilyn Strathern notes that when a specific category 
of kin is defined as ineligible for marriage this is less the result 
of a conceptualized category of kin than 'it is the existing 
obligations between specific kinsmen that Hageners see as a bar to 
marriage' (1972a: 77-78). This observation is also true for Chuave 
and helps to explain people's changing perceptions of groups within the 
clan.
Chuave and Siane informants agreed that marriage with a woman of a
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man's mother's door was prohibited, stating that they took 'food to 
the door' of a man's classificatory mother's brothers. I found no 
examples of marriages which violated this norm. Conversely, men ex­
press a preference (but never unsolicited) for marriage with a 
classificatory mother's brother's daughter, but specifically with a 
woman of a man's mother's opposite door. But such marriages are 
exceptional and constitute less that four per cent of all current 
marriages. A few men, however, argued that this was not always so, and 
that in both Siane and Chuave the operative unit had once been the 
lineage. The vast majority of men, however, told me that this was 
absolutely wrong and maintained that the subclan always regulated 
marriage. But Salisbury's assertion that, in 1952-1953, Siane men were 
prohibited from marrying into their mother's brother's lineage gives 
some validity to these exceptional statements (1956a: 646).^
Because the lineage has declined in importance as the principal 
pooling or sharing unit in exchanges between affinal kin, the Siane 
have redefined their marriage prohibition in terms of the new operative 
unit, the subclan. In Chuave this may also have occurred, yet it is 
possible that most informants are indeed correct in asserting that the 
subclan has always been the prohibited unit. It is clear, however, 
that changes in exchange patterns and reciprocity have resulted in a 
shift from lineage to subclan, and that this latter group is nowadays 
more important and formalized than in the past. In the next chapter 
I show how this process has had fundamental implications for leadership 
within the clan.
The posts: lineage composition
Lineage mates say they are 'one post' of the men's house or that 
they are 'one blood' (arginom towane). Whereas in central SImbu 
where this latter reference denotes many things, including locality and 
shared residence in a men's house (Brown 1972: 37), in Chuave this term 
pertains to small patrilineal groups believed to be closely related by 
blood. During disputes between men of the same subclan, I have seen 
men trace the veins on their arms to demonstrate their perception of 
the branches between one blood groups within the door.
Yet lineage composition is not well-defined, and even men of the
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same lineage cannot always agree on whether or not particular persons 
should be included or excluded from this group. Genealogies in Chuave, 
as elsewhere in the highlands, are shallow. A person may be able to 
recall at most the name of his grandfather's brothers and only the 
oldest men of the lineage are able to provide a genealogical 
rationale for the group as a whole (cf. Reay 1959: appendix; Salisbury 
1956b: 4).
As in central Simbu and Siane (Brown 1969: 81; Salisbury 1956b:
5), the Chuave lineage is associated with a pair of ancestral flutes, 
each with its own name and distinctive tune. In the past, initiation 
practices made it easier for men to identify their lineage mates. 
Initiates cradled in their arms the flutes of their particular lineage. 
As a result they henceforth called themselves members of the Bandi 
or Koiboiri (flute) lineage, and the ability to trace actual 
genealogical ties became unnecessary.
Today however, initiation of male youths no longer survives: it
ceased in the early 1950s, and men as old as 35 are regularly unable 
to name their lineage flutes. Most men, in fact, show little interest 
in lineage membership, and as I have noted, the lineage has lost much 
of its importance as a ceremonial unit. Based on genealogies and on 
flute identification by old men, the typical lineage in Chuave 
comprises six married men, their unmarried children, and two aged and 
widowed men.
The guardian of the flutes was the lineage's eldest male member.
He was addressed as aunam or 'my eldest brother' by all members of 
his age-group and called 'first father' (awo or nenam) by younger 
lineage mates. This man, whom I call the lineage head, assumed 
responsibilities similar to his Siane counterpart, the yarafo 
(Salisbury 1962: 21-22). In chapters three and four I discuss the 
succession to this position and the reasons for why the lineage head's 
authority has declined since contact. Here I note only that even prior 
to contact the aunam does not seem to have been as significant a 
political leader as the Siane yarafo. Several indicators support 
this statement.
First, unlike Siane where lineage property - flutes, lineage land,
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ritual knowledge, gerua (ancestor board) designs, and the right to 
make speeches — comprises an 'entailed estate' with the lineage head as 
trustee (ibid.:61), all Chuave men individually own property. The 
Chuave aunam acted as his lineage's representative in ritual, but he 
did not control gerua designs nor did he possess special ritual 
knowledge. Rather, specialists in various rituals, garden or war magic 
existed in each clan. Nor does the aunam make decisions to cultivate 
land or organize work on lineage land. In Chuave, individual owners of 
particular plots assume this responsibility.
With respect to land, the Chuave lineage head is a guardian. He 
is not necessarily the largest owner of lineage land, as in Siane, but 
he has some control over the alienation of land. Specifically, non­
agnates should always consult with the aunam before selling their 
land and although an agnate may independently decide to alienate his 
own garden plots, etiquette requires him to clear this transaction with 
the lineage head - and today with a subclan leader. Similarly when a 
man dies leaving sons or daughters who are not yet old enough to 
cultivate gardens, the aunam is often responsible for ensuring that 
others in the lineage do not use this land or that it is eventually 
returned to the deceased's offspring.
Today the lineage seldom acts as a unit. Lineage mates 
occasionally join together in fencing gardens or in constructing 
women's houses, but in both these situations co-residents who belong 
to different lineages may aid in the work. Lineage wives frequently 
join together to prepare communal meals for lineage members - often 
on Sundays or other Christian holidays. Here again, however, men and 
women who are not related may participate in these communal meals, and 
some lineage mates from other men's houses often fail to attend. These 
occasions then are subject to great variation, and ties of friendship 
often mean that participants from outside the lineage are present.
The extent to which a lineage head dominates distributions depends 
on both individual ambition and the relationship between the lineage 
and subclan leader. Thus, at weddings a lineage head may actively 
participate in the decisions regarding distribution of foodstuffs, 
beer, and cash. Conversely, he may allow the subclan leader to assume 
this responsibility. The two leaders sometimes act in tandem. Today
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the effective or operative lineage leader may be a young man. Where 
this man hopes to demonstrate his mastery of distribution to the sub­
clan or clan, he may attempt to isolate the subclan leader and prevent 
him from acting as representative in the exchange. Such occasions 
usually lead to complaints by those involved in the exchange. People 
admire co-operation between lineage heads and between a lineage head 
and major big men such as magistrates or subclan leaders.
Summary
In this chapter I have outlined the major forces - economic 
change, missionization and the introduction of administrative 
and legal institutions - that have transformed the nature of Chuave 
groups. Later in my thesis I fully discuss each of these factors in 
reference to changing patterns of leadership. The expansion and 
contraction of effective political groups did not begin with contact.
But the presence of the Australian administration resulted in a 
political environment of unprecedented stability; that is, an 
environment in which clans could live in close proximity without fear 
of major attacks from enemies.
It is now clear that the clan continues to be a conceptually 
bounded, agnatic group demarcated by political and jural norms which 
isolate it from other groups. Even where clan members live in 
different communities clan solidarity remains evident. As a corporate 
unit the clan now participates in ceremonies that were once the sole 
responsibility of smaller segmentary groups. And as I show in chapter 
four, it is the involvement of the clan in competitive exchanges that, 
in the absence of warfare, ensures its continued solidarity vis-a-vis 
other groups.
Yet ceremonial activity punctuates the calendric year only at 
irregular intervals. In the daily flow of events people now interact 
with others outside the clan. As is evident in the prohibition against 
warfare between 'close people' (the proximate clans forming a subtribe) 
Chuave people believe that shared locality requires them to limit and 
control tensions between groups so that major disruptions to the social 
order do not occur. With pacification, the creation of vehicular roads 
and subsequent modifications to village organization the clan as polity
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has declined in importance. Just as men's house residence encourages 
co-operation between members of different lineages and subclans, today 
shared locality in a single village, community or eria promotes 
peaceful co-existence between clans. Thus although men maintained that 
future wars between clans are possible - itself and indication of 
continued clan solidarity - they do not believe they are likely.
During the last 25 to 30 years in Duma there have been only four inter­
clan skirmishes - fought with bows and arrows - and no prolonged 
hostilities.
Despite continued rivalry between clans in ceremonial exchange 
and between big men of different groups, people now believe in 
representative institutions that incorporate these formerly autonomous 
groups. As important, established leaders regularly move between clans. 
Government officials mediate disputes between unrelated kinsmen and 
take an interest in the affairs of the ward, tribe or eria.
Subsequently, in the next chapter I consider the role of the first 
government leaders in Chuave and show how the introduction of these 
officials by the Australian administration radically transformed the 
nature of political authority and competition at the local level.
Howlet et al (1976:193) provides man-land ratios for Simbu 
province. The Daribi-Kararaui area has a population density of 
9 persons per square kilometre, significantly lower than 36 per 
square kilometre in Siane, 47 persons per square kilometre in 
Chuave and 132 persons per square kilometre in central Simbu 
(Waiye census division).
A 1939 patrol report (Downs CPR 1939-40) refers to a base camp 
at Chuave. A 1935 patrol report mentions two villages on the 
Maifutigar (now Mai) River but makes no reference to the name 
Chuave (Black PR B.16: 2). The origin of the word itself is 
unclear and I discovered no vernacular meaning for it. Rather, 
people say only that it is a place-name, but villagers living near 
the station were unable to point out any specific plot of ground 
or traditional site called Chuave.
Map 1 is adapted from Howlet et al (1976: vii). 1 composed Map 
2 with the aid of Gomia, Kamara and Duma informants. Tribal 
boundaries may shift slightly according to different informants 
and are still subject to formal adjudication between members of 
different clans or tribes.
Siane Local Government Council administers only Nambaiyufa census 
division. Siane speakers belonging to the Eastern Highlands 
province elect councillors to Watabung Local Government Council. 
Salisbury’s research was conducted among those Siane groups now 
belonging to Nambaiyufa census division. Nambaiyufa people stress 
they are Siane not Simbu, and say only that they 'belong to Simbu' 
(province).
I gathered this information during a single, three-day visit to 
the Nomane area in September 1980.
I use the terra 'descent group' in the most general sense of a 
group with an ascription of common descent from a real or mythical 
ancestor. For the Upper Simbu Valley, Criper argues that men do 
not employ any descent construct when referring to their main 
named groups. It sometimes seems possible to suggest resemblances 
in size or function between Chuave and Upper Simbu groups - for 
example, between the Chuave tribe and Upper Simbu 'district'.
But Criper's perspective makes such comparisons questionable; he 
is primarily concerned with 'quasi-groups' or temporary ego-based 
alliances of men that emerge in specific ceremonies or other 
social situations (see Criper 1967: 116, 291, 316-317). I 
therefore ignore the Upper Simbu material and focus on a Chuave- 
central-Simbu comparison.
Andrew Strathern gives a population range of 241 to 6,719 for 
Hagen tribes (1971: 21). Chuave tribes fall within this range 
but the average size is considerably smaller; 2,816 for Hagen 
(based on Strathern's table) as compared to 1,215 for Chuave.
The Village Courts Act makes no provision for the creation of 
specific court erias. In Chuave, Elimbari Council determined 
these. The history of these decisions and subsequent changes to 
court areas are too complex for me to fully detail them here.
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9. Salisbury (1962) calls this group a phratry. I have used 
'phratry' in a fashion similar to other authors, to describe the 
largest descent group in Chuave. To avoid confusion I have 
ignored Salisbury's term in my thesis and refer to subtribes when 
speaking about both the Chuave and Siane areas.
10. Salisbury has described these and other ritual aspects of the 
Siane pig festival which closely resemble those found in Chuave 
(1965: 66-69). Chuave men, like those in Siane, often attempted 
to synchronize rites of passage with the pig feast. Traditionally 
however, the Chuave pig festival cycle seems to have been more 
variable than the Siane; men held pig feasts at intervals of 
between three and seven years.
11. Brookfield and Brown state that councillors are usually leaders 
of clan sections and that komiti are subclan leaders (1963: 12). 
This is another indicator that the Chuave and Siane subtribe can 
be correlated with the central Simbu clan section. This 
comparison is questionable, however, because the Australian 
administrative appointment of leaders and the creation of council 
ward boundaries is notoriously variable in linking together groups 
that villagers may not perceive as related.
12. I have taken the Chuave numbers from the 1979 census. Although 
the figures may be inaccurate, I am familiar with all of the 
administrative units listed and they correspond to groups I call 
clans. Using these same census figures for Siane, I obtained an 
average clan size of 195, a figure remarkably close to Salisbury's 
estimate (1962: 14). Siane clans range from 66 to 344 people per 
clan. In both average and range of size, therefore, Siane clans 
are smaller than those in Chuave.
13. Ratanaka (1972: 13-21) and Ride (1980: 50-53) provide only brief 
outlines of social groups and, although there appear to be 
differences between Sinasina and central Simbu, the authors do 
not elaborate on these and their terminology follows Brown's.
14. After hearing of this association between political status and 
bed location, one subclan leader promptly shifted his bed to 
correspond to the traditional pattern, saying he would follow the 
customs of his ancestors.
15. Because further residence changes may occur, I offer this figure 
only as an illustration. There is no significant change to the 
percentage, however, when specific age categories form the 
sample.
16. The word guman has several idiomatic meanings but men literally 
translate it as 'nose'. Here, however, it clearly denotes 
division. Similarly, kon guman borongwa means a fork in a path 
or road, and the phrase non kion gumanon boro bebnie describes 
the breaking of a pig's jaw into two halves during a wedding 
ceremony (the bride and groom then exchange the halves).
- 54-
17. The Siane kanu means door or path, and firinka is a boundary 
mark. Salisbury notes that the phrase kanu firinka farenka 
would translate as 'from the door on this side to the door on 
that side* and does not believe it could refer to ’halves’ as is 
the case with the Chuave phrase (personal communication 1980, 
1981).
18. The central Simbu data are also relevant here. Brown notes that 
marriage prohibitions are difficult to define and that they may 
shift occasionally. She states the prohibition as involving a 
man's mother's subclan section or one blood group. Later she adds 
that sometimes the prohibition applies to the mother's entire 
subclan. Unlike Chuave, however, people regularly violate this 
second prohibition (Brown 1969: 81-82).
Chapter Three
DESPOTISM AND DEMOCRACY
In this chapter I reconstruct traditional leadership patterns, 
and using this baseline, I examine a few aspects of local level 
political change over a 50 year period, specifically the nature of 
political competition and the degree of power wielded by leaders during 
several post-contact periods. At issue is how the colonial 
administration transformed leadership patterns by introducing 
government officials and later local government councils (Brown 1963; 
Salisbury 1964b; Reay 1964; A. Strathern 1966). I also consider a 
related issue often ignored in the literature: the effect of
missionization on local politics.
Pre-contact politics: a reconstruction
Traditionally, a big man's power base lay within his clan.
Leaders could enhance their status or reputation in other clans, but 
a renowned man could not command men outside his natal group. Both 
fear of sorcery attacks and potential physical assault by enemies 
curtailed a leader's interaction with other clans. Pig festivals or 
large food distributions, the two occasions when several clans co­
operated, allowed group representatives who were flamboyant orators and 
wealthy men to 'lift up their names' in other clans. All other 
exchanges were small in scale, being attended by members of a single 
lineage and perhaps one or two leaders from other lineages or 
subclans.
In one respect big men were influential in inter-group affairs.
By acting as neutral third parties they encouraged cessation of warfare 
or minor hostilities and acted as mediators during compensation 
payments. The effectiveness of a leader on such occasions rested on 
the extent to which a man's reputation was valued in other clans, and 
whether he was perceived to be unbiased in his decisions. Moreover, 
his influence resulted from people's perception of his group's 
strength. Leaders could threaten to involve their own groups in the 
confrontation, thereby upsetting the balance of power. The leader's 
reputation as well as the corporate strength of his clan, therefore, 
were important factors in the settlement.^- In the absence of these 
conditions any leader's attempt to enforce decisions on members of
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other groups was doomed to failure simply because 'outside men' were 
not authorized leaders.
In discussing traditional Madang politics Morauta notes that some
communities might have several big men while others have none at all
2- though this is not to say they were leaderless (1974: 21-22).
People in Chuave also stressed that political competition varied in 
different clan-villages. Characterizations of political competition, 
however, are difficult to make. Three generalizations, still 
applicable today, seem justified. First, big men could be associated 
with particular men's houses and still act as leaders of subclans and 
lineages. Second, where men of equal power existed they reached tacit 
or explicit agreements concerning their respective domains. Thus, 
rivals resided in different men's houses and, in exchanges, dominated 
only those distributions involving their own social groups. Third, 
young men first achieved recognition within their own lineage and 
men's house group and only later became authorized leaders of subclans 
or extended their authority to other men's houses.
This is not to suggest that political followings correspond to 
the segmentary structure of the clan; membership in particular units 
determines only the position of spokesman. Within the clan a man 
competes with other leaders for the allegiance of followers - first 
within his own men's house group and then more generally throughout 
the village. In the past skill or bravery in warfare, physical 
strength, ritual expertise in garden and pig magic all enhanced a man's 
reputation but were not sufficient by themselves to build a wide 
following. Rather, the defining characteristics of a big man were and 
are oratorical skill, expertise as a distributor or manager of group 
valuables, and an ability to mediate disputes.
The relative importance of particular skills varies through time. 
In order to distribute valuables and to challenge the authority of an 
existing leader, a young man must contribute a large amount of his 
own personal wealth in given exchanges or sponsor his own ceremonies 
(see chapter four). Once a big man has demonstrated his ability to 
provide a fair distribution of valuables and to act as group spokesman, 
however, he needs only to expend a minimum of his wealth and may even 
act in this capacity when he has not contributed to particular
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exchanges. In the past young men also built reputations as fierce 
warriors. But an established big man's life, men say, was too 
important to be risked and a big man rarely, if ever, participated in 
battle (cf. Bergmann 1971: 194; A. Strathern 1971: 75).
For central Simbu Brown stresses the 'emergent' big man, a leader 
who achieves his position through personal ambition (de Lepervanche 
1973: 3). She argues that there were no 'hereditary positions' and 
few 'hereditary advantages' - a position she has recently reasserted 
despite Standish's evidence that the Simbu frequently state that 'in 
principle' leadership passed from father to son (Brown 1963: 5, 1979: 
103; Standish 1978: 15). Salisbury has also explicitly denied 
hereditary leadership in Siane though he describes a method of 
succession for the lineage head (1962: 22).
In Chuave a generalized ideology of hereditary leadership and a 
specific method of succession within the lineage endowed certain 
individuals with advantages most of their peers did not have and so 
enabled a few men an easier pathway to power. Burling states that in 
any hereditary system resulting in the acquisition of real power there 
are always ways of evading rules of hereditary accession (1974: 163).
I would reverse this statement for Chuave. Achieved criteria are the 
basis for initial recruitment, but when ambitious men emerge appeals 
to hereditary rules further bolster their status and power, and 
disadvantage their competitors. Furthermore, where no hereditary 
advantage exists, or conversely where people regard the advantaged few 
as inadequate leaders, men adjust beliefs about ascribed status to 
accommodate or rationalize post facto the status of the emergent big 
man. This contradiction is real: in Chuave an ideology of hereditary
leadership exists, but the nature of succession is such that achieved 
and not ascribed traits predominate in the selection of leaders.
Brown (1979) correctly asserts that, because promising leaders 
may have died in warfare or because sons may claim that their fathers 
were big men when in fact they were not major leaders, it is difficult 
to accurately test succession to big man status. Yet there is a 
growing body of evidence which stresses the importance of ascribed 
status in the selection of Melanesian leaders. Chowning (1979) and 
Hau'ofa (1981: 291) document many coastal and island examples of
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leadership patterns that stress both ascribed and achieved 
characteristics. While acknowledging the importance of competition 
and personal ambition in Tauade, Hallpike has gone so far as to label 
leaders chiefs, thus emphasizing the crucial importance of hereditary 
ideology (1977: 138-143). For Hagen, Andrew Strathern notes that sons 
'emulate* their fathers, and that major big men favour the idea that 
their sons should replace them as leaders. Major big men are three 
times as likely to have fathers who were leaders rather than ordinary 
men. Yet minor big men in Hagen have no more than a fifty-fifty chance 
of being a leader's son. But Strathern believes achieved, not ascribed 
status is most important. He states that no hereditary rules exist 
and describes Hagen society as a meritocracy in which any advantage 
a son has stems from his aspirations to achieve a status similar to 
his father's and, perhaps, the 'head start' which a big man can give 
to his son, through using wealth or by ensuring that his son marries 
early in his political career (1971: 208-212).
In contrast the Kuraa do have a recognized hereditary rule. When 
the authorized leader of a sub-subclan (equivalent to the Chuave and 
Siane lineage) dies, his eldest son replaces him as leader (Reay 1959: 
114). When a son was unable to replace his father because of 
immaturity, lack of interest or for other reasons, the position passed 
to the leader's younger brother or to less closely related kinsmen 
within the sub-subclan (Reay 1981: personal communication). Sixty-four 
per cent of leaders in the 1950s had succeeded their fathers to this 
position (op cit).
For Duma I first attempted to establish the names of pre-contact 
leaders whose reputations as leaders were unquestionable. People 
remembered only four such leaders belonging to four Duma clans. Only 
one of these had a son and grandson who were also major leaders. 
Ambitious Chuave men, like those in Hagen, do not invariably claim 
their fathers were big men. But because current leaders or ambitious 
men may claim such status for their fathers, I decided to survey 
current leaders who had held government office - a status that I could 
check with other men throughout the area. Eleven of 52 village court 
magistrates (21.15 per cent) and 11 of 29 councillors (37.9 per cent) 
had fathers who had also served as government officials - the majority 
as either luluais or tultuls. Overall, therefore, 27 per cent of
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men currently serving in some government capacity had fathers who had 
also been government leaders.
To acknowledge, as Brown does, that a test of succession is 
difficult because current leaders may rationalize post facto their 
fathers’ status itself indicates that informants perceive heredity 
to be important. The following explanation by a Duma leader, age 34, 
illustrates the mixture of ascribed and achieved qualities preferred 
as the ideal type of Chuave leader.
We know a leader's way and look at his child. When 
a big man has a male child first that boy can be a 
leader. If four or five big men have children who 
are age-mates, one will be first [in seniority].
Will he be a leader? We don’t know. A leader is a 
man who is clever, who speaks well and who 'steers' 
men's work. Is the first man a 'true' leader or a 
'nothing' leader? We don't know - that is up to him. 
But in the lineage the first man is always the leader.
Men have different opinions about the importance of hereditary status. 
Some men argue that the sons of lineage heads and major leaders 
automatically become big men. But the general consensus is that men 
watch closely the sons of leaders for indications of leadership skills. 
This is the difference between 'nothing' leaders, men who may speak 
in public or are respected because of their fathers' status, and 'true' 
leaders who gain power and authority to act on behalf of the group.
While a man gives small allotments of his land to kinsmen sharing 
a common men's house, he gives most of his land and other wealth to 
his sons often well before his death. After marriage the eldest son 
often controls large amounts of land which he may temporarily allocate 
to gain a political following. Only later, when his younger brothers 
reach marriageable age, is it necessary to further sub-divide his land 
according to his father's wishes. Therefore, the sons of wealthy 
leaders or men owning larger than average tracts of land accrue some 
early economic advantage. But people also believe that a son inherits 
both the physical and personality traits of his father or grand- 
father. Indigenous conceptions of biological and social inheritance 
are not well-defined, and unlike the Tauade for instance, Chuave people 
have no native theory of a 'creative force' or power as the basis for 
their hereditary ideology. Men stress that a son's behaviour tends
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to replicate his father's. Humour, anger, good judgement, diligence, 
and personal strength are a few such characteristics. Men also 
recognize that a big man encourages and even trains his son to follow 
in his footsteps. But unlike Hageners who also say sons emulate their 
fathers, in Chuave a man gains some advantage simply by his birth.
Within two men's house groups in Keu, for example, many men bemoaned 
the fact that their current big men were childless - even though both 
had adopted sons - and encouraged these leaders to divorce their 
'barren' wives so as to produce male children who could carry the name 
of the clan. The reputation of the group is thus an important 
consideration in the choice of a leader; the son of a prominent big 
man more easily enhances the group's name by appealing to his father's 
former status and exemplary actions.
The quotation above also acknowledges a distinction between age- 
mates (enambai) and other clan brothers. In the past, as few as five 
or as many as 15 youths were initiated simultaneously and travelled 
together to other clans for courting parties. As in Siane, age-mates 
are the preferred choice for leviratic inheritance of widows (Salisbury 
1962: 16). Age-mates play together as children and youths, often 
forming life-long friendships. True age-mates, men whose births are 
close together (within approximately a one year period), share a 
special relationship. They often act as guardians to each other's 
children or name children after their enambai, thereby creating 'one- 
name' relationships which their children may call upon for aid in 
exchange. Age-mates are in many ways socially identical (Salisbury 
1962: 16) and in Chuave food prohibitions affirmed the intensity of 
these relationships. Men could not eat the meat of pigs or game killed 
by age-mates, nor accept food from an age-mate's wife.^ Today, 
however, age-mates do not always follow these prohibitions.
Within this subset of classificatory brothers, the first born has 
a special status. He is the 'first man' and should act as leader and 
guardian to his peers. Men say particular first born children 
demonstrate leadership qualities in children's play activities and 
suggest that they will continue as leaders throughout their lives.
Rival big men who are approximately the same age may all produce sons 
therefore, but one is inevitably born first and may use the terra 'first 
man' to legitimize his political aspirations. Ideally, the eldest of
- 61 -
an age-mate group marries and has a male child before his peers. Thus, 
when this individual becomes a big man later in his life, his child 
is the natural successor, not only because he is the son of a big man, 
but also because he is ’the first man'.
Men often adjust generational boundaries to accommodate men who 
have demonstrated leadership abilities. When I asked men who would 
replace Mama, a former government official, as leader of his subclan, 
they named four minor big men whose ages ranged from mid-thirties to 
late forties. Three of these men claimed to be the eldest of their 
age-grades. They paid no attention to the set of men who had been 
initiated together; rather, each man simply defined the boundary of 
his age-group downward from his own birth and ignored all older men. 
Subsequently, the onus is on followers to determine who becomes the 
subclan leader and who becomes the 'first man' by deciding which claims 
to first born status are legitimate and which may be ignored. Big men 
are not always the 'first men' of respective subclans, and it cannot 
be said that proven leaders acquire this title post facto. Rather, 
there is an occasional adjustment to the alignment of generations to 
accommodate capable leaders. When a big man has some legitimate claim 
as the eldest of his generation, this is unnecessary. But the fact 
remains that just as men have an advantage because they are 'first', 
so too - at least in some instances - men become 'first' men because 
they have proven themselves as big men.
Variations in this belief in both Kuma and Siane help explain 
succession at the lineage level. As I have noted, Kuma succession 
for the sub-subclan's 'first man' is from father to eldest son. In 
Kuma, as in Siane and Chuave a man has many 'fathers' - all subclan 
members - but commonly only men of the same sub-subclan, who are born 
about the same time as a man's father, may be addressed by this kin 
term. An actual brother or patrilateral parallel cousin who may be 
a secondary leader is technically next in succession to the authorized 
leader if the leader's son is too young. When such secondary leaders 
are the most senior of a line other than that of the leader, they are 
disqualified as 'first' because they were too young when the previous 
leader died or retired. Alternatively, the secondary leader 'is the 
most senior of a line junior to that of a leader who has no sons' (Reay 
1959: 114) .
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In Siane the lineage head is yarafo, eldest brother, to his own 
generation and 'first father' to children in the lineage. Succession 
to the yarafo's position passes from first father to next eldest 
brother of the same generation. This new eldest brother then becomes 
yarafo to his own generation and first father to all children in the 
lineage. When all members of the parental generation have died or 
retired, the yarafo of the next generation becomes lineage head. 
Salisbury states that the 'dividing point between generations is 
arranged so that the yarafo of the rising generation is a capable 
person and anyone younger than him is his younger brother' (1962: 22).
Chuave and Siane kin terms are equivalent. In Chuave, within the 
lineage the aunam, eldest brother, replaces the nenam, first father 
Although a man may call any older male of his own generation 'eldest 
brother' the term is generally restricted to lineage members. People 
thus equate succession to the positions of 'first man' and 'first 
father'; the latter is a more specific form of the former. The first 
father is a leader to younger members of his generation within the 
lineage, occasionally acts as the guardian of lineage land, and 
oversees lineage distributions. Today, because of inflation in 
ceremonial exchange, subclan leaders commonly assume these responsi­
bilities and override the authority of particular lineage heads (see 
chapter four).
The major difference between modes of succession in Siane and 
Chuave is that Chuave people believe the shift from first father to 
next eldest of his generation is a temporary one. Because, as in Kuma, 
the lineage head's son may not be of an age to act as leader, the 
headship must pass to the eldest member of the older generation. When 
the lineage head's son comes of age, he replaces any younger members 
of the aunam's generation who retire, provided he is a capable man.
The division between generations is adjusted to accommodate his new 
status. Because the lineage has declined in significance as a social 
group, only old men could accurately assess the former importance of 
the aunam or describe succession to the lineage headship. Younger 
men stressed that father-son succession and age-grading were important 
in the subclan or more generally, throughout the clan.
I have described succession in ideal form in order to show that
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a combination of ascribed and achieved status is important in these 
three societies. In each, I would argue, relationships between men 
of a single generation, especially between age-mates, and the notion 
of hereditary father-son succession are important. But in reality 
particular conditions and political competition distort systems of 
succession. A lineage leader, for example, may not have a son and so a 
secondary leader replaces him. Conversely a man may delay his 
retirement in order that his own son, and not the son of a previous 
leader, is given the time to demonstrate his leadership capabilities. 
Within the lineage and subclan it is followers who must determine which 
of several possible competing claims to authority are legitimate. In 
the absence of elections the test of leadership was in the actual 
exercise of authority. People either heeded the aspirant to 
leadership or ignored his claims to succession. Today, leader and 
follower alike signal the importance of both ascribed and achieved 
status when they give or withhold their support, or when they attempt 
to manipulate the system to fulfill their own or another's political 
ambitions.
The case for despotism
One central and still unresolved issue in highlands ethnography 
concerns the degree of power that pre- and early post-contact leaders 
possessed. Brown argues that the introduction of government officials 
and institutions by the Australian administration resulted in leaders 
whose power was unprecedented by traditional standards (1963). 
Salisbury has contested this by arguing that 'although the indigenous 
ideology was one of democratic equality and competition, the empirical 
situation at this time [pre-contact] was one of serial despotism by 
powerful leaders' (1964b: 215). Salisbury demonstrates how a number 
of factors - including economic changes as well as the existence of 
administration sanctions - enhanced the power and sphere of influence 
of some post-contact leaders. He concludes that anthropologists have 
ignored these powerful leaders ('directors') in pre- and post-contact 
society because they are outnumbered by lesser big men (’executives'), 
whose behaviour regularly accords with the prevailing political 
ideology of egalitarianism and competition.
Andrew Strathern notes that Salisbury fails to provide an
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explanation of how men become directors or how they control managers 
(1966: 356). Salisbury maintains only that directors do not arise 
through the 'system', that is, 'by standard procedures for promotion 
and decision making', and suggests that political patronage may be one 
important factor in the rise of these men. His sole example of this 
latter variable is a post-contact one (1964b: 236-239).
I believe that one way real big men succeeded in maintaining power 
and authority for long periods was by combining the ascribed and 
achieved characteristics I have outlined above. But unlike Salisbury,
I do not believe that pre-contact leaders regularly became despotic or 
autonomous leaders. Moreover, flaws in Salisbury's argument suggest 
that extremely powerful highlands leaders could only have emerged under 
post-contact conditions. Briefly, I re-examine the evidence for 
traditional despotism.
Watson (1971) wrote his account of the Tairora despot, Matoto, 
on the basis of people's statements 39 years after contact. This 
leader's reputation was certainly enhanced over the intervening 
decades, but Watson clearly distinguishes between the legendary and 
historical figure. Matoto was both a peacemaker and wealthy man who 
controlled the entire resources of his local community. Watson argues 
that the economic benefits Matoto's followers enjoyed were less 
important than Matoto's personal strength and his reputation as a 
fierce, feared warrior. His 'unbridled sexuality' possibly added to 
the aura of strength, for Matoto, unlike other men, was immune to the 
contaminating influence of women and flagrantly violated the sexual 
mores of his community. Matoto's control over economic resources, 
Watson believes, was more the result than the cause of his despotic 
rule. Nonetheless, if Matoto's aggression helped launch his career, 
he further consolidated his power later in life by controlling economic 
resources.
This despot allegedly killed many men in both his own and enemy 
groups. Yet Watson provides only two examples of 'inside' killings.
One was Matoto's wife, and, as Watson acknowledges, this was by no 
means an exceptional occurrence in the highlands. The second victim 
was probably Matoto's affine who was residing in Matoto's territory.
The stimulus for the killing, furthermore, came from the victim's natal
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group. Matoto received payment for this death, and I would argue that 
it resembled a 'contract* killing similar to Matoto's mercenary acts 
against enemy groups. Watson notes that the man was a non-agnate yet 
fails to provide any further examples of killing within the local group 
- Matoto's major political arena of about 200 people. I believe that 
any such action would have seriously endangered Matoto's authority and 
must have been rare indeed.
Matoto's personal network of supporters and his political 
influence, however, spread beyond his local group. The despot could 
walk freely over great distances through five different territories, 
and Watson estimates that 2,000 to 2,500 individuals may sometimes have 
'fought or thought of themselves as a part of Matoto's enterprises' at 
some time during his career (ibid.: 253). Yet Matoto's 'reign' 
introduced no specific political or military innovations (ibid.:
263). Loyalty and allegiance to Matoto varied over time. Inter-group 
hostility persisted throughout his career and must have occasionally 
disrupted Matoto's influence beyond his own group. Matoto's death 
itself demonstrates that no permanent transformation of the political 
arena occurred: traditional enemies ambushed him while he was in
foreign territory.
Whatever the limits of this despot's influence, he clearly 
commanded immense power within his own group. Watson believes that 
such leaders demonstrate the conflict between people's expectations of 
a big man's behaviour and the military or political needs of their 
group. Matoto, in fact, began his career shortly after his group 
returned from exile. Through his strength and skill in battle, he 
provided security for his kinsmen and enhanced the reputation of the 
local group in the eyes of communities throughout the Tairora area. In 
return for these accomplishments, Matoto's supporters paid the high 
price of their leader's arbitrary and despotic rule (ibid.: 274).
The account of Matoto, written after Salisbury's 1964 argument, 
is the one classic case of a traditional highlands despot. Salisbury 
draws on Schafer's description of the Simbu leader Kavagl as a primary 
example of despotism. This leader, whose career spanned the years 
preceding and following the arrival of whites, was, like Matoto, a 
fierce warrior and an angry, strong man. He too, was abnormal in his
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sexual behaviour by community standards. Kavagl openly associated with 
women and preferred to sleep in his wives’ houses rather than the men's 
house - a preference which people joked about (Schafer 1975 [1938]:
194). Unlike Matoto, Kavagl's power was not so great that he could 
command the labour of other men. Schäfer notes that while Kavagl may 
have had three wives at one point and owned 17 pigs, he was not as 
wealthy as other men, and did not want more wives because he would have 
had to make too many gardens (ibid.). Kavagl was a powerful orator, 
but Schäfer did not believe he was a 'tyrant' because 'he discusses 
with his colleagues but regards himself as the man who knows everything 
best' (ibid.: 92). Salisbury, however, regards Kavagl as a despot 
because of his reliance on personal strength and aggression.
Kavagl was a warrior par excellancey a quick-tempered man who 
killed two wives in fits of anger and who was feared by his kinsmen. 
Although Kavagl killed many enemies prior to contact, Salisbury states 
that Kavagl 'attacked with a club any of his supporters who opposed 
him, or had a pig or shells he coveted, and had killed many of them' 
(1964b: 227). While Kavagl did indeed attack men with fence posts - 
even today a common method of fighting within the clan - Schafer 
describes no such assault by Kavagl on 'supporters'. Rather, with the 
exception of Kavagl’s murder of two wives, all his killings occurred 
in warfare or against members of named groups other than the Korugu, 
Kavagl's natal unit. Chuave leaders sometimes executed women who were 
believed to be witches (see chapter five). But as I noted in the 
previous chapter, the murder of a clan brother is a heinous crime, 
and - with one exception I discuss later - I could not discover any
Linstance where a big man murdered a clan brother. Furthermore, by 
characterizing Kavagl as a 'highwayman', Schafer seems to imply that 
the theft or seizure of valuables was from men outside Kavagl's own 
group. Schafer's account is unclear on this point, but it can be 
safely said that Kavagl directed most of his violence against men 
outside his own political unit.
Kavagl's pre-contact rule ended when he and his group were routed 
in warfare. They sought refuge with affines north of the Bismark 
Mountains, and in this foreign territory Kavagl 'grew quiet'; only upon 
returning to his own territory did Kavagl reassume his dominance of 
a large following. But I would argue that during his post-contact rule
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Kavagl's power owed much to his affiliation with Schafer's mission.
Here I note only that under pre-contact conditions Kavagl's followers 
may have paid the ultimate penalty for their leader's aggression 
against other groups: defeat and presumably loss of life in warfare.
When Kavagl said he wished to murder a Nauru man he believed to 
have caused his wife's death, Schafer threatened to call upon the 
kiap to have him jailed and hanged. To this Kavagl replied, 'That 
does not matter, I will first have my revenge, and if in the process I 
lose my life, even that does not matter, since I have a grown up son 
who can represent me'(1975: 92). As Standish notes, Kavagl's son later 
became luluai and a member of the Simbu Interim Provincial Government 
(1978: 21, note 1).
In Chuave people speak of only two men as truly despotic pre­
contact leaders: Wahgi of Duma tribe and Amoi of Gai tribe. Many men
had reputations as fierce warriors who killed 'hundreds' of men, but 
these two men clearly used coercion within their own group to maintain 
their authority. Amoi, like Matoto, was killed in a raid by an enemy 
clan. Wahgi, on whom I have more detailed information, was killed 
shortly before contact by his brother, a minor big man, who then took 
refuge in his wife's village a short distance from his natal group.
Wahgi was a powerful orator and a violent man. Old men say that 
'every man' feared Wahgi, that he stole pigs, ambushed and killed his 
enemies, verbally and physically abused members of his own clan, 
Komogam. Kaupagam men said they had several times plotted to kill 
Wahgi 'who made fools of us', but they feared Komogam's retaliation 
which would necessarily follow the death of a 'true' big man. Though 
Wahgi never killed a fellow clansmen, his close kinsmen were said to 
have been 'like police' and Wahgi himself to have physically beaten 
several rivals within his clan. Wahgi apparently also ordered the 
theft of garden produce and pigs which he then used to feast his 
supporters. This despot was not a wealthy man and never had more than 
two wives simultaneously. I am unable to estimate how long Wahgi 
ruled, but he clearly based his power on personal strength and the use 
of physical force.
No one could accurately state the circumstances surrounding
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Waghi's death. Men said only that Wahgi treated both people of other 
clans and his own agnates ’like pigs’ and that he had become 'too big’. 
Wahgi's brother apparently approached him while he was clearing a 
garden and axed him to death. The brother then fled to Kaupagam where 
he received a hero’s welcome and shells and pigs in payment for the 
murder. Men denied that they gave any payment in advance for this deed 
and despite offering refuge to his brother, no confrontation or 
fighting between Komogam and Kaupagam followed Wahgi's death. Wahgi’s 
body was publicly displayed for several days, and before burial his 
mother severed his head and then stored it in her house: the only 
instance of the mutilation of a corpse I ever discovered, and one for 
which people could offer no explanation.
The death of Wahgi is consistent with general statements 
concerning the power of pre-contact leaders who used beating and public 
humiliation of women and youths to punish offenders of traditional law. 
Men say that, within the clan, the use of force was a dangerous tactic. 
Kaupagam men, for example, still remember one traditional subclan 
leader who publicly beat a youth for the theft of a Kaupagam pig. 
Following this punishment the youth's father and lineage mates 
assaulted and axed the leader, causing serious injury.
I believe, therefore, that in Chuave and throughout the central 
highlands, traditional leaders who relied primarily or solely on the 
use of force and physical coercion within their own political group 
were extremely rare. Like Read (1959), I would argue that strength 
alone is never the defining characteristic of the big man. Great 
leaders, 1 suggest, regularly emerged when they combined ascribed and 
achieved characteristics similar to the Chuave ’true' big man.
Traditional highlands political systems, however, were 
sufficiently flexible to allow for the emergence of aggressive leaders 
under particular conditions. During hostilities or, as in Matoto's 
case, where groups needed to re-establish their security after defeat 
in war, 'strong' or 'hot' big men could dominate clan affairs. Such 
leaders emerged in situations where strength and aggression were 
encouraged in all men: their personalities contained qualities that
were vital to the success of the group as a whole.
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It is also true, as Salisbury argues, that acts of aggression 
against members of enemy groups could enhance a leader's standing within 
his own political unit (1964b: 228). But I believe that big men who 
persistently committed aggressive acts against other groups ran the 
risk of physical assault, as well as the potential attack against their 
clans as a whole. In times of peace therefore, men insisted that 
leaders control their aggressive behaviour or supported big men who 
were skilled in the arts of diplomacy, conciliation and mediation; big 
men who could settle inter-clan disputes without drawing the clan into 
unwanted or unnecessary confrontations. As I now demonstrate it was 
only after contact that despots regularly emerged to dominate not only 
their own clansmen but members of other groups.
Village officials: post-contact despotism
Salisbury believes despots could act autonomously with little 
regard for public opinion for long periods of time. For example, he 
estimates that Kavagl's rule lasted 20 years. Salisbury does not give 
evidence to suggest that pre-contact Siane leaders acted autonomously; 
rather he states only that for the period 1933-1955, Siane leaders 
called bosbois ruled for lengthy periods.^
The office of bosboi is not recognized by the 
administration, but the rate of turnover has only 
been one per ten years, or one per 15 years if 
deaths, which hardly constitute "control by public 
opinion", are not considered (Salisbury 1964b: 228).
Salisbury discusses the bosboi under the rubric of 'indigenous 
despotism'. He then begins his analysis of the Australian 
administration's effect on local politics with the luluai and his 
assistant, the tultul - prominent government officials appointed in
OChuave and Siane during the 1950s who were superior to the bosboi.
But elsewhere Salisbury notes that, as of 1945, the administration 
began formally recognizing big men as bosbois and gave them 'rings, 
belts and articles of clothing' (1962: 123). Other evidence suggests 
that people always associated the title bosboi with early government 
leaders. As such their influence or tenure of office supports Brown's 
assertion that the presence of the Australian administration enhanced 
the power of local leaders.
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Chuave was patrolled from Kundiawa, for example, at least annually 
from the late 1930s. A police base camp was established at Chuave by 
1939 and a patrol officer stationed at irregular intervals during the 
1940s. Patrol reports from 1939-1940 note government attempts to 
establish influence in peripheral areas such as Chuave, and that 
kiaps appointed ’headmen' who were given badges of office - a white 
china ring that everyone in Chuave and Siane today associates with the 
title bosboi. People were told to call these officials by title and 
not by name (Downs CPR 1939: 5; CPR June 1940: 3; CPR October 1940:
3). When in late 1940, a war broke out in Siane, ’bosbois of non- 
combatant groups decided that arbitration by Europeans, whom they had 
previously visited, was necessary' (Salisbury 1962: 123).
In Chuave, bosbois, having only indirect contact with kiaps, 
often appointed other men who, while lacking the china badge, used the 
title bosboi and were regarded as secondary government officials (cf.
M. Strathern 1972b: 43). Siane was administered and patrolled from 
Goroka and not Kundiawa at this time, but there can be little doubt 
that some Siane groups - particularly those closest to the Chuave base 
camp - used the term bosboi for men who were government repre­
sentatives. The power of these officials was subject to great 
variation; but in Chuave one or two bosbois in each tribe obtained 
unprecedented authority.
People say that government 'came with the ring'. Even today, when 
a former bosboi dies, Papua New Guinea flags are flown at half-mast 
at village courts and people sometimes purchase flags for the burial 
sites of these men. Koiboiri was Kaupagam's bosboi. A lineage head, 
and 'first man' of his subclan, Koiboiri was a powerful leader who 
dominated Kaupagam both prior to and following contact. Men do not 
clearly distinguish between Koiboiri's pre- and post-contact authority. 
But they do remember that he and Wemin, a Komogam bosboi, 'acted like 
kiaps' after receiving their rings. Kaupagam men say that as 
government representative, Koiboiri dominated not only his own, but 
also other clans. He publicly caned men for theft or fighting and tied 
ropes around their faces, arms and legs. On at least three occasions 
he took men to jail at Kundiawa. Koiboiri appointed three of his age- 
mates as secondary bosbois, and obtained rings for leaders in other 
clans. Wemin and Koiboiri encouraged clans to move closer to the rest
- 71-
house, and men from several clans cleared this site and nearby 
footpaths to facilitate government patrols.
Part of Koiboiri's power undoubtedly resulted from his already 
established reputation as a ’true' big man. His control of shell 
valuables also enhanced his authority. Men recall how, on hearing of 
patrols near Chuave base camp, Koiboiri confiscated pigs to sell them 
for shells. Salisbury has argued that Siane lineage heads and other 
big men enhanced their power when they came to control shells after 
contact. He believes that a leader's control over a rapidly inflated 
ceremonial exchange, as much as the fear of administration sanctions, 
allowed government officials to expand their political following. As 
I noted in chapter two, the Siane yarafo seems to have had greater 
control over lineage land and wealth than the Chuave aunam. In 1953, 
for example, Siane government officials and lineage heads controlled 
the cash of returning labourers and by 1960, they had managed to 
isolate large tracts of lineage land for coffee production (Salisbury 
1962: 136; 1964c: 3). All wealth in Chuave is individually owned, and 
lineage heads seem to have used neither of these economic strategies.
I fully treat the relationship between economic resources and 
political authority in the following chapter. Here I note only that 
it is difficult to estimate the importance of these economic changes 
for the power of early government officials who, along with other 
leaders, certainly enjoyed an advantage over lesser men in their access 
to shells. Yet given the degree of inflation and expansion of 
ceremonial activity (Salisbury estimates a five-fold increase during 
the period 1933-1944), economic competition must have been intense (see 
also A. Strathern 1966: 364-365). Nor was the sale of pigs and produce 
for shells at administrative outposts confined to leading men. Some 
lesser leaders or wealthy men must have challenged the power of 
government officials.
But men do not speak of bosbois as wealthy leaders. Rather, 
their statements stress the bosboi's role in stopping fights, 
settling inter-clan disputes, punishing men and encouraging co­
operation between former enemy groups. Although the power of these 
officials was unprecedented by traditional standards, their actions did 
not always go unquestioned. Koiboiri and Wemin, for example,
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apparently over-extended the limits of their authority. Tabiagam and 
Marime men said that they raided Komogam and Kaupagam in the mid-1940s 
to avenge several instances of physical abuse and punishment that these 
officials inflicted upon members of their clans.^ Tabiagam and 
Marime routed Kaupagam in this battle and ’many' men were jailed.
During the hostilities Komogam men fought on both sides of the battle. 
Kaupagam men agreed that Wemin's and Koiboiri's behaviour may have been 
contributing factors to the raid but stressed that the fight was 
sparked by a quarrel concerning the theft of garden produce by Tabiagam 
men. After Kaupagam returned to their village site, Koiboiri never 
regained his power over the groups that had fought against him.
By 1953, the administration had begun replacing bosbois with 
luluais and tultuls who were responsible to the kiap at Chuave 
patrol post.^ Some bosbois became luluais but, at least in 
Chuave, the administration commonly appointed younger men who were 
better Pidgin speakers, or who had served the administration as 
interpreters or carriers on patrols (cf. Brown 1963: 9). The 
administration first appointed luluais as tribal leaders and 
tultuls as clan leaders, but later appointed luluais for each clan, 
made one paramount luluai (waitpus) for the tribe and assigned 
tultuls to act as assistants to the luluai within the clan. These 
officials oversaw government roadwork, the building of rest houses and 
aid posts. They were also responsible for settling minor disputes and 
for enforcing government regulations pertaining to the proper care and 
maintenance of villages.
The Duma paramount luluai was Mama, who today, people say, ruled 
like a king: a leader whose power has never been equalled and against 
whom men measure the authority of all subsequent leaders. Mama was 
in his early thirties when the kiap appointed him luluai at 
Koiboiri's instigation.^ A member of Koiboiri's opposite door, Mama 
was both the 'first man' of his subclan and a man who had demonstrated 
leadership skills. A proven warrior, he was a strong, quick-tempered 
man, who spoke some Pidgin. He and Kaupa, Koiboiri's son, had served 
as adjutants to Koiboiri during the 1940s. Kaupa, a close friend of 
Mama and his junior, expressed no interest in the position, but the 
kiap made him tultul. Around this time also, Koiboiri retired as 
lineage head, and was replaced by Mumuga, the only son of Koiboiri's
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elder brother who had died in warfare years earlier.
By all accounts, Mama was powerful indeed; his influence with 
kiaps was certainly great. He received pigs and shells when the 
kiap appointed particular leaders as officials in other clans. He 
settled disputes throughout Duma and received shell payments, and later 
cash, for his services. About ten young men from several clans lived 
with Mama in Kaupagam, acting as his ’police'. Mama secured wives for 
these men: at least two were married women seized following marital
disputes after Mama had declared their current marriages null and void. 
Mama beat people for transgressions of administrative law, enforced 
the building of bridges, roads, and latrines, and is said to have 
brought former enemy clans to their present location along the road.
At a central location within Duma he built a compound which he used 
as a temporary holding centre (Pidgin: kalabus) for men who were
to be forwarded to Chuave or Kundiawa for imprisonment.
Only one other luluai, Kuri of Gomia Meri tribe, rivalled Mama's 
power. People may occasionally exaggerate the extent of Mama's 
authority, but it is certainly true that Mama was able to obtain 
unprecedented authority early in his career as luluai. As luluais 
became entrenched in other local communities, competition for their 
positions would have increased, and the appointment of luluais for 
individual clans must have limited Mama's authority outside Kaupagam. 
According to one Chuave kiapy the positions of luluai and tultul 
were regarded as a 'supreme honor', and by 1958, there were not only 
countless requests to appoint men to these positions, but also efforts 
to purchase the office (Mackenzie CPR 24, 1958: 6).
Today when people are shown a luluai or tultul badge, they 
immediately produce detailed stories about the coercive power of 
specific officials, as well as general statements about the 'golden 
age' of government, when law and order were maintained, and all men 
feared government officials. Like Brown, I would argue that these 
officials' power rested primarily, if not solely, on the fear of 
administration sanctions. Salisbury (1964b) notes that luluais had 
no statutory authority to adjudicate disputes involving native custom, 
but recognizes that in practice luluais exploited the government 
court system and exacted obedience by threatening to take people to
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court. But he believes that the administration's presence also gave 
people the opportunity to dispose of despotic leaders. Luluais were 
themselves subject to administrative sanctions, and by withholding 
their labour for government projects, by frame-ups, or by simply 
demonstrating that luluais had exceeded their authority, people could 
have the luluai replaced. He notes that Brown lists comments by 
patrol officers about untended rest houses or villages, and that the 
administration regarded many luluais as ineffective.
Salisbury has clearly shown that villagers could opt for a number 
of strategies, including 'passive resistance', when attempting to 
dispose unpopular officials. Mama, for instance, was dismissed by a 
kiap in 1960 after he failed to mobilize Duma men for a bridge 
building project. In Mama's case, two younger men, Kopon and Girimai, 
who later became councillors, encouraged people to ignore or disobey 
Mama's orders.
It is also necessary to distinguish between administration 
practice and policy. Chuave patrol reports make reference to 'lazy' 
officials or a luluai 's inability to mobilize people to work on roads 
or maintain proper hygiene within the village. But kiaps clearly 
recognized the luluai's role as arbitrator of disputes. Government 
officials handled 'minor disputes' or settled complaints by arbitration 
and sought only the kiap's confirmation of their decisions (Keogh 
CPR 2 1953-54: 2). Officials were 'harsh' in matters of compensation 
by European standards (Mellor CPR 1955: 1). While maintaining law 
and order, 'occasional unintentional abuse' and 'a small degree of 
graft' sometimes took place (ibid.).
Rather than being aware of the dangers of 'satrapy' or 'leaning 
over backwards to be legalistically correct' (Salisbury 1964b: 229), 
some patrol officers did everything possible to increase the power of 
officials. Patrol officers Keogh and Mellor, for example, both noted 
that while officials performed satisfactorily, the indifferent 
attitudes of many villagers or the scheming and conniving of political 
rivals hampered the officials' authority. Because of this political 
competition, these kiaps were apt to ignore the officials' inability 
to maintain total control over government projects and were well aware 
of the possibility of 'faked' charges against luluais and tultuls
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(Mellor CPR 7 1954-55: 4; Keogh CPR 3 1953-54: 10). After discovering 
such 'trumped-up charges', Keogh recommended that no dismissals or 
charges against officials should occur so as to strengthen the 
influence and prestige of government officials (ibid.).
The comments of two kiaps cannot be held to be representative 
of administration policy or practice. But quite obviously a wide range 
of options by particular kiaps, government officials, and villagers 
were possible. Burridge has shown how these leaders were subject to 
pressures from both their own community and from the administration 
(1960: 210). Government officials are middlemen who must manage both 
information and the respective demands of their own followers and 
superiors (Bailey 1969: 167). I argue that, in the 1940s and 1950s, 
the bosboi's and luluai's success and power rested in a real sense 
on their ability to convince their superiors that all was well within 
their appointed sphere of influence, and simultaneously, to convince 
villagers that bosbois and luluais had both the right and duty to 
enforce administration law.
Salisbury is also correct in asserting that, in some cases, 
luluais were 'straw bosses', men fronted for directors who were the 
true authority within the village (1964b: 236). Luluais and 
tultuls were not always big men in Chuave. The need to choose Pidgin 
speakers, or men who had government experience, who had worked as wage 
labourers and who were pro-administration, meant that the administra­
tion selected many young men unproven as leaders. But such young men 
could use their government position to enhance their political careers 
within the village, as Kondom did (Brown 1963). However, the 
administration also selected many established leaders as bosbois and 
luluais in Chuave, and their government affiliation both bolstered 
their power and increased their sphere of influence. The use of force, 
moreover, became part and parcel of the government leader's role rather 
than an extension of a 'strong' or authoritarian personality. People's 
perceptions of the government and of the government's officials meant 
that most luluais and tultuls legitimately used sanctions: these
men were authorized arbitrators of disputes. The rewards of serving 
as bosbois and luluais, including their domination of dispute 
settlement and the economic benefits accruing to their positions, made 
these offices attractive to many big men and would-be leaders. The
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competition of rivals for these positions and the continuing influence 
of particular big men who were unable to or uninterested in obtaining 
government offices therefore, best explains the limits of the luluais 
power.
Men's ability to gain access to these positions because of their 
Pidgin skills or previous associations with the administration, 
regardless of their political standing within the village, afforded 
them unprecedented opportunities to enhance their political careers. 
Missions, however, were a second major external force which provided 
men with an alternative avenue to power. I now examine, therefore, 
the importance of missionization before proceeding to a discussion of 
the next stage of political development, the introduction of government 
councils.
Mission leaders
Schafer, notes Salisbury, characterized Kavagl as a protector of 
the mission and not its protege. Kavagl's ability in 1953, before the 
administration firmly established control, to mobilize several 
thousand men and two enemy groups to level a mission airstrip was due 
according to Salisbury to his 'force and oratory' - and to the time 
made available by the use of steel axes (1964b: 231).
While I agree that the size of Kavagl's following in this instance 
was unprecedented by traditional standards, Schafer's (not, of course, 
disinterested) account makes it clear that Kavagl's post-contact 
authority owed much to his new, Christian status. Moreover, while 
Schafer explicitly states that Kavagl's exceptional oratorical skills 
were important here, Kavagl's post-contact rule seems devoid of force, 
at least in the sense of physical coercion. Schafer states that 
Kavagl took credit for bringing the first missionaries to the Wahgi 
Valley. During the five years since Schafer's arrival, Kavagl always 
attended church services, 'listened attentively and then gave great 
speeches afterwards outside', frequently disclaiming his past 
aggression. Kavagl did a volte-face, and preached that hell, the 
'great fire', was the penalty for theft, fighting, or other bad deeds 
(1975: 93). Kavagl's ability to mobilize thousands for a mission 
project, therefore undoubtedly owed a great deal to his standing as
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a mission leader.
In some central Simbu areas, mission bosbois recruited people 
for church activities and competed with government officials for 
authority and political followings (Brown 1963: 9). As early as 1940, 
Downs (then a patrol officer) noted the tension between government 
officials and mission personnel, and clearly stated that it was 
necessary for kiaps to prop up the authority of officials to ensure 
that they were the primary leaders of local communities (CPR June 1940: 
3).
Chuave men say the mission ’came with government'; in fact, 
mission influence preceded the establishment of a permanent patrol post 
in 1953. The Lutheran mission, established by Rev. Bergmann and Rev. 
Wolber, created a station in Gomia territory at Mainarao around 1947, 
and later established a second temporary site in Duma. Native teachers 
and evangelists manned both locations. In 1950, the Lutherans 
established a permanent mission at Monono in Mam tribe's territory.
This station served as the major Lutheran centre under Rev. Heuter 
until the early 1960s when native missionaries undertook the entire 
operation of the church (Fowler CPR 7 1952-53: 5; McBride CPR February 
1958: 1). By 1952, two additional missions, one Seventh Day Adventist 
and one Catholic, were established near Chuave station and at Wongoi 
in Elirabari respectively (McBride CPR 4 1954: 5). Even before this 
time, however, native evangelists trained by Bergmann at Ega (Kundiawa) 
had begun preaching in Chuave. Men remember such early mission 
bosbois who patrolled the entire Chuave area, delivering sermons from 
raised platforms, encouraging the cessation of warfare, and also the 
burning of flutes, gerua boards or other cult objects.
Shortly after World War Two Koiboiri divorced one of his wives 
in order to be baptized . After 1947, he resided for about two years 
in the Lutheran mission village of Mainamo and took Kaupa, Mama and 
several other Kaupagam men with him to receive religious instruction 
and be baptized. Converts lived in mission enclaves for up to two 
years prior to this ceremony, and were forced to abandon polygamous 
marriages, to cut their hair and wear laplaps which became the 
uniform of Christian converts. Entire families and lineages were 
converted simultaneously, and celebrated baptisms by killing large 
numbers of pigs and giving feasts to other Christians. Christians had
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special privileges. Allegedly they received preferential treatment 
from kiaps and luluais, and physical punishment was confined to 
pagans. Converts ignored government officials who remained pagans or 
who had polygamous marriages. These officials faced constant 
disobedience (Bagita CPR 4 1962: 1).
By 1952 there were 16 Lutheran teachers in Chuave; two of these 
in Duma (McBride CPR 4 1952: 6). By all accounts antagonism between 
mission teachers and government officials was intense. Mama himself 
regarded the mission as the most powerful force in the Chuave area, and 
told me that his early baptism enabled him to take part in mission 
affairs and gain him the allegiance of converts. Fervent mission 
supporters, aided by Koiboiri and Mama, led a campaign against 
initiation, revealed the ancestral flutes to women, and burned cult 
objects as well as weapons (cf. Read 1952: 8).
Mission leaders clearly based their power on Christian ideology 
which rapidly supplanted traditional religious beliefs. Accounts by 
two Simbu missionaries illustrate the mission’s conscious attempt to 
substitute Christian ritual and symbols for indigenous rites. Father 
Nilles notes that as early as 1938 in central Simbu, people brought 
gerua boards and burned them at his mission station. He suggests 
that a recent anthrax epidemic had motivated people to try out mission 
'medicine and prayers' rather than their own magical techniques. While 
he and other missionaries never discouraged the celebration of pig 
festivals, he suggests that catechists may have encouraged the belief 
that traditional religious practices were the result of satanic 
influences. His mission succeeded in using crosses rather than gerua 
boards during the pig festival thereby substituting a Christian symbol 
for a traditional one (1977: 176-178).
Charles Turner, a New Tribes missionary who first worked in 
Sinasina in 1960, notes similar substitutions. There, as in Chuave, 
men placed gerua boards on fertility sites and poured pig's blood 
over sweet potato vines to ensure the health and growth of pigs and 
garden produce prior to large exchanges. By 1960 native priests were 
planting crosses and sprinkling holy water over vines. Following the 
opening of churches, men killed pigs and held fertility rites (1968: 
20-21). Men often brought grasses to their baptisms to soak up
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water that they later sprinkled over pigs and gardens. Turner also 
notes that Christians held a special status. Unbaptized individuals 
had no say in village disputes, and the church pastor, followed by the 
luluai and other Christians, decided the outcome of one adultery case 
he witnessed (1964: 180). Turner's mission sought out big men for 
leadership positions. Later, when the Church tried to institute a 
plurality of leadership, competition between big men within the mission 
became intense (1968: 22).
In Chuave, Lutheran pastors and pastors' assistants, called 
songon in Kote, also planted crosses on fertility sites and held 
services to pray for the success of new gardens. Christian teaching 
became associated with health, productivity, and general welfare as 
God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit became known as guardians whose power 
was superior to ancestral spirits. People spoke of aspects of 
traditional life, including warfare and the pig festival as the Devil's 
work (see also chapter four). Today taim bilong Satan (Satan's time) 
signifies the period before mission influence. People quickly 
associated Christian missions with western material wealth. Missions 
operated the first two tradestores and mission leaders told me how 
early songons spoke of the need to convert to Christianity as a 
prerequisite to obtaining white man's 'cargo'.
Mission leaders distinguished between pagans and converts and 
mobilized large numbers of people from different clans, thereby 
creating new villages which, in areas like Duma, radically altered 
traditional settlement patterns. The power of these mission leaders 
was an obvious threat to the authority of government officials. Like 
Koiboiri and Mama, most Chuave government officials - and other big men 
- rapidly converted to Christianity. By co-operating with mission 
leaders or becoming active in mission villages and affairs, therefore, 
government officials could use Christian ideology to legitimize their 
secular government roles and so command followings beyond their own 
clan (cf. Lawrence 1971: 26). At the same time friction between 
government and mission personnel forced leaders to map out separate 
spheres of influence (cf. Berndt 1971: 415).
Today songons no longer hold ceremonies concerned with fertility 
and productivity. Christian ideology, however, continues to link a
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belief in God with the general welfare of groups and individuals - a 
point I discuss further in chapter five. The power of God as guardian 
and protector of people’s welfare and the destructive power of Satan 
permeate modern Christian beliefs - in particular, those of funda­
mentalist denominations. Many believe Satan, like witches, to 
be capable of entering a person’s body and upsetting a person's moral 
and rational behaviour. Although Christian ideology is pervasive, 
belief in ghosts, witches and sorcery still continues. During crises - 
at death or during the sickness of humans and animals - traditional 
beliefs find expression. Fervent Christians condemn the discussion 
or mere mention of aspects of traditional religion, but some Lutheran 
songons allow divination and even the open discussion of sorcery and 
witchcraft.
Missions have effectively banned polygamous marriages: less than
one per cent of all adult Duma men had such marriages in 1980. Prior
to missionization I estimate 10 to 15 per cent of adult men would have
13had polygamous marriages at any given time. Every individual 
claims to be a baptized Christian. Being a Christian is a fact of 
life, and belonging to particular denominations denotes a specific 
social status. Four missions have churches in Duma. The Church of 
Christ, Four Square Pentecostal and New Tribes missions are all 
fundamentalist missions established after 1970. Combined they have 
perhaps 300 adherents, most of whom are under the age of 35. The 
Lutheran mission continues to dominate the Duma area. But there are 
also members of the Anglican, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Baptist 
and Ba'hai faiths in Chuave. Relations between missions differ 
dramatically. The Lutherans and Catholics for example, co-exist 
peacefully, and their members refer to both these missions as the 
'true' and 'first' Churches. The relations between Four Square and 
Lutheran missions in contrast, are very poor. The Four Square mission, 
first established in 1978, competes with the Lutheran church for 
adherents, particularly among youths. Four Square pastors have been 
physically attacked by Lutherans; and the burning and destruction of a 
Four Square church, members say, was the result of the competition 
between these sects. As part of the ongoing ideological warfare 
between these missions, Four Square converts argue the need for 
spiritual rebirth through adult baptism and preach the imminence of the 
Second Coming. During my stay, there were rumours that Lutheran
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songons were agents of the anti-Christ who would lead a communist 
government, and this would signal the return of Christ.1  ^ Many 
people often dismiss such rumours but fervent Christians find them 
distressing. In villages where supporters of several missions reside 
together, these stories create tension between people of the same men’s 
house group or clan.
At Keu members of these smaller missions joined together to pick 
and process coffee, build and run tradestores or co-operate in garden 
activities. Mission affiliation cross-cuts relationships based on 
subclan or men’s house affiliation. Such coalitions, therefore, are 
cliques whose members share a common identity and which co-operate for 
both 'expressive' and pragmatic reasons (Bossevain 1974: 174). 
Fundamentalist cliques within particular men's houses or clans 
sometimes refuse to participate in ceremonies sponsored by Lutherans or 
to follow the instructions of Lutheran big men and songons. Mission 
affiliation, therefore, occasionally affects a leader's ability to 
mobilize people for particular projects.
Lutheran leadership is well organized. In Duma there are 29 
songons, four of whom are senior officials recognizable by their 
badge - a yellow chirho cross monogram sewn onto white shirts 
(lesser songons wear a red chirho). Each clan has about three 
songons, usually one per men's house. After consulting villagers and 
other songons, pastors appoint men to these life-long positions.
Only highly flagrant violations of moral norms - constant physical 
aggression, wife beating, or adultery - result in their dismissal.
Most appointments occurred in the 1960s and so Duma songons are now 
men in their early forties to late fifties. In addition each village 
has Lutheran 'workmen' (Pidgin: woJcman), young literate men who give
Bible readings or sermons. Men hold all leadership positions. Weekly 
Monday night meetings of songons, workmen, and other Lutherans take 
place in various men's houses along a circuit linking the Ei, Gomia, 
Duma and Mara tribes. Leaders discuss the church's role in maintaining 
good relations between different tribes and communities, the songon's 
role in settling marital quarrels and encouraging correct moral 
behaviour, and various church projects. Meetings, lasting long into 
the night, include sermons, Bible readings, prayers and hymns. Women 
from the host men's house prepare and cook food for those present, but
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do not participate in discussions.
Christians differ as to whether or not songons should become 
involved in government or restrict themselves to the teaching of 
Christianity. Prior to the 1980 council and village court elections, 
songons met and agreed that mission personnel should not run for 
office. Despite this consensus, however, several did stand. Only a 
small number of songons manage to become both mission and government 
representatives (see below). As I later show, mission leaders and 
other big men often come into conflict at ceremonial exchanges, but 
people everywhere respect songons and allow them to speak at any 
public gathering. Other important factors are the songon's moral 
and ethical leadership and their influence in dispensing an idealized 
conception of normative behaviour which leaders must attempt to 
approximate if they wish to be elected to public office (see chapter 
seven).
Democracy: local government councillors
My data do not support either Brown’s (1963) suggestion that 
satrapy might continue under the council system, or Salisbury's 
argument that a council president, the 'supreme individual' within a 
given council area, should be classed as a director whereas lesser 
councillors are mere managers (1964b). It is true that councillors 
sometimes abuse their authority and that they occasionally maintain 
office for lengthy periods of time. But both tenure of office, and 
the authority of particular councillors are tied to democratic 
elections within the council and electoral ward. Those men who cannot 
meet the demands of their followers run the risk of being quickly 
dismissed and replaced by other leaders.
Chuave Council was formed in 1961. Each clan in Chuave district 
and part of Sinasina elected a councillor. By 1965 Sinasina groups 
were excluded and Elimbari and Siane groups incorporated in a new 
Elirabari Local Government Council (ELGC). Forty-one wards each elected 
one councillor. In 1975 following years of quarrels, factional 
fighting, and occasionally physical violence between Siane and Simbu 
councillors, Siane Council was created, reducing the number of Elimbari 
wards to 29. People greeted the initial Elimbari Council with great
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enthusiasm but rapidly became disenchanted with its inability to 
develop rural communities. Today people's expectations of the 
council's potential remain high even while criticisms of the body 
itself and of particular councillors are common. People describe the 
council as the epitome of co-operative enterprise, wok bung> between 
different tribes and as responsible for the development of rural 
communities.
But people also argue that their tax money 'never comes back' to 
the village or that it is used to develop other areas. In 1979 the 
council collected only K15,618 of an estimated potential K40,000^ 
tax - an indication of the villager's apathy towards this institution.
Of 300 people surveyed at Chuave and in Duma, 59 per cent of the males 
and 34 per cent of females expressed disenchantment with the council's 
work (18 and 33 per cent of men and women respectively were indifferent 
or offered no opinion). Men criticized the councillors' laziness, 
their theft of tax money, and their failure to listen to people or 
communicate details of council meetings. People blamed the council 
in general for failing to bring development, roads, bridges, schools 
and aidposts, or complained that council staff were inept and 
dishonest. Women had many of these same complaints but stressed the 
council's failure to maintain market sites and the exclusion of women 
from council participation (see chapter five).
Prior to 1978 a councillor's success depended on his role in 
maintaining law and order and his ability to bring development to the 
ward. Today village court personnel have the former responsibility, 
and councillors bemoan the loss of power they suffered after the 
implementation of courts. In chapter seven I detail the relationship 
between law and political power in Chuave. Here I briefly outline the 
councillor's former role as dispute settler.
Following in the footsteps of the luluai and tultul, the 
councillor and his assistant, the komitiy came to have authority over 
all disputes in the village. Although other big men took part in moots 
and courts, the councillor made the final decision concerning sanctions 
or compensation in quarrels and disputes disrupting the village. As 
in Minj, the Chuave komiti was an underling of the councillor, and 
komitis never acted as a unit (Reay 1970: 533). From 1965 to 1970,
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the election of male and female komitis occurred, but the female 
komiti 's role was ill-defined and was apparently restricted to domestic 
matters: encouraging diligence in garden work, proper hygiene such as
washing dishes and clothes, and general maintenance of the village.
By 1970, the Elimbari Council banned female komitis after several women 
had nominated for councillor's positions. After 1970 the election of male 
komitis was irregular, and as I noted in the previous chapter, it is now 
common practice for councillors to appoint komitis from the runners-up 
in elections.
Male komitis often bore the brunt of the legal workload; 
councillors heard only major offences or disputes that proved difficult 
to settle. Marilyn Strathern's excellent analysis of the Hagen 
unofficial court system clearly demonstrates that a key factor in these 
officials' authority was their ability to legitimately punish offenders 
of customary or administration law (1972b: 119-121). The Native Local 
Government Ordinance of 1949-60 and 1963 made no provision for 
councillors to settle disputes, but kiaps and Local Court Magistrates 
encouraged councillors to settle disputes on their own and villagers 
clearly believed councillors and komitis were acting as authorized 
dispute-settlers (ibid.: 86, 119-120, 124). Councillors acted not 
only as mediators but sometimes as arbitrators in a wide range of 
disputes including criminal offences. Officials often received part of 
compensation payments they awarded or small gifts in recognition of 
their role in settling disputes, and Europeans and Hageners related 
occasional tales of 'extortionist' komitis and councillors (ibid.:
109). Sinasina councillors, who also had great authority over 
disputes, occasionally pocketed court fines and people strongly 
reproved them for this action (Hatanaka 1972: 73).
In Chuave, villagers clearly perceived the councillor and his 
assistants as legitimate arbitrators of disputes. Although councillors 
sometimes referred difficult court cases to the Local Court Magistrate, 
their ability to impose compensation, fines, and to make binding 
decisions was unquestioned. Subsequently, appeals to kiaps or 
Magistrates at Chuave were rare. (As I show in chapter six, the 
appeal to higher authorities is a dangerous tactic for litigants.) 
Councillors and komitis also imposed fines and compensation, and, 
as in Hagen, people regarded the money officials received as rightful
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payment for their services as mediator or arbitrator.
The second major aspect of the councillor's role is his 
responsibility for development. Brown notes that the ideal of 
progress, including the need for schools, co-operation between groups, 
and hard work in cash cropping, dominated the first year of councils 
in central Simbu. Councillors were almost invariably young men who 
had worked for whites outside their own localities and who believed 
in a 'new way', the economic progress the early council embodied (1963: 
11). Hatanaka has likewise shown that economic development was a major 
concern of Sinasina councillors in the 1960s. Of 36 councillors, 33 
had work experience outside of the area (1972: 64-69).
Develomen has a dual meaning for Chuave people. It embraces 
specific council or other government projects such as roads, schools 
and village water supplies, as well as group or individual enterprises 
like pig or poultry projects, coffee processing schemes, tradestores, 
or the purchase of vehicles. In sum, 'development' stands for people's 
desire to approximate western economic standards and models of material 
wealth and well-being. The concept also merges with people's 
conceptions of bisnis which I outline in the following chapter. Here 
I draw the distinction between development which people primarily 
regard as the responsibility of government agencies, and business which 
produces material success through individual entrepreneurial skills. I 
agree with Howlett that early councillors often gained status as 
innovators in economic ventures, but that in recent years, wider 
opportunities have reduced their monopoly in entrepreneurial ventures 
(1976: 185, note 2). Almost half of Chuave councillors in 1980 had 
some business interests, but only four of 29 councillors were major 
entrepreneurs. People believe the council is responsible for the 
balanced development of the council area, but they also expect their 
own councillor to give priority to the needs of his own ward or 
community. Councillors who use council resources for their personal 
economic careers are everywhere criticized as self-centred, and as 
failing to protect the interests of the group. Misappropriation of 
council funds or theft of tax money, therefore, greatly damages a 
councillor's reputation and endangers his chances of re-election.
A councillor consequently attempts to introduce economic 
innovations, to mobilize his ward to build and maintain schools,
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aidposts and roads, and attempts to obtain the financial resources 
needed for these or other projects. He is a major link to government 
agencies in a society where knowledge of grants or loans is poor and 
where the council must approve all requests for funds from the 
provincial government.
Howlett correctly asserts that misappropriation of council funds, 
financial mismanagement, ill-considered decisions and a lack of 
supervision all contribute to people’s disenchantment with local 
government (ibid.) My own investigation into the financial status 
of Elimbari Council failed because council bookkeeping was inconsistent 
and records were occasionally non-existent. During my 22 month stay 
in Chuave, four council clerks, alleged to have stolen funds, were 
dismissed. ° Several cases involving theft by councillors of small 
amounts of tax had occurred over recent years with at least three 
convictions.
Knowledge of the council's financial status is confined to an 
indigenous clerk and the District Officer In Charge (DOIC) of Chuave 
who acts as council supervisor. Councillors lack the formal education 
and managerial skills to adequately understand council revenue and 
expenditure. The full council rarely reviewed the council's 
K65,544^ budget for 1979 and the clerk, who attempted to accommodate 
demands by particular councillors for projects, prepared the estimates 
of revenue and expenditure. Council meetings consist mainly of 
discussions of proposed projects in various wards and requests made to 
the provincial government for additional aid. Each year the council 
submits plans for Rural Improvement Projects (RIP) used to build 
government facilities and maintain tertiary roads. The council also 
recommends to the provincial government a small number of projects 
which aid small village undertakings such as coffee schemes. In 1980 
the council received over 80 such applications, from which it selected 
a dozen to be forwarded to the provincial government for approval.
People's disenchantment with this institution is directly 
attributable to the council's allocation of resources. In 1979, for 
example, Elimbari Council applied for K33,500 in RIP funds to finance 
14 projects. However the council received only K14,000. As a result 
many projects were not completed, and others deferred to the next
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calendar year. This process, complicated by ill-conceived planning, 
is repeated each year. In 1979-1980, councillors voted to purchase 
a new vehicle, but had not included its cost (K4,960) in the estimate 
of council expenditure for that year. The council purchased but 
neglected to insure the vehicle and it was soon destroyed in an 
accident. Such failures oblige the council to divert money from other 
accounts, even from specific rural projects. Inaccurate estimates of 
tax and other revenue also lead to deficits. Elimbari Council's 
financial status, like that of other Simbu councils, has been 
precarious for many years.
Council structure also affects allocation of funds. The president 
and vice-president, along with five finance committee members, comprise 
the council's major decision-making body which meets in camera. These 
men, the clerk, and the DOIC dominate council meetings and clearly 
decide the allocations for particular projects. Lesser councillors, 
therefore, sometimes attempt to influence these men by using personal 
flattery, gifts of beer and occasionally money to gain support for 
their own projects. Despite these attempts the Elimbari Council 
finance committee attempted to balance the distribution of rural 
facilities and award projects to less developed areas. Nonetheless, 
when finance members requested projects, they often received priority 
over the proposals of other councillors.
Villagers therefore become disenchanted as councillors promise 
them specific projects that never materialize or are postponed for 
several years. From the villagers' viewpoint, the councillor's major 
task is to 'puli' development from the council. To do this he must 
be a powerful orator arguing the needs of his ward and capable of 
dominating council proceedings. Those councillors who become finance 
members stand a better chance of re-election because of the influence 
of this position. In addition a councillor must be capable of 
manipulating his relationships with other government officials. He 
must 'work the system'.
Howlett has noted the importance of the wantok system for Simbu 
politics. The term wantoky originally used for a person speaking 
the same language, has long been broadened to include relationships 
based on common work or friendship rather than kin or language ties.
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Howlett also states, ’the extended meaning of the term now includes the 
evolution of a patronage-like system, influence peddling, and other 
forms of exploitation of political power and public office for personal 
advantage’ (1976: 206-207). Within the council, there were few 
relationships I would characterize in terms of patronage. Certainly 
such relationships exist - particularly between provincial or national 
politicians and business men or other local leaders. But relationships 
between councillors shift and sometimes reverse themselves according 
to particular issues and goals, and it is often difficult to determine 
who is acting as patron to another's client at any given time.
People now occasionally omit the word wantok and simply use the 
phrase wokim sistim to describe how leaders manipulate their personal 
relationships. The phrase has either positive or negative connotations 
according to a person’s frame of reference. Thus, a councillor's clan 
or ward members may praise him for working the system when he boasts 
that he has obtained development money because he has a wantok in 
high places - be he the council clerk, the D01C, a provincial official 
or politician. But members of other clans or tribes simultaneously 
criticize the councillor on the grounds that he has taken advantage 
of his personal relationships and has ignored the needs of the council 
area as a whole. As a general rule villagers stress this latter, 
negative meaning. Subsequently, wantok sistim often becomes a catch- 
phrase for all that is wrong with government; that is, for the 
council's mismanagement of money or for its inability to act as an 
unbiased institution that equitably distributes resources.
Few councillors manage to succeed within the competitive 
environment of this institution or to meet their electorates' 
expectations and thereby maintain power for more than one or two terras. 
Competition within the clan and ward also influences a leader's chances 
of maintaining power. People say that council elections have always 
been competitive occasions for clans within the ward. Each clan wants 
to elect its candidate so as to enhance its group's status and to 
ensure priority treatment in obtaining government funds. Block voting 
by clans results in advantages for the largest clan of a ward over 
successive elections. In practice, however, candidates do not always 
successfully prevent in-group rivalry or electoral competition, and the 
result, the splitting of a clan's votes, affords candidates of
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smaller groups excellent chances for victory. Conversely, some 
councillors manage to become recognized leaders of the ward and return 
to office unopposed.
The appendix describes voting patterns in eight council elections. 
In sura, the results show that intra- and inter-clan rivalry is ex­
tremely variable. Moreover, voting occasionally cross-cuts clan 
boundaries; even when a man is a recognized leader, his clansmen 
sometimes choose to cast ballots for members of other groups.
Particular conditions within the ward, such as the importance of 
mission affiliation and the success or failure of incumbent councillors 
in obtaining council funds, explain extreme instances of this pattern 
when over 60 per cent of a candidate's agnates vote for an 'outside' 
man. Because I documented some cases of voting by lineage members, I 
am able to state that where several candidates nominate from a single 
clan, voting does not always correspond to the segmentary structure of 
descent groups. Husbands and wives, people of the same men's house 
groups, lineages, and subclans occasionally support different 
candidates - as they do in provincial elections (see chapter seven).
The election results demonstrate that fragmentation of votes 
between candidates of the same clan may result in the defeat of very 
successful incumbents. People uphold the individual's right to vote 
for any candidate, be he an agnate or a member of another group. The 
element of chance and the importance of political competition are both 
recognized in the characterization of elections as a card game: 'One
man pulls a queen but I pull a king. That's all. I win.'
I believe that in Chuave, the turnover of councillors in elections 
has always been high. In the first Hagen (Dei) Council elections, all 
but four councillors were re-elected. Andrew Strathern notes that this 
vote - by show of hands - was a 'ceremony of confirmation', but 
acknowledges that people understood the idea of voting and realized 
they could displace inefficient councillors (1970: 553). Hatanaka 
notes that Sinasina voters became severely critical of their 
representatives' performance after three successive council elections 
held during the 1960s (1970: 41). Elsewhere she provides data on 
successful candidates in these elections (1972: 68-69). Only 12 of 
36 councillors had been elected for three straight terms; another four
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served two terms. Based on her table, I calculate that the dis­
placement of councillors was 61 and 55.5 per cent in the second and 
third elections respectively.
I have data on seven elections from 1966 to 1978. In 1977, 11 
of 29 incumbents returned to office (38 per cent). In 1970, 30 of 41 
councillors were re-elected (73 per cent). An average of 54.4 per cent 
of incumbents returned to office during these seven elections. My 
information concerning tenure of office is incomplete for the early 
1960s. I was able to trace a number of councillors elected to the 
first council who had continued to hold power into the 1970s. If these 
men are included, the average tenure of office is just over six years, 
or two complete council terms. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the 
terms of office for 108 councillors.
Table 2: Councillors' tenure of office
Terms served Number of councillors Percentage
One 49 45.3
Two 29* 26.8
Three 16 # 14.8
Four 6+ 5.5
Five 7 6.5
Six 1 1.08
108 99.98
includes two councillors who resigned
includes one councillor who resigned
one councillor was replaced after his death
The sole councillor who had served six terms was a former luluai 
appointed in 1954. His government career spanned 27 years, during 
which he was also a member of the Simbu Interim Provincial Assembly. 
He lost in the 1980 provincial election and 1981 Elimbari Council 
elections. Because I lack data on the first two councils I am unable 
to say how many luluais or tultuls made the transition to 
councillor. For the Dei council in 1964, 27 of 40 (67.5 per cent) of
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councillors had previously served as government officials (A. Strathern 
1970: 555). In 1968, only five of 36 Sinasina councillors were former 
officials (Hatanaka 1972: 68). In Chuave by 1969, 13 of 41 councillors 
(31.7 per cent) had experience as bosbois, luluaisy or tultuls 
(Bates 1969).
This information, plus people's statements, suggest that perhaps 
half of the early councillors were former government officials. By 
1969 this figure was reduced to a third as these men who had served 
more than a decade as government representatives lost or resigned their 
offices. By the 1970s, with only a few exceptions a new generation 
of councillors had been elected.
It is difficult to draw a composite picture of the 'average' 
councillor. In the 1978-1981 Elimbari Council all but three 
councillors were fluent Pidgin speakers. On average, the councillors 
had less than two years mission or government education. Over one-half 
had previous government experience, usually as ward komitis. Only 
22 per cent of councillors were also mission leaders while 40 per cent 
had some business interests. Only four men, however, were major 
business men. Finally, more than a third (37.9 per cent) were men 
whose fathers had served as councillors or other government officials.
A few councillors manage to combine several of these characteristics. 
Mori Au, Elimbari Council Vice-President in 1980, for example, who was 
elected president in 1981, is a former komiti who had also served 
as the council's rules inspector. The son of a government bosboi, 
this man was already a prominent business man before being elected to 
the council in 1975. After a single term he became vice-president, 
and is today the most dominant of Chuave councillors.
Given the significant turnover in elections, it is possible to 
suggest that councillors of long-standing come to dominate the council 
and obtain finance committee positions. Factionalism within the 
council ensures that these positions, like those of president and vice- 
president, are difficult to maintain over time. Salisbury's suggestion 
that a president is the 'supreme individual' in the council, a director 
who rules for lengthy periods, ignores the competition within the 
council. Councillors from the same tribe or census division align 
themselves to chose a president who will aid them in obtaining council
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funds. While it is possible for presidents to dominate the council 
through the force of their personalities, their re-elections are by 
no means assured. Since 1963 Elimbari Council has had five presidents, 
none of whom served more than two terms in this capacity. Moreover, 
far from being widely admired, presidents become the target of constant 
criticism by lesser councillors and their electorates, who use the 
them as scapegoats for all the council's failings. The respect and 
decorum maintained towards the president at council or other public 
meetings, therefore, masks widespread disenchantment with his 
leadership in informal situations and these men have little or no 
influence beyond their own tribal areas.
Andrew Strathern notes that as many as one-third of Hagen 
councillors in the 1960s could not be considered big men (1970: 553- 
558). This contrasts the role of the councillor with more traditional 
leaders, 'moka-makers', influential in exchange within the segmentary 
political structure of the clan. Today, in Chuave, councillors are 
by definition regarded as big men and are addressed by this term or 
kaunsil. It is possible to distinguish councillors who being 
young men or serving their first term, have not established reputations 
as 'place leaders' or big men in the general sense of the term.
Perhaps 5 or 10 per cent of Chuave councillors fall into this class.
But successful councillors have specific skills associated with 
'government' and 'development' of the clan or ward. I would argue, 
therefore, that a councillor embodies a separate political status, one 
which merges with or is distinct from other statuses such as mission 
leadership or a group representative in exchange. It is self-evident 
that men can use the position of councillor to enhance their 
reputations in these other areas: by simply being government 
representatives they may speak in any public forum or offer advice 
concerning the distribution of wealth in exchange.
Kopon's career illustrates many of the factors I have discussed.
An excellent Pidgin speaker, who had experience of wage labour and had 
trained for a short time as an assistant patrol officer, Kopon was 
about 25 years old when he defeated Mama in the 1963 council elections. 
Development orientated, he encouraged kinsmen to plant coffee and start 
small tradestores; he also raised money to help a Kaupagam man buy the 
first Duma-owned vehicle. Today people describe Kopon as a man who
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'knows' government, who dominates council meetings and whose talk is 
'sweet': he is by far the best Pidgin orator in Kaupagam. Kaupagara
men say Kopon brought development to Duma. Duma roads are excellent 
by local standards and these, as well as the government school, aidpost 
and large numbers of tradestores present in Duma, are all cited as 
evidence of Kopon's power within the council. Other Duma men argue 
that it was President Girimai, Kopon's close friend and a Koraogam 
councillor, who in the 1960s succeeded in obtaining council funds for 
Duma. When pressed Kaupagam men admit Girimai was influential but 
stress, quite rightly, that since Girimai's death in 1978, Kopon has 
managed to provide funds for school classrooms and a tertiary road in 
Duma. Kopon is an active councillor. As finance member since 1975, 
he travelled throughout the council area overseeing council projects, 
and also to Kundiawa with other top ranking councillors to solicit 
government funds. Despite nominations, Kopon has twice failed to 
become president. He frequently expressed his disenchantment with the 
council, regretted his exclusion from the village court, and has 
threatened to retire from politics. He argued, however, that no one 
except his rival, Martin, a Koraodurumo village court magistrate, is 
capable of replacing him. In the 1981 council elections, Kopon 
returned to the office unopposed.
Kopon had few claims to hereditary status when first elected as 
councillor. But he has used his position to act as group repre­
sentative and dominates his own subclan, the smallest in Kaupagam, 
in ceremonial matters. Kopon's cousin, Bobiange, the wealthiest 
Kaupagam man and one of the two leading Duma business men, is 
uninterested in acting as spokesman within Kaupagam. Kopon, in 
contrast, is not a wealthy man; many others surpass his material wealth 
and contributions to exchanges. Outside Korowa, his own men's house 
group, Kopon does not dominate exchanges. In Aragor and Mamgram, the 
other two Kaupagam men's houses, Dege, a former komiti, village court 
magistrate, and the 'first man' of a larger subclan whom people regard 
as more skilled in methods of distribution than Kopon, controls these 
exchanges (see also chapter four).
Kopon rarely attends church services or songon's meetings, as 
he is content to distinguish between his own government leadership and 
mission affairs. With one exception - a Lutheran wokman, aged 30,
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who has expressed a desire to stand for council - Kopon maintains 
excellent working relationships with leaders of several missions.
Within Komodurumo Kopon has a few close friends and supporters 
who admire his ability as councillor and have voted for him in 
elections. But Kopon has no influence in Komodurumo affairs. Martin 
continues to lead this clan and so intense is the rivalry between these 
leaders that Kopon rarely sets foot inside the Komodurumo section of 
Keu village. Kopon’s relationship with Tabiagam, the ward's third 
clan, are better as they respect and support him as councillor, though 
Tabiagam big men control the daily and ceremonial affairs of this 
group. Kopon freely interacts with members of this group. When 
together in public, Kopon, Dege and Martin all share in the 
organization of ceremonies or participate in speech making. In private 
each man, along with a few close supporters, wage attacks against the 
others’ character and criticize their abilities.
Kopon’s reign has not always been uncontested. Martin, Mama,
Dege, and a second Kaupagam komitl and two Tabiagam leaders have 
opposed Kopon in different elections. In 1972, following what many 
men now describe as Kopon’s theft of council funds allotted to buy 
coffee processors for KTK ward, Kopon was defeated by Martin, his sole 
opponent, 187 votes to 162. Despite this setback Kopon regained his 
seat in 1975. Moreover since 1970, he has always polled over 100 votes 
in elections (File 42-35, 2, Local Government Office, Kundiawa).
Competition from principal rivals and aspiring leaders with whom 
he must co-operate in public forums restricts Kopon’s personal power 
within the village and ward. His success in elections, I would argue, 
is not the result of personal obligations he has formed, of political 
patronage, or of his leadership in everyday activities. Indeed, Kopon 
is somewhat of a loner; he often spends a week or more living at his 
pig house near garden sites and fellow villagers criticize him for 
being 'hidden' during these periods. His influence, both inside KTK 
and throughout Duma, results rather from his reputation as an excellent 
orator and as a man intensely concerned with and successful in 
government. The respect accorded to Kopon and to his decisions is 
due primarily, if not solely, to his status as a government leader.
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Despotism and democracy
I have argued that the regular emergence of despotic leaders could 
only have occurred in post-contact conditions. I reject the premise 
that major pre-contact leaders were ’autonomous’, somehow immune to 
the influences constraining the power and authority of lesser leaders. 
Men who combined ascribed and achieved characteristics that followers 
admired and whose authority did not depend on coercive force managed 
to act as leaders for lengthy periods of time. In both pre- and post­
contact society, moreover, the political competition of rivals 
restricted a leader's following. The power of bosbois and luluais, 
and the expanded following they led, rested primarily on the sanctions 
and potential force of the colonial administration and the actions of 
its agents, the kiaps.
Government officials, I believe, did become 'autonomous'. Kiaps 
supported these officials' power while often attempting to ensure that 
village officials, as symbols of government authority at the local 
level, were the dominant leaders in local communities. The success 
of these leaders and their ability to overstep the limits of their 
authority relied not only on the degree of competition from mission 
or other leaders within the village, but also on the official's ability 
to manipulate his relationship with the kiap in order to gain 
administration support.
The introduction of elections under the council system gave 
villagers unprecedented control over government officials. Instead 
of having to appeal directly to the kiap, withholding their support 
for government enterprises, or falsifying charges against luluais, 
villagers could replace officials by voting for other leaders. 
Competitive electioneering, including the opposition of clans within 
the council ward, ensures that regular tests of a councillor's 
authority occur. Yet some councillors manage to maintain power for 
long periods.
Their success depends on people's expectations of the government 
leader and the realization that some men are better equipped than 
others to fulfil the responsibilities and duties of elected office. 
Consequently it is possible for men who have little wealth, who have
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little influence in mission affairs, or who are unskilled in methods 
of distribution to become successful councillors. Finally, until 
recently, councillors used sanctions and occasionally physical force 
as arbitrators of disputes. The use of sanctions, however, did not 
result from a leader's personal strength nor his authoritarian 
personality, but was defined by villagers as a legitimate right of the 
authorized government leader.
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Notes
1. For example, men drew parallels between traditional warfare and 
current leaders' attempts to settle a war between Kebai and 
Sinasina groups which occurred in 1980. They stated that only 
leaders from proximate clans or tribes, and not provincial 
politicians or kiaps, would end the battle because they could 
threaten to join their clans in the battle causing further 
escalation of the fight.
2. Morauta's comments refer to self-made big men who were 
influential by the force of their personalities. She calls these 
men 'optional leaders'. Two other types of leaders, the land 
leader and magician, held office in the clan through a mixture
of ascribed and achieved characteristics and were always found 
in each community (Morauta 1974: 21-22).
3. Generations are often skipped to account for characteristics 
lacking in ego's father but well-remembered for ego's 
grandfather.
4. Food prohibitions were extended to include age-mate's wives.
Thus, a woman could not accept green vegetables or meat prepared 
by her husband's age-mate's wife.
5. Nenam komeno, literally 'my first father', is less often heard 
than nenam, Auwo, the familiar form of father and auwom
the familar of aunam are regularly used in common speech and 
to some extent interchangeable. There is little distinction, 
therefore, in terms of address or in the behaviour of eldest 
brother-father. Both men act as guardians to all younger men in 
the lineage. Christians use the words auwo and auwom for Amen 
and for God in prayers thereby emphasizing the guardian role of 
the creator.
6. Arguing that Simbu despotism was common, Bill Standish cites Rev. 
Bergmann's account of Simbu leaders who employed 'henchmen', who 
ordered the killing of more than 100 men, and who were 'esteemed' 
because they were feared. Bergmann's account, however, does not 
distinguish between the killing of enemies in battle and the 
killing of agnates, but the quote Standish cites falls under 
Bergmann's discussion of central Simbu warfare. Standish 
acknowledges that elsewhere Bergmann states leaders were killed 
when accused of witchcraft or having harmed the welfare of the 
group. In addition, Standish notes that Bergmann recorded 876 
killings, 424 of which four men committed over several decades. 
While he recognizes that it is important to determine the 
operational political unit and the possibility for exaggeration, 
he arbitrarily decides that 10 per cent of these killings may have 
been within the men's own group. This figure - approximately ten 
murders by big men over three decades - I argue would be 
impossible under Chuave conditions and unlikely anywhere in Simbu 
(Bergmann 1971 Vol. 1: 94-95; 1972 Vol. 4: 75-76; Standish 1978: 
75-76).
7. Salisbury also uses Tolai evidence to support his suggestion that 
despots ruled for lengthy periods of time. His primary example
of arbitrary and despotic rule, however, is the account of Kavagl.
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8. That some men retained the title bosboi under the luluai 
system is consistent with Salisbury's description of Siane 
leadership in the 1950s (1962: 28-29, 123-124, 127). At this time 
it was the luluai who was specially recognized in the 
distribution of valuables. The bosboi was a 'manager', the 
spokesman for the men's house group, and a man who could not 
become 'over-assertive' because lesser leaders would 
'ostentatiously disregard any attempt by the figure-head to set 
himself up as a chief' (ibid.: 28-29).
9. I am unable to date this battle accurately as I could find no 
reference to it in patrol reports.
10. In central Simbu the introduction of luluais occurred earlier. 
Within Elimbari and south of the Wahgi River bosbois remained 
important government officials until 1955 (Keogh CPR 1953-53: 8).
11. Given Koiboiri's long association with the government, it is 
reasonable to believe he had great influence in the choice of his 
successor. Mama and Kaupa both say Koiboiri first made the 
decision and then accompanied by Koiboiri, they went to Chuave
to receive their badges.
12. It is common for old men who are devout Christians or for young 
'born again' Christians to dwell on past bad deeds or sinful 
behaviour and to exaggerate the extent of such behaviour in order 
to stress their moral transformation after 'finding Christ'. It 
is also possible that Schafer overestimates Kavagl's 'volte face' 
or that Kavagl himself exaggerated his pre-contact aggression for 
this reason.
13. Brown notes that 10 per cent of 206 central Simbu men were 
polygamous in 1958 and states mission influence had decreased the 
incidence of polygamy by this time (1972: 33). In my survey of 
175 adult men I found about 22 per cent had polygamous marriages 
during the course of their lives.
14. My arrival in the village sparked similar rumours. As a white 
man who smoked cigarettes and drank liquor, and who apparently 
possessed some article of clothing with markings which could be 
interpreted as the symbol 666 (Revelations 13: 18) and who was 
interested in studying gavmen> I was labelled an agent of Satan.
15. In 1979-1980 men paid K8 tax and women K2. The K40,000 estimate 
is based on population figures and my conversations with council 
clerks and the D0IC of Chuave.
16. Disarray in books meant that no charges could be proven. Only 
one attempt, subsequently withdrawn, was made to prosecute.
17. Almost half of council revenue comes from government grants and 
subsidies. Taxes, market and store licence fees, vehicle hire 
and village court fines raised the remaining revenue.
Chapter Four
BISNIS BEFORE POLITICS
The Pidgin word bisnis refers primarily to modern entrepreneurial 
activities: bisnis man are store owners, PMV operators or coffee
buyers. But bisnis also includes all forms of personal wealth and 
ceremonial exchange. Thus, women wok bisnis when marketing garden 
produce, and men sometimes list pigs or coffee gardens as bisnis.
Large prestations are bisnis bilong tambuna (the ancestors’ or 
traditional business). Bisnis also describes friends or distant kin 
who receive wealth in exchange but are outside traditional kin 
categories - these are ’business relations'. Educated men, 
entrepreneurs, and politicians contrast bisnis to develomen, 
thereby opposing wealth or material success that is the product of 
people's labour, to the government's external and limitless resources 
used to build or maintain roads, aidposts and schools.
In this chapter I analyse the relationship between bisnis and 
politics. For most villagers, the prestige derived from giving wealth 
to others is an end in itself - a method of obtaining respect and 
recognition among one's closest friends and kinsmen within and beyond 
the clan. For leaders, wealth is an important, though not primary, 
element of their authority. Aspiring leaders must use their wealth 
wisely early in their careers. Individuals who fail to establish 
reputations as wealthy or generous men may lead - even obtain 
government office - but their prominence in group ceremonial activity 
will always remain limited. I show why those men who are engaged in 
western-style businesses are often politically inferior to other 
men, and how, inevitably, a few successful and politically ambitious 
entrepreneurs become the most prominent Chuave big men. The analytic 
separation of bisnis into ceremonial and western economic spheres, 
though descriptively useful, is very artificial. Wealth, prestige and 
occasionally political influence are the by-products of success in 
either sphere. The two spheres are also linked by a common valuable 
- money. Consequently, I describe how individual decisions or actions 
can simultaneously affect a person's success or failure in one or both 
economic sectors.
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Economic change: 1933-1980
Here, as background to an analysis of current economic action,
I describe the changes in the Chuave economy since contact. Two 
complementary accounts of cultures adjacent to Chuave - Salisbury's 
(1962) classic study of economic change in Siane, and Hide's (1980) 
detailed quantitative description of production and economics in 
Sinasina prior to 1973 - provide greater analytic depth than is 
possible here, and have immeasurably aided my own reconstruction.
People's poor memories, the necessity for quantifying valuables 
exchanged, and highlanders’ penchant for self-aggrandizement make 
accurate estimates of the size of past ceremonial payments or feasts 
difficult. Bridewealth and wedding feasts - the best-remembered
ceremonial occasions - provide a rough guideline to the changes and
inflation 
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Table 3: Valuables exchanged at marriage over five decades
Decade Number of 
cases
Shell Plumes Pigs Money
(in
Beer
cartons)
1930s 5 2-6 1-3 1-3 — —
1940s 5 3-10 1-3 3-6 — —
1950s 7 9-20 5-6 4-10 £1-30 —
1960s 8 0-10 10-20 2-20 $20-150 1-10
1970s 10 — 10-30 7-24 K300-1400 30-240
Traditional payments to a man's maternal or affinal kinsmen were 
small in scale, relying on the productive capacity of a man's household 
and lineage. Men, 70 years or older, say traditional bridewealth was 
comprised of five or ten pig tusk necklaces, a small strand of cowrie 
shell, a few pearl shell fragments, tobacco, salt, and one or two parrot
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or hawk wings. The inclusion of pig tusk necklaces differentiated 
Chuave from Siane bridewealth, though the scale of payments was similar 
in both areas (Salisbury 1962: 100). Both Siane and Chuave bridewealth 
payments differed from Sinasina and central Simbu ones in excluding 
stone axes, though in the late 1930s and 1940s, steel axes were 
sometimes given (Hide 1980: 113-130; Bergmann 1971, Vol. 1: 174). Tra­
ditional Chuave wedding feasts were held over a two day period in the 
groom's village. One or two pigs were slaughtered, cooked and 
exchanged between the bride and groom's lineage heads who then 
distributed pork to close agnates, friends and big men in attendance.
Other payments were smaller. 'Hand' payments to a man's eldest 
brother-in-law or wife's father in recognition of a woman's labour, 
'head' payments to a male child's mother's brother, and 'lower back' 
payments to a child's maternal grandmother for her pain in bearing the 
child's mother seldom included pearl shell. Payments could either 
coincide with, or be separate from, feasts at which cooked pork and 
other foods were given to both agnates and non-agnates. Men say child 
payments or feasts were given only on behalf of male children and could 
be held at one or more stages: at birth, at naming or hair cutting
ceremonies, upon ear and nose piercing of a boy between the ages of 
five and eight years, and prior to initiation. Those men who chose 
to celebrate each of their son's status changes, therefore, gained 
reputations as industrious and generous men.
Death payments for men to maternal kinsmen and for women to 
affinal kinsmen were comprised of two or three slaughtered pigs. The 
death of a 'true' big man, however, was specially marked. His death, 
unlike others, required the killing of ten or more pigs, plus a public 
display of the corpse for as long as a week in which leaders and other 
people from all clans within the tribe mourned. After any man's 
unnatural death - one attributed to sorcery or witchcraft rather than 
old age - maternal kinsmen raided the deceased's gardens and stole his 
own or his agnates' pigs. This practice continues today and, as in the 
past, obviates demands for any formal death payment.
As elsewhere in the central highlands, the scale of Chuave 
ceremonies increased dramatically during the period 1933-1950. The 
influx of shell valuables, the increased leisure time, as well as the
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productive potential resulting from the availability of steel tools 
were all contributing factors. Just as important was the virtual 
cessation of warfare, occurring around 1940-1943 in Chuave. The 
creation of a stable political environment enabled whole clans to 
attend marriages or other ceremonies, thereby producing a wider 
audience for men who wished to use wealth to enhance their reputations 
(cf. Salisbury 1962: 119). This is not to imply that inter-clan 
exchange became a substitute for warfare as it did in other Melanesian 
societies (cf. A. Strathern 1971; Young 1971). In Chuave battles a 
man avoided close inter-clan kinsmen with whom he exchanged valuables.
At the group level, particular exchanges stress inter-clan solidarity 
and co-operation. Chuave big men may delay exchanges in order to 
produce sufficient valuables to enhance their groups’ reputation. 
However, unlike the situation in Hagen, clans do not attempt to ’beat’ 
others in exchange, nor do ’superior’ groups give valuables to 
’inferior’ ones to gain political dominance (A. Strathern 1971: 128- 
129). In Chuave, major imbalances between groups over time are the 
source of hostility and, in the past, could serve as a cause for 
warfare. Elements of individual and group competition are found in 
almost all Chuave exchanges. Ideally, however, it is co-operation 
between groups in exchanges which is stressed: exchange, therefore, is
functionally opposed to warfare.
Using pearl shells as an index, Salisbury estimates a five-fold 
increase in the capitalization of Siane gima activities during this 
period (op. cit.: 153). Hide estimates that the average number of 
shells in Sinasina brideprice payments increased six-fold, that pigs 
doubled, and that after 1939 steel axes became a part of payments - 
at first competing with, and by 1944 surpassing, stone axes in 
importance (1980: 114-117). By 1953 steel tools were so common that 
axes became valueless as items of exchange in Siane. Chuave men state 
that they had become obsolete exchange items by about 1960.^
As Table 3 shows, the amount of cooked pork at marriage feasts 
continued to increase after 1950, but the use of pearl shells peaked 
during this decade, later to be replaced by bird plumes and cash - both 
originally introduced by returning migrants. Black plumes (E. 
fastosus and A. stephanlae) became much sought after during the 
early 1960s, but had declined proportionately to cash by the latter
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half of this decade. Chuave men obtained plumes from Sinasina, 
central Simbu, Wahgi, and Hagen, either for cash or in return for, by 
then antiquated pearl shells (cf. A. Strathern and M. Strathern 1971: 
29, cited by Hide 1980: 132). In 1980 high quality long and short 
plumes, valued at K20 and K10, comprised a portion of all bride 
payments, and were used as bride's decorations and as important 
ornaments for both males and females in inter-group dances.
Cultivated garden areas also increased during the 1950s.
Salisbury estimates that one Siane clan increased its area under 
cultivation by 18 per cent during 1952-1962, and suggests many reasons 
for this trend: the increased reliance on mixed vegetables, the need
to feed larger numbers of guests at ceremonies, the increased need for 
pig fodder, and the alienation of land for coffee. Ceremonial 
distributions of food increased at least four-fold during this period 
as people from a wide area participated in feasts and food exchanges 
(1964c: 6).
The introduction of coffee had the most far-reaching effects on 
the Chuave economy. Cash had entered Siane bridewealth payments by 
1953 (Salisbury 1962: 132), and small amounts of cash were a part of 
all Chuave bridewealth payments by 1955 (M.V. NcNeil CPR 1957: 9).
In nearby Watabung, brideprices included as much as £15 by 1955 
(Cleland, Goroka CPR 18 1954: 9). Although cash was at first 
restricted to returning labourers during the 1950s, it became general 
by the 1960s as coffee trees matured. Coffee trees, first planted in 
Chuave by 1952, became readily available from the Chuave nursery by 
1955, at which time Duma men were especially active in planting 
(Salisbury 1962: 43; Mellor CPR 1956: 8). Bridewealth inflation 
illustrates the impact of cash cropping. Central Simbu payments had 
risen from £15 in 1958 to as much as £200 by 1965 (Brown 1967: 88). 
Chuave men widely ignored a 1963 council rule attempting to restrict 
bridewealth to a maximum of £25, and brideprices skyrocketed during 
the mid-1960s (Hiatt CPR 3 1964-65). The take-off point for cash 
cropping appears to have been 1964, when improvements to secondary 
roads and the formation of the Kundiawa Coffee Society caused traffic 
by coffee buyers to rise 500 to 600 per cent, and approximately 300 
tonnes of coffee was sold (Wohlers CPR 4 1964-65: 1; CPR 5 1964-65: 
1). Increases in ceremonial payments continued throughout the 1970s,
*3
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re q ui r i ng contributions from a wider circle of agnates. I estimate 
that brideprices averaged K250 by 1972 and K500 by 1975. In 1980 clans 
attempted to conform to a standard brideprice of K1,000, though actual 
payments ranged from K340 to Kl,400. Other payments were also subject 
to variation. Adoption payments for male children ranged from K50 to 
K500, and for female children, from K50 to K200. 'Head' payments 
similarly ranged from K50 to K500, and constituted a single payment 
or a series of payments over many years. ’Hand’ payments, now regarded 
sometimes as a second bridewealth, are subject to the greatest 
variation: some men never give them; others make payments of up to
K1,000.
The expansion of small scale business is more difficult to trace.
In 1956, a twice-weekly market was established in Chuave. Both men 
and women sold produce and pigs - as many as 15 on a single day - 
mainly to patrol post staff, but also to other villagers (Mellor CPR 
1956: 4, 6). Patrol reports do not mention rural markets until the 
mid-1960s. Dominated by female sellers, these markets were held twice 
or thrice weekly in each tribe. Today small markets, involving five 
to ten women, are held every day of the week except Sunday. In Duma, 
three large markets are held each week, and between 20 and 200 women 
sold items such as sweet potato, mixed vegetables, tobacco, scones, 
and cooked pork. Women primarily control proceeds from markets (see 
chapter five).
Duma clans purchased two vehicles prior to 1960, but single 
entrepreneurs controlled and operated these in the name of their 
groups. Data for Chuave during the 1960s are unavailable, but by 1969 
there were 11 vehicles in Nambaiyufa, and a similar, or slightly larger, 
number must have existed in Chuave (Chuave District Office files).
In contrast, by 1980 seven vehicles operated in Duma tribe alone; 
individuals, rather than corporate groups, owned five of these.
Tradestores also increased in popularity during the 1960s. As 
early as 1957, three stores - all mission controlled - had begun 
stimulating people’s demands for European clothes, utensils and 
consumables such as rice, tinned meat and European tobacco. There were 
five tradestores in Duma by 1963; of these, three were owned by 
councillors who had raised the capital with the aid of their clans or
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men’s house groups. By the late 1960s patrol officers noted that 61 
tradestores were operating in Elimbari (Downs CPR 1967; Faulkner CPR 
1967). Using current population data, a similar figure for Chuave 
would represent a single store for every 187 people. Stores were a 
source of prestige and competition initially between clans and later 
between men’s house groups.
Individual men, however, always controlled stores, no matter who 
financed them, and conflict inevitably arose between group and 
individual prestige and profits. Chuave men stress that many early 
businesses collapsed because contributors demanded profits or free 
access to store goods. Finney notes that one quality of early Goroka 
entrepreneurs was their ability to use group resources and labour for 
their own benefit, and he has argued that entrepreneurs are similar 
to traditional big men who use group resources to gain reputations in 
exchange (1969: 1973). He also states, however, that as early as 1967, 
men withdrew political support from business men who became too 
concerned with profits or claimed exclusive rights to prestige accruing 
from their entrepreneurial activities. I return later to the conflict 
between individual and group benefits intrinsic to both Chuave exchange 
and business enterprises. Chuave businesses that are started with 
group contributions reach a point when business men believe they have 
sufficiently repaid their debts to kinsmen and are free to use their 
profits as they wish. Further, by the 1970s, individuals could easily 
obtain the capital necessary to start small businesses. Consequently, 
a single person owned, as well as controlled, tradestores and PMV’s, 
and economic competition was between individuals within and across 
clans. Unfortunately, Elimbari Council licensing of stores was lax and 
records are incomplete. Nonetheless, I estimate that, in 1980, about 
500 tradestores existed within the council area. This figure, if 
accurate, would mean one store per 45 persons. Christie, using 
Sinasina Council files, estimated that during 1975, 1976 and 1977, 
there was one store for every 72, 55 and 49 persons respectively (1980: 
72).
Rice and tinned foods now supplement the diet of Chuave villagers 
and, during periodic garden shortages, are the food staples of a few 
families for periods of one to two months. It is also common for women 
to sell garden produce, and then use their cash to buy luxury foods.
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Store foods and other consumer products are also used in ceremonies. 
Feasts now include rice and tinned fish, and tailor-made cigarettes 
are mandatory gifts in ceremonial contexts. Western-style clothing, 
along with traditional items such as net bags and women's pubic 
coverings, are included in a bride's trousseau or given to women who 
have aided the bride's mother. As a result, store owners' profits are 
linked both to everyday preferences and to the ceremonial activities of 
clans.
The most important luxury consumable is beer, which is drunk on 
informal occasions and exchanged in ceremonial contexts. Beer had 
entered wedding feasts by 1968, but it became a common gift after the 
licensing of rural outlets in 1972. By this time clans exchanged 
about 30 cartons of beer on such occasions. It was during the dramatic 
increase in coffee prices from 1975 to 1977 that beer assumed its 
present ceremonial significance, and now beer is exchanged in all major 
Chuave ceremonies or feasts (see Townsend 1977: 167-168). The epitome 
of beer exchanges occurs at wedding feasts when the bride's clan gives 
about 80 cartons of beer to the groom's clan and receives, at a later 
date, over 100 cartons. These ceremonial prestations entail a cash 
outlay of over K1,000 per clan. I later outline the pattern of 
distributions and contributions that occur at these exchanges. Here, I 
stress only that, as a valuable, beer is equivalent to pork and is 
endowed with symbolic qualities similar to this traditional 
valuable.“^ Thus, the traditional prohibition against eating a pig 
a man or his close age-mates have killed has been extended, so that 
men refuse to drink beer that they or their close age-mates have 
purchased for ceremonies.
The subsistence, ceremonial and luxury nexuses of Siane economic 
activity characterized by Salisbury can still be identified in Chuave. 
The use of money, however, has not only fixed the relative value of 
different commodities but has also facilitated the conversion between 
different categories. Every consumable or valuable can be priced:
10 toea for three sweet potato tubers, K.14 for a carton of beer, K20 
for a bird of paradise plume (A. stephaniae) and K200 or more for 
a large pig. But today men buy and sell pigs to obtain cash for 
payments to kinsmen, or conversely, buy pigs and freezer meat for use 
in feasts. Cash can be used in any transaction, but its common and
- 107-
ceremonial uses are distinguished. Thus, when comprising part of a 
ceremonial payment, it is specially displayed: in bridewealth,
concentric circles of K2 notes, preferably unfolded, are surrounded 
by a border of bird of paradise plumes; in 'head' payments money 
becomes 'leaves', strung along bamboo poles about 35 metres long. In a 
fashion similar to the former display of shell fragments, money is 
attached to a bride's netbag, constituting a portion of the personal 
wealth a woman carries to her husband's clan.
At a more basic level, the use of cash entails constant choices 
between the allocation of wealth for consumer, luxury and ceremonial 
activities. When men speak of months or years when they have 'hard 
work', they are referring to periods when they have to allocate a 
greater portion of their cash to ceremonies. Expenditure patterns, 
therefore, change dramatically over time, both according to the timing 
of particular events and to the social distance between the person and 
the principal sponsor of upcoming feasts or payments.^
There is a clear distinction between rich and poor which is 
consistent with men's degree of involvement in western-style business. 
In the next section, I examine the resources available to individuals 
and the increasing economic stratification of Chuave society.
Entrepreneurs: wealth and social differentiation
The majority of Chuave people have equal access to common 
resources: individual differences in material wealth are the product
of ambition and industry. To some extent pig ownership differentiates 
men who continue to use exchange to gain prestige. Table 4 lists the 
numbers of pigs owned by 117 Keu households.^
With rare exceptions only men own pigs, though women share in 
their caretaking. The average of 3.73 per household is similar to that 
reported in Sinasina (Hide 1980: 319-321; Christie 1980: 148). 
Significantly, half the men surveyed accounted for less than 20 per
cent of all pigs, while 12 per cent of the sample, those owning eight
pigs or more, accounted for 34 per cent of the pig population (cf. Hide
1980: 319, 321). Those men owning one pig or none at all were often
younger than 25 and older than 60 years of age, that is, either
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unmarried and having few exchange commitments or past the age when men 
are expected to contribute to exchanges. However, men owning eight 
pigs or more included men as young as 22 or as old as 60. Thus, pig 
distribution is only slightly affected by age.
Table 4: Pig ownership
Total
Number of 
pigs owned
0 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 437
Number of 14 16 22 13 9 13 8 5 4 9 5 1 0 1 0 1 117
owners
Average: 3.73
Ten store owners in this sample each owned an average of 3.2 pigs 
(range 0-10). Eight men who were government officials or men’s house 
leaders, in comparison, owned 6.7 pigs on average (range 2-13). Major 
big men say that they maintain large numbers of pigs to ensure they 
can contribute to any exchange. Thus, when pigs given by others are 
insufficiently large or numerous and thereby potentially damaging to 
their groups' reputation, big men kill pigs - a responsibility that 
leaders often describe as a burden of their position because such gifts 
are rarely, if ever, returned at a later date. But most men owning 
large numbers of pigs were neither recognized big men nor known as 
aspiring leaders. Most major owners, therefore, contributed pigs to 
their agnates’ exchanges and so gained reputations as 'good' and 
generous men. But they seldom played an active role in the 
organization of feasts nor were they prominent in men's house conver­
sations or other public forums.
Compared to other Simbu areas land is plentiful in Chuave. A 
married man has between 20 and 40 dispersed garden locations. Of 
these, up to seven sites may be allocated to coffee production, a 
similar number to subsistence production, one or two sites to pandanus 
nut or oil production, and the remainder are fallow. Individual 
locations, however, vary greatly in size, from single plots averaging 
10 by 30 metres to quarter hectare sites, which are subdivided into
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smaller plots and temporarily loaned to agnates, affines or maternal 
kinsmen. In June 1980 I surveyed the gardens of four men. The area 
under cultivation ranged from .18 hectares to .42 hectares per person, 
with an average of .295 hectares. Of this area between 20 and 25 per 
cent was allocated to coffee production. These figures are higher than 
those reported for Sinasina and central Simbu (Hide 1980: 301-302; 
Brookfield 1973: 156), in part, I suspect, because two owners were 
cultivating food crops for major distributions and required food above 
normal subsistence and exchange requirements.^
Because land is readily accessible to everyone, leaders seldom 
rely on the gift or loan of land to attract followers. Men loan land 
to agnates and non-agnates for a variety of reasons, but especially 
to accommodate affines who wish to make regular or extended visits, 
or to ensure that aged people have sites near the village. Sites 
bordering on villages or roads are preferred for coffee gardens and 
tradestores. Men rarely give such coveted sites to kinsmen, though 
they may sell them for K100 to K300 for a 10 by 30 metre plot. Most 
men, however, retain roadside locations in the hope that they, or their 
children, will one day use the site for bisnis.
The introduction of coffee produced different results in Chuave 
than in either Siane or central Simbu. In one Siane clan, partly 
because of a misunderstanding over government policy concerning land 
rights, lineage heads were able to use their authority to plant and 
assume ownership over large tracts of coffee (Salisbury 1964c: 3, 9). 
Moreover, because direct father-son inheritance of coffee plots was 
established by 1963, the sons of these early planters had distinct 
advantages over other men (ibid.). Today, all Siane men own some 
coffee, but the significant impact of this early economic advantage 
remains. In Nambaiyufa I saw several individually owned coffee tracts 
or 'plantations' between one and two hectares in size. These served 
as an important resource base for three Siane entrepreneurs, one of 
whom was a man about 30 years old who had inherited a large holding from 
his father. Likewise, Brookfield reports that by 1961 some central 
Simbu leaders had 'extracted' land from private holdings and 
established communal blocks of coffee. Though some of these were sub­
divided, and though by 1961, almost all men had some coffee, a few 
leaders had as much as a hectare planted (1968: 101-102).
- 110-
In Chuave luluais, tultuls, and later councillors were the 
earliest coffee planters, and during the early 1960s, these men may 
have enjoyed some economic advantage over others. However, Chuave 
coffee plots are individually owned, dispersed (generally within a 3 
kilometre radius), and small in scale. People have always opposed 
individual attempts, beginning in the late 1950s and continuing to the 
present, to alienate agnates’ land or to establish communal coffee 
gardens. One reason for this resistance is that most men believe that 
large continuous blocks of clan land should be reserved for food 
production for ’first fruits’ ceremonies (see below). Although I lack 
quantitative data for the gardens of men known for their coffee 
growing, I estimate that few, if any, Chuave men have coffee holdings 
in excess of one-quarter of a hectare. In Chuave, therefore, coffee 
ownership serves as a universal resource for all men, and offers only 
slight advantage to the most industrious planters.
During 1980 roadside coffee prices fluctuated between 45 and 75 
toea per kilogram. For a sample of 20 married men, ages 25 to 60, 
coffee incomes ranged from K146 to K296, averaging K226 per year.
These figures represent household incomes, the division of which varies 
from family to family. Some men enforce their rights to all coffee 
incomes; others divide their cash or coffee holdings with their wives 
(see chapter five). Only ten of 117 men, 18 years or older, did not 
own coffee. Eight of these were unmarried men under the age of 25.
A father usually divides his coffee plots after his son's marriage and 
encourages his son to plant coffee before considering marriage.
I found no correlation between coffee incomes and leadership or 
entrepreneurial status. Big men can, however, use coffee to obtain 
a following among young men. Martin, whose coffee income was K241, 
frequently contributed cash to Keukobu and Mamgram exchanges, and 
allowed Keukobu youths access to his coffee, particularly towards the 
end of the coffee season when picking was difficult. Bobiange, 
Kaupagam's premier blsnls mant allowed any Mamgram man to pick coffee 
from one of his plots adjacent to the men's house and still managed 
a coffee income of K230. In contrast, Dege - who, unlike Bobiange, 
was politically influential - was known to be stingy with his coffee 
and personal income. Although he frequently made token contributions 
to exchanges, his cash gifts were smaller than other men’s, but, as
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I show below, he played an important part as group representative in 
most Kaupagam exchanges.
Overall therefore, access to basic resources is relatively equal. 
Three other options - wage employment, coffee buying, and small scale 
businesses - are open to men who wish to increase their cash reserves. 
Government officials receive salaries and allowances in addition to 
coffee incomes: village court magistrates and peace officers about
K200 and councillors between K96 and K144 per year. These leaders gain 
access to public funds which are sometimes appropriated for personal 
benefit (see also chapter six). In addition, Chuave station and road 
maintenance work, affords young men the opportunity to gain temporary 
wages as provincial or council labourers, receiving K24.80 per 
fortnight for periods of usually four to eight weeks. Permanent 
salaried employment is also available for a few men in each tribe.
In Duma there were three such men: a bank officer, an aidpost orderly
and a road foreman, earning fortnightly salaries of K72, K75 and K84 
respectively. The two largest Duma entrepreneurs, Bobiange and Tiena 
Maima, also employed between three and ten men at various times as 
storekeepers, drivers, mechanics and labourers, paying them K10 to K25 
per fortnight. In addition, between 10 and 15 per cent of any clan’s 
population resides outside Chuave census division in major towns where 
some people find jobs. Villagers receive cash gifts from these 
employed kinsmen and send messages to towns soliciting contributions 
to major ceremonies. The influence of townsmen, however, is rarely 
noticeable to an outside observer, except when men return to the 
village - permanently or temporarily - and use their savings to sponsor 
ceremonies or start businesses, and in doing so, gain recognition from 
kinsmen.
Coffee buyers, operating from private or company motor vehicles, 
are generally men under the age of 35. Independent ’foot' buyers often 
purchase unprocessed coffee, ’cherry’, for as little as 8 toea per 
kilogram. They then process and dry the coffee themselves before 
selling it. Transportation costs limit foot buyers' profits; a 
man may have to pay a vehicle owner K50 or more to transport the coffee 
to factories in Goroka or Kundiawa. Only four such buyers operated 
in Duma during 1979-1980; the time and labour involved in this 
enterprise are too great an investment for most men. However, one Keu
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man, age 22, accumulated profits of over K800 in this way during 1980, 
using his income to increase the stock of his small tradestore and 
then to build a larger, more permanent store.
Men owning vehicles concentrate on the purchase of coffee 
parchment. Their potential incomes are great, though limited over 
several years by the need to service their vehicles or save sufficient 
money to purchase new trucks. Short term problems are similar to those 
faced by a third type of buyer: major factories hire local buyers to
purchase coffee in their own areas in order to decrease the chance of 
theft (of cash and coffee parchment) by local raskol gangs. In these 
cases, factories take responsibility for petrol and maintenance costs, 
and give each man about K1,000 to purchase parchment. From a salary 
of as much as K200 per fortnight, buyers must pay their driver (if a 
different individual) and one or two youths who weigh and load the 
coffee. Buyers told me they could expect to make about K80 to K130 
over a ’good’ two week period. However, hired buyers must account for 
any deficit caused by buying coffee above the factory recommended 
roadside price. Stock taking occurs after they take each load to the 
factory, and it is common for buyers to have a deficit of K40 to K100 
which must be quickly repaid from salaries, or they risk losing their 
job. A coffee buyer competes with 15 to 20 other men within a single 
council or census area, and because few men have the mathematical 
skills required to pay proper prices consistently, most buyers shave 
losses by setting scales anywhere from 3 to 10 kilograms below zero.
Villagers are selective, often passing up five or more buyers to 
establish a maximum price for their coffee before selling. Conse­
quently coffee incomes fluctuate enormously as factory manager,
Omiddlemen, and seller attempt to obtain maximum profits. Two Duma 
company buyers told me they made profits of K194 and K25 over a four 
week period, after paying their helpers. Buying strategies are also 
directly related to political patronage. Thus, a man who buys at above 
market prices, thereby reducing his own profits, quickly gains a 
reputation as a generous man and may even use his small income (however 
valid his statements) as proof that he works not for himself but for 
all men. A few coffee buyers said that the demands of kinsmen, or 
conversely the need to be recognized as a fair buyer, made them try to 
buy for less when in other tribal areas in order to balance losses
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incurred when buying within their own tribe or clan. The political 
value of 'coffee patronage' is clearly evident when elections draw 
near, as candidates attempt to become buyers in order to establish 
reputations in different tribes or communities (see chapter seven).
The coffee economy is important to all villagers. Men's house 
discussions often revolve around the generosity or greed of particular 
local buyers, and the government's inability to control or stabilize 
road prices. One event demonstrates the importance of coffee-related 
issues. In 1980 the Sirabu Interim Provincial Government, hoping to 
increase its revenue base (see Standish 1979), raised licence fees from 
K25 to K100 for foot buyers and K100 to K1,000 for vehicle buyers. In 
Chuave the reaction to this decision was one of widespread disapproval 
and outright hostility. Independent buyers, in tandem with bisnis 
man and councillors, organized a demonstration at Chuave, attended by 
several hundred people, which led to a bitter confrontation between 
provincial and local politicians. Although the demonstration had few 
immediate effects, the issue became central to the provincial 
government election campaign, ultimately fuelled resentment against the 
provincial government, and re-kindled calls for the creation of a 
separate Boraai Province (see chapter seven).
Tradestores or vehicles are the ultimate bisnis and status 
symbols to most villagers. All Duma vehicles served as PMV's on a 
daily or weekly basis. Owners of small trucks charge as many as 15 
passengers K4 for a return Chuave-Goroka journey, earning up to K60 
before expenses on a given day. Inevitably, close kinsmen and govern­
ment officials are given free rides. Petrol expenses, as well as money 
spent on food or beer while in towns, further decrease profits. 
Moreover, accidents, mismanagement of profits, and improper vehicle 
maintenance make the lifespan of these operations the shortest of all 
Chuave businesses. The abandoned shells of old vehicles, along roads 
or in villages, serve as testimony to once viable enterprises. But 
for a few astute business men who can secure government or bank loans, 
trucking or PMV operations provide regular incomes. Tiene Maima,
Duma's most successful entrepreneur, ran twice weekly trips to Goroka 
and bi-monthly trips to Lae, carrying up to 40 passengers in his 5 
tonne vehicle, bought for K13,988 and serviced each month. In 1980 
Tiene's educated son, who acted as his father's business manager,
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stated this PMV operation yielded a K4,484 profit after expenses. In 
addition, Tiene made another K8,500 through trucking contracts with 
major highlands wholesalers.
Men start tradestores, spending between K50 and K.1,000 to construct
bush or permanent material buildings; the appearance of a store is
itself a sign of material success. Initial purchase of stock from
wholesalers entails cash outlays of K20 to K300 or more. Tables 5 and
96 show store stock varies considerably in size as do profits. Few 
store owners kept records of sales or receipts of wholesale purchases. 
Estimates of their profits and are subject to inaccuracies. Dama and 
Bobiange, owners of stores six and ten respectively, were unable to 
estimate incomes. They did keep receipts, however, and I derived their 
incomes from tallies of receipts and stock turnover based on an 
arbitrary mark-up of 20 per cent above wholesale prices. Mark-ups 
range from 5 to 30 per cent on food products to as much as 80 per cent 
on clothing. I believe both estimates are conservative as they ignore 
the sale of clothing for which no receipts were kept, and in Bobiange's 
case, only a partial estimate of petrol sales for which only some 
receipts were available.
The current situation, therefore, is one in which many small or 
newly established stores compete with a few successful, well-managed 
stores in each tribe or community. Small tradestores frequently fold 
after only a few months to a year because of mismanagement. Transport 
costs for small store owners, who must rely on PMV's, also severely 
restrict profits. Small stores are commonly stocked with such items 
as rice and tobacco for which there is a great demand. Large store 
owners have more capital invested in clothing and other consumer goods 
and consequently monopolize this trade. Similarly large stores offer a 
greater range of all products. Bobiange's store was equipped with a 
generator and freezer and was the only Duma store selling freezer meat. 
Moreover, his store, unlike most others, was open eight hours a day and 
was stocked with over 200 different products: everything from perfume,
toothpaste, diapers and umbrellas to a variety of 'essentials' such 
as soaps and tinned meats. Bobiange's Kaupagam store was one of two 
he owned. The second, located in Nambaiyufa and run by his sister's 
husband, provided him with some additional and undetermined income.
- 115-
Table 5: Information on Keu v illage  s to res  operating in  February 1980
O sier's
age
P o litic a l
sta tus
Other R etail value 
of stock
Cash on 
hand
Estimated
yearly
income
1) 36 — — K 43 K 15 K 50
2) 50 former kjmiti — K 64.20 K 30 ?
3) 43 songon — K 80.60 K ? K 40
A) 55 — — K 115.40 K 80 K 80
3) 36 — — K 328.90 ? ?
6) 40 men's house 
leader
mi
operator
K 450.20 K 150 K 600*
7) 37 men's house 
leader
— K 534.85 K 250 ?
8) 35 — coffee
buyer
K 740.80 1 ?
9) 50 — — K 864.15 ? ?
10) 40 mission
leader
PM7
operator
APO
K3296.89 K 3000? K1200?
* (Vned by Joseph Darn and the only Keu s to re  in  the sample licensed 
to  s e l l  beer. Cam's K600 income includes a net p ro fit of K450 
from beer sa les.
Table 6: Comparison of stock fo r  th ree  tradestores
Large s to re Mädiun sto re Small s to re
Stock category Value Percentage 
of stock
Value Percentage 
of stock
Value Percentage 
of stock
Food/soft
drinks
K 917.52 27.83 K224 41.95 K25.70 59.77
Tobacco —
*
K 6 1.12 K 7.40 17.2
Clothing K1430.50 43.38 K224 41.95 — —
Tools/household
goods
K 728.45 22.10 K 24 4.49 — —
Kerosene/soap K 69.70 2.11 K 19.50 3.65 K 3.30 7.67
Other^ K 150.72 4.57 K 36.50 6.83 K 6.60 15.35
Total K3296.89 99.99 K534.00 99.99 K43.00 99.99
*
+
#
Bobiange's sto re . Bobiange's re lig io n  prohibited the use of tobacco 
Including machetes, axes, un tensils , blankets, e tc .
I t  aus such as playing cards, bilan  rope, b a tte r ie s , razor blades.
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Dama's business, in contrast, was in rapid decline. He had owned 
three stores and two vehicles in 1979, but by 1980, closed two stores 
and sold his largest vehicle to pay off debts to savings and loans 
societies and wholesalers. Dama's failure to properly maintain his 
vehicles, a number of ill-planned investments, and his willingness to 
allow kinsmen to buy on credit were all contributing factors in his 
business collapse (see also chapter seven). But despite his 
diminishing scale of business, Dama was considered second only to 
Bobiange as a business man and Kaupagam's premier entrepreneur by some 
men - a reflection of the Chuave belief that status gained is difficult 
to lose.
When compared to Tiene Maima, Bobiange's or Dama's operations were 
small in scale. Tiene, who first began his bisnis career in 1966 
with $200, has constantly re-invested profits and has built a small 
business empire. He owns four tradestores - one of which is licensed 
to sell beer - and two vehicles. His son estimated Tiene's 1980 income 
at K17,914.06. In 1980 after spending K10,800 to begin building a 
tavern in Duma, Tiene had cash savings of K7,500. In addition he owned 
land in Wau, and had built permanent material houses for himself, his 
brother and son. A conservative estimate of Tiene Maima's total assets 
in 1980 would be in the vicinity of K50,000.
Tiene's career provides the classic role model for aspiring 
business men. However, most tradestores yield small profits - perhaps 
equal to half of the average coffee income - which, if properly re­
invested over many years, could build a successful, highly competitive 
enterprise. But many small entrepreneurs are content to keep stores 
stocked with basic commodities to keep their stores afloat. They use 
their profits to buy consumer items, to make visits with kinsmen living 
in towns, and to contribute to exchanges. Such men gain reputations 
as unselfish individuals who cater to their kinsmen's needs, allowing 
credit when ceremonies arise, or opening stores at all hours of the 
night and day.
To some extent income levels create differences in material wealth 
owned or displayed and so differentiate villagers. Traditionally, few 
status markers existed in Chuave. Major big men possessed special 
bracelets which they, upon retirement from political life, gave to
- 117-
their first born sons. After contact, shells and plumes, used as body 
decorations, differentiated men according to wealth. Like the central 
Simbu (Brown 1972: 41-42), Chuave men differentiate between big men, 
that is leaders (yar togara)y 'ordinary' or married men (yarigan:
'man with a child'), unmarried men (yar keminim), and 'rubbish' men 
(yar kuwanom: 'dusty' or 'dirty' men).^ This last category
included men with physical or mental disabilities as well as 
unambitious men who seldom contributed to ceremonial exchanges or 
raised pigs. Chuave women, like those in Min j, had uniformly low 
status in comparison to men (Reay 1980: 13). As Josephides has noted, 
'where status is achieved for men it is ascribed for women, determined 
by their sex' (1981: 7). This statement holds true for traditional 
Chuave society, but, as I show in the next chapter, the socio-political 
status of Chuave women has improved greatly during recent decades.
No special term denoted 'wealthy men', but status markers were 
important on one occasion - the pig festival. Unlike Hagen men who 
wear bamboo sticks representing the number of shells they give away 
in moka exchanges, Chuave men do not use 'prestige tallies' (A. 
Strathern 1966: 362). Gerua boards, however, were important 
religious and status objects. Valuables and dried fingers of deceased 
kinsmen decorated these androgynous ancestral representations which, 
after use, were buried in fertility sites to promote the clan's wealth, 
as well as protect pigs and crops. Gerua were not only generalized 
symbols of wealth and productivity, but also signs of a man's personal 
wealth. Between three and five pigs were killed and distributed to 
agnates at separate stages during the gerua's manufacture. At pig 
festival dances, therefore, the gerua represented pigs killed that 
were above and beyond those given to inter-clan kin at the actual 
feast. Thus, the gerua, as men say, 'ate' pigs and were the hallmark 
of wealthy men. This status marker, moreover, was superior to the 
diri (a feathered ornament), which required the killing of a single 
pig, and to other common decorations, effectively and visibly dividing 
clansmen into three strata.
In 1980 some men as old as 35 had neither seen a gerua or knew 
of its significance. Not suprisingly, old men compared 'gerua men' 
to the current bisnis man. Pursuing this analogy, they argued that 
the status of 'gerua men' and big men was different in that gerua
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men were not necessarily politically influential men or men's house 
leaders. They, like business men, were wealthy and sometimes generous 
with their wealth, but were often politically unambitious and secondary 
to the 'first man' of a lineage or subclan. The wealth they used, 
therefore, enhanced their own and their group's prestige, but served 
to detract from other leaders' ability to use wealth to obtain a secure 
political following.
Large stores and vehicles are major status symbols: signs of both
individual and, in some cases, group success. Other status markers, 
in the form of consumer items, now abound in Chuave and differentiate 
the wealthy from the poor. All households surveyed had a variety of 
western utensils and some western clothing. Roughly one-quarter of 
117 families owned radios, and 60 per cent owned one or more kerosene 
or pressurized gas lamps. Although 10 per cent still had some pearl 
shell, 60 per cent possessed bird of paradise plumes.
In contrast, successful business men maintain a material standard 
of living well above other villagers. Western-style clothing is 
mandatory for all entrepreneurs and between one and five business men 
in every tribe own houses that have tin roofs, glass windows, western 
furniture and running water. Bobiange and Dama both owned such houses, 
and, in addition, possessed more consumer products than other Keu 
villagers: from bisnis-related items such as mechanic's tools,
calculators and sewing machines to household products like gas burning 
or iron stoves, tricycles and china.
Material signs of economic stratification, therefore, clearly 
exist at the rural level; social stratification, however, is a concept 
that remains antithetical to the villager's way of thinking. Although 
there is a growing concern among parents of educated children and 
wealthy men that their sons and daughters should not marry 'down', rich 
and poor do continue to intermarry and interact on a daily basis with 
little sign of deference behaviour. Not surprisingly, ray initial 
attempts to have people rank others inevitably led to categorizations 
of men based on first born status within age grades. After further 
clarifying ray interest in men's relative economic and political status, 
I found informants' responses were enormously inconsistent. In part 
this was due to segmentary group structure. Thus, men possessing
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similar influence or wealth were ranked differently according to 
whether or not they belonged to the respondent's own subclan or clan; 
for example, no Kaupagam man ever ranked Tiene Maima above Bobiange 
or Kopon.^
However, a few trends were discernible. First, men refused to 
label any man as 'rubbish' as they insisted that this category was no 
longer applicable. They argued that every man had coffee, steel axes, 
and other western goods. People still use the term 'rubbish man' as an 
insult though without reference to a man's actual economic status; its 
utterance inevitably results in demands for compensation. Second, men 
place the most successful entrepreneurs 'above' all others on the basis 
of their 'cargo', that is, visible material wealth; but when asked to 
consider both economic and political prominence they continually ranked 
government or men's house leaders, who had fewer material possessions, 
above all entrepreneurs. Third, all other men, including minor 
leaders, village songons and small tradestore owners were 
differentiated only on the basis of first born status.
These trends help illustrate the conceptual distinction between 
material and political prominence. Within Duma, business men, men's 
house leaders, and government officials were often different 
individuals. Although these statuses occasionally coincide, I would 
argue that a division between political and business leaders in Chuave 
naturally arises because the time and effort required to become a 
business man detracts from men's ability to act as political leaders 
and, more important, the wealth held for reinvestment in business 
cannot be given away in exchange. I return to this point later in the 
chapter. First, however, it is necessary to consider the relationship 
between big men and exchange.
Big men and exchange
Chuave and Siane exchange systems involve corporate prestations 
and rely almost exclusively on the local production of food, pigs and 
coffee within the clan. As a clear example of what, after Andrew 
Strathern (1969b), may be called a 'home production' system, Chuave 
pig festivals and other ceremonial exchanges differ from such well 
known 'finance systems' such as the Hagen moka and Enga tee. In
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finance systems men rely, in part, on inter-clan partnerships to amass 
wealth and exchange live pigs that have been acquired in earlier 
transactions.
Chuave men also rely on production to a greater extent than those 
in other Simbu areas to the west. In contrast to the situation in 
Sinasina and central Simbu, Chuave men have continued to resist the 
transfer of live pigs in exchange (see Hide 1980: 162, 526-528). For 
example, Hide notes that Sinasina bridewealth payments have always 
included live pigs. Since 1960, however, the percentage of live pigs 
exchanged has increased and, by 1972, live pigs surpassed the number 
of pigs slaughtered (ibid.: figure 4.5, p. 162). The exchange of 
live pigs allows men to re-allocate the pigs they receive to forth­
coming ceremonies, including major pig festivals. Chuave men laugh 
at the Idea that in other areas men exchange live pigs; they argue that 
all pigs 'must die' and stress that pork fat 'fastens' social 
relationships when exchanged. Thus, ten or more youths from a single 
men's house simultaneously eat the lacerated backside of a single pig, 
thereby demonstrating their solidarity. Chuave brideprices do not 
include pigs. At weddings the bride's closest kinsmen sometimes give 
the groom one or two live pigs, usually as the core of his and his 
wife's future heard. In comparison, clans slaughter, cook and 
exchange 15 to 20 pigs at two separate wedding feasts.
In Chuave inter-clan partnerships were rarely permanent nor were 
they used to link a series of exchange payments over time. In contrast 
to Hagen or central Simbu big men, Chuave leaders do not seem to have 
been energetic traders; they monopolized neither traditional nor post­
contact trade routes (Brown 1978: 196; A. Strathern 1971: 225). Chuave 
men traded freely with maternal and affinal kinsmen on a single 
transaction basis to obtain salt, axes, pigs and shell. Trade was of 
limited importance following major pig festivals, insomuch as men used 
it to rebuild pig herds (see Hide 1980: 433-442). Chuave groups, like 
those in Siane, however, temporarily prohibited pig dealing for as much 
as a year prior to pig festivals by arguing that 'pigs belonged to the 
ancestors'. They also refused to kill small pigs to ensure breeding 
stocks for future herds (Salisbury 1962: 93). Nowadays, men sometimes 
purchase pigs from strangers or friends who receive cash; but all 
valuables ultimately remain home produced, that is, tied to gardening
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or cash cropping.
Chuave pig festivals have declined in importance, scale and 
frequency, in contrast to Hagen moka and Enga tee exchanges which 
have become larger and more competitive. It is difficult to estimate 
the size of traditional pig festivals; but men insist that 'hundreds’ 
of pigs were involved and that each clan member commonly killed between 
three and five pigs. But during the 1970s pig feasts involved the 
killing of only 50 to 70 pigs per clan, that is, less than one pig per 
adult male. Brown has noted the declining frequency of central Simbu 
pig festivals during the 1960s and 1970s and suggests that men's 
increased interest in development and cash cropping are responsible 
for this trend. However, Chuave people themselves argue that the major 
reason for this trend was the effect of missionization on the pig 
festival - an intrinsically religious rather than economic institution 
(cf. Salisbury 1962: 33, 94 n., 1965). It must be noted that other 
Chuave ceremonies - including those that had traditional religious 
significance - have survived and flourished, albeit in a secular form 
(see below). But it was the pig festival that became the focus of 
attacks by mission bosbois and catechists during the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. And present-day Christians - particularly members of 
fundamentalist sects - continue to associate the pig feast with 
paganism and with 'Satan's work'.
A major difference between finance and production systems concerns 
the type and locus of competition occurring between individual big men 
and the groups they represent. Here differences between authors who 
have studied finance systems, as well as between culture areas, make 
generalizations difficult. For example, Meggitt has stressed the 
corporate nature and competition of Mae Enga tee exchanges. He 
notes that the tee is ultimately concerned with the protection of 
clan territory; by making tee, clans not only gain prestige but also 
attract political allies. A big man's power base is firmly entrenched 
in the segmentary structure of the clan. But Meggitt has also 
suggested that, during times of peace when inter-group relations are 
relatively relaxed, inter-clan partnerships may significantly affect a 
big man's support group. At such time a Mae Enga leader needed to draw 
both wealth and support from various outside tee partners, as well 
as agnates, in order to maintain his position in the face of
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competition from clan rivals (1965, 1971a: 198 n.12, 1971b: 200-204).
According to Feil, among the Torabema, a fringe Enga people, group 
ideologies and group performance in exchange are unimportant. In 
comparison with the Mae Enga, however, Tomberaa population densities 
are low. Allies are also attracted on an individual, rather than 
group, basis, and no permanent alliances between clans exist (Feil 
1978a: 33-34). Tombema subclansraen make tee prestations together 
at a common ceremonial ground. But Feil, who conducted his fieldwork 
long after pacification, stresses the significance of individual tee 
partnerships, and argues that Tomberaa men make tee prestations 
without reference to group concerns or co-ordination. A man's surest 
tee supporters, Feil states, are his inter-clan partners: inter-clan
co-operation fuels intra-clan competition, specifically competition 
with a man's closest agnates or subclansraen (1978a: 27, 342-346,
1978b: 221-222).12
In Hagen, pairs of individuals as well as corporate groups make 
moka exchanges. Strathern's analysis, however, is primarily 
concerned with how groups use moka to cement alliances or gain 
temporary superiority over other groups (1972: 129-130, 218-223). But 
in noting the inapplicability of Sahlins' (1963) big man model for 
Hagen, Strathern argues that big men are, to some extent, set free from 
their 'segmentary enclavement' because they can rely on inter-clan 
partnerships to compete against rivals within the clan. Small 
segmentary groups can also hold their own in moka against larger 
groups so long as they have a capable big man who has extensive inter­
clan networks (ibid. 218-223).
Precisely where the locus of competition lies in finance systems 
and whether or not the tee or moka are culturally tilted toward 
the expression of individual or group concerns are important 
questions. I would argue that individual and group concerns are 
intrinsically a part of all highlands exchanges. As a 'game', exchange 
necessarily allows individual players and whole teams to excel, be it a 
clan or, as in Torabema, a group of subclansraen who hold a prestation 
at the same time on the same ceremonial ground.
Different games or variations of a single game may also place
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greater emphasis on group or individual performance. Furthermore, the 
rules of games are subject to change over time. Thus, Hageners have 
increasingly relied on the exchange of pearl shells and, more recently, 
cash in moka. In contrast, the Tomberaa continue to resist using cash 
and to place primary value on the exchange of pigs (see Feil 1982; A. 
Strathern 1979). Inflation and the post-contact extension in exchange 
networks have also produced changes in moka and tee exchanges.
But whether or not post-contact change has produced a major shift in 
the locus of political competition remains in doubt. Meggitt has 
stated that, in the decade immediately following pacification, a number 
of changes - including the rise of western businesses and the increased 
availablity of cash - resulted in the 'progressive erosion' of many of 
the social, political and economic functions of Mae Enga segmentary 
descent groups (1971a: 208). Meggitt does not specifically suggest that 
the pacification of the Mae Enga area led to a shift in emphasis from 
group to individual concerns in tee exchanges. Nor does he state 
that there has been an increase in intra-clan competition in exchange. 
This latter trend, however, would be consistent with his observation 
that, traditionally, big men were able to use tee partnerships to 
unseat rivals during periods of peace.
In Chuave, pairs of agnates, men's house groups or entire clans 
undertake particular exchanges. As in central Simbu production 
exchanges, however, Chuave men organize major prestations involving 
a wide circle of agnates, so as to emphasize group rather than 
individual transactions (cf. Brown 1972: 50, 1978: 229; A. Strathern 
1969b). All corporate exchanges are channelled through one or several 
group representatives; individual contributors are not entitled to 
make speeches or to exchange valuables directly with their inter-clan 
relations (cf. Salisbury 1962: 27). Chuave men display all valuables 
as corporate gifts., They first contribute to their group's gift and 
then representatives transfer valuables either to people in the 
receiving group or, more commonly, to the receiving group's big man.
But as I show below, men's reliance on cash and other modern valuables 
has altered some exchanges so that individuals are now allowed greater 
freedom of action than in the past. At the same time, the size of 
modern Chuave prestations, in conjunction with changes to village 
settlements, makes co-operation between big men belonging to different
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segmentary groups essential.
Although all exchange revolves around relationships created by 
the transfer of women between groups, the Chuave emphasis on corporate 
prestations forces women to the periphery of ceremonial life. Marilyn 
Strathern has noted that Hagen women depend on men for prestige and 
recognition of their productive ability. But although women’s 
participation in exchange is of a private rather than public nature, 
they are key mediators of particular inter-clan partnerships (1972a: 
146-147, 150-153). Andrew Strathern states that, despite the use 
of cash in moka and women’s access to money from marketing produce, 
Hagen men refuse to recognize publicly a woman’s cash contributions 
or allow them direct participation in moka. In Chuave a man's 
contributions to exchange are often as much in aid of his agnates as 
in recognition of inter-clan links created through his marriage, though 
different transactions stress agnatic or non-agnatic ties. Thus, a 
man who gives valuables to his wife's brother may be aided by 
contributions from agnates who have few, if any, direct ties to his 
wife's group. Although a woman's labour is critical in that it often 
produces the wealth that a man uses to help his agnates, women are 
rarely publicly recognized in exchange, nor, to ray knowledge, do they 
determine how their husbands allocate cash, pigs, or produce (see 
chapter five).
As big men mediate major exchanges, it occasionally arises that 
men do not receive the same amount or kind of valuable they give in 
a series of delayed exchanges. Distribution, therefore, is critical 
in Chuave, and political competition revolves around access to 
distribution and the right to act as group representative. In most 
cases, aspiring leaders must use their wealth lavishly and show their 
generosity to agnates before being accorded this privilege. Once 
established as a big man, however, a man controls not only his own 
wealth, but also the wealth of others. It would be incorrect to say 
that leaders gain and maintain followings by using their own wealth 
to obligate others - though this is sometimes true in particular 
leader-follower relationships. Rather, a leader represents a certain 
group and protects their interests in exchange. Thus, over many 
years, several big men may contribute equally to the same exchanges 
or give valuables to the same individuals. In conjunction with a big 
man's gifts, men from an entire men's house group or clan make
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additional, often larger, payments. What is required of an established 
leader is that he ensures that all contributors - even those agnates 
who have not contributed - receive a portion of the return gift. In 
other words, he must ensure that distribution is fair and impartial.
What is not required of big men is the continual use of his own wealth 
or contributions greater than those of other men. It occasionally 
arises that songons or government leaders who are renowned for their 
oratorical skill act as group representatives in exchange. And because 
they have proven leadership abilities men give them the opportunity 
to distribute valuables even though they may have little personal 
wealth or have made only token contributions to their agnates’ 
exchanges. Eventually such men may gain reputations as excellent 
distributors and play a prominent role in most inter- and intra-clan 
exchanges. Such men are exceptions to the rule that a man must prove 
his generosity to kinsmen early in his career. Nonetheless, these men 
serve as examples of the relative importance of distribution over 
contribution in exchange. I would argue, therefore, that a man 
commonly builds a following by using wealth to aid first, his own men's 
house kinsmen and second, men of other houses. Most big men then 
maintain their following by adequately discharging the responsibilities 
of group representative and make only small, token contributions to 
all exchanges. But those men who continue to make lavish use of wealth 
throughout their careers decrease the chance that younger, aspiring 
leaders will supplant them.
Reliance on production in Chuave has meant that small groups have 
undergone gradual incorporation into larger units. The Chuave lineage 
head, for example, was forced to rely on other segmentary units to 
produce sufficient wealth for inflated prestations. It seems that by 
the late 1950s, the aunam's control over distribution had already 
begun to decline. By this time mission activity had undermined both 
the aunam's ritual position and the institution of polygamy. Those 
men - particularly government officials - who had greater access to 
shell during the first decades following contact, or those who could 
increase their productive capacity through polygamous marriages, must 
certainly have been able to solidify their support by protecting their 
lineages' reputation vis-a-vis other groups. They may also have 
attracted followers from beyond their own lineage (cf. Salisbury 1962: 
100). By the late 1950s, however, entire clans attended weddings,
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necessitating the production of food and pigs by a large network of 
agnates, and the productive capacity of individual men, now monogamous, 
must have been relatively equal. The rapid abandonment of polygamy 
by the majority of Chuave men is itself one indication that wealth, 
though important, is not essential for leadership. As I have 
previously argued (chapter two), mission conversion and government 
office were more critical factors in determining political standing 
at this time. I would suggest that by the 1960s when all men had 
access to coffee incomes and when 100 people or more attended even 
baptismal parties given on behalf of male children, the reliance on 
a wide network of agnates was firmly established. The result of this 
process is clear: subclan leaders, often the first born of their
generation, are today the principal group representatives in exchanges, 
and subclans - particularly co-resident subclansraen - are the prominent 
pooling unit for large exchanges. Moreover, major exchanges, those 
revolving around first marriages for example, entail contributions from 
almost all agnates; the result, therefore, is either political 
competition or co-operation between leaders who represent different 
men's house groups, subclans or clans. I later return to other special 
relationships between big men and exchange. First however, I describe 
how 'ordinary' men use exchange to enhance their own and their groups' 
reputations.
The gift of 'first fruits' - uncooked food from a new, previously 
unharvested garden - is a highly esteemed act. Sweet potato comprises 
the bulk of most prestations, but some payments also include yam, taro, 
sugar cane, and nut or oil pandanus. When in season, the two latter 
luxury foods may comprise the entire gift. Individuals, pairs of 
agnatic groups, and entire clans undertake these exchanges. For 
brevity's sake, I describe only the smallest and largest of these 
prestations.
A man, with the aid of agnates, harvests a portion of a new garden 
or the entire plot over a one or two day period. After harvesting, 
they decorate yams or other special food with flowers and vines, and 
then carry the food - as much as 300 kilograms - to the recipients' 
men's house square, and display it in a single pile. Although these 
gifts are occasionally considered betrothal payments for very young 
children, people realize a child is in no way bound by the payment.
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Rat h e r  , t h e  g i f t  i s  a symbol of  p r i o r  and p o t e n t i a l  m a r r i a g e s  be tw een  
d i f f e r e n t  f a m i l i e s .  The r e c i p i e n t ,  u s u a l l y  a w i f e ’ s b r o t h e r  o r  
c l a s s i f a c t o r y  m o t h e r ' s  b r o t h e r ,  r a r e l y  d i s t r i b u t e s  food u n l e s s  he i s  
a b ig  man. Subc lan  l e a d e r s  o f t e n  d i s t a n c e  th em s e lv e s  f rom t h e  food 
p i l e  u n t i l  t h e y  a r e  c a l l e d  upon a t  two s t a g e s :  f i r s t ,  t o  d e l i v e r
s p e e c h e s  t h a n k i n g  th e  v i s i t o r s  and p r o m is in g  a r e t u r n  g i f t ,  and second 
to  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  f o o d ,  o f t e n  a f t e r  t h e  v i s i t o r s  have l e f t  t h e  v i l l a g e .  
Big men a t t e m p t  t o  e n s u r e  a l l  p e o p le  a t t e n d i n g  r e c e i v e  some f o o d ,  bu t  
a l l o c a t e  o i l  and nu t  pandanus  to  men who w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  to  a r e t u r n  
p r e s t a t i o n ,  f o r  n o t  a l l  men own t h e s e  t r e e  c r o p s .  With t h i s  e x c e p t i o n ,  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  r e c i p i e n t  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  p l a n t i n g  a new g a r d e n ,  
s u f f i c i e n t  i n  s i z e  to  p r o v i d e  an e q u a l  o r  s l i g h t l y  l a r g e r  r e t u r n  p r e s t ­
a t i o n .  O c c a s i o n a l l y ,  no fo rm a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o c c u r s ;  pe op le  s im p ly  g r a b  
food from the  p i l e  as  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  s t a n d s  i d l e .
In  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  most  e l a b o r a t e  p r e s t a t i o n  i n v o l v e s  t h e  d e l a y e d  
exchange  o f  a s  much as  10 t o n n e s  o f  food from communal g a r d e n s  p l a n t e d  
by ' f r i e n d l y '  c l a n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h o s e  g roups  who have c l o s e l y  i n t e r ­
m a r r i e d  o r  wish to  e n c o u ra g e  f u r t h e r  i n t e r m a r r i a g e .  Clans  o f  t h e  same 
s u b t r i b e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r a r e l y  a r e  i n  a d o n o r - r e c i p i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
Accord ing  to  some men, t h e s e  c e re m o n ie s  were f o r m e r l y  used  to  cement  
w a r f a r e  a l l i a n c e s ;  b u t  o t h e r s  r e j e c t e d  t h i s  i d e a ,  and a l l  examples  of  
exchange  p a r t n e r s h i p s  I  c o l l e c t e d  i n c l u d e d  groups  who had been  e ne m ies ,  
as  w e l l  a s  a l l i e s ,  ove r  t h e  y e a r s .  Insomuch as  t h e s e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
promote good r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  g roups  and h e l p  c r e a t e  o r  r e - a f f i r m  
a f f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h e y  r e s e m b le  t h e  s e c u l a r  food f e s t i v a l s  found i n  
c e n t r a l  Simbu and Wahgi ( s e e  Brown 1972:  146-147;  Reay 1959:  8 6 - 8 9 ) .  
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  however ,  Chuave and S iane  f i r s t  f r u i t s  c e re m o n ie s  were 
a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  r e l i g i o u s  e v e n t s  h e l d  in  honour  of  t h e  a n c e s t r a l  s p i r i t s  
and aimed a t  p romot ing  t h e  f e r t i l i t y  o f  c l a n  l a n d .  S a l i s b u r y  has  
d e s c r i b e d  t h e  f e r t i l i t y  r i t e s  which used to  p r e c e d e  p r e s t a t i o n s  (1962:  
32 -33 ,  1965: 6 4 - 6 5 ) .  Here I  n o t e  o n l y  t h a t ,  in  Chuave and S i a n e ,  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a f f i n a l  t i e s  be tw een  g roups  was f o r m a l l y  e x p r e s s e d  when 
young unm ar r ied  women from t h e  r e c e i v i n g  group  v i s i t e d  t h e  h o s t  c l a n  
en m asse  t o  pe r fo rm  c o u r t s h i p  da n c es  f o r  s e v e r a l  days p r i o r  to  the  
p r e s t a t i o n .  These c o r p o r a t e  exchanges  and t h e i r  accompanying ceremony,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  were in  many ways a n a lo g o u s  to  b e t r o t h a l  e xchanges  of  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  s y m b o l i z i n g  p a s t  and p o t e n t i a l  m a r r i a g e s  be tw een  c l a n s .
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Today these major food prestations - like those to the west - are 
secular affairs that involve entire tribes or clans from other census 
divisions and sometimes coincide with inter-clan sports competitions.
In 1981, for example, Koigam and Marime initiated a prestation to 
Koraodurumo and Supagam. Komodurumo had held a prestation for Marime 
about 1968, which had been returned in 1974 or 1975. A Marime intra­
clan distribution which recognized agnatic aid in past exchanges and 
everyday tasks preceded the inter-clan prestation. These gifts do not 
cancel agnatic 'debts'. Indeed, this is impossible because most 
agnatic aid requires no specific return. People consumed intra-clan 
gifts or used them to increase inter-clan prestations.
The following day, the major exchange occurred at Tiene Maima's 
(of Marime) tavern site. Supagam and Komodurumo big men led their 
respective clans into the clearing to dance around Marime and Koigam's 
clan displays. The formal prestation, lasting six hours, involved well 
over 1,000 separate prestations - from a single yam or oil pandanus 
to disc-shaped parcels of sweet potato weighing about 100 kilograms. 
Attached to each gift was a tag that named the donor and recipient. 
Recipient clans received food at staggered intervals, with speeches 
made prior to each clan distribution; Komodurumo and Supagam, the last 
and largest recipients, received about 60 per cent of all the food 
given. Six other Duma clans, as well as clans from Gomia, Mara and 
Nambaiyufa received the remaining food. All gifts were passed first 
between clan representatives - though not necessarily major big men - 
before reaching designated recipients, who constantly shouted accolades 
of wanoba-bee ('big thanks') or mandemande ('ground-ground') to 
acknowledge that a return payment will be quickly forthcoming. 'Free 
piles', donated by men without specified recipients, were also given to 
some clans. As in individual prestations, people who have not received 
food rush the pile and claim parcels. Men state that, in the past, 
inter-clan exchanges were occasionally comprised entirely of these 
corporate gifts.
The size of this prestation and the confusion surrounding 
individual transactions make generalizations difficult. Errors are 
certainly made: men complain that gifts are given to the wrong person.
This is not surprising given that men belonging to the same clan have 
the same or similar names, and that literate youths, charged with
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reading tags, frequently become frazzled by the pace and length of the 
prestation. However, I will note that reliance on communal gardens 
ensures that individual contributions are relatively equal. The 
contributions of Marime big men were neither larger nor more numerous 
than those of other men. Tiene Maima, however, received praise for 
his prowess in organizing the ceremony and for special gifts, which 
included betel nut and coconut purchased in Lae. The amount of food 
received, of course, varies considerably according to whether or not 
men have close relations in the host clan. Thus, 14 Keukobu men did 
not receive any food; in contrast, several men received over ten gifts 
totalling several hundred kilograms, which were redistributed to less 
fortunate agnates. Martin, Keukobu's leader, had expected to be well- 
recognized although he had only one direct tie to Marime, his mother's 
brother. As the prestation proceeded, he became increasingly agitated 
as his name failed to be called, and he finally left the central 
ceremonial area. As the distribution drew to a close, he received 
eight parcels from a Marime magistrate, Tiene Maima and Tiene's family. 
Although the total size of his gift was by no means exceptional, the 
timing of the prestation, prearranged by Tiene and unknown to Martin, 
enhanced his reputation as Komodurumo's major big man.
As described by Keukobu men, the return prestation highlights the 
corporate nature of this ceremony. Komodurumo men had planted a 
communal garden - about 20 hectares - realizing that a return 
prestation would be required. Because of Komodurumo's particular kin 
network, the core of the return payment is given to Marime and Koigam, 
but additional gifts are distributed to kin in other Duma and non-Duma 
clans. It may take years, even a decade, for all gifts to be returned. 
Kaupagam men may return individual prestations at any time or wait 
until Kaupagam sponsors a corporate payment to a clan other than Koigam 
or Marime. If the prestation is a corporate one, men repay debts 
incurred at the 1981 prestation and create new debts among Kaupagam's 
particular kin network. First fruits ceremonies, therefore, enable 
clans to signal special corporate relationships with other groups, even 
while expressing over time, a man's kin ties in several widely 
dispersed clans.
Men also gain status by acting as sponsors or 'fathers' of feasts 
and payments on occasions such as opening a tradestore or purchasing
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a car and on behalf of male children or aged kinsmen. I have provided 
detail on these ceremonies elsewhere (Warry 1982). Unambitious men 
may never hold a major feast or payment. Instead, they make small 
informal payments to agnates, maternal and affinal kinsmen, and 
contribute to others’ ceremonies and so gain recognition as good, if 
not exceptional men.
A man and his close agnates sometimes raise major cash payments 
to give to inter-clan kin at feasts. A variety of cooked food, pork 
and beer, however, is given to a wider circle of non-agnates and 
simultaneously to agnates throughout the clan. Consequently, 
feasts significantly affect a sponsor’s reputation within and beyond 
the clan. Contributions of cash (used to buy tobacco and store foods), 
pork and beer come primarily from the sponsor's lineage and co-resident 
subclansmen. These, along with the sponsor’s own contribution, are 
displayed together in the men's house, and the men's house leader or 
the sponsor’s subclan leader formally distributes the gifts to agnates 
and non-agnatic visitors. Over 100 people attend large feasts.
In this way men greatly enhance their status and gain partial 
access to distribution. A sponsor, for example, decides which of his 
closest inter-clan kin or distant agnates should receive large amounts 
of pork and beer. Big men, however, ensure the sponsor’s agnatic 
reserve wealth is used to provide for all non-contributors, giving 
especially large gifts to big men of other men's houses and the 
visitors' clan. Big men also cajole or coerce the sponsor’s closest 
agnates into making contributions to protect the group’s prestige and, 
in exceptional instances, kill their own pigs when unexpectedly large 
numbers of guests attend. A single feast does not entitle men to 
control others’ distributions. Rather, the signature of an aspiring 
big man is the sponsorship of a series of feasts. In the interim, of 
course, skilled distributors take responsiblity for a variety of other 
men’s feasts. Established leaders often oppose aspiring big men 
sponsoring their own feast. Although a man needs at least the minimal 
support of his own lineage to contemplate sponsoring a major ceremony, 
the support of subclansmen or other co-residents is seldom assured.
As a result, young men are sometimes forced to spend K100 or more to 
buy tobacco, food and beer to guarantee their ceremony's success and 
prove their independence from other leaders. They must also make
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lavish gifts of beer and pork to rival big men within and outside the 
clan to ensure that, at future feasts, they will be publicly recognized 
by leaders controlling or influencing distribution.
A man and woman's first marriage rarely passes without elaborate 
celebrations. Marriage exchanges also best demonstrate the complex 
relationship between individual and group co-operation and competition. 
Bridewealth payments and wedding feasts usually occur during the coffee 
flush (May to August) when men have ready access to large amounts 
of cash. Bridewealth is essentially a corporate gift disguising 
individual performance and focussing attention on the strength of men's 
house groups, and ultimately, the entire clan. The groom and his 
father contribute a core payment of about one-fifth of the whole or 
approximately K250. Men's house groups make corporate cash 
contributions. Thus, in one Kaupagam payment totalling Kl,200 the 
groom and his father contributed K226, their men's house group, Aragor, 
K480, and Mamgram and Korowa K240 and K160 respectively. Four 
Tabiagam friends donated the remaining K54. These corporate 
contributions hide individual donations which range from K1 to K40. 
Small contributions are sometimes made surreptitiously, but a man can 
easily discover which agnates have made significant payments and have 
donated plumes. However, men stress that this generalized aid 
eliminates the need for repayment of particular gifts. It is absurd, 
as well as almost impossible, therefore, for a groom or his father to 
feel obliged to repay individual contributors: they are indebted not
to particular agnates but to all clansmen. Consequently, only inter­
clan donations are repaid.
This practice also prevented me from gathering a complete list 
of all contributors to any payment. On three occasions, however, I 
obtained information on a substantial portion - about three-quarters 
- of the total bridewealth. Despite possible inaccuracies and 
variation between payments, there are three general points I wish to 
make. First, as in the above example, the groom's men's house is the 
principal pooling unit. Second, virtually all of a man's co-residents 
and about three-quarters of all clansmen make some token donation. 
Songons, government officials, men's house leaders and business men 
all made contributions to each payment. Their contributions, however, 
were substantial - K10 or more - only when the groom was a member of
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their own subclan or men's house. Third, a man and his lineage donate 
about 30 to 35 per cent of the payment, and other subclansraen an 
additional 40 to 50 per cent. Men of opposite doors and non-agnates 
give the remainder - about one-quarter - of the payment.
Bridewealth distribution never parallels the method of collection. 
Plumes and cash are displayed in the centre of the men's house square; 
the bride's father and one or two big men huddle around the valuables 
and call people from the periphery of the yard to the centre to receive 
their portion of the pay. All men who will kill pigs at the bride's 
feast receive K50 to K70, depending on the size of the promised pig.
Big men attempt to limit these payments so that between K500 and K800 
is allocated to pig givers. Members of the bride's immediate family 
receive K50 to K200. Between K200 and K400 is left for individual and 
men's house payments. Men's houses receive K30 to K50, and individuals 
K2 to K20 on the basis of their prior relationships with the bride's 
father. One or two plumes accompany all major cash payments. Great 
leeway exists for big men to slight men or to bestow small gifts to 
supporters. Several leaders told me that bridewealth, if properly 
distributed, should yield at least K50, which they give to their 
closest supporters.
Bridewealth distributions are the source of great tension between 
rival leaders and between the bride's father and his clansmen. Men 
say that just as a person should not kill, butcher or eat his own pig 
least he draw attention to his own wealth and 'feel shame', so too men 
should not distribute their daughters' bridewealth. In fact, the 
bride's father makes most decisions at these distributions. But even 
when a big man's daughter marries, lesser leaders or even rival big 
men act as representatives. The presence of a leader who is not 
closely related to the bride is itself the sign of fair and just 
distributions, and because lesser men cannot confront a leader in 
public, clan solidarity is publicly maintained to visitors from other 
clans witnessing the distribution. The choice of a big man, however, 
also gives rise to problems; consequently, a single subclan leader 
usually takes primary responsibility for these affairs, allowing rival 
big men to remain close to the valuables or to participate in the 
complex decision-making that occurs.
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But because these occasions present an ideal opportunity for men 
to prove their ability or their rival's expendability, men sometimes 
insist on acting alone. Miscalculations prove disastrous, and public 
criticism is almost assured as other big men, feeling slighted, 
encourage sarcastic remarks or outright confrontations. For example, 
Peter - a potential replacement for Mama as subclan leader - refused 
to allow any Kaupagam big man a part in the distribution of his 
daughter's bridewealth. Unfortunately, he miscalculated by giving K100 
or more to several men willing to kill their pigs, and K180 for his 
son's pig. He also gave exceptionally small men's house payments and 
totally neglected two men who were to contribute pigs. Criticisms, 
open arguments, refusals to accept insufficient payments resulted and 
another of Peter's daughters and two of his lineage mates attacked him 
physically. Even though Peter disassociated himself from later 
distributions during the wedding feasts and relied on Martin and Dege 
to act as his representative, his reputation was irreparably damaged.
Wedding feasts involve the delayed exchange of food, pork, beer 
and cash. The two feasts, held in the bride's and then the groom's 
village, are separated by a period of one or two weeks allowing the 
groom's agnates to pick coffee and obtain cash to return the beer.
A bride is formally given to her husband’s agnates at the first of 
these feasts and thereafter resides in her husband's village. Bride- 
receivers commonly give greater amounts of beer and pork than bride- 
givers. At each feast the guests - over 200 people - enter the hosts' 
village en masse singing songs which recount prior relationships 
between the two clans. Visitors then sit in the courtyard opposite 
their hosts and immediately receive food prepared by women from several 
men's house groups.
Pig contributions for either feast are also influenced by group 
membership and residence. The groom and bride's father's men's house 
groups invariably give about one-half of all pigs. Lineage mates 
account for about 25 per cent of all pigs, subclansraen contribute an 
additional 45 to 50 per cent and non-agnates and distant agnates donate 
the remaining pigs. The extent to which the gift of pigs creates debts 
or diffuse obligation is difficult to judge. The bride's father's 
obligation to return agnates' pigs is partially alleviated by his gift 
of bridewealth and by the pork and beer pig contributors receive at
- 134-
the return feast. A groom and his father are clearly more indebted. 
Although they give major portions of pork and whole cartons of beer to 
men who will kill pigs at the groom’s feast, the need to provide for 
all agnates means that, although men may receive equal amounts of beer, 
the amount of pork they receive is seldom as much as they gave. Men 
say only the bride's father and the groom or his father must first give 
shoats or kill pigs to return those given by non-agnates or by 
distant agnates. Pigs given by co-residents or lineage mates are 
dismissed as part and parcel of the mutual aid that occurs over time.
A man's closest agnates criticize him, therefore, only if he 
consistently fails to kill pigs or contribute in other ways to the 
exchange commitments of those men who have aided him at marriage. Men, 
however, sometimes contribute pigs to their age-mates' weddings with 
the explicit understanding that the groom will contribute to their own 
marriages.
Pork is also a corporate gift, controlled by the bride and groom's 
father in conjunction with big men. Again, leaders attempt to ensure 
pork is properly divided to provide for all guests and to allocate 
special gifts to every big man, including those in attendance from 
unrelated clans.
In contrast, beer exchanges resemble the first fruits ceremony, 
by including both corporate and individual transactions. Each carton 
of beer is marked with the names of the giver and receiver, and stacked 
in men's house or clan displays, visibly demonstrating intra-clan 
divisions or clan solidarity. For example, Kopon used Korowa's 
disenchantment with Peter's bridewealth distribution to insist on a 
separate Korowa beer display and prestation at the wedding feast. 
Keukobu, Mamgrara and Aragor combined in single prestation under the 
direction of Dege and Martin. Martin's involvement was both a natural 
development of his influence in the village, and necessary in order to 
recognize publicly Komodurumo contributions.
Each carton of beer, along with tobacco and small cash payments, 
is transferred between group representatives before being given to the 
designated recipients who further distribute their beer by the single 
bottle. When the total prestation is considered, the net result is 
an overlapping of hundreds of individual gifts as men give their beer
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to, and receive beer from, a wide circle of agnates. Women sometimes 
donate beer but only men publicly receive it and women consume beer 
only when their husbands who control cartons specifically give it to 
them. The bride and groom’s closest agnates, and men having no direct 
ties to the visiting clan, give beer to the bride and groom's father. 
Consequently these men control more beer than others, and in con­
junction with big men, distribute whole cartons or individual bottles 
as they see fit - often using beer for competitive drinking bouts or 
to provide what is called in Pidgin ’profit’ beer, that is, beer 
additional to that which a man directly receives from his inter-clan 
kin. To ensure large gifts, the bride and groom's fathers usually 
spend as much as K100 on beer. Yet, at Peter's daughter's marriage, 
the father of the groom, an ex-tultul, spent about K1,000 to purchase 
100 cartons. He used 16 of these to return the gifts he had personally 
received at the bride's feast, but gave the remainder as 'profit' beer 
to Kaupagam men. As a result, many of Peter's agnates and Peter 
himself, received more beer than they had given, and all Kaupagam and 
Komodurumo big men each controlled several cartons. This leader's 
reputation for generosity was immensely enhanced by this act; his 
gifts, however, created no obligation for informal or formal repayments 
by Kaupagam receivers.
When beer first entered wedding feasts, it was a corporate gift.
As the quantities of beer increased, however, men insisted on making 
individual gifts to inter-clan kinsmen. These are returned tit for 
tat and differentiate agnates. Most men buy one or two cartons for 
inter-clan kinsmen, or conversely, ensure these are returned. Aspiring 
big men belonging to the bride's clan, however, use weddings to buy 
up to seven cartons of beer, which are given to a range of 
classificatory kin. At the return feast, they then receive these back 
and control the beer's distribution, using small gifts or whole cartons 
to extend their support in other men's house groups.
Beer exchanges are highly competitive. Entire clans, encouraged 
by big men, may leave wedding feasts early to show dissatisfaction with 
the size of beer gifts. Conversely, a clan and a clan's big men 
greatly enhance their reputations if dusk to dawn drinking occurs.
The most successful wedding feasts entail virtual sobriety for the 
host clan, and wide-spread drunkenness for the visiting clan, who have
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unopened beer left over that they consume over subsequent days.
The use of beer also highlights some special relationships between 
different types of leaders and exchange. As I have argued elsewhere, 
men use the cover of drunkenness as an excuse to confront big men 
openly and to air all kinds of grievances against agnates and fellow 
kinsmen in other clans (Warry 1982). Ensuing quarrels and physical 
assaults, often caused by the particular pattern of distribution, 
result in weddings being the most raucous of Chuave ceremonies. 
Consequently, men's house leaders and songons request village court 
magistrates and peace officers to attend any ceremony involving beer. 
Officials belonging to the host clan, moreover, use their government 
status to act as consultants or enforcers of particular distributions, 
and to give public speeches on the need for peaceful and co-operative 
behaviour. Magistrates maintain a higher profile than other leaders 
throughout the entire feast.
Magistrates also use their position to assume almost total control 
over divorce and bridewealth repayments, as well as death payments (see 
chapter six). Death payments rarely occur; they are given to a tribe 
or clan when one of its members has been murdered or killed in battle. 
When they arise, however, payments are large - as much as K3,000 and 
ten pigs. Because the chance of revenge killings or open warfare is 
enormous, magistrates take full responsibility for setting the size 
of payments, overseeing distribution and threatening men with jail 
terms or fines at the slightest show of hostility. In conjunction 
with the deceased's closest agnates, they distribute valuables to 
individuals and make corporate payments to men's house groups. When a 
member of another tribe kills a person of a magistrate's own tribe, 
magistrates ensure distribution covers the entire tribal area; each 
men's house group is allotted a portion of the pay in order to 
forestall tensions arising at future inter-clan or inter-tribal 
meetings.
All deaths thrust songons or other church leaders into the 
centre of public life. As upholders of Christian ideology and 
practice, they make concerted attacks on traditional mourning 
behaviour, attempt to prohibit mortuary payments and the raiding of 
gardens, and insist on maintaining a reverent atmosphere at mortuary
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feasts. Although most Lutherans drink alcohol, songons discourage 
the use of beer or the killing of pigs at death. People circumvent 
these beliefs by sponsoring parties for aged kinsmen - traditionally 
unknown - at which beer, pork and cash payments are distributed. The 
gift of pork at mortuary feasts, which are actually a combined feast 
and church service, is very rare. Songons control cash contributions 
by men’s house groups, using some of the money to purchase store foods 
for immediate consumption, and saving some for church projects such 
as wire fencing for graveyards.
Big men and the deceased's close agnates, however, often insist 
on purchasing beer. Tension and trauma surrounding the death of 
prominent men, in particular, is hard to contain and leads to con­
frontation between songons and other leaders. Because the death of 
prominent men must be lavishly commemorated, songons are usually the 
losers in these confrontations, resulting in the distribution of both 
beer and pork. When a Church leader dies, however, mourners pay honour 
to these men in a very different way, by strictly adhering to church 
dogma to the extent that all big men within the clan and community 
actively discourage bereavement songs, public shows of mourning and 
gifts of beer and pork.
Despite these special relationships and the individual variation 
of ceremonies, several generalizations are possible. Competition in 
exchange takes place simultaneously within and between clans over long 
periods. Within the clan, consistently large contributions and the 
sponsorship of particular payments and feasts differentiate segmentary 
groups, men’s houses and individuals. All individual competition or 
one-upmanship, however, enhances the size of corporate payments, and 
inevitably fuels inter-clan rivalries. Underlying this competition 
are the principles that a wide circle of agnates co-operate in 
exchange, that mutual aid is as important as individual achievement, 
and that a man enhances group prestige by his own actions.
Inter-clan relationships are important in particular exchanges, 
though it would be misleading to call these dyads partnerships. In a 
delayed exchange or series of exchanges, a man who is generous to non­
agnates or uses a wide network of inter-clan kinsmen eventually 
receives valuables that can be distributed to agnates to gain prestige,
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and ultimately political support. Invariably, however, exchanges occur 
with a series of different clans, often those standing in a wife- 
giver/wife-receiver relationship. Consequently, some men are dis­
advantaged and others advantaged according to whether or not they have 
close kin ties to the guests present.
Established big men in each clan have a natural advantage in 
exchange; they are the focus of almost all transactions regardless of 
their particular inter-clan dyads. To the extent that a big man gives 
to or receives gifts from inter-clan kin in situations divorced from 
his representative role, he is on equal footing with others and must 
produce sufficient wealth to meet his obligations. But a few big men 
in each clan also gain partial or complete control over the wealth 
others exchange; they ensure and symbolize equitable distribution and 
protect the interests of all contributors. The expanding scale of some 
prestations, therefore, means that big men representing different 
groups are forced to co-operate or face the withdrawal of aid by other 
groups. Kopon's insistence on a Korowa distribution at Peter's 
daughter's marriage, for example, was a contributing factor to a 
boycott by Mamgram men of a wedding feast held on behalf of a Korowa 
bride the following coffee season. This type of intra-clan 
competition, therefore, can lead to reduction in the size of a clan's 
prestations and seriously endanger a group's reputation.
At the corporate level, exchange does not create reciprocal 
transactions between clans. Rather, each group is involved in numerous 
exchanges with many clans over time. Particular inter-clan ceremonies 
are often unbalanced: wife-givers gain more than wife-receivers. What
is necessary, therefore, is attention to the size of prestations with 
different groups over time; clans strive for long-term balance in 
ceremonial activity and in the amounts of valuables exchanged, or else 
risk criticisms which lead to open confrontations or the abandonment 
of corporate exchange relationships. Inter-clan exchange is thus 
characterized by short-term imbalance in particular ceremonies, and 
long-term balance in a series of exchanges.
Bisnis before politics
The western and indigenous sectors of the Chuave economy are
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intrinsically linked by common commodities, individual choice and by 
ideology. ’Fathers of stores', like the father of a feast, enhance 
both their own and their group's reputations by successfully 
manipulating wealth. Likewise men say women are similar to stores 
because they bring wealth, first to their fathers and second, to their 
fathers' agnates. Occasionally, men use their own and their immediate 
families' portion of bridewealth as capital to construct small stores. 
Adolescents, influenced by western ideas of marriage, suggest that 
both the bride and groom's clans should contribute 'bridewealth' solely 
to the married couple so that they could build western-style houses 
or start small businesses. Yet some men build tradestores only to find 
that the time and effort required to manage it properly, or the 
persistent demands of kinsmen to share in profits, outweigh the 
material benefits of store ownership. Such men may then decide to rid 
themselves of this burden and convert their wealth into prestige by 
sponsoring a feast, totally depleting their cash reserves or store 
stocks in the process.
These facts help introduce a nagging problem bisnis men and to a 
lesser extent all men face. Wealth is given away to produce status 
in exchange. Those who 'tightly hold' (save or consume) their own 
wealth are subject to the criticism that their personal success or well­
being has been accomplished at the expense of others. At feasts, for 
example, men often ignore the traditional prohibition against eating 
pork one or one's close age-mate contributed. Those renowned for their 
generosity, however, follow this rule and also refuse to drink beer 
they have purchased. The mediation of big men, of course, prevents 
criticism. A man who contributes to a corporate gift and then receives 
beer or pork from this same reserve cannot be accused of being 
ungenerous; it was the big man's, and not his own decision, that he 
consume wealth. But at a wedding feast, those individuals who give 
beer to affines, and later receive a return gift can be criticized as 
having solicited beer for their own consumption; hence the common, 
though not universal practice, of redistributing individual cartons 
received.
The bisnis man's dilemma is of a different nature. Indirectly, 
tradestores and PMV operations still continue to reflect positively 
on a clan's or community's relative prosperity vis-a-vis other groups,
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to the extent that one of the entrepreneur's most basic fears is that 
inter-clan jealousy may result in theft, looting or destruction of his 
vehicle or store, should open hostility between groups arise. But 
constantly underlying the entrepreneur's career is the potentially 
dangerous, and in some ways contradictory, assumption by agnates that 
his personal, financial success has been accomplished at the expense 
of group interests. As a man's material possessions increase, so too 
does the visible distinction between wealth that is saved or 'tightly 
held' versus that which he gives away or the group as a whole consumes.
A common criticism of a successful business man is that he 'lifts up 
his own name'. In contrast, group representatives who distribute 
valuables, organize ceremonies and make public speeches lift up the 
'name' of the entire clan or community.
Men often argue that the time a business man spends outside his 
community or tending his store prevents him from adequately carrying 
out the duties of elected office. Few entrepreneurs contemplate running 
for village court office. As I show in chapter six, these officials 
are constantly on call, and only the most industrious man can allocate 
sufficient time to undertake both bisnis and village court 
responsibilities. In the past, village councillors, who constantly 
heard village disputes, may have used this argument. Today, however, 
councillors use the critique of self-interest against business men who 
wish to run for public office. They argue that a bisnis man should 
not be allowed access to public funds, and say that stores or other 
enterprises are visible proof that money will be misappropriated for 
personal use and not used for the benefit of all. As previously noted 
(chapter three), government officials also face this same criticism 
from rivals. But when such accusations are made against councillors, 
they react by publicly pointing out that they lack material wealth or 
by disclaiming interest in entrepreneurial activities.
This belief partially explains why people say a bisnis man 
should not 'double work' by holding an elected office. Other related 
but practical considerations help explain why entrepreneurs are often 
ineffective political leaders. Few men have the industry, ambition 
or acumen to juggle successfully the demands of kinsmen, and so become 
both an exchange leader as well as a bisnis man. It is difficult 
for aspiring leaders to build and manage tradestores large enough to
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corape te with other businesses, while simultaneously reserving enough 
of their income to sponsor ceremonies and so become group repre­
sentatives. Established big men, in contrast, often say that their 
’work' - that is, lavish ceremonial expenditures - are finished by the 
time they are 35 or 40 years old, and that they may now turn their 
attention to starting a business. Such late starts, however, mean a 
man's chances of building a competitive business are remote. Moreover, 
established leaders have sufficient status so that any material 
benefits a business would bring are superfluous and, to some extent, 
might detract from their reputations as men who are concerned with 
group, rather than personal, success.
It follows, therefore, that politically unambitious men more 
easily succeed in entrepreneurial activities. At a very general level,
I would argue that those men who are unconcerned with acting as group 
representatives or with controlling distributions are able to avoid 
sponsoring ceremonies and so ensure sufficient savings to re-invest 
in expanding entrepreneurial activities. Taking a specific example, 
credit buying, I would suggest that only those business men who are 
unafraid of alienating agnates or unconcerned with maintaining a wide 
following, are capable of refusing credit or insisting - on threat of 
court action - that debts be repaid.
In contrast, young men who have little blsnis experience occa­
sionally become elected as councillors on the basis of their development 
outlook. Councillors argue that it was only through government efforts 
that coffee was planted or that roads were built, thereby enabling the 
rise of small scale businesses. Those councillors who bring an aidpost 
or school to their areas, who succeed in obtaining coffee machines for 
clansmen, or who obtain contract work for a business man's trucking 
operation, therefore, claim that they work on behalf of all men's 
prosperity. Moreover, because these individuals are elected 
representatives and skilled orators, they sometimes assume a central 
role in intra- and inter-clan exchanges. Their control over 
distribution, however, remains limited unless they have a proven 
ability in exchange. Thus, Kopon frequently controlled Korowa 
distributions and always took primary responsibility for organizing 
Korowa contributions; he was not, however, known as a skilled 
distributor, and as a result, his role in Mamgram and Aragor exchanges
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was second to Dege and to other minor big men who had proven ability 
as distributors. In contrast, Martin had been appointed komiti in 
the late 1960s, even before he was married, on the basis of his 
experience with wage labour and his association with several kiaps.
From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, he had sponsored several 
exchanges which are still remembered for their size and for the extent 
of his personal contributions. He became renowned as the most skilled 
distributor in Keu, and despite the fact his contributions to current 
exchanges were smaller than other men's, he was frequently called upon 
to control exchanges in Mamgram, as well as Keukobu.
Inevitably, a few astute and extremely industrious men succeed 
in balancing the demands of both the exchange and western business 
sectors. Their businesses reach a take-off point where profit margins 
are sufficiently large to meet exchange commitments to kinsmen and to 
ensure continued growth of PMV or store operations. Three brief 
examples will help illustrate the range of behaviour that occurs in 
such cases.
Bobiange has a reputation as a constant, generous contributor to 
his agnates' exchanges. His personal beliefs, however, limit his 
effectiveness as a political leader. Because he is a leader of the 
New Tribes mission, he refused to sell cigarettes or beer in his store, 
nor will he give these commodities in any exchange situation. 
Politically unambitious, he has persistently denied that he has either 
the time or desire to run for office. In exchanges and public meetings 
he remains at the periphery of all distributions and rarely speaks.
In everyday life, he is somewhat of a loner, rarely appearing at the 
men's house and always sleeping in his own house. His constant 
attention to his agnates and the community's needs, however, means that 
he is well-respected. He is Duma's aid post orderly, freely 
provides transportation to a number of small business men, gives close 
agnates free rides to Goroka and consistently contributes to Kaupagam 
and Komodurumo exchanges. Moreover, because he is not perceived as 
a threat to other leaders, Keu men rarely criticize him as self- 
interested. What wealth Bobiange gives to Kaupagam men only detracts 
from other big men's ability to gain stable political followings by 
creating economic obligations.
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Tiene Maima, in contrast, has some, though limited, political 
ambitions. He dominates Marime exchanges and other Marime leaders, 
including government officials, and is also one of the most prominent 
songons in the Chuave area. The epitome of a clan representative,
Tiene has long eschewed elected office, stating correctly that his 
Pidgin speaking ability is poor in comparison to other men and that 
his business and exchange commitments require most of his time and 
labour. His son, however, has publicly stated his desire to run in 
the 1987 national elections, and will undoubtedly receive lavish 
financial support from his father. Tiene's brother - a Lutheran pastor 
- and another lineage kinsmen, have both attempted to run for council 
with Tiene's public support and some financial backing. Both were 
defeated by non-Marime candidates. In 1981, Tiene decided to run for 
council, primarily for business-related reasons. After spending K10,800 
on his tavern, the council told him that his bid for a liquor licence 
might be rejected because non-Lutherans complained that the tavern was 
located too close to Keu primary school. He then decided to run for 
council in order to use council and provincial contacts to influence 
the Liquor Licensing Commission. Despite the criticism of self- 
interest by rivals, Tiene's victory was never in doubt, though voting 
patterns clearly show that Tiene's major support was within Marime and 
not ward-wide (see appendix). Both preceding and following the vote, 
Tiene gave parties involving distributions of beer and store foods to 
ensure voters' support.
Mori Au, of Karaara, Elimbari Council President, is also a major 
business man. Fire destroyed his store, one of the largest in Chuave, 
in an obvious act of arson in 1980. Following the fire, speculation 
raged throughout Chuave concerning the responsible parties - who were 
never discovered - and the reasons for the act. Mori Au himself 
claimed members of other Kamara clans were responsible. Duma men, and 
some of Mori Au's own agnates, suggested that Mori Au's own clansmen or 
rivals, jealous of his success, were to blame. Duma men stated simply 
that Mori Au, then Vice-President, had become too influential, that his 
clan was noted for its intense political rivalry, and that Mori Au had 
ignored commitments to fellow clansmen in order to lift up his own 
name. Mori Au rebuilt his store and fully stocked it in a few short 
months - a fact which led to widespread criticism that Mori Au had 
misappropriated council funds. Mori Au's clan fiercely denied
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these criticisms, which were, to my knowledge, groundless; the store 
had been insured and Mori Au had sufficient cash reserves to recover 
from this personal disaster. Moreover, Mori Au's intra-clan support 
was sufficient enough for him to be re-elected in 1981.^
Nonetheless, the incident demonstrates people's suspicions and mistrust 
of the councillor-entrepreneur and, as important, the ability of some 
leaders to ignore or overcome widespread criticism of their actions.
Chuave exchange and entrepreneurial activities remain male- 
dominated. Men formally control valuables, and ceremonial or western- 
style business success remains concerned with male, not female, 
prestige and political influence. Men's comparisons of women to 
tradestores, however, indicate that men recognize the exchange of women 
as the source of wealth received in intergroup exchanges. Men also 
clearly recognize that their wives' labour is necessary for their own 
material success and prestige derived from exchange. Although a few 
Chuave women have attempted to gain greater influence over how their 
husbands conduct exchanges or run businesses, most Chuave women have 
chosen a different course to assert themselves vis-ä-vis males. They 
have created alternative corporate groups that enable them to control a 
portion of the wealth they produce, and alternative exchange systems 
which they alone dominate. In the next chapter, I examine the 
relationship between wealth, female status and political power.
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Notes
1. I initially questioned 50 men, ten each of five different 
generations. Twelve men aged 45 or more could not remember the 
details of their payments. Also, assistants considered the 
responses of three other younger men unreliable, and I have 
eliminated these. The table does not include average payments 
because, with the exception of pigs and money, men often could 
not quantify valuables given. Hide provides information on 
bridewealth for first and other marriages in Sinasina (1980 
appendix 3).
2. In Sinasina steel axes remained a part of bridewealth until as 
late as 1973 (Hide 1980: 114), presumably because stone axes 
initially had some symbolic value and, unlike the Chuave 
situation, were important items of traditional exchange.
3. Hide also documents the shift from red (P. raggiana) to black 
plumes which occurred during this decade (1980: 148-154).
4. Much of my information concerning the use of beer in Chuave 
ceremonies has been presented elsewhere. In particular, I have 
outlined beer's symbolic value, its suitability in conforming to 
traditional methods of distribution and the use of intoxicated 
states to confront kinsmen and big men. For ceremonial and other 
uses of alcohol throughout Papua New Guinea, see Marshall (1982).
5. See Christie (1980) for an account of how expenditure patterns 
differ between households and for an excellent analysis of 
changing consumer behaviour among town and rural Sinasina 
families.
6. Because pigs are agisted to protect against anthrax and to 
disguise the size of pig herds from agnates, this survey is 
subject to inaccuracy. I simply asked men to count the pigs they 
owned, including those agisted to kinsmen. I later made a random 
check of responses by counting the pigs of ten men. With the 
exception that men commonly exclude shoats from their responses, 
the figures were accurate.
7. Hide discusses the problems of comparing areas under cultivation 
in different cultures (1980: Appendix 6: 611-614). My
survey, like Hide's, included only those areas planted with 
unharvested and recently planted crops and excluded all fenced 
in areas as yet unplanted.
8. Two other tactics are evident. Coffee is bought by weight and 
grade, whether or not the coffee is properly dried. Raskols 
occasionally increase weight by adding stones to the bottom of the 
bag or by topping off wet coffee with dried beans. All that is 
required for such a strategy to succeed is boldness and the speed 
to flee with money before being discovered. Middlemen also use 
company vehicles to buy coffee with their own savings, as well
as company cash; their own coffee is kept separate, stored and 
later sold to a rival factory.
9. The largest Sinasina store surveyed by Christie in 1977 had stock 
to the value of K586.05 (1980: 60-70).
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10. The analogy is to the soot of fires and is similar to the Hagen 
terra for rubbish man (Strathern 1971: 187-190).
11. Consequently, I have not tried to quantify informants’ responses. 
Hayano (1974) and Hawk.es (1978) have quantitatively analysed big 
man status in two eastern highlands societies. Hayano found both 
traditional wealth and personal health were associated with high 
status among the Tauna Awa. But he was unable to estimate the 
importance of modern monetary or material wealth. Hawkes* analysis 
shows that wealth is not an important characteristic of Binumarien 
big men, but that big men 'co-operate more and more widely than
do ordinary men in production tasks' (1978: 179).
12. Feil (1978a: 346) notes that his emphasis on inter-clan co­
operation is analogous to Forge's (1972) remarks concerning kula 
partners, who, because they are outside the political community, 
'cannot be in any sense a rival for prestige within their villages 
and their network of daily face to face relationships' (ibid.: 
534).
13. Tomberaa women are exceptional by highlands standards in that they 
are 'essential participants' in tee exchanges who make 'key 
political decisions' (Feil 1978c: 265).
14. Mori Au, as well as his rival candidates, were reluctant to allow 
me to reveal their names in any analysis of voting patterns.
This ward's election is not analysed in the appendix, and I have 
decided to give no further indication as to the ease or difficulty 
with which Mori Au gained re-election.
Chapter Five
KAFAINA: FEMALE WEALTH AND POWER
Kafaina is a savings and loan organization, created and controlled 
by women, which began in Chuave in the early 1960s with women’s diffuse 
pleas for economic and political equality. The movement has progressed 
through several stages, with formalized group action first occurring 
in the late 1960s. Today Kafaina, or Wok Meri as it is called in 
Eastern Highlands province, provides an institutional framework that 
links together thousands of women from different tribal and language 
areas.
My analysis of this institution supplements earlier reports of 
the movement (Anggo 1975; Munster 1975) and expands on Lorraine 
Sexton’s (1980, 1982) thesis that 'Wok Meri is an organized 
collective response by women to the erosion of their economic status 
in the last fifty years' (1980: 198). I demonstrate that Kafaina is 
also a response to the peripheral political status of women and a 
reaction against women’s exclusion from modern political institutions. 
Kafaina beliefs are concerned with the inherent power of females and 
their ability to produce wealth. Women as producers have always been a 
source of wealth and political power, appropriated in the past by male 
control of wealth in exchange, and Kafaina women are viewed, and view 
themselves as responsible for wealth that will be used in the modern 
development sector of the cash economy. I show, for example, that 
characteristics of Kafaina groups parallel traditional beliefs about 
the power of women as producers of food, caretakers of pigs and sources 
of male wealth in general. In addition, within Kafaina, women not only 
produce and protect wealth but also strive to control its allocation, 
and this too was a characteristic of traditional roles vis-a-vis 
wealth objects. But although a correlation between women's roles in 
the exchange economy and in the modern cash economy is evident, they 
differ in one important respect. Whereas females formerly achieved 
only a modicum of success in the control and allocation of wealth used 
in exchange, Kafaina women have institutionalized their control over 
the valuables they produce, and hence have achieved a real degree of 
political power.
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Male-female relations
Women still have few political and legal rights in comparison to 
men, though their status has improved enormously over the past 50 
years. In the past a wife faced severe sanctions for publicly or 
privately confronting her husband. Verbal abuse or insults necessitated 
immediate compensation to her spouse; lineage mates of the aggrieved 
husband would seize and kill a woman's pig or that of her brother or 
father. A woman who physically assaulted a man or committed adultery 
would be publicly beaten; in severe cases, a husband might shoot an 
arrow into his wife's leg or thigh. Such extreme punishment was not 
regularly administered and depended on the quality of particular 
husband-wife relationships. In contrast, however, women could not 
claim compensation for mistreatment at the hands of their husbands. 
Informants were reluctant and ashamed to discuss the few cases of 
female suicide I discovered, and I suspect that they concealed additional 
cases from me. But people acknowledged that suicide and desertion by 
wives were responses to physical mistreatment by husbands. As Dorothy 
Counts (1980) has demonstrated in an excellent case study from Kaliai,
New Britain, suicide by otherwise powerless females can be a political 
act.
Today men continue to physically and verbally abuse their wives. 
Because of administration law and mission teachings, however, women 
receive compensation in adultery cases; marital quarrels often dominate 
village court proceedings. In marital disputes, most women do not 
proceed with formal litigation unless injuries have been sustained 
or physical abuse has been prolonged, or they regard divorce as a real 
alternative to their current relationship. In court cases women 
continue to receive biased treatment by both male magistrates and 
mission leaders who believe that women are less than equal partners 
in marriage.
Women remain peripheral to political and public affairs within 
the clan and village. Although women are no longer prohibited from 
entering the men's house they rarely speak publicly. On those 
occasions when a 'strong' woman wishes to speak, a leader will call 
for complete silence so that she may be heard (unlike men, women's 
voices are not believed to be strong enough to compete with others').
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But men almost always ignore such speeches, and the acknowledgement 
of a woman’s right to speak is only a minimal advance towards the 
possibility of a political status equivalent to males. Women are 
totally excluded from public offices; no woman has ever been elected 
as councillor or village court magistrate. Women are likewise excluded 
from active participation in mission affairs and may not hold the 
position of pastor or songon. Both men and women regard all these 
positions as the domain of men.
In the previous chapter I stressed men’s continuing domination 
of ceremonial exchange. As a general rule a woman still gains only 
a modicum of reflected status and prestige from her husband’s or male 
kinsmen's transactions. Whereas in the past women were prohibitied 
from even approaching displayed wealth, they now handle cash and other 
valuables freely; they restrict their movements only during the actual 
transfer of valuables.
Men continue to be the principal owners of pigs. Of 91 couples 
surveyed, only four women (4.3 per cent) claimed to own pigs - seldom 
more than two - which they could allocate to exchanges without their 
husbands' consent. Such pigs are usually those a woman brings to her 
marriage. Men differ in the extent to which they feel obliged to 
consult their wives before allocating pigs for particular ceremonies 
and both men and women agree that a woman cannot override her husband's 
decision. While the care and feeding of pigs is sometimes a shared 
activity, women assume a substantial part of this work. As in Siane, 
women often wail or protest when husbands kill their pigs, and they may 
receive small gifts to 'calm their stomachs' on such occasions 
(Salisbury 1962: 62). Such payments are not compensation for a woman's 
claim for co-ownership for the pig itself, but rather for the labour 
and care a woman has invested in raising the pig.
A woman exercises great control over all crops she plants though 
she relinquishes this control to her husband when foodstuffs are used 
in formal exchanges. A husband should, in theory, ask his wife's 
permission to enter her garden even though he is the owner of the 
property. Today this is seldom done, but men still seek their wives' 
permission before harvesting crops - a situation similar to the Siane 
(ibid.) and Hagen areas (M. Strathern 1972a: 23) but different to
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the Daulo region where both men and women have rights to harvest crops 
(Sexton 1981).
A wife should allocate a portion of her crops to cook for both 
her husband and his men’s house mates. Women who do not frequently 
bring food to the men’s house are accused of stinginess and criticized 
for their lack of generosity. Such a woman may be a successful 
gardener; but ultimately her and her husband's prosperity, in 
combination with ungenerous behaviour, are believed to be signs that 
a woman is a witch whom men will then carefully watch and mistrust - 
a point I return to shortly.
Today markets flourish in Chuave, being held two or three times 
weekly in most areas. As few as 20 or as many as 100 women attend these 
markets to sell garden produce and other items such as netbags and 
clothing. Market income is a primary source of cash for Kafaina 
women. Thus, while 70 of 120 village women surveyed (58 per cent) sold 
produce at markets, 62 of 68 Kafaina women (91 per cent) obtained cash
Oin this manner. Based on a survey of ten women over a three week 
period, the daily earnings from market sales ranged from as little as 
40 toea to as much as K5.20, with women averaging K1 per market day.
Men do not question a woman’s right to sell produce but demand only that 
sufficient crops are planted for household use and for upcoming 
commitments to group exchanges. All men agree that the profits from 
these transactions belong to women. Women use this cash to buy 
cigarettes, gamble, obtain tradestore goods and to invest in Kafaina 
savings. But women often share their market incomes with spouses and 
use this money for household purposes.
Men plant and control yams, sugar cane, bananas, pandanus nut, oil 
pandanus and coffee; but money from coffee, the primary source of cash 
income, is the source of continuing tension between husbands and wives. 
As in the Daulo region, women complain that men waste money on beer and 
gambling and Kafaina women use this criticism as the primary rationale 
for their own savings (Sexton 1982: 169). But in practice, women 
gamble as frequently as males and their complaints must be regarded as 
a more general comment on their inability to control coffee incomes.
In theory, because men own and plant coffee trees, they have total 
control over coffee incomes, even though women invest much more time
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and labour in coffee production than men. Work patterns vary greatly 
from family to family. Some men refuse to pick coffee at all, and yet 
enforce their right to control cash incomes. Other men pay youths or 
children to aid their wives in picking and processing coffee, and some 
regard coffee production as a shared activity. In extreme instances 
men may allocate particular plots to their wives and so divide both 
labour and proceeds in what men regard as an equitable fashion. I have 
data regarding the division of coffee proceeds for only five couples 
and so can provide only an indication of the possible variation which 
exists between husbands and wives. Although women provided most of 
the labour in all these instances, their personal incomes from coffee 
ranged from K63 to K103 with an average of K75.60 per woman 
in 1980. These figures represent from 26 to 42 per cent of the total 
family income derived from coffee sales (an average of 38 per 
cent).^
To summarize, women continue to provide most of the labour in both 
the subsistence and cash economies, while receiving a dispropor­
tionately small share of cash income. In noting the reduction in time 
males spend in subsistence activities, Salisbury estimated that 
traditionally Siane men and women spent 80 per cent of their time on 
subsistence labour (1962: 108). For the Daulo region in 1976-1978, 
Sexton reports that women spent 43.5 per cent of their daylight hours 
on subsistence tasks, and men only 18 per cent (1980: 131). When cash­
generating activities were included, the figures were 53.1 per cent 
for women and 35 per cent for men. Women, furthermore, continue to 
have only a peripheral role in the exchange economy. While they now 
have access to more cash than in the past, they must allocate a portion 
of this to the care and maintenance of their households and face the 
possibility of having their husbands appropriate the cash for use in 
exchanges from which women can derive only second-hand status and 
respect as producers.
Something hidden: female power in Chuave
Despite the dominance of males over females in public affairs, 
men continue to both fear and mistrust women. The danger of females 
results first from contaminating effects of menstrual blood which is 
viewed as debilitating to men and other living things - including pigs
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and garden produce. Among men who place some store in traditional 
religious beliefs, however, females are also powerful because they are 
more closely in tune with the ancestral spirits than men. Virtually 
all men, furthermore, continue to believe that at least some women are 
themselves supernatural beings, capable of destroying the wealth of men, 
and in the extreme, of causing death or physical injury to males at 
the slightest provocation.
As in Siane, women unlike men, were said to be able to 'see’ 
ancestral spirits, g±ri> in a tangible form (Salisbury 1965: 75).
In Chuave, middle-age or elderly women were in the past best able to 
speak to spirits and act as mediums in seances held in women's houses 
at night.^ People asked the glrimoi or obar kwiam garingwa 
('woman who knows spirits') to call specific ancestors to the house 
so that they could be consulted on a range of decisions which needed 
to be made: for example, whether or not to marry, to plant gardens
or prepare feasts. Upon hearing the whistling sound of the spirits, 
the girimoi acted as a translator for those in attendance and often 
received payments such as a small pig, bits of shell or pig's teeth 
for her services. Today such seances are no longer held but a woman's 
supernatural power is emphasized in other ways.
Menstrual blood is still regarded as dangerous to men; sexual 
intercourse during menstruation never occurs, and women pay as much 
as K100 compensation to men who accidently come in contact with 
menstrual blood. Other prohibitions are no longer strictly enforced. 
Today men may receive food from a menstruating women; and females show 
no reluctance to travel through the village or to gardens during 
menses. Although male initiation no longer occurs, men still insist 
that a girl's first menstruation requires isolation of between one and 
two weeks (formerly two to three months). A girl stays behind an 
enclosed division or wall, sometimes called a 'bed', in her mother's 
house. The girl's father or brothers may not enter the house during 
this time, and all other men must remain in front of the barrier, and 
may not see the isolated girl. Shortly before leaving the house a girl 
is given food, formerly sugar cane and now also candy, which represents 
ancestral spirit substance (see also Salisbury 1965; Ross 1965; Whitemen 
1965). When a girl leaves the house, dressed in her finest decorations
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and a new pubic covering, she proceeds along a pathway and walks over 
pandanus leaves, associated with productivity, wealth and fertility 
(cf. Newman 1965: 77) (today coffee leaves are sometimes used), small 
net bags and money (formerly pigs1 teeth or shell) which are then 
grabbed by people in attendance. This ritual act reverses the usual 
prohibition that women must not walk over any material items or food 
for fear of contaminating them and stresses both the girl's fertility 
and her ability to bring wealth to the clan in exchanges which will 
revolve around her marriage (see Sexton 1982: 179).
Read (1952) has demonstrated how men used secret cults surrounding 
male initiation and the ancestral flutes to preserve their superior 
status over women. He notes that old women were shown the flutes and 
that women, in fact knew of their existence (ibid,: 5-6, note 14); 
he argues that these cults, plus the secrecy surrounding them, are an 
artificial and culturally-contrived mechanism to separate male from 
female status. In Chuave old women were shown and allowed to handle 
the flutes, but men and women insisted that most women remained unaware 
of the true nature of the flutes.
While women in Chuave have known of the flutes' existence since 
the early 1950s when missions forced the dissolution of these male 
cults, women continue to withhold specific types of knowledge from 
men, and use secrecy to assert their common identity. Control over 
their reproductive capacities was one of the few methods women could 
use when seeking to assert themselves in the face of persistent male 
domination. As in Minj (Reay 1975-1976: 79), Chuave women may use 
abortion or infanticide to thwart their husbands' desire for children 
when husbands have mistreated them. Women continue to withhold 
information concerning abortion, infanticide, and contraception even 
to the present. Male informants could not elaborate on any such 
practices and some men even insisted that twin births had never 
occurred in Chuave until after the arrival of whites. Nor would women 
reply to my own questions concerning these topics. Only my wife's 
inquiries revealed such information, plus the fact that women still 
regard these topics as their sole concern and not to be discussed with 
or revealed to men.
Nowhere is female secrecy more feared and the power of women over
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men more evident that in beliefs concerning witchcraft. The word for 
witch and for the vivifying substance that resides in witches giving 
them their power is kumo, a term which also means 'something hidden' 
or 'secret' in both the Chuave and Siane languages.^ Chuave witches 
are female. Informants state that men too may be witches, but in fact 
all accusations of witchcraft are against women; the female marker 
obar is regularly attached to kumo in speech (obar kumo, 'woman 
witch'), and descriptions of witches' potential powers always refer 
to women. A prevalence of female witches is also found in Sinasina 
(Hide 1980: 246) and in Gururumba (Newman 1965: 86). In contrast, in 
central Simbu (Brown 1977: 28; Bergmann 1971, Vol. 4: 15-21) witchcraft 
accusations involve both men and women while among the Kuma witches 
are usually male (Reay 1976: 1). As in all these areas, Chuave witch­
craft is directed against a victim belonging to the local group (the 
clan) in contrast to lethal sorcery where the victim is a member of 
an enemy clan.^
Women are not born witches; rather they receive kumo from a 
practising witch. A witch passes this substance to a novice, sometimes 
her daughter, simply by touching the skin or by giving a gift - usually 
a net bag - to an unsuspecting female. Once endowed with kumo, the 
novice receives further instruction and care from her tutor. Only the 
members of a witch's husband's lineage whose 'blood is cold' are free 
from attack. While women may occasionally be victims, children of both 
sexes and men are the primary targets of witchcraft.
Witches are the strongest supernatural beings in Chuave. They 
become invisible when attacking their victims, entering the body 
through a pathway located in the armpit, and cannibalize the intestinal 
organs (in particular the liver, the location of a persons' vital 
essence) causing illness or death. Witches commonly use the cover of 
darkness to steal to people's houses and listen in on private 
conversations or roam the periphery of the village to seek out human 
and animal faeces, which they consume. Covens including women from 
several clans hold secret meetings at night in the bush or pig houses 
and may join together to rob the graves of the recently deceased. 
Because they eat the decaying flesh of corpses, men guarded graves in 
the past for several weeks after burial to deter attacks (cf. Brown 
1977: 27; Reay 1976: 2). The witches' coven, in fact, is perhaps the
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most dreaded of all possible scenarios for it involves secrecy and 
group action by uncontrollable, powerful females. Few methods of 
discovering witches and few remedies for illnesses caused by them are 
available to men.^ Rather people accuse women on the basis of 
observed behaviour and supposition. In the past, when witches were 
discovered they were banished from the clan or quickly killed, and 
their body discarded in a cave or thrown into a river. In the case 
of young novices, however, there was occasionally ritual exorcism of 
the witch substance.
Several authors have noted the relationship between social status, 
wealth, and witchcraft in the central highlands (Hide 1980; Newman 
1965; Reay 1976). In Chuave, as in Sinasina, witches are of either 
exceptionally high or low social status. Thus, they are described as 
poor, 'rubbish', or infirmed and consequently jealous of their victim's 
material success. Conversely, they may be exceptionally wealthy, 
excellent gardeners occasionally possessing special garden magic as 
in Gururumba (Newman 1965: 86), and successful in raising pigs, or the
Qwives of prominent men. People say that witches have voracious 
appetites for pork and other animal flesh. Therefore, it is said one 
must not place animal bones in a fire least the witch smell the burning 
marrow and attack out of jealousy. Similarly they may capriciously 
cause the illness or death of pigs, or attack when they feel slighted 
or mistreated - when, for example, they fail to receive pork at 
distributions. As previously noted, women who do not respond to social 
obligations within the men's house group are likewise suspect and run 
the risk of being accused as witches.
Today possible sanctions against witchcraft are no longer in 
force, and accusations of witchcraft seldom result in serious public 
discussion; I witnessed only two witchcraft 'courts' during 22 months 
of fieldwork. At such discussions village court magistrates refuse 
to have the case heard in formal court and will order compensation for 
the accused women, arguing that, because there is no proof, the 
accusation is slander. I know of no recent cases, furthermore, where 
women have been forced to leave the clan.
But belief in witchcraft remains pervasive. Informants speak 
in hushed tones when discussing the topic and even fervent mission
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supporters or educated men who disdain talk of sorcery admit that 
witches exist. Men continue to suggest that witches have caused the 
illnesses of pigs and particular persons, though they are reluctant 
to name specific women they suspect. It is not surprising that of 
14 women so named by informants all belonged to Kafaina groups 
for Kafaina remains a secretive organization, based on the withholding 
of wealth from men, and is a perceived threat to men’s domination over 
women. Kafaina ritual and symbolism, in fact, perpetuate many of the 
beliefs I have noted concerning the intrinsic power of females and 
elaborate on the theme of female productivity in relation to modern 
forms of wealth. Before discussing these facets of Kafaina 
organization, however, I will describe the origins of the movement.
The origins of Kafaina
Kafaina is the name used for the current stage of women’s groups 
in the Chuave and Siane areas. As Anggo notes, the word has no meaning 
in the Chuave or Siane languages (1975: 210). But Kafaina is a common 
women’s name of modern origin, and the only such ’meaningless’ name 
in Chuave. Women are commonly named after shell valuables, and Kafaina 
may well be derived from the Siane word kifana meaning stones or 
coins. What is clear is that since the attachment of this name to 
a movement formerly recognized by other terms, the name itself has 
become associated with the control of coins by women; Kafaina women’s 
personal savings are commonly coins and rarely paper money.
Although the origins of the movement are difficult to date, there 
were several precursors of modern groups and historical antecedents 
of women's action. Traditionally Chuave women joined together in stick 
fights against women of other clans, or against their menfolk in 
stylized fights at pig kills (cf. Newman 1965: 38). Today some Kafaina 
dances mimic these fights. However, Salisbury’s account of a Chuave 
indigenous cult in 1947, among the Gai and Onakari tribes located in 
Elimbari census division, is the earliest indication of a three-fold 
relationship between religious beliefs, women and wealth (1958: 67- 
78).
A male prophet, a former mission evangelist from the Kainantu 
area, told of an imminent flood that would transform everyday objects
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in to valuables such as shells and rifles. When a woman's vision 
confirmed this prophecy, the prophet persuaded people to build a cult 
house. They killed pigs and danced in honour of the ancestors. All 
the young girls of the tribe entered this house, as did the prophet, 
and stones - smeared with pig's blood and wrapped in leaves - were 
stored on one side inside the house in the belief that they would be 
transformed into shells. Information about the cult was eventually 
leaked to the administration, and in subsequent police action, 13 
cultists were killed. Salisbury points out that many of the cult's 
features were congruent with traditional religious beliefs, in 
particular, the belief that young women, associated with the ancestral 
spirits, enhanced the potential for attracting or creating wealth 
within the clan.
Sexton has noted a possible forerunner of Kafaina in the 
missionary Bergmann's account of a 1955 women's movement in the Ega 
area (Kundiawa) of Simbu province (1980: 200). Though his description 
is brief, he remarks that decorated women sang and danced as they 
travelled from place to place - a feature of present-day Kafaina 
groups. Men complained to him about this behaviour, but apparently 
he made little effort to stop it. The movement began over a 
'misunderstanding' about the coronation of Queen Elizabeth in 1953, 
when women declared that they wished to be appointed as luluais.
This is the first indicator that women's group action might be a direct 
response to their peripheral political status. Queen Elizabeth remains 
the ultimate symbol of a politically dominant woman, a leader who rules 
men in a western political system. Chuave women told me that they 
formerly believed the Queen, Jesus and God resided together in heaven 
and they remember how administration officers instructed them not to 
work for three days in celebration of her coronation. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the coronation provided the genesis of a 
movement which strove to correct the imbalance of power between men and 
women within the system of appointed administration officials that 
dominated local level politics during the 1950s.
Women's savings groups called Sande Skul (Sunday School) began 
in the early 1960s, originally I believe around Chuave Station, where 
today this name is still sometimes used for Kafaina. By 1964, and 
throughout the remainder of the decade, women's groups known either
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gby this name or Meri Sande and Meri Marla (after the virgin 
Mary) intermittently flourished in Chuave, Siane and Elimbari census 
divisions (cf. Anggo 1975). Lutheran and Catholic pastors originally 
started these groups in which women learned to sew; they also 
encouraged the market sale of clothing and foodstuffs, proceeds of 
which were used for church or small scale business enterprises. Women 
joined together once a week, chose a leader who was formerly a female 
council komiti and pooled their cash. A male clerk kept a record 
of each woman’s personal savings in a ledger. Few men or women 
remember details of these groups but many state that each group was 
independent of others in the area. The lifespan of many groups was 
short. Women told me that groups often disbanded before they had saved 
large amounts of money, and that men associated with these groups often 
took women's savings for their personal use. Apparently, men started a 
few small stores with the proceeds but all eventually failed because 
of mismanagement.
The efflorescence of women's groups at this time must be seen in 
light of the conditions of the decade. As 1 have previously noted 
(chapters two and three), money supplanted pearl shells in exchange 
during the 1960s and pearl shells were sold to other areas to obtain 
cash. The decade was also characterized by an initial enthusiasm for 
local government councils followed by rapid disillusionment, in the 
late 1960s, with the council's failure to provide prosperity and 
development at the local level. People increasingly complained about 
taxes and enforced roadwork. During this time, group action by women 
was not confined to the Chuave area. A women's strike in the Minj area 
was itself related to the action of a candidate in the 1964 election 
and it established women's rights to a share in money derived from 
roadwork (Reay 1975: 6). The initial development of the Kafaina 
movement also preceded the introduction during the mid-1970s, of the 
government sponsored women's organization Yangpela Didiman (Young 
Farmers' Clubs). Furthermore, it occurred in the absence of western- 
style savings and loan organizations which, in Chuave, were not 
introduced until the late 1970s.^
From the Chuave and Siane areas, women's savings organizations 
spread northeast to the Watabung and Goroka regions (Sexton 1980; 
Munster 1975). These groups developed in Siane to become what is now
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called Kafaina and they spread southeast into the Lufa census division. 
Simultaneously, a second, more formalized, savings asssociation 
developed in Chuave in the early and mid-1970s, only to be replaced 
late in the decade by Kafaina which spread from Siane, first into 
Elirabari and then into Chuave. This secondary stage was usually called 
Meri Songony and less commonly, Sande Skul (Sunday School). Both 
men and women met on Saturday and Sunday and contributed money - from 
as little as 10 cents to as much as 40 dollars - and women controlled 
all money directly (Schilling CPR 1973: 13). Each group selected 
female leaders, called komiti or songon, and unlike previous 
groups, these were bound together in a loose network for specific 
enterprises. A church bell called participating members to meetings, 
and money was kept in cash boxes. Money gathered could not be used to 
pay council tax. Savings eventually went to help buy materials for 
churches or to buy PMV trucks, controlled and managed by men associated 
with the groups. In Duma, Meri Songon groups had loan arrangements 
with other similar groups at distances of over seven kilometres.
There are a number of indicators that this stage of group action 
also had its origins in women’s disenchantment with local government.
In 1964 three women had nominated for council elections. By 1967 one 
woman in both Chuave and Siane nominated, and 21 women nominated in 
Elimbari census division (Cummins 1966-67, CPR 4). During the mid- 
1960s, female komitis who had no official government recognition were 
active in the council area and women took an interest in affairs 
previously dominated by men (ibid.). Apparently because of women's 
demands for participation in council affairs, the council made a 
provision that mandatory election of female ward komitis (two per 
ward) occur in the 1969 elections (Findlay 1968-69, CPR 2). No female 
nominations for the position of councillor occurred during this 
election; men apparently persuaded women not to stand (Sanders 1968-69 
CPR 8).
A council ruling which followed this election obliterated any real 
gains women had made for 'equal' representation in council affairs.
A 1970 administration report speaks of women's increased resentment 
of the council following an all male council's repeal of the 
regulation requiring the election of female komitis. The report adds
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that women were incensed with this unilateral decision, which 
effectively excluded them from council participation, and they 
threatened not to pay council taxes in future. Following this 
decision, there is no further mention of any women’s nomination for 
council positions. I regard the prohibition on meri songon savings 
being used to pay taxes and the continued use of the term komiti by 
females, therefore, as a women's protest against their exclusion from 
representative government.
By the mid-1970s women in Elimbari census division were 
participating in Kafaina, the latest development of women's savings 
and loan societies. Duma women began Kafaina in 1977, and informants 
clearly recognize the transitional nature of the movement over the last 
decade. Men and women state that while in the past they participated 
in Sunday School and Meri Songon, their efforts to save were often 
thwarted by mismanagement. They add that the latest stage, Kafaina, 
has 'laws' that protect against the theft and mismanagement of money 
and ensure the success of the group.
Anggo has described Kafaina's own origin story (1975: 211). It 
tells of a woman whose husband constantly took cash income from coffee 
for his own use. One coffee season the wife hid her income by burying 
her coins beneath the stones of the fireplace. Each time she hid the 
coins 'she would pray to God for the safety of the coins and also for 
the coins to multiply'. Eventually she removed the money, which 
totalled several hundred pounds, and showed it to other women in her 
village. She convinced them to gather money; they later appointed a 
leader to take care of their savings and held weekly meetings at which 
they sang traditional songs. The women then began to teach women from 
other villages about their group, and so created the existing network 
of groups.
Kafaina women still pray to God for the safety of their money, 
and ask for God's assistance in their work. Some people state that 
Kafaina groups actually believe their money 'grows' and pray to God 
for it to multiply (cf. Sexton 1980: 218). It is ironic that many 
Christians today actively oppose Kafaina, for it is clear that the 
movement grew from initial encouragement by male church leaders.
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More important, the origins of this movement show that women regard 
themselves as excluded from participation in both mission and 
government institutions. Women, more than men, were central to 
traditional religious activities and yet they have been forced to the 
periphery of institutions proselytizing Christianity. As a result 
they created women 'pastors' totally without approval of the Lutheran 
authorities. Similarly they have created positions of absolute 
authority over men within the framework of Kafaina. Kafaina women view 
themselves as accomplishing tasks once seen as the responsibility of 
local government councils. The following statements illustrate the 
relationship between failed expectations concerning government and 
Kafaina participation. The first is by a bosmeri, the female leader 
of a Kafaina group.
I have lived a long time and my coffee is dry. I 
planted it again and it is still dry. And so I voted 
for my husband to become councillor, but he did not 
become councillor. I voted for him to be a committee 
man but he did not become a committee man and so he 
did not 'puli' anything to me.
I worked and nothing came of it. Now a mother of 
mine from another place came and looked after me.
This work came from an old woman and I think it is 
very good. My old mother came and gave me the name 
Kafaina and my name remains Kafaina.
The second statement is by a Kafaina 'cargo boy', a man who is often 
a bachelor and who runs errands for Kafaina women.
Councillors came, committee men came and I thought 
they would 'puli' something to me but I have seen 
nothing. Now women's work has come and I am very 
happy. I travel around as the 'legs' of women. I 
carry their net bags, cook their food, wash their 
clothes, and buy them cigarettes; that is my work.
Both speakers comment on the councillors' failure to 'puli' or 
bring something to people at the local level. They are referring to 
development, a concept, which as I have noted, includes not only specific 
projects such as schools and roads, but more generally the wealth and 
financial success which whites possess. Because modern political 
institutions have failed to provide economic prosperity at the local 
level, women have created Kafaina to accomplish this task. In doing
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so, they have re-established the fundamental equation between female 
power, productivity and material success. As I will now show, this 
equation is evident in the ritual and symbolism surrounding Kafaina 
activity.
Kafaina organization
Kafaina groups range in size from five to 26 women, with an 
average of 12 women per group. These women, aged 30 or more (average 
age is approximately 38 years) are contributing members; each has her 
own cloth or net bag in which savings are kept, and a special ledger 
or ’pass book' that records her savings. These are kept locked in 
a small room called a ’bed' inside the Kafaina house. The walls of 
the bed are decorated with flowers and leaves and the room itself is 
accessible only to the bosmeri. She is on average 45 years old, 
selected by consensus, and frequently instrumental in the establishment 
of the group within the men’s house group. Other women, who do not 
contribute or participate in Kafaina celebrations, may attend Kafaina 
meetings, which are held at night, twice weekly on market days.
Kafaina groups also have at least two male members. A male clerk 
(kuskus), often a young man with some education, tabulates the 
women's savings at each meeting and is responsible for keeping track 
of all loans made to other groups. As in Daulo, young men can use the 
position of clerk to prove that they are capable of handling money or 
are responsible adults who care about the welfare of others (Sexton 
1980: 298). In doing so, they demonstrate some qualities which men 
look for in a leader, and ambitious young men can use this position to 
enhance their political careers.
A second, older man, on average 45 years, is selected as 
'chairman' of the group. The chairman was the bosmeri's husband in 
ten of 32 groups in Duma tribe. This man guides the group and may make 
suggestions concerning the loan of money to other groups, but all 
decisions concerning Kafaina money are made by women. Should the 
bosmeri feel that the clerk or chairman are attempting to dominate 
Kafaina meetings she may overrule their suggestions or simply silence 
them by insisting Kafaina is women's work. The chairman also 
accompanies Kafaina women on their trips to other areas and may oversee
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the organization of feasts given at inter-group meetings. From my 
conversations with Kafaina chairmen, it was clear that these men 
expected to act as managers of any future Kafaina enterprise. Men 
definitely see the position of chairman as a potentially influential 
and economically lucrative one. Only one of 32 Kafaina chairmen had 
ever been a councillor, but more than half had acted as komitis in 
the past or were men’s house leaders. Thus, men regard the position 
of chairman as one alternative to elected office - a position by which 
men can obtain recognition within the men’s house group, and which 
allows them to dominate big men or government representatives within 
the context of Kafaina celebrations.
Unlike in Daulo (Sexton 1980: 20) women of a Kafaina group are 
not necessarily the wives of a single lineage. Rather, they are 
married to men who belong to different lineages and subclans but who 
reside in a single men's house group. Women often take the name of 
the men's house to designate their group. Each new group forms under 
the tutelage of a pre-existing ’mother' group belonging to another clan 
and becomes their 'daughter' or 'child'. Once a daughter group has 
proven itself diligent in saving money it seeks permission from its 
mother to 'give birth' to its own child-group. In Duma individual 
mother groups have created up to three such daughters. Kafaina women 
also refer to their 'old mother' (grandmother group) and more rarely, 
to 'sister' groups. However, because Kafaina groups save money for 
four to seven years, grandmother groups have usually dissolved by the 
time their grand-daughter groups are fully active.
Bosmeris or other women from different groups sometimes have 
close kinship relationships which serve as the basis for these inter­
group ties. For example, a Kafaina woman may approach a real or 
classificatory mother from her natal group or a sister who is married 
into a nearby clan in order to start a daughter group. Perhaps half 
the Kafaina groups begin in this way. But proximity and the need to 
find as yet untouched Kafaina territory also are important criteria 
for the creation of groups. Thus, the mothers of most Duma groups 
belonged to tribes to the south-east in Elirabari census division at 
distances of between two and ten kilometres from their daughter's 
villages. The first Duma groups to be established in 1977 or 1978 
sometimes founded daughter groups within the tribe - occasionally
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ignoring real or classificatory kin ties to establish groups within 
a short walking distance. As villages within Duma and neighbouring 
tribes became saturated with Kafaina groups, women were forced to 
travel greater distances to form daughter groups. Here again kinship 
ties are often important, but women sometimes solicit daughters after 
travelling along the road until they have found a men’s house group 
which as yet has no established Kafaina group. Duma groups have 
started daughter groups to the north, west and east among other Chuave 
tribes and beyond the census division in Siane, Watabung and Sinasina. 
It is difficult to accurately estimate the number of women 
participating in various stages of Kafaina activity. Within Duma, 
however, just over one-half of all adult women (over 18 years) were 
contributing members of Kafaina groups.
The combined savings of these Duma groups are staggering. Because
of the secrecy surrounding Kafaina savings I was not able to obtain
accurate figures for all Duma groups. A very conservative estimate
based on survey figures, however, indicates that some K50,000 has been
saved since Kafaina first began in Duma in 1977 - an amount for a
single tribe which is comparable to the annual budget of the Elimbari
Local Government Council. Table 7, an outline of the financial status
of Kafaina groups within Keu village, is based on my own tallies of
1 ?the books for seven groups.
Table 7: Keu village Kafaina savings
Kafaina
group
Operating
months
Women
Contributing
Total
Amount
Debts Net
Savings
1 25 18 K 2,864.80 K 60.00 K 2,804.80
2 44 6 K 3,300.00 K 67.33 K 3,232.67
3 11 8 K 1,324.30 K 104.00 K 1,220.30
4 25 8 K 2,275.00 K 25.00 K 2,250.00
3 14 16 K 3,065.40 K 800.70 K 2,264.70
6 12 7 K 608.00 K 20.00 K 588.00
7 9 5 K 616.00 K nil K 616.00
Totals 140 68 K14,053.50 Kl ,077.03 K12,976.47
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Individual savings increase during the coffee season, and some groups 
suspend operations during the off-season. Based on the figures in 
Table 7 individual women save between K6.23 and K13.68 per month and 
K74.79 and K166.40 per year.
Women stress the differences, not the similarities between Kafaina 
and western banking systems (cf. Sexton 1980: 265-266). Unlike banks, 
where money is easily withdrawn for use, Kafaina savings are protected; 
they constitute assured savings. Once a woman places money in her 
savings bilum she cannot withdraw it until the Kafaina group 
dissolves. Kafaina groups cannot use their savings to pay taxes or 
village court fines, nor can they use it to contribute to men's 
ceremonies. I witnessed only two occasions, both involving 
compensation ordered by village court magistrates, where bosmeris 
violated this rule. Many additional occasions arose, however, when 
men subjected Kafaina women to prolonged pressure and verbal persuasion 
to use their savings for group prestations. At such times Kafaina 
women simply refuse to discuss the matter stating that they could not 
touch their money because of Kafaina 'law'.
These and other decisions concerning Kafaina money are ultimately 
the responsibility of the bosmeri who is the guardian of the group's 
money. As Anggo notes, persons chosen to care for or safeguard 
valuables derive a great deal of status as 'good' and trustworthy 
people (1975: 213). By safeguarding Kafaina savings and having a key 
role in determining when and where Kafaina women engage in transactions 
with other groups, the bosmeri demonstrates skill comparable to male 
leaders who organize and oversee the distribution of valuables in group 
exchanges. As a guardian of group resources, the bosmeri is thus 
analogous to the male aunam, responsible for the allocation of 
lineage wealth in traditional society.
Kafaina meetings open with a prayer soliciting God's aid for the 
women's work and affirming their belief in Jesus Christ. The male 
chairman often gives the prayer. Kafaina women vehemently denied that 
they ask God to help make their money grow or multiply, and all prayers 
that I heard closely paralleled those heard in church services. After 
the prayer, women sing hymns and traditional songs, turning their heads 
back and forth in a fashion reminiscent of courting parties, a stylized
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behaviour which has become a trademark of Kafaina women. Meetings last 
for several hours, and occasionally through the night, during which 
women sing, gossip, and discuss forthcoming meetings with other groups. 
Near the close of the meeting women place their savings in bilums, 
always with encouragement or admonishment from the bosmeri, who 
stresses that the members must be diligent in their work. Kafaina 
activity is clouded in secrecy. The amount of individual or group 
savings should never be revealed to outsiders, and men who do not 
attend are misinformed about what actually occurs at meetings. Non­
members also over-estimate the size of Kafaina wealth. Men's initial 
reactions to the creation of Kafaina groups in their village range from 
laughter and derision at the mere mention of the word Kafaina, to 
mistrust, and in some cases, fear; though beyond the claim that some 
Kafaina women are witches or that Kafaina is somehow 'anti-mission', 
men are unable to explain their discomfort with these women's groups.
In the absence of male participants, mother groups teach a number
of Kafaina 'laws' to daughter groups, and instruct them not to reveal
these rules (see Table 8). Husbands of Kafaina women are misinformed or
ignorant of these regulations and the few chairmen who knew of these
prohibitions stated that they did not discuss them with men outside the 
13Kafaina movement. Nor was I myself able to easily discover these 
laws; most information came from Leeanne Greenwood's discussions with 
Kafaina women. These 'secret' prohibitions along with some traditional 
correlates, are listed in Table 8.
In contrast to traditional prohibitions, which are regularly 
broken, Kafaina rules are rigidly obeyed. The sole exception to this 
statement is rule five. Kafaina women do in fact attend first 
menstruation parties and also aid in the instruction of young girls 
during isolation. I believe that this rule arose as an attempt by 
Kafaina women to end, by boycott, this rite which they regard as 
antiquated, unjust, and perpetuated at the insistence of men.
Women could not elaborate on the rationale behind these 
regulations and stated only that their mothers had taught them the 
rules which were to be obeyed to ensure the success of the group's 
enterprise. My own and my wife's suggestions that particular rules 
were related to traditional prohibitions were greeted with laughter
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or simply denied by Kafaina women. Nonetheless, I regard Kafaina rules 
as analogous to many traditional beliefs and I believe that they 
emphasize the inherent power and danger of women vis-a-vis a modern 
valuable, cash, which is itself contextually regarded as intrinsically 
powerful.
Table 8: Kafaina rules
Kafaina Law Traditional Prohibition
1. Sexual intercourse prohibited 
on Kafaina night.
2. Money received from sexual 
services cannot be contributed 
to Kafaina savings.
3. Menstruating women cannot 
attend Kafaina meetings.
4. Women cannot go to Kafaina 
after the death of a close 
family member.
5. Kafaina women should not attend 
or eat food given at first 
menstruation parties.
6. After the 'child' is given to 
daughter groups, daughter 
members cannot enter gardens 
for two weeks.
7. Women cannot eat pork on the 
evening when they wish to 
contribute savings.
8. Pork cannot be eaten inside 
the Kafaina house.
9. Rubbish (animal skin, bones, 
food scraps, etc.) cannot be 
put into the fireplace of a 
Kafaina house.
1. After sexual intercourse men and 
women cannot enter a new garden.
3. Menstruating women cannot enter 
gardens or pig houses.
4. Men and women who handle a 
corpse cannot enter a new 
garden.
7. Women cannot enter a new garden 
after eating pork.
8. Men and women cannot eat pork 
inside a house where love magic 
substances or sorcery materials 
are stored.
9. Animal bones or remains cannot 
be placed in fires for fear of 
witchcraft attack.
Rules one to four relate to physical states believed to endanger 
the growth of living things or regarded as debilitating to individuals.
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Just as garden produce and pigs could be endangered after intercourse, 
during menstruation, or from indirect contact with a corpse's flesh, 
so too, Kafaina savings must be protected from any polluting or 
contaminating influences. While for most Kafaina women rule four 
requires exclusion from Kafaina savings for approximately one week, 
the bosmeri - who not only comes into contact with money but also 
enters the Kafaina bed - must not participate in meetings for up to 
one month.
I would also argue that the existence of a separate and special 
space, the Kafaina bed within the Kafaina house, is the creation of 
a potent and efficacious environment for the coins that women 
contribute. The appearance of the 'bed' itself, resembles the enclosed 
space for a girl's isolation at first menstruation, and restrictions 
on entering this area, I believe, affirm the belief that the money 
itself is endowed with special qualities which are dangerous to both 
humans and other animate objects. The construction of new Kafaina 
houses, likewise, occasionally takes place on sites associated with 
traditional welfare magic that ensured the continued growth of garden 
produce and pigs. These are places where men stored or buried 
ancestral boards and ritually treated pig killing sticks. Again, 
Kafaina women insisted that they chose these sites for convenience 
sake, but equally suitable sites were available, and some people who 
were not Kafaina members saw a relationship between the 'growth' of 
Kafaina wealth and traditional beliefs.
As I have noted in chapter four, people take great care when 
displaying cash in inter-group exchanges; money should not be folded 
and men frequently obtain mint-condition bills for prestations. 
Similarly men and women say that coins and paper money should not be 
taken into gardens though they are unable to state the reason for this 
modern prohibition. The prohibition against eating pork within the 
Kafaina house affirms the belief that the savings themselves are 
potent. The only traditional corollary of this prohibition is the 
restriction against eating pork inside houses that store 'strong' or 
powerful substances used in sorcery or love magic. People thought that 
the presence of pork (specifically pork fat) contaminated these 
materials and reduced their efficacy. Pork was also believed to 
decrease people's strength. Thus, as men were prohibited from eating
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pork prior to battle least they be susceptible to enemy attacks, women 
were prohibited from entering a new garden after consuming pork for 
fear that their power as producers be decreased and crops be damaged 
or fail to grow. Rule seven thus restates the relationship between 
women as producers and protectors of modern wealth within the Kafaina 
setting, and rule six elaborates on this theme and that concerning 
the potency of Kafaina wealth by forcing women who have received a 
major Kafaina payment to abstain from gardening activities.
The final prohibition is clearly meant to protect Kafaina women 
and savings from witchcraft attack. Women clearly regard their wealth 
as an obvious target for jealous witches - and for theft by young 
raskols. Men or women always watch over the Kafaina house when 
members are away from the village. It is ironic, therefore, that while 
Kafaina women fear witchcraft attacks, others suspect them of being 
witches because they hoard wealth and conceal Kafaina activities.
In addition to these prohibitions, other Kafaina 'laws’ more 
regularly known by outsiders, reinforce the solidarity of Kafaina 
groups. Kafaina women, led by their bosmeri, hold courts (called 
'making a fire') to enforce these regulations.-^ Men who laugh or 
joke about Kafaina dances or decorations are fined up to ten kina for 
their insults. Physical assault against Kafaina women also results 
in compensation; attacks against a bosmeri result in an immediate ten 
kina fine. Non-Kafaina women who wear the kiruwa headdress 
associated with the movement are similarly fined. A bosmeri can 
prohibit Kafaina women who argue with her or fail to obey her 
instructions from attending Kafaina meetings for one week. Would-be 
mother groups may also demand compensation when men object to their 
wives' plans to start a daughter group. In one such instance a village 
court magistrate who rejected the idea of a Kafaina group paid K20 
compensation for the women's labour in travelling to his village.
After receiving this money the Kafaina women returned twice more, only 
to be rejected and receive compensation - until their fourth attempt 
to form a daughter group proved successful.
Men may ignore Kafaina women's demands for compensation, and in 
court, magistrates refuse to uphold the right of Kafaina women to fine
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offenders of Kafaina law. But as in the above example, most men submit 
to Kafaina demands for compensation, stating that Kafaina women are 
'strong’ or that they do not wish to be on bad terms with particular 
Kafaina groups. Several times I saw Kafaina women join together for 
real or mock attacks on men who had mistreated their wives. Once, a 
Kafaina woman complained to her group that her husband had killed 'her' 
pig for a classificatory sister's feast even though he had received 
no part of the brideprice. The group waited for the husband to return 
from gathering firewood and set upon him, beating him, though not too 
strenuously, with fists and sticks. The attack ended with the women 
cautioning their member's husband not to be as foolish with his pigs 
in future and admonishing him to consult his wife over future 
transactions.
Inter-group ceremonies
Most inter-group visitation and exchanges take place during the 
coffee flush when groups of 20 or more Kafaina women sing and dance 
along major roads as they travel to Kafaina meetings. I will discuss 
first those meetings which take place between mother and daughter 
groups, and second those involving formal exchanges between non-related 
groups.
Mother-daughter visits last as long as three days during which 
time the hosts provide garden and store foods, freezer meat, and 
occasionally beer and cooked pork for their guests. Such reciprocal 
visits - as many as ten per year - provide women with the opportunity 
to travel to other villages and allow them respite from gardening and 
other household chores. Husbands of Kafaina women often complain that 
they are forced to harvest food, prepare their own meals (or rely on 
the generosity of other women), and care for children during their 
wives' absences from the village. When their wives act as hosts, 
furthermore, men must collect firewood, butcher and prepare pigs for 
cooking, or parry - often unsuccessfully - their wives' demands for 
men's crops such as sugar cane and bananas. Kafaina women from other 
groups in the village may also attend, and make small contributions to 
visits by mother or daughter groups, and as these informal meetings 
expand in size, Kafaina women may appropriate the use of the men's 
house for dawn-to-dusk singing sessions thereby forcing men to sleep
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in other dwellings.
Small exchanges of money regularly take place at these meetings.
All involve 'new' money (that which is not already a part of Kafaina 
savings); the receiving group divides any payment among its members 
and places this money in the Kafaina bed. Rough equivalence in 
payments exists over time, but with daughter groups providing some 
profit money to their mothers. Many women say that it is only by 
’giving birth’ to daughter groups that their own group will become 
successful and obtain profit. But the real strength of Kafaina as an 
economic organization results from the capital accumulated upon each 
transaction with the mother and other Kafaina groups (see below).
After groups disperse, they may use this capital while continuing to 
repay any outstanding debts with ’new' money.
Exchanges between mother and daughter groups are couched in 
idiomatic reference to the Kafaina ’child’ or 'daughter', a specially 
decorated payment given from the mother to daughter group. In Chuave 
this major payment generally occurs twice: the first, six months to
a year after a group begins operation, and again after about two years 
(some daughter groups receive these when they have saved K1,000 and 
K2,000). Prior to these payments mothers say they are 'straightening 
the road' for the child, and following the transfer of the child, say 
they are giving money to care for, feed, or clothe the child. In 
contrast, daughter groups describe payments to their mother as 
brideprice and later as 'head' pay (child payments). The Kafaina 
daughter group, therefore, is regarded as wife-receiver to its mother 
group who is perceived as wife-giver. Sexton provides an analysis of 
exchanges initiated in Kafaina and actual marriages (1980: 276-277, 
n. 3, 307). Unlike Chuave women, Daulo women describe both major 
payments as brideprice and make no reference to 'head' pays. Despite 
idiomatic references there are clear differences between Kafaina and 
real marriage exchanges because the 'child' is itself a payment or loan 
given from mother (wife-giver) to daughter (wife-receiver); that is, 
a payment that reverses the flow of wealth occurring in actual 
marriages.
The 'child' itself exists for only a few weeks during and after 
the transfer of these payments (which range from K200 to K400). The
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girl-child, a netbag in which the money is hidden, is decorated with 
a woman's pubic string skirt and other ornaments. A match box, 
containing a one or ten toea coin is also attached to the child. 
Informants interpret this as a symbol that the daughter, too, saves 
and hides money and brings wealth to her new clan. As in Daulo (Sexton 
1979: 177-179) where some Christians believed Kafaina women prayed to 
these 'dolls,' members of fundamentalist missions in Chuave told me that 
the 'child' was a false idol or samting bilong Satan and that women 
prayed to it to help their money grow.
As Sexton (ibid.) has noted, the netbag is an important symbol 
of female productivity and nurturance, and she has interpreted the 
link between the netbag-child and coins as a symbolic statement 
concerning the importance of women as creators of wealth and 
reproducers of society. In Daulo, the netbag, called owo> meaning 
'womb' is displayed on a wooden post following menarche as a symbol 
of the girl's future marriage and her ability to bring brideprice to 
her natal clan and also at betrothal in the bride's new village. In 
Chuave the words for netbag and womb are different, and netbags are 
not displayed at marriage. Brides, however, often carry newly made 
netbags, laced with two kina notes which constitute their personal 
wealth, when they travel to their new villages. In the Gai-Onakari 
region and in Siane, furthermore, netbags are sometimes displayed on 
a wooden frame - precisely as Kafaina women display them - following 
a girl's first menstruation. Another Kafaina practice explicitly 
demonstrates a young girl's ability to bring wealth to her natal group; 
some groups hide the netbag-child in the Kafaina bed for a period of 
two to three weeks after its arrival in the daughter group's village. 
During this time, when Kafaina women are also restricted from entering 
gardens, the receiving group may not open the netbag or see the actual 
payment.
Sexton notes that in Daulo the ritual departure of the 'child' 
from the mother group's house and village recapitulates all the impor­
tant events in a woman's lifecycle, with the exception of menarche. 
Daulo women themselves, however, describe the ritual strictly as 
symbolic marriage of the 'child'. For example, the symbolic daughter 
is instructed in her duties as a wife, the raothers/wife-givers 'sob and 
cry out in sorrow at the girl's departure', and the daughter group
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is urged to ’look after’ the bride who, it is said, will be homesick 
for her family (Sexton 1982: 177-180). I witnessed only two departures 
of the ’child ’ and neither followed the pattern reported for Daulo.
In Chuave, when the bosmeri carried the doll from the Kafaina house 
she proceeded along a path lined with coffee leaves and flowers, called 
the rot bilong moni - a practice analogous once again to a young 
girl’s emergence from menstrual isolation. Women then publicly 
displayed the doll and bosmeris of both groups made speeches 
referring to the fact that the child was now married and to the bonds 
which united the two groups. Two men then carried the doll, which was 
tied to a pole, to the daughter group’s village where it was again 
displayed and then, without ceremony, placed in the Kafaina 'bed'.
Despite cultural differences then, the rites surrounding the 
marriage and transfer of the Kafaina ’child' between mother and 
daughter groups in both Daulo and Chuave clearly stress the 
relationship between modern wealth, female productivity and 
reproductive power. It is also clear that this theme has been 
elaborated upon in recent years. Thus, although symbolic marriage was 
part of Wok Meri ritual in 1977 only the prohibition against 
menstruating women attending Wok Meri meetings existed at that time 
(Sexton: personal communication). All other rules are unique to the 
current state of Kafaina activity I witnessed in 1980.
Similarly, recent developments include several exchanges that link 
other Kafaina groups. All are clearly post-1976 in origin, and one 
celebration, the opening of special Kafaina houses, had apparently 
begun in 1979 shortly before my arrival in Chuave. These new exchanges 
increase the resource-building capacity of groups by adding sums of 
money to Kafaina savings and create a complex network of debts 
involving hundreds of groups. Thus, all money received from other 
groups is placed in savings and may not be touched. ’New’ money given 
to other groups as either a return or initiatory gift must be raised 
by women in addition to the coins which women continue to save at 
regular Kafaina meetings. Equally important is the way inter-group 
exchanges and their accompanying celebrations reinforce a woman’s 
identity and allegiance to the Kafaina movement. Not least they allow 
women the unprecedented opportunity to dominate large public meetings.
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The first and second stage Kafaina exchanges revolve around 
Kafaina decorations. Kafaina women eschew western clothes and wear 
traditional string coverings now regularly worn only by elderly women. 
They decorate themselves in traditional finery or a mixture of 
traditional and modern garb including tinsel, plastic, and manufactured 
paints. Women also wear typically male attire - rear coverings of 
cordyline leaves placed over cloth or bark cloth and cassowary 
headdresses that in the past were a sign of a warrior. Another common 
male item now used by Kafaina women is spears, which they carry from 
place to place and use in group dances that mimic war-charges or 
attacks.
This decoration constitutes the uniform of the Kafaina movement 
and clearly affirms Kafaina women’s common identity. Intense 
missionization in Chuave has resulted in the abandonment of traditional 
dress and many women stated that they felt deeply ashamed at the 
thought of wearing string coverings or being seen bare-breasted. One 
woman, after participating in Kafaina for almost a year and refusing 
to abandon her western dress, finally donned full Kafaina regalia, 
saying simply that the behaviour of her Kafaina 'sisters’ had 
encouraged her and that she was now 'truly Kafaina'.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the women have developed 
inter-group exchanges that emphasize facets of Kafaina decoration.
The duration of Kafaina activity is sometimes distinguished by 
reference to decoration: a short string skirt (kabiam kairi) cycle
lasts for three to four years whereas the long string skirt (sambuna) 
terminates after five or more years. The first inter-group exchange 
occurs when a daughter group gives the mother between K40 and K60 for 
red nose paint, and occasionally cassowary headdresses, which members 
wear henceforth at inter-group meetings. This process is repeated (at 
variable intervals) when a daughter group gives about K100 and in turn, 
receives the right to wear the Kafaina kiruwa, a bird wing which is 
attached to a coil that sways as Kafaina women 'turn heads' during 
songs and dances.
Prior to both these occasions, male messengers travel to other 
groups throughout the area to inform them of the celebrations. On the 
appointed day as many as 30 groups travel to the daughter’s village
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to sing, dance and make small payments to the group’s savings which 
will later be reciprocated with ’new’ money. Each bosmeri makes a 
formal prestation of the money (either paper money or coins) in the 
name of her group, frequently cautioning the receiving group to guard 
their savings well, and acknowledging the date or festivity when they 
will expect a return payment. Slips of paper, called kontrak 
(contracts), are given to the Kafaina clerk. These list the donating 
group, the payment which ranges from K1 to K20, and note whether the 
money creates or cancels a debt. A host group can expect to receive 
between K100 and K150 at these times. Kafaina groups sing songs and 
perform stylized dances in which women ask to see or be given the 
Kafaina child and mimic the ’pulling' of money to the Kafaina house.
In return for their participation, women are given food which is 
displayed on tables and reserved for women or men active in the groups 
attending.
The third stage celebration is much larger in scale. When a group 
first establishes itself, members build the Kafaina bed in the 
bosmeri's house where meetings will be held. After a group has given 
birth to daughters and has saved in excess of Kl,500, it constructs 
(after consultation with its mother group) a Kafaina house, 
occasionally called a Kafaina haus lotu (Kafaina church). Kafaina 
houses, either round or oval, are larger than a woman’s house, 
sometimes equivalent in size to a small men's house. Husbands of 
Kafaina women are responsible for the construction of the house, but 
other men from the men’s house group may aid in this task. People 
gather bush flowers to decorate the bed and the house walls, gather 
firewood, and harvest crops which will be given to the celebrants.
As many as five pigs owned by women, the chairman, or other men are 
killed for this major celebration, which groups from the entire region 
attend. (Alternatively, women purchase freezer meat requiring an 
expenditure of up to K300.) Other Kafaina groups within the village 
also aid in the preparation and organization of this event.
Over one thousand women, in one instance representing 167 groups, 
congregate for this ceremony which begins with a prayer officially 
opening the Kafaina house. The meeting lasts one or two days during 
which the host groups may collect contributions of between K600 and 
K1000. Individual payments range from less than one kina from unrelated
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groups Co as much as KL00 from daughter groups. The prestation of 
all the money to the Kafaina clerk may take over five hours, as 
bosmeris use the presentation of their groups' payments to make 
speeches which stress the value of women's work, the histories of their 
own groups, and the relationship between groups in different areas.
These meetings are also attended by people from nearby areas who are 
not part of the Kafaina movement, but simply want to witness the 
spectacle of 100 or more groups of decorated Kafaina women participating 
in mass singing and dancing throughout the day and late into the evening.
Women's work is finally completed when Kafaina groups 'wash hands' 
or 'wash plates'. I was unable to witness this ceremony while in 
Chuave, but the festivities and exchanges associated with house-openings 
closely parallel the 'washing hands' ceremonies Sexton describes for 
the Daulo region (1980-1982). Informants stated, however, that in 
Chuave, unlike Daulo, no 'marriage' payment is made during the washing 
hands ceremony. Excluding this difference all major features of the 
celebrations resemble the house-opening: prayers once again begin the
ceremony, groups contribute a final payment to the sponsoring group, 
and Kafaina women participate in group singing and dancing. Informants 
state that two or more groups from a single village (as is the case in 
Daulo) might sponsor this final ceremony, but stressed that individual 
groups could also make the decision to wash hands. In the days 
following this final stage, Sexton reports that after the group 
publicly counts the cash saved, it announces the total amount to all 
present (presumably the clan or village) (1980: 242-244). In Daulo, 
conflict prevailed in this distribution as women accused clerks of 
having stolen some of their money. Sexton notes that in some groups 
women's savings had not been kept in individual bags; in Chuave money 
is always kept in individual netbags, and money received from other 
groups is quickly divided among all members.
Kafaina: female wealth and power in Chuave
Women in traditional Chuave society were producers and guardians 
of the wealth men used in exchanges; they were also themselves sources 
of wealth because their marriages created relationships necessary for 
an extended series of inter-group exchanges. Today, Kafaina women also 
watch over and protect modern wealth, but the extent to which they may
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allocate wealth remains questionable.
I have little information on the use of money by groups who had 
'washed hands'. Of three Elirabari groups that had reached this stage, 
all used their money to purchase trucks, which men operated and 
controlled. The 'owners' of these PMV businesses were all former 
chairmen of Kafaina groups, and they assured me that women received 
a share of profit money. But the women I spoke to from these former 
Kafaina groups denied that they had received any money; rather, they 
stated that they did not expect money and that their work had 'lifted 
up’ the name of their village and clan. Informants from current groups 
stated that they would also use their money to buy trucks, to start 
tradestores, or as capital to start coffee buying schemes; but the 
group always defers the decision concerning the use of Kafaina savings 
until they 'wash hands'. Sexton provides details on the expenditure 
of Wok Meri savings (ibid.: 282-290). In one of 15 cases, 
money was returned to individual members and not used in any group 
enterprise. In nine instances, groups purchased trucks and, as she 
notes, trucks are the most important status symbol of western wealth 
at the local level. Of course, male drivers were employed and Sexton 
notes that, because of reckless driving and failure to service vehicles 
properly, trucking operations are notoriously subject to a high failure 
rate. Sexton does not indicate the extent to which women actually 
managed or controlled the trucks, though she states that the name of 
the Kafaina group was painted on the vehicle and that females clearly 
made the decision to purchase the truck.
In Chuave, men closely associated with Kafaina groups definitely 
see themselves as the future managers of Kafaina wealth. Women, 
furthermore, believe that they do not have the mathematical or 
managerial skills necessary for large economic ventures, and 
consequently, request the aid of male clerks and chairmen. Some 
husbands also make de facto contributions to Kafaina savings via 
their wives in order to freeze their incomes and escape demands on 
their money from kinsmen. Such men stated that they would expect a 
portion of Kafaina savings after the group had disbanded. When a local 
government councillor persuaded two Kafaina groups to use their savings 
as a basis for applying for RIP funds to start a coffee project, he 
proposed that only the savings of the younger members would be used
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as older women had not been interested in the enterprise. The 
councillor made the actual application, and he stated that the business 
would be run by him and perhaps two other men. The women, he added, 
would receive a share of all profit money (from which he would subtract 
a portion as his salary), but only after he had determined that the 
business had grown sufficiently in size.
These facts demonstrate that having undertaken years of saving, 
women run the risk of having men mismanage their money and that some 
women may be content to abandon their claims to the money once 
businesses have begun. Like their traditional counterparts, therefore, 
Kafaina women protect wealth for years only to have men appropriate 
it, finally gaining in the process only tangential status and prestige 
within the development sector of the economy. Nor is the length of 
time over which Kafaina savings are protected greater than in the 
exchange sector of the economy. Kafaina cycles correspond closely to 
traditional pig cycles - periods of from three to seven years during 
which women constantly cared for pigs only to have men allocate them in 
massive pig killings and exchanges. When the total lifespan of Kafaina 
groups is considered, consequently, Kafaina women can be viewed as 
simply replicating their traditional position as producers within the 
modern cash economy.
The success of the Kafaina movement, however, is not to be judged 
by the degree of control women exercise over the allocation of 
wealth, because Kafaina, as a syncretic movement, has also created an 
institutional framework within which women have achieved an 
unprecedented degree of political power and status. It is the Kafaina 
institution itself, and the benefits women derive from membership, not 
the eventual use to which money is put, which women see as valuable.
Sexton has noted that the combination of Christian prayers, ritual 
and symbolism found in Wok Meri are strikingly reminiscent of cargo 
cult activity (1980: 252). Yet for Daulo she regards these elements 
as superficial; she notes that cargo cults are usually associated with 
a single leader, are dominated by men, involve a repudiation of at 
least a portion of traditional cosmology, seek to decipher a secret 
for obtaining European material goods, and seek to overturn the current 
power relationship between the colonized and colonizer. She regards
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Wok Meri 's emphasis on small savings as more reminiscent of a 
Protestant work ethic and as an essentially 'rationalistic’ approach 
to women's grievances and she states that 'women do not strive to 
overturn the male-female or larger political power structure in the 
society1(ibid.)
My own interpretation, based on a later stage of Kafaina or Wok 
Meri activity than that observed by Sexton, elaborates on the themes 
raised by the Daulo material. Chuave women clearly explain their 
participation in Kafaina in pragmatic and rationalistic terms: men
both control and waste modern wealth, and women must subsequently 
enforce their own right to products of their labour. But it is clear 
that Kafaina is a syncretic movement which blends both traditional and 
modern ideologies and that the movement's success rests as much on the 
unconscious and emotive force of Kafaina symbols and ritual as it does 
on the women's pragmatic, corporate actions.
The power equation colonizer-colonized is no longer appropriate 
simply because, while admiring the white man's 'cargo', people in 
Chuave rapidly realized that their colonizers possessed no secrets that 
generate wealth. Kafaina is concerned with self-help and the ability 
of men and women to accomplish what government has been unable to 
obtain for them: western style material success. It is not a
coincidence that the precursors of Kafaina arose during the initial 
years of local and national government, or that Kafaina has flourished 
in the years following self-government and independence. People have 
long been disenchanted with the government's inability to bring wealth 
and development to the local level. Women in particular have been 
excluded not only from modern political institutions but also from 
small-scale business which is regarded as the exclusive domain of men.
In Kafaina women have created an alternative political domain in 
which they dominate men. They engage in inter-group exchanges and in 
public speaking during large scale meetings. Excluded from public 
office, they have created a specific political status, the bosmeri, 
whose authority cannot be challenged without risking the group's 
institutionalized sanctions. The degree to which this special and 
separate institution will ultimately affect women's political and jural 
status in the society at large is not easy to predict. Yet
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participation in Kafaina groups has already had far-reaching effects. 
Having proven their ability to organize exchanges, some women now 
insist on their right to be active participants in exchanges of all 
types, and 'strong' women, often Kafaina bosmeris, now demand to be 
heard in other public forums. Kafaina courts serve as an alternative 
to village courts where women are not only excluded from acting as 
arbitrators but also continue to be treated as second class citizens.
Similarly, by institutionalizing their control over savings and 
developing regulations which prohibit the use of Kafaina money to pay 
council taxes or court fines, women delimit Kafaina activities as not 
only a substitute for modern political institutions but also, by 
definition, as antithetical to representative government. Men 
associated with Kafaina groups, furthermore, may also use this 
organization as an alternative avenue for gaining political prestige. 
Given continued disenchantment with government it is possible that 
Kafaina will serve, in future, as a model for other institutions that 
reject political bodies imposed by outside authorities, and attempt to 
develop political frameworks that are more responsive to local needs.
The threefold relationship between religious beliefs, women and 
wealth evident in the 1947 Chuave cult continues today. Although women 
were regarded as central to traditional ancestral beliefs, the 
introduction of missions, controlled by males, forced women to the 
periphery of institutions preaching modern religious ideologies. While 
women now regard Christianity as a legitimate substitute for ancestral 
beliefs, they continue to be neglected in church affairs, and in certain 
instances, have sometimes seen Christian ideology turned against them 
for the benefit of their husbands. Thus, use of Christian ideology 
in Kafaina is no more than an attempt by women to make these western 
beliefs more relevant for their own lives by transferring them from a 
male dominated institution to the context of women's work. Missions 
have taught that Jesus and God watch over, protect and through faith, 
are capable of endowing men and women with super-human strength. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Kafaina women call upon these deities 
for aid in their work. The accusations that Kafaina women believe 
appeals to God or the Kafaina doll cause their wealth to grow, like 
statements that Kafaina is 'Satan’s work', are easily dismissed because
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such criticisms invariably stem from fervent mission supporters who feel 
threatened by the use of Christian ideology and practices in a context 
outside formal church services and in situations ripe with traditional 
ritual and symbolism. Kafaina savings do in fact ’grow' over time and 
appeals through Christian prayer (as well as any attempt to appeal to 
ancestral spirits by locating Kafaina houses on traditional 'sacred' 
sites) are fundamentally realistic. Kafaina women are not under the 
delusion that any miracle of loaves and fishes is about to occur in 
Chuave; rather, they seek only to affirm their faith in God and to 
ensure the success of their goals by harnessing any spiritual power at 
their disposal. But by simply adapting Christian practices for use 
in Kafaina, women link beliefs in the supernatural to their own status 
as protectors of wealth.
The movement's strength is also explained by the emotive power 
of increasingly elaborate Kafaina ritual and symbolism which are based 
on traditional beliefs concerning the danger and potency of female 
sexuality towards wealth objects. The reinvention of prohibitions 
revolving around this theme, furthermore, demonstrates that Kafaina 
ideology has become more and not less 'rationalistic' over time.
Sexton notes that in 1977 Daulo men continued to regard Wok Meri 'as 
a kind of secret society for which there is no precedent in traditional 
culture' and which threatens male authority (ibid.: 302). She 
believes that men regard Wok Meri as akin to their own, now defunct, 
male cults by which men asserted their dominance over women.
Not all Chuave men are frightened or suspicious of Kafaina groups. 
Some are merely curious or puzzled; others are ignorant or unconcerned; 
some show little interest in what they believe is a women's affair, 
and their exclusion from Kafaina neither bothers nor offends them.
Yet I would argue that men's initial reaction to the formation of Wok 
Meri groups in their own village is predominantly one of mistrust, 
if not fear. In Chuave, furthermore, a traditional precedent does 
exist. It is to be found in beliefs concerning witchcraft and the 
witches' coven - the prototypical female behaviour which links secrecy 
and supernatural power with material success. The accusations 
surreptitiously made against Kafaina women demonstrate that men 
consciously or unconsciously see a relationship between Kafaina and 
witchcraft. The power women obtain over men is, therefore, partially,
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explained by men's equating Kafaina with the supernatural power of 
women; and, in some cases, men's failure to reassert their dominance 
over Kafaina women results from their apprehensions about supernatural 
reprisals by Kafaina women. Women, furthermore, have always asserted 
their common identity and independence from men by withholding 
information concerning their control over their biological and 
reproductive capacities. Kafaina women have expanded this women's 
knowledge by attempting to consciously restrict information concerning 
aspects of Kafaina activity from men and have thereby created a 
separate and bounded conceptual niche for Kafaina members. If women 
have as yet failed to overturn the balance of power between men and 
women in the society at large, they have at least created a special 
environment in which they both reign supreme over and achieve true 
independence from men. They have created an organization which, given 
future growth and evolution, may be used as a springboard for further 
assaults on men's domination of women.
Sugar cane, a male crop, is the only food commonly marketed by 
men. In general male sellers are scarce and would comprise less 
than 5 per cent of all sellers. Profits from the sale of other 
male crops such as pandanus nuts are often shared by women with 
their husbands.
Attendance at markets is subject to both personal and seasonal 
variation. The figures cited are based on women’s responses to 
a village survey. Women were asked simply whether or not they 
had marketed produce within a previous one month period. I have 
no figures which could be used to project monthly or yearly market 
earnings for women. For Daulo, Sexton (1980: 153) gives an 
estimated mean annual market income of K51 for 15 women surveyed.
Here comparisons with Daulo are difficult to make. In 1977 
Daulo women had a mean annual income of K62 from the sale of 
coffee cherry (Sexton ibid.: 153-157). Men averaged K321 for 
the sale of parchment. But while Sexton notes that men should 
ideally share their incomes with their wives, she gives no actual 
cases and notes only that (as in Chuave) women have no legal 
claims to their husbands' coffee incomes.
See Wagner (1977) for a detailed discussion of spirit mediums in 
Daribi. Daribi and Chuave beliefs about spirits and ghosts 
differ greatly but Daribi mediums, like those in Chuave, are 
predominantly female.
Salisbury (1965) discusses kumo as the manipulation of spirit 
material by men in curing as a sorcery technique. The technique 
referred to is also found in Chuave but is regarded as sorcery 
(gene) and distinguished from kumo. My own Siane informants 
used the word kumo for witchcraft but this may be a recent 
usage; the term is clearly western and not eastern highlands in 
origins: kumo being used in central Simbu and kum in the Minj
area. Salisbury also notes that in attacks by ancestral spirits 
(Siane, korova", Chuave, giri) female spirits are considered 
more capricious and vindictive than those of men. From 
Salisbury's description it is clear that women were regarded as 
potentially dangerous spiritual beings and Siane spirit beliefs 
and Chuave witchcraft beliefs share many common characteristics.
An opposition exists, therefore, between sorcery or poisoning used 
against all other enemy clans and witchcraft in which all in- 
marrying females are regarded as potentially harmful. In both 
Hagen and Chuave, the poisoning of food was one method of killing 
enemies (both the Hagen and Chuave terras also mean 'root ginger'). 
But in contrast to the Hagen area, Chuave women rarely act as 
poisoners, nor are they regarded as susceptible to the suggestion 
by their natal groups that they use poison against their husbands' 
kinsmen (A. Strathern 1971: 81-82).
One past method of both curing and discovery was as follows. A 
witchcraft victim who falls ill with severe stomach pains could 
be healed by obtaining a piece of pandanus leaf from the door of 
the suspected witch's house. The leaf was burned and the victim 
made to inhale the smoke. Immediate recovery was regarded as a 
sure sign of the woman's guilt.
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8. In certain circumstances it is possible to suggest that such 
accusations were indirect attacks on prominent big men. One 
situation within Keu village clearly had such political overtones. 
A discussion of the implications of witchcraft accusation for male 
leadership falls beyond my concerns in this chapter. Reay (1976) 
discusses several such examples in the Minj area.
9. Howlett et al (1976: 257) reports that prior to 1976 men and 
women contributed savings to groups called magai (a Kuman terra 
meaning ’meeting') which were organized by Lutherans in Sinasina 
and notes that the word sande is used for savings and loan 
groups run by wage earners in coastal towns (1976: 257).
10. The Chuave branch of the Simbu Savings and Loan Society was not 
established until 1978. During the late 1960s and early 1970s 
membership in western-style credit associations in Simbu was 
concentrated in the Kerowagi and Kundiawa districts (Howlett et 
al 1976: 243-246). It is possible that the expansion in 
Kafaina activity in Chuave during the 1970s may be related to 
people's peripheral involvement in these western savings societies 
and their desire to create a local equivalent of such 
organizations. However, the origins of Kafaina clearly pre-date 
the introduction of western-style credit associations and people 
rarely mention these western institutions when discussing 
Kafaina.
11. Kafaina leaders may also be called 'mother' or 'the woman who 
holds the key' (to the Kafaina 'bed'). The term 'big woman' used 
in Daulo (Sexton 1980: 204) is uncommon, though heard in Chuave.
12. Kafaina groups (and individual members) save greater sums of money 
than Daulo Wok Meri groups. This is because Kafaina groups 
receive more loans from other groups during ceremonies which are 
of recent origin (see text). The largest total for a Daulo group, 
for example, was K2,481 for 35 members (Sexton 1980: 268). In 
contrast, one Duma Kafaina group, which had not yet completed its 
savings, had collected K6,783 for 26 members. Kafaina groups can 
now expect to save in excess of K4,000 on average.
13. It is possible that some leakage of Kafaina information occurs, 
though my questioning of non-members leads me to believe that 
these regulations are restricted from most men. Any knowledge 
of the regulations, furthermore, must only reinforce men's 
suspicions about the secrecy and covertness of Kafaina activity 
and thereby increase their misgivings about these groups.
14. Pascoe (1975) and Sexton (1980: 281) both report women's courts 
for the Unggai and Daulo regions of the Eastern Highlands 
province.
Chapter Six
LAW, POLITICS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER
The Sirabu are aggressive, argumentative and litigious. People 
recognize incessant small scale disturbances to village life as 
necessary, if dangerous evils. Individual rights are both broadly 
defined and fiercely defended. Even the slightest infringement of 
these rights - a personal insult or the questioning of a person's 
motives or behaviour - can result in heated denial, counter-accusation 
and occasionally physical violence. Morover, a man who fails to defend 
his family, property, character or personal rights loses face; 
passivity is synonymous with weakness. Consequently, for the 300 
adults living in close quarters In Keu village, verbal arguments are 
daily events, and violence erupts at least once a week. No one is 
concerned to eliminate confrontations between kinsmen for that would 
represent a denial of human nature. Rather the phrase 'law and order', 
used by villagers, invokes the necessity to limit the scale of 
confrontation and to repair the damage to the social order that 
disturbances of the peace cause. People seek to re-establish, even 
temporarily, a balance between right and wrong, to restore a balance 
between disputants, and to prevent quarrels from escalating into 
violent clashes which threaten to disrupt entire clans and 
communities.
Men who successfully act to punish law breakers, or to restore 
by mediation or adjudication a balance between disputants, become 
respected and admired. Formerly, government officials - bosbois, 
luluais, and later councillors as well as komitis - assumed primary 
responsibility for maintaining law and order. They reported serious 
breaches of administration law to the kiap or Local Court and settled 
a number of disputes by hearing kots in village settings. The 
establishment of village courts in 1978 separated the powers and duties 
formerly accruing to the same government official. As an institution 
responsible for law and order, village courts are a second arm of 
government, separate from, and often opposed to, the local government 
council. Village court officials, particularly magistrates, have 
become the most important government officials at the local level.
Their power and influence supersedes that of councillors, who have been 
stripped of the de facto right to punish law breakers. The 
magistrate’s authority over legal matters is far greater than that of 
prior government officials. However, villagers closely scrutinize
- 186-
courts officials' behaviour. In this chapter, I analyse the interface 
between law and politics, and demonstrate how the interaction between 
leaders and followers affects the limits of the court officials' 
authority and the nature of the law itself.
The selection of court officials
Eleven village courts operate within the Elimbari Council area.
Each court has, on average, six magistrates, three peace officers, and 
one court clerk; these officials are drawn from various clans in the 
eria. Some clans, may have both a councillor and a magistrate, or 
a magistrate and peace officer, but no clan ever has two magistrates. 
Inevitably some clans do not have a magistrate. When this occurs peace 
officers, councillors and magistrates often encounter conflict as they 
attempt to assert their authority outside their own agnatic group.
Within Keu community, the magistrates Martin and Dege (of Komodurumo 
and Kaupagam clans) often heard disputes at men's houses belonging 
to other clans (that is, Komogam and Subagam). Men of these clans 
usually accepted them, but would have preferred to have their own 
magistrate. In order to avoid confrontation, Martin and Dege allowed a 
Komogam peace officer to hear a number of small disputes, and 
frequently presided over men's house courts in tandem with this man 
or other local leaders. Where Martin or Dege's decisions were 
questioned, the magistrates sent the dispute to the official village 
court. Magistrates and peace officers, therefore, hear a number of 
disputes in unofficial settings outside of the formal village court 
(cf. M. Strathern 1972b). I define 'disputes' and outline dispute 
processing shortly, but first, I examine the selection and powers of 
village court officials.
Procedures for selecting magistrates are as yet undefined and 
therefore a source of great tension and criticism. The Village Courts 
Act stipulates that the Provincial Supervising Magistrate,^" after 
consultation with local government councils and with 'such other bodies 
as he considers appropriate', will submit to the High Commissioner, 
the names of village court magistrates to be appointed to specific 
courts (1973-74: section 6:7). A village court can have no fewer than 
three and no more than ten magistrates (section 7:2). The appointment 
of magistrates is 'reviewed' at the end of three years, and the
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Supervising Magistrate may terminate appointments at any time for 
reasons of ’incompetence' or 'misconduct' (section 7:10). Magistrates 
and clerks are national government employees. Peace officers, 
similarly appointed, are employees of the council, which determines 
their salary and conditions of service (section 62). In 1981 
magistrates received K203 per year (almost double the allowance of 
councillors), and peace officers and clerks received slightly less.
When Elimbari Council first established courts in 1978, 
councillors selected magistrates and peace officers, in theory, after 
they had obtained the consensus of their villagers. In practice, 
however, political patronage and the councillors' perception of the 
powers that magistrates would have influenced appointments. Although 
the Village Courts Act allows councillors to hold the office of
Omagistrate, no Elimbari councillors chose this option (cf. Warren 
1976: 3-4). Councillors told me they had assumed that magistrates 
would act as ward komltis and, wishing to rid themselves of the 
burden of dispute settlement, they selected former komitis or other 
leaders for this office.^ Of 46 first term magistrates, 23 had 
served as ward committee men, and four others had previously been 
councillors. In KTK ward Komodurumo men insisted that Martin should be 
appointed because, as komlti, he had long been responsible for 
hearing Keukobu disputes. Kopon, the Kaupagam councillor, told me he 
agreed to this because Martin was Komodurumo's recognized leader and 
his authority was minimal within Kaupagam. The Komodurumo men's house 
at Onama, therefore, was ignored. Kopon also ignored Tabiagam's 
demands for representation, and selected Mama as magistrate and Touri, 
a young educated man who had stood in the 1977 national elections, as 
court clerk. The choice of Mama was based on his prior reputation as 
luluaiy his position as the land mediator for Chuave, and Kopon's 
regard for him as a capable arbitrator of disputes. Other Duma 
councillors selected the remaining officials, appointing five 
magistrates from the largest clans and two peace officers from the 
smaller clans. Because the DOIC and Local Court Magistrate had 
previously determined the size of the court, Tabiagam failed to obtain 
any representation. Later two Ei tribe magistrates and one peace 
officer joined the Duma court, bringing the total number of officials 
to eleven.
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Once established, it became clear that the court was a separate 
institution from the council, and that magistrates were responsible 
to the Local Court Magistrate, not to the councillors. Magistrates, 
trained in their powers and duties by the Local Court Magistrate, 
received special uniforms and badges of office. Court officials then 
chose sites for the village court, and, aided by close kinsmen, built 
special court houses based on the model of the local court, complete 
with flag poles, benches and tables (see Westermark 1978). Magistrates 
rapidly took responsibility for hearing all disputes arising in the 
village and, backed by the DOIC and Local Court Magistrate, excluded 
councillors from acting as mediators or adjudicators in disputes.
Each court also elected a chairman. In Duma, Martin quickly used 
his position as chairman to persuade the Local Court Magistrate to 
replace Mama and Touri. Using Touri’s inattendance at village court 
as an excuse, he selected a Tabiagam youth as clerk, thereby appeasing 
Tabiagam's claims for representation. Supported by several Mamgram 
men, Martin argued that Mama was too old to be a magistrate and that 
Kaupagam men preferred Dege, a close friend of Martin's, a former 
komiti and Kopon's rival. After pressure from other Kaupagam men,
Kopon was forced to accept Dege's appointment.
By the end of the court's first terra, magistrates had established 
themselves as the most powerful leaders at the local level, and their 
relationships with councillors were often strained. Today, councillors 
feel that magistrates have usurped their power and have become the true 
government leaders. Competition between the council and courts is 
sometimes bitter. Thus several magistrates encouraged a boycott of tax 
patrols in 1979 because the council had not empowered magistrates to 
fine tax offenders. In retaliation, the council ignored all 
magistrates' demands for funds to maintain or build new court houses 
and excluded magistrates from speaking at council meetings. Moreover, 
councillors often tried to discredit particular magistrates by 
spreading rumours that they were stealing court fines or by criticizing 
them for biased decisions and other abuses of power. I return to the 
legitimacy of these accusations later. By 1980, despite criticisms of 
the court and occasional vandalism of court buildings by youths, there 
was intense competition for village court positions.
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Although the Village Courts Act makes no strict provisions for 
the re-appointment of magistrates, it is clear that community 
consultation and consensus should be sought. The DOIC at Chuave, after 
consultation with the Provincial Magistrate, agreed to villagers' 
requests to conduct a general election by show of hands. The council, 
however, maintained its authority to appoint peace officers.
Word of the impending election spread rapidly causing great 
confusion. People wishfully assumed that they would now elect a 'true' 
court and that each clan would select its own magistrate. The DOIC, 
after hearing this rumour, informed villagers that each court would 
elect the number of magistrates extant: no new positions would be
created. Villagers then discussed the possibility of voting on an 
eria basis, suggesting that those seven magistrates who received the 
most votes should be elected. The DOIC also vetoed this proposal. 
Villagers then said they wished to vote on a community basis. Thus, 
Subagam people living at Keu wanted to vote for a Keu resident rather 
than voting with the Subagams living at Onama because magistrates from 
other communities are rarely available to hear informal courts in the 
village. They preferred to nominate a Subagam leader who would compete 
against Dege or Martin for the position of Keu magistrate. The DOIC 
dismissed this proposal on the day of the election on the basis that 
it would make voting too difficult, and, I believe, because the idea 
was so unprecedented that the DOIC wanted to conform to prior ward-clan 
divisions.
Nine of 46 existing magistrates were unopposed in the election.
One hundred and twenty-seven men contested the remaining 37 positions. 
Overall, 25 of 46 magistrates were re-elected. I observed the election 
of magistrates in Chuave census division. Of the 26 successful Chuave 
candidates, 73 per cent had some previous government experience: two
were currently peace officers, four had previously been councillors, 
and 13 had been komitis. Four successful candidates were Lutheran 
songons. Only two men who were currently councillors stood for this 
election, however, and both were defeated. People distinguish sharply 
between councillors and magistrates as types of government leaders.
Thus everyone agreed that councillors should not be elected as 
magistrates or vice versa. The magistrates' election preceded the 
council election by one month. Only 12 men stood in both these
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elections. Of these, three were successful in one election, but no 
candidate was elected to both village court and council.
Each contest was influenced by local conditions, in particular 
the division of clans between different communities and attempts by 
clans to elect not only their own kinsmen but also members of their 
local community. Because census books were not used to separate clans, 
heated arguments often arose as men attempted to vote several times 
for different candidates or as groups aligned themselves to improve 
their chances of electing a magistrate. KTK ward’s election 
illustrates the type of competition that occurred.
Rumours about potential candidates spread several months prior 
to the election. The incumbents, Martin and Dege, made it clear that 
they would stand, but not campaign. People, they said, were aware of 
their reputations and could vote as they pleased. In fact, they made 
very few speeches or formal pledges. Conversations focussed on whether 
people should contest Martin's or Dege’s office and emphasized the 
necessity of a high turn-out to the election. As weeks passed, it 
became clear that Dege's position would be contested. Many men felt 
that he had become 'too big' and that he was too demanding and 
assertive as a magistrate. Several days before the election there were 
rumours that Kopon, and as many as five others, would run as 
candidates. The day before the vote three men publicly announced they 
would contest Dege's office: Kopon, the only competitor belonging to a
different subclan from Dege's; Man, a lineage head and leader of Aragor 
men's house; and Lewas, a Lutheran wokman and younger member of Dege's 
lineage who, like Kopon, belonged to Korowa men's house. Up until the 
day of the vote, there was confusion as to whether or not Martin and Dege 
would compete against each other and whether Tabiagam men would nominate. 
Martin, however, was considered unbeatable and many Kaupagam men 
suggested that they would vote for Martin in preference to Dege.
When the DOIC appeared at the court house to hold the vote, 
leaders from all three clans approached him to ask about who could 
stand and whether the ward would vote as a whole. The DOIC informed 
them that as the ward currently had two magistrates, they would vote 
for two positions; thus Tabiagam would have to contest either Martin's 
or Dege's position, but not both, as clans had to vote as a unit. Two
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Tabiagam raen then announced their candidacy, and a quick meeting of 
Tabiagam men decided that they would run against Dege. This choice 
was obvious given Martin's strong candidacy. Table 9 lists the results 
of the Tabiagam-Kaupagam vote.
Table 9: Tabiagam-Kaupagam village court election results
Candidate Approximate
Age
Clan Details Votes
Dege 45 Kaupagam Incumbent/subclan leader 35
Lewas 30 Kaupagam Lutheran leader 4
Man 38 Kaupagam Komiti/lineage leader 1
Kopon 42 Kaupagam Councillor/subclan leader 0
Robert 26 Tabiagam (see text) 84
More 45 Tabiagam Subclan leader/former 
komiti
6
The winner, Robert, though having no claim to any hereditary 
status, nor previous government experience, was a young, literate man 
who had worked as a wage labourer for four years. He was also a member 
of the New Tribes mission, and Tabiagam men characterized him as an 
honest, hard working and 'educated' man. The election of younger men 
was by no means a universal feature of the Chuave elections, though 
in Elimbari this trend was noted by the DOIC (Mogna CPR 1 1981; 7).
A growing awareness that magistrates should be literate in order to 
read the village court manual is juxtaposed with the competing belief 
that older men are more experienced in matters concerning customary law. 
Only 15 per cent of first terra magistrates and 23 per cent of second 
term magistrates were literate.
As the smallest of KTK's clans, Tabiagam had never succeeded in 
electing a councillor. In this election, however, 76.7 per cent of 
Tabiagam adults voted compared with only 21.1 per cent of Kaupagam. 
Tabiagam's turn-out (or conversely, Dege's inability to mobilize
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Kaupagam voters) therefore, largely account for Robert's success.
While all Tabiagam men voted for their own candidates, four Kaupagam 
men cast their votes for Robert - another indication, however minor, 
that Dege's actions as magistrate had alienated his own kinsmen.
Voters explained to me that they disregarded Man and More because these 
men were both renowned for their quick tempers and aggressiveness; they 
were 'hot' men whose personalities were incompatible with the 
magistrate's position. People argued that magistrates should be 'cold' 
men who 'scale' or balance both sides of an argument and who, unlike 
More or Man, rarely resort to physical violence.
In contrast, Kopon and Lewas were already established leaders, 
and this explains their poor showing. As councillor and church leader 
respectively, these men were not entitled to undertake a second 
'profession'; they could not 'double work'. One month later, Kopon 
was returned as councillor unopposed by any KTK leader. Thus people 
explicitly stated that, although Kopon had formerly settled disputes 
as councillor and while his decisions were 'true' and unbiased, he 
would become too dominant in village affairs if he were elected to both 
government offices. Thus, they insisted on the separation of roles.
Martin was returned unopposed after a massive turn-out by his 
kinsmen who were concerned that he might have to compete against 
Kaupagam or Tabiagam candidates. But, several months later,^ before 
the swearing-in ceremony, the Senior Provincial Magistrate dismissed 
him on the grounds that the Local Court Magistrate insisted that Martin 
had twice failed to appear in Chuave for appeals against village court 
decisions. According to this Provincial Magistrate, the dismissal was 
also based on Martin's past record: as councillor in the early 1970s,
he had been convicted of tax theft (G. Lapthorne: personal
communication 1981). The overturning of the villagers' consensus 
caused great disenchantment with the Local and Provincial Magistrates - 
resentment fuelled by Martin's own complaints that the government was 
unfair. For villagers who have had almost 20 years experience with 
democratic elections, village court elections are the best method of 
obtaining consensus. Villagers, moreover, were aware of Martin's past 
record and did not see this as an obstacle to his proper fulfillment 
of the magistrate's office. They argued that other magistrates, too, 
had been jailed for various crimes before assuming office and that the
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Local Court was meddling in village affairs.
At a meeting following this election, the council selected the 
peace officers. Typically, between five and ten men nominated for 
these positions in each court area. In Duma councillors decided on 
community rather than clan representation and re-appointed two peace 
officers from Gun and Onama. Kopon, however, successfully lobbied to 
replace the Keu peace officer, a Komogam, with a Subagam nominee. In 
doing so, he ignored three Kaupagam candidates. Although he denied 
any bias in this appointment, two of the Kaupagam men were highly 
respected. One, a former Papua New Guinea constable, was ideally 
suited in people's minds for the office. Men suggested that by 
ensuring Kaupagam had no court representation, Kopon could subsequently 
attempt to reassert his leadership in the village by acting as 
mediator in disputes or presiding with Martin in court cases involving 
Kaupagams.
The selection of court officials is an intrisically political 
process, shaped by both individual and group rivalries. The results 
of these elections show that magistrates, like councillors, have great 
difficulty maintaining power. The degree of competition for court 
positions is mainly due to the enormous responsibility and power of 
these officials. Those men who obtain village court office quickly 
become the most dominant and influential men in their communities.
The village court
A village court manual, called the 'red book', outlines the duties 
and powers of court personnel. The clerk's duties include keeping 
track of court summonses and fines, as well as writing 'order' forms 
which record details of cases and list the names of litigants involved 
and the presiding magistrates. In Chuave, clerks are usually men in 
their early twenties, with at least a standard six education.^ Peace 
officers, called polis in Pidgin, are charged with maintaining order 
in the village court eria and at the court house, ordering law 
breakers to appear in court, ensuring that community work as punishment 
for offences is fulfilled according to magistrates' decisions, and 
transporting people to the temporary lock-up in Chuave. They also have 
the power of arrest. In Chuave, peace officers are equipped with
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handcuffs and a few have obtained billy-clubs which they carry while 
in uniform. Typically, peace officers are strong men, ’true 
musclemen', who are recognized for their aggressive personalities. 
Physical and verbal abuse of convicted parties and of individuals 
failing to show proper respect for the court are common. The slightest 
breach of court decorum - failure to remove a hat before entering the 
court building, failure to stand straight or to speak up in response 
to a magistrate's question - often results in a rapid cuff or slap from 
the peace officer (cf. Westermark 1978: 84). In extreme instances, 
faced with magistrates' vitriolic lectures and the intimidation of 
peace officers, litigants are driven to nervous shaking, crying, and 
fainting while in court.
Both peace officers and clerks, are in theory, restricted from 
participating in court decisions. In practice, they frequently make 
their opinions known, occasionally influencing the result of a case.
When peace officers flagrantly attempt to intervene in court decisions, 
however, magistrates always caution them and sometimes order them from 
the court building.
In most areas the court meets twice a week, on Mondays and Fridays. 
Chuave courts, like those in Kainantu, are actually comprised of two 
forums: an 'outside' or kros kot held in the court's yard and an
'inside' or 'full' court held in the court building (see Warren 1976:
13; Westermark 1978). The outside forum is essentially a mediation 
court in which magistrates, peace officers and occasionally 
councillors, songons and other big men encourage litigants 
to reach a agreement. This court also determines the severity of the 
offence and whether any law has been broken. It acts as a clearing 
arena for the full court by eliminating those squabbles regarded as too 
petty to be heard inside. Of 404 cases for which I have data, 70 (17.3 
per cent) were resolved in this forum or otherwise failed to proceed to 
the full court.
In the inside court, which is based on the model of the Local 
Court with benches and a desk separating magistrates from litigants, 
strict rules of decorum apply and peace officers cannot interfere (cf. 
Westermark 1978: 81-83). Here magistrates adjudicate. The red book 
sets out both court procedure and the sanctions available to
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magistrates . To avoid split decisions, three, five or even seven 
magistrates hear each case. Magistrates cannot hear cases involving 
close agnates, affinal or maternal kinsmen (Pidgin: wanblut o wan
pisin o kandere samting). In Chuave, magistrates broadly interpret 
this rule as not being able to hear disputes involving any close 
maternal or affinal kin or any member of their own clan. Magistrates 
go to great lengths to ensure the public believes the inside court is 
neutral. Thus, they always remove themselves from the bench and 
sometimes leave the court building when their kinsmen's cases are 
heard. When giving evidence, they remove their badges and uniforms 
before entering the court. As I show later, such public displays of 
neutrality often mask private interference in particular cases, and 
allow magistrates to disassociate themselves from particular 
settlements, even when they have played a crucial role in the case's 
outcome.
The red book outlines 16 categories of offences, which, given 
their ambiguous wording and the magistrates' flexible interpretation 
of them, cover any breach of customary or administration law. Assault, 
theft, property damage, disturbing the peace, lying or slander are all 
examples of separate offences. Offences are punishable by a maximum 
of K50, jail sentences of four weeks, or community work for four weeks 
(eight hours a day, six days a week); magistrates may also order 
compensation of up to K100 in lieu of fines. Magistrates make all 
court decisions in camera, after which they call the litigants back 
into the court, read the applicable offence and maximum penalty to the 
convicted party, and then announce their decision. The clerk writes 
the court order and then hands copies to the claimant and defendant. 
Occasionally, magistrates render verbal decisions and forego the use 
of written orders. Table 10 lists the average fines or compensation 
for seven offences frequently heard in village court. Of 270 cases 
for which I have accurate information, 90 (33.3 per cent) resulted in 
fines, 150 (55.5 per cent) in compensation, and 30 (11.1 per cent) in 
both fines and compensation.
People regard the village court as a harsh institution. In part, 
this stems from the frequency with which fines are imposed, a practice 
contrary to traditional methods of settlement based on compensation. 
This is particularly evident in cases involving physical violence,
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which magistrates regard as a breach of administration rather than 
customary law. Such cases often result in fines, compensation being 
awarded only when injuries have been caused. People also realize that 
magistrates can link offences and impose fines which are impossible 
to pay. For example, a fight that starts over an insult can lead to 
several charges - tok bilas (lying or slander), assault, and 
disturbing the peace - and the potential fines could total K150. 
Failure to pay fines or compensation ordered by the court constitutes 
’disobeying orders' and is subject to an additional fine of up to K50. 
Thus, despite the fact that offenders may perceive all offences as 
related to a single argument or dispute, the court can charge them for 
several offences and, failing payment, impose jail sentences. In the 
three years since the inception of the Duma court, 88 men and 14 women 
had been jailed and given sentences ranging from one week to three and
f.:a half months.
Table 10: Fines and compensation imposed in village court*
Offence Average fine Average compensation
Assault K27 K30
Marital quarrels K22 K26
Pig trespass — K12
Theft K12 K20
Adultery — K40
Tok bilas/lying/ 
slander
K14 Kll
Disobeying orders K14 —
* rounded off to the nearest kina
Chapter six of the red book outlines those offences over which 
magistrates have no power: motor vehicle regulations, land disputes^
and cases previously heard in another village court. Offences not 
covered by the 16 categories listed cannot be heard. Specific examples
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of this latter type include murder, rape, theft of goods valued over 
K100, and escape from imprisonment. Even in these cases, however, the 
village court may order compensation. Rape cases, for example, are 
rarely reported to Local or District Courts. The village court simply 
orders compensation of between K50 and K100 to the victim, and fines 
the attacker for disturbing the peace or assault - a method of 
settlement regarded as legitimate by men and women alike.
Magistrates are futher empowered to award unlimited compensation 
in matters concerning child, death or bridewealth payments. Only cases 
concerning the last of these is regularly heard in village court. Upon 
divorce, for example, the court often decides the amount of bridewealth 
that must be paid back to a man's agnates, based on the length of time 
the couple has been married. Divorce settlements for marriages of less 
than a year often result in repayment of one-half to three-quarters 
of the bridewealth. For long-term marriages, the settlements are 
usually a small portion of the initial payment - less than K50 - or 
none at all.
Magistrates are also responsible for 'settlement orders' and 
'preventative orders', but in Chuave village courts these are rarely 
used. The former covers cases where the litigants themselves reach 
an agreement concerning compensation in kros kot. People who later 
renege on these can be charged with disobeying orders. Preventative 
orders are written when magistrates believe particular individuals or 
groups are about to fight or when they believe court decisions will not 
be followed. These are mostly given after divorce cases to prevent 
future quarrels between former spouses or to list the terms of child 
custody.
The magistrates' power to adjudicate is theoretically limited to 
those cases heard in village court, that is, the panel of at least 
three magistrates who make decisions by majority vote and who are 
unrelated to litigants. Magistrates are further empowered to act as 
mediators in any matter 'relating to a dispute' prior to resorting to 
adjudication (Village Courts Act part two, division two; part three, 
division four). In other words, magistrates are official government 
mediators in all disputes not formally heard in village court. In 
practice, however, a single magistrate often acts as an adjudicator
- 198-
because the people recognize him as a legitimate authority responsible 
for the maintenance of law and order. But although his authority 
extends beyond the village court and is embodied in the role of 
magistrate itself, the magistrate’s actual power is restricted by his 
relationships with kinsmen and friends within the clan and community. 
Subsequently, magistrates are forced to temper their power and ignore a 
wide range of disputes. Those cases heard in village court - over 800 
per year - represent approximately one-third of all disputes arising 
within the eria. The magistrate's complex role is best understood 
by examining the options available to people when disputes arise within 
the village.
Dispute processing
Following Gulliver (1969: 14) and Counts (1974: 119), a dispute 
arises when disagreements between groups or individuals result in a 
claim by one party that 'alleged rights’ have been infringed upon, 
interfered with, or denied by another (see also Epstein 1974: 8-9). 
Determining whether or not a 'claim' has been made is itself difficult. 
In Chuave, the use of go-betweens is common, and minor grievances may 
never become known to the general public. Likewise, at ceremonies or 
exchanges, many accusations or verbal skirmishes which can be called 
'arguments' often arise. Thus, people may demand portions of a payment 
or claim publicly that individuals are not fulfilling their responsi­
bilities to kinsmen. I do not consider such points of contention 
'disputes'. Rather, only those cases where people publicly claim their 
rights have been infringed upon or where these arguments lead to 
physical violence, demands for compensation, or the threat of legal 
action, I consider disputes. I have information on 319 disputes 
involving members of Keu village. Of these, 21 resulted from Chuave 
police arrests and may be considered violations against the state.
They include offences such as traffic violations, gambling, and 
carrying an offensive weapon. The remaining 298 disputes result from 
the claims of individuals in the local community. I use the phrase 
'dispute processing' to indicate the choices, available to individual 
disputants and third parties, that determine both the outcome of 
disputes and the forums where resolution occurs.
Table 11 lists the types of disputes that arose and the number
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Table 11: Categorization of Keu village disputes
Type Number of 
disputes
Number of
violent
disputes
a) Marital
division of labour 17 10
adultery accusations 16 4
household expenditures 15 7
insults/tok bilast 10 8
divorce 8 2
drunkenness* 7 5
children/child rearing” 5 5
sexual rights 2 0
subtotal: 80 41
b) Pig trespass 43 4
c) Theft
pigs/fowl 12 3
garden produce 9 0
money 7 1
coffee 6 0
store goods 4 0
personal possessions 2 0
subtotal 40 4
d) Tok bilas/slander 23 15
e) Distribution/debts 23 7
f) Drunkenness/spak bisnis* 19 13
g) Property rights
garden sites 14 3
water rights/pollution 3 0
subtotal 17 3
h) Property damage 13 1
i) Sexual offences
rape 3 3
sexual harassment 3 1
pregnancy/unwed mothers 1 3
menstrual contamination 2 0
incest 1 1
subtotal 15 8
j) Children's behaviour 11 6
1) Cards/gambling 5 4
m) Responsibility for communal work 3 0
n) Witchcraft accusation 3 0
o) Accident liability 1 1
Total 298 107 (35.9%)
* Cases where the cause itself is attributed to the intoxicating 
effects of alcohol (see Warry 1982).
// These are separate cases occurring between spouses and are 
additional to those listed under categories d and j.
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of disputes involving violence. The cause of a dispute is usually 
clear cut. Occasionally, however, several causes merge in a single 
dispute. For example, a person who discovers some of his garden 
produce has been stolen, may accuse another person seen near the place 
of the theft. If there are no eye-witness accounts of the actual theft, 
the accusation may be unprovable, in which case the accused may counter­
claim that his reputation has been damaged and receive compensation for 
the insult. Slander or insults often arise as part and parcel of any 
heated dispute. In Table 11, I have relied on informants' statements to 
list the principal cause of the dispute.
Often disputes do not result in any litigation. They may simply 
lapse because disputants decide not to press claims for compensation. 
Case A shows that even bitter disputes involving physical violence may 
not end in litigation.
Case A
Kaupa approached his son Bandi, age 17, at Mamgram and told him 
that Bandi's grandmother had complained about the boy's failure to 
gather firewood or help with other household chores. Kaupa berated 
his son for ignoring his responsibilities to his grandmother, who was 
old and infirm. He further accused Bandi of laziness, adding that, 
by belonging to a Keu gang, Bandi was always getting into trouble.
Bandi replied by saying he was old enough to do as he pleased and 
finally told his father to 'shut up'. At this remark Kaupa slapped 
Bandi several times. Bandi then became incensed and attacked his 
father. The ensuing fight quickly became one-sided as Kaupa, a 
much stronger man, retaliated and beat his son. Hearing the fracas 
several men, including Silas, Bandi's uncle, and Paul, a patrilateral 
cousin of both Silas and Kaupa, emerged from Mamgram men’s house. Silas 
was Bandi's 'second father', his guardian, and quickly entered the fight 
to defend Bandi. Paul also joined the fight, first attempting to 
restrain, and then attacking Bandi. Another Mamgram resident, Nime, who 
belonged to a different subclan, managed to intervene between Kaupa and 
Silas and persuaded them to stop fighting. After several minutes other 
onlookers also began shouting appeals for an end to the fight, telling 
the parties that it was a foolish quarrel, a 'rubbish' matter.
The men ceased fighting but continued to exchange insults. Kaupa 
argued he alone was responsible for Bandi's behaviour. Silas, in turn, 
maintained that Bandi was an adult, and deserved to be treated like 
one, arguing in effect, for Kaupa to pick on someone his own size.
After an obscene insult, Kaupa broke loose from Nime and again attacked 
Silas, grabbing his brother by the throat. Both men then broke free, 
grabbed fence posts and exchanged several blows. Two additional men 
from Kaupa's subclan also joined the fight at this stage, both on 
different sides. There was no bloodshed during this stage of 
escalation which, by Chuave standards, did not reach serious 
proportions. Nime and a Keukobu man interceded and threw the fence
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posts into a nearby garden. The matter, they shouted, was finished 
and would be settled in court. Kaupa and Silas again exchanged 
insults, this time concerning each man's alleged failure to contribute 
to lineage and men's house exchanges. Bandi remained silent throughout 
this stage, the initial quarrel now almost forgotten. Both Silas and 
Kaupa threatened each other with court action for the insults and blows. 
The matter ended when Silas dragged Bandi away by the arm, and Kaupa 
retired to the men's house, shouting about his son's pig-headed nature 
and his brother's unwarranted interference.
No court action resulted from this fight. The principal 
antagonists ignored each other for several weeks; Kaupa decided to 
sleep temporarily in his pig house away from the village, and Bandi 
made himself scarce around Mamgram by sleeping and eating at another 
men's house. Nime and Paul separately approached both Martin and Dege, 
and informed them of the fight. Dege, a Mamgram resident, immediately 
decided the matter should be allowed to lapse and informed Mamgram men 
that a court would be held only if Kaupa or Silas insisted. Martin 
later approached Dege and suggested that the men could be fined for 
fighting and disturbing the peace. Dege considered the fight a minor 
affair, calling it 'family business' (a lineage matter), and insisted 
that charges would only exacerbate the contention between the parties.
Obviously, no two disputes are the same. The intensity of the 
dispute and the decision to press claims for compensation are 
contingent on the personalities of the disputants and the relationship 
between parties. People recognize that violence may erupt in any 
dispute. Violence is more common in intra-clan disputes: of 183
intra-clan disputes, 74 or 40.4 per cent ended in violence, whereas 
in disputes between members of different clans, 33 of 115 or 28.7 per 
cent resulted in violence. The highest incidence of violence - 52 per 
cent - occurs in marital disputes. Even if these are excluded, 
however, intra-clan violence occurs in 33 per cent of all other cases. 
Ideally, of course, Chuave people like other highlanders, stress the 
peaceful, harmonious nature of relationships between close kin (Berndt 
1962: 291; M. Strathern 1972b: 17). In practice, the figures I have 
cited show that strained relationships between spouses or clansmen 
result in a high degree of intra-clan or intra-village conflict.
Berndt (ibid.: 292-293, 330) has also noted that in practice, 
relations between close kinsmen can lead to physical violence and 
reports that 59 per cent of disputes he recorded in the Kamano-Fore 
region (63 of 107 cases) were related to marital dissention (see also
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Warren 1976: 8-9). Similarly for the Gumine area of Simbu province, 
Podolefsky (1978) has shown that certain types of disputes - those 
involving pig trespass, land encroachments or accusations of adulterous 
behaviour - occurred more often between clan members than between 
members of different clans. As in case A, violence itself is sometimes 
regarded as a legitimate mode of resolution. When I later questioned 
Mamgram men about this fight, they agreed that by fighting the 
disputants had cleared the air and that no further trouble would occur. 
Unlike the village court, therefore, people do not necessarily regard 
violence as a serious offence, but see it instead as a form of self- 
help and a method of asserting or protecting individual rights.
Moreover, conventions exist that prevent the escalation of physical 
violence. Members of opposite 'doors’ or men's houses should not 
choose sides in disputes. Like Nime, they should act as neutral 
parties, attempting to prevent physical violence. In contrast, inter­
clan violence rapidly escalates because no co-residents or neutral 
parties exist to encourage an end to the fight. Moreover, people 
believe that any violence between clans is long remembered and that 
this increases the likelihood of further violent confrontations. 
Consequently, magistrates insist that any inter-clan dispute involving 
violence should proceed to litigation.
Large inter-clan confrontations result in an immediate show of 
authority by magistrates. Stick fights involving between 20 and 80 
participants often lead to an ad hoc village court at the scene of
Othe disturbance. Magistrates from the eria or tribe carry village 
court books to the scene, and word of the fight is sent to Chuave 
police. The magistrates tell the police on their arrival, that the 
matter is under control; their presence, however, is used to threaten 
villagers with immediate arrest if money for fines is not forthcoming. 
Anyone participating in the fight receives a fine of between K10 and 
K40, and after one such fight 27 men were fined a total of K440. 
Alternatively, magistrates are empowered to fine entire men's house 
groups or clans. Thus, when Miumabnu and Nudian men's houses fought, 
the two groups were fined K100 and K165, and ordered to kill, cook, and 
exchange a large pig at a formal 'shaking hands' ceremony which 
conclude these large settlements. At this court, James, an aspiring 
leader and Miumabnu youth who despised both Martin and Dege's constant 
interference in Miumabnu's affairs, insisted that no fines should be
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paid. He argued that if Komodururao or Kaupagam had been involved, the 
court would have ordered smaller fines. He also accused Martin of a 
number of transgressions, including the theft of court money. Other 
men accepted these arguments and began to quarrel with the presiding 
magistrates, eventually forcing them to leave the village. The 
magistrates returned the next day after consulting the Local Court 
Magistrate, and explained the Inter-Group Fighting Act which makes 
leaders liable for the actions of their clan. The magistrates then 
began to write orders of imprisonment for the Miumabnu councillor, 
songon and other leaders who had not participated in the fight.
Faced with this threat and the return of Chuave police, the people 
quickly gathered the money and paid the fines. In addition, James was 
fined K50 for disobeying orders.
The decision to press claims is also linked to both the social 
distance between disputants and the type of dispute. Accusations of 
theft are only provable when eye-witness accounts are available. In 
contrast, disputes involving long outstanding debts usually end in 
litigation or the payment of compensation because they are a matter 
of public record. Section A of Table 12 shows that a higher percentage 
of cases lapse between subclansmen, lineage mates or husbands and wives, 
than between more distantly related kinsmen. Section B provides 
information for five major categories of disputes.
In 21 of 298 cases, the defendants themselves admitted guilt and 
offered compensation. Thus, almost one-third of all disputes, the 
majority of which involved spouses or lineage mates, did not end in 
litigation. When compensation is not offered, when the disputants 
insist on pressing claims, or when magistrates insist litigation is 
necessary, several options are available. A third party may mediate 
the dispute in Local, village, or men’s house courts. I use the word 
'settled' for those cases where guilt was determined or where 
compensation or fines were paid. Occasionally, aggrieved parties may 
accept the admission of guilt as an adequate resolution of a dispute. 
Each court, in fact, involves two separate arguments: one to establish
guilty parties, and a second to determine whether compensation is 
necessary, and if so, the size of the payment. Thus, a man may argue 
that his pig was not responsible for damaging another's crops, or that 
it did so only because a fence was not properly maintained. If he is
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Table 12: Decision to press claims for compensation or request
litigation
A) Relationship 
Disputants
between
Cases
disputants
Litigation/
Compensation
Number of 
cases that 
lapsed
Percentage of 
cases lapsing
spouses 80 55 25 31.25
lineage members 31 8 23 74.19
subclan members 27 16 11 40.74
clan members 45 41 4 8.88
inter-clan 115 101 14 12.17
B) Type of 
Dispute
disputes
Cases Litigation/
Compensation
Number of 
cases that 
lapsed
Percentage of 
cases lapsing
marital 80 55 25 31.25
pig trespass 43 39 4 17.39
theft 40 30 10 25.00
tok bllas 23 19 4 17.39
debts 23 21 2 8.60
found negligent, he may then use either of these arguments or others 
to claim exemption from compensation. He may also argue that the case 
is a first offence or that he will ensure that he tethers or fences 
in his pigs in future. The aggrieved party may accept these arguments 
and the accused simply admonished or a minimal compensation demanded. 
Where guilty parties are dissatisfied with the amount of compensation a 
disputant requests or a magistrate suggests, they may take the case 
to another forum. I use the word ’referral' for those cases where such 
appeals are made, or where disputants or third parties, having failed 
to establish guilt but believing the dispute to be serious enough to 
warrant further litigation, take the matter to another forum. Only 
about one-fifth of all referrals constitute appeals against court 
decisions. A third possible outcome of disputes is that litigants 
insist on their innocence and third parties lack sufficient evidence 
to determine guilt or award compensation. Once again, these cases 
lapse: litigants are forced to leave the matter unresolved. Table 13
provides a summary of dispute processing for Keu village.
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Table 13: Keu village dispute processing
Cases Settled Lapsed Referrals
a) Informal mediation
by songons and 10 4 2 2 to village court
councillors
by magistrates 25 12 3 4 to men’s house
— — . —
8 to village court
Total 35 16 5 14
b) Men’s house court
referral from mediator 4 2 0 2 to village court
referrals from 12 8 4 nil
village court
direct by litigants 105 54 24 27 to village court
Total 121 64 28 29
c) Village court
from mediation 10 6 4 nil
from men's house 29 27 2 nil
from Local Court 6 5 1 nil
summons by magistrate 20 16 1 3 to local court
direct by litigants 33 17 7 2 to local court
— — —
12 to men's house
Total 98 66 15 17
d) Local court
summons by police 21 21 0 nil
village court appeals 5 5* 0 nil
direct by litigants _J_ 1 _0 6 to village court
Total 33 27 0 6
* Of five decisions, four were upheld by the Local Court Magistrate 
and one in case the magistrate ordered additional compensation.
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This table shows that of 200 disputes, 50 per cent resulted in 
settlement in the first forum in which they were heard. An additional 
26 per cent were settled after being heard in one or more additional 
forums. Moreover, the chance of settlement being reached or imposed 
increases at each level of the legal 'ladder'. The 'ladder' is a 
metaphor that police and court officials use when telling villagers 
that disputants themselves should settle their disagreements, or when 
magistrates refuse to hear a dispute at village court unless settlement 
is first attempted in the village. The Local Court Magistrate rarely 
hears any customary or civil dispute unless it has already been to 
village court and he confines himself to criminal matters and appeals.
Several factors influence the location of a court hearing.
Usually disputes arising on the evening before, or day of, the village 
court proceed directly to this forum. Often parties or witnesses to a 
dispute fail to appear at village court, and the court instructs a 
particular magistrate to hold a men's house court in the interim 
between court days. Difficult cases, such as divorce, alternate 
between the men's house and village court because magistrates are 
reluctant to reach a decision and encourage the parties to undergo
Qtrial separation or a final period of reconciliation. Where spouses 
have been married in a Christian ceremony, divorces are referred to 
songons: magistrates are extremely hesitant to grant these divorces
without church approval.
The numerical preference for men's house courts, however, is also 
due to the nature of the dispute, the differences between the two 
forums, and people's expectations of magistrates. Pig trespass, for 
example, is so common that the court has developed systematic, 
standardized methods of settlement. Almost always these offences 
result in K10 or K15 compensation, and magistrates often send these 
cases directly to village court rather than face long, involved 
discussions in the village. Other disputes, such as those involving 
breaches of incest rules and deciding responsibility for the pregnancy 
of young unmarried girls, rarely proceed to village court. These 
cases are 'hot', and magistrates believe they should be settled 
immediately least violence erupt before the matter can be taken to 
village court. The social stigma attached to these offences, moreover, 
means that the parties involved prefer to have the case aired among
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kinsmen so as to avoid the gossip among other clans whose members have 
attended the public kros kot• Witchcraft or sorcery accusations also 
do not proceed to village court because magistrates stress the 
impossiblity of proving the truth of the accusation, and are usually 
inclined to charge the accuser with slander. Instead, magistrates hear 
such cases in the men’s house court. I discovered only three cases 
in which sorcery or witchcraft accusations led to an admission of 
guilt, with compensation of the aggrieved party.
The men’s house courts, which resemble both traditional moots and 
the kros kot, are held early in the morning or following the evening 
meal. Disputes are taken to the men’s house either by agreement 
between parties or when the aggrieved party approaches a magistrate, 
who then instructs the accused person to attend. In inter-clan 
disputes, the aggrieved person and his kinsmen travel to the men's 
house of the accused. Men shout to the peace officer or magistrate 
and inform him of the court. After arriving, the official first 
identifies the complainant and the defendant, and then asks the 
claimant to speak. After he has finished, the defendant airs his 
version of the dispute. Interruptions by either party - denials, 
amendments or accusations of lying - are not tolerated.
Following the speeches, anyone present may ask questions, 
contribute yet another version of the dispute, or join in the general 
discussion of how the dispute might be resolved. Men’s house courts 
sometimes last for several hours during which people may comment on 
a number of other cases which involved the litigants or which can serve 
as precedents for a decision. Chuave men's house courts, like Hagen 
unofficial courts, attempt to find the 'root' or ’base cause' of the 
dispute (see M. Strathern 1974: 313). Determining the base cause not 
only allows court officials to categorize evidence as admissible or 
irrelevant, but also determines responsibility for the dispute. People 
fully realize that surface aspects of a case often disguise the base 
cause. A woman who sues for divorce or alleges that her husband has 
not given her a share of coffee money may be more concerned to publicly 
air the husband's mistreatment of her over several months. Once 
officials or other men realize that the dispute is a front for other 
contentions, they allow discussion of the marriage history in order 
to pressure publicly the husband into acting more responsibly.
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Likewise, they may appeal to songons who can lecture the litigants 
on the sanctity of Christian marriages, the need for co-operation and, 
often the husband's right to dominate his wife.^ Similarly, even 
though men's house courts involving witchcraft accusations usually 
end in the compensation of the accused woman, by airing the grievance 
against her, the woman is publicly sanctioned for anti-social behaviour 
such as not bringing food to the men's house. In extreme cases, such 
as the discussion of land ownership which cannot be heard in village 
court, men's house courts allow the airing of long-standing quarrels 
which may hark back for years or even decades.
The 'base cause' of a dispute may also reveal evidence that a 
defendant can use to escape compensation or fines by placing 
responsibility for the dispute on someone else. When fights occur at 
small beer parties or card games, disputants may argue that the host 
brought them to the location of the dispute. Often the sponsor of 
the event pays the compensation based on the belief that, although he 
knew relationships were strained between the disputants, he insisted 
on bringing them together thereby creating trouble. Insults and 
physical fights between men and women may also reveal the root of the 
fight to be adultery or sexual flirtation. Thus, the principal dispute 
may be ignored and the man or woman responsible for establishing an 
illicit relationship is verbally chastised or forced to pay 
compensation.
Each men's house court, therefore, presents magistrates or peace 
officers with special problems. Court officials prefer to mediate in 
village settings for, as Bailey has noted, this is a more politically 
expedient strategy than adjudication (1969: 63-4). By suggesting 
decisions or relying on other leaders and interested persons to resolve 
the dispute, the magistrate avoids the risk of alienating one or both 
disputants, as well as any other kinsmen concerned with the outcome 
of the dispute. Magistrates must take into account their own 
commitment to the law as well as the severity of the dispute and the 
personalities of the disputants. Inevitably, however, magistrates 
do adjudicate in village settings. In such situations the men's house 
court resembles the kros kot: failure of mediation leads to the
dispute being referred to village court or to imposed settlements.
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The men's house court allows a full airing of relevant evidence.
In contrast, the village court hears up to 17 cases at a sitting; the 
amount of time available for each case varies from between five minutes 
to one-half hour depending on the size of the court calendar. Thus, 
although magistrates attempt to account for the base cause of disputes, 
the time available for each case means that they often ignore a great 
deal of evidence and almost all testimony concerning the history of the 
relationship or a person's character. Thus, the court may disregard the 
fact that a fight resulted from a person's failure to contribute to a 
particular ceremony, from sexual flirtation or adultery, and simply 
deal with the overt aspects of the dispute - the insults that were 
exchanged or the resulting physical violence. Moreover, by first 
airing the dispute in the men's house, the litigants gain an 
understanding of the possible outcome of any appeal or further court, 
and magistrates become acquainted with relevant information that they 
can use to render verdicts in village court. Three cases help 
demonstrate the relationship between men's house and village court 
cases and illustrate some of the options available to both litigants 
and magistrates.
Case B
Simon, a Komodurumo man living at Keukobu, returned from his pig 
house early one morning and several people told him that his wife,
Maki, had been seen the previous evening with Tonare, a Kaupagam man 
from Mamgram. He accused Maki of having sexual intercourse with Tonare 
and, after striking her several times, she admitted the transgression 
but maintained she had not initiated the liaison. Several Keukobu men 
heard this quarrel and immediately called to kinsmen saying that they 
wanted to find and 'kill' Tonare.
Martin calmed the men by saying that he would hold a court at 
Mamgram and by adding that anyone seen with a weapon or starting to 
fight would, in turn, be fined. Martin and 14 Keukobu men went to 
Mamgram where they seated themselves on one side of the men's house. 
Both Tonare and Dege were called for.
After they arrived, Simon spoke first, briefly stating that Tonare 
had cajoled his wife and had slept with her. Both Maki and Tonare were 
wrong, he said, and he demanded compensation from his wife and from 
Tonare. The affair, he added, was a serious and intolerable offence 
because Komodurumo and Kaupagam were 'brothers' and did not intermarry.
Maki then gave her version of the events stating that she had told 
Tonare she did not wish to have intercourse, that she was too old, but 
adding that Tonare had given her cigarettes and persisted in his 
advances. She included the events of the morning when Simon had beaten 
her. At this point, Martin interjected to ask whether Maki had had
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intercourse with Tonare. When Maki admitted this, Martin ended her 
account saying she was in the wrong. He then asked Simon whether he 
had struck his wife, and this too was admitted. Martin then ordered 
Tonare to speak.
Tonare immediately admitted his guilt but argued that Maki had 
encouraged his advances. She had accepted his cigarettes and, when 
taking them, she encouraged his overture by gently rubbing his hand.
He said that he had gone to Keukobu to play cards, but unable to find a 
game, he sat and gossipped with several men and women, including Maki. 
When Maki had decided to leave, he had accompanied her to her house 
where she invited him inside. He had given her K2 and slept with her. 
This last remark, insinuating that Maki was a prostitute, resulted in 
a quick denial from Maki and an accusation that Tonare was lying. Maki 
was silenced and Tonare ended his account by saying that he had felt 
ill the previous evening, and that he was a good Christian man. He 
suggested that a witch, or possibly Satan, had entered his body and 
enticed him to act as he did. He was ’sorry’ for his actions, but his 
thoughts had been disturbed and he could not remember any other 
details.
Martin then called on Keukobu witnesses who testified that, when 
Maki was about to leave the group, they had heard her tell Tonare to 
remain behind and that she would find her own way. Someone had heard 
Tonare say that he would do as he pleased when he left with Maki. A 
long discussion then ensued. Keukobu men insisted that Maki was a 
'good' woman and that Tonare should pay compensation for accusing her 
of prostitution.
A pastor from Tonare’s mission, the Four Square church, then 
lectured to the group about Satan and insisted that the affair was 
the Devil’s work and that Tonare, while guilty, was not responsible 
for his actions.
Even while this discussion was evolving, Martin and Dege began 
to confer. Each magistrates sided, in part, with his own kinsman.
Dege believed that both Maki and Tonare were to blame and that each 
should pay compensation to Simon. He suggested K20 in each case. 
Martin, however, believed that the matter was more serious and that 
the compensation must be larger. He wanted Tonare fined for entering 
Simon's house without his permission and compensation of K100 to Simon. 
Maki, he argued, should pay only a small amount because she had already 
been punished. At this suggestion, Dege said that Simon too should be 
fined for striking his wife. After conferring for about 15 minutes, 
the two men reached agreement. Dege finally was persuaded by the 
argument that without heavy payment, violence would erupt between 
Keukobu and Mamgram.
Dege voiced the decision of the court by reiterating almost all 
of the points that had been raised, stressing that the court was both 
serious and difficult. He said that Tonare and Maki were both wrong, 
but that Tonare had been persistent in his advances and was guilty of a 
serious offence against his ’brother’. Dege admonished Simon for 
striking Maki and not bringing the matter to the immediate attention 
of Martin. No compensation was awarded between spouses; rather, they 
were lectured that any future violence or quarrelling would be taken 
to village court. Tonare was ordered to pay K80 to Simon and K10 to 
Dege - the latter a fine for trespassing. Tonare was told that because 
the case was difficult, he could take the matter to village court.
- 2 1 1 -
Tonare  s a i d  he would a c c e p t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  f o r  Dege and M a r t in  were 
’ lawmen’ and he would t r y  to  f i n d  t h e  money. Mamgram pe o p le  s p e n t  the  
n e x t  hour  or  so a t t e m p t i n g  to  r a i s e  i t .  T o n a r e ' s  w i f e ,  a lo n g  w i th  two 
o t h e r  men, c o n t r i b u t e d  K10 e a c h .  An a d d i t i o n a l  K30 was r a i s e d  in  
amounts of  K1 to  K4. Tonare was t h e n  g iv e n  two days to  r a i s e  t h e  
r e m a i n d e r .
Case C
A Keukobu man, Andrew, was working  t e m p o r a r i l y  i n  P o r t  Moresby.  
During  h i s  absence  h i s  w i f e ,  S e s s e ,  a sked  P e t e r ,  Andrew's  b r o t h e r ,  to  
s l e e p  i n  he r  house  to  ' p r o t e c t  h e r  f rom r a s c a l s '  and t h e r e b y ,  t o  q u e l l  
any s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  she was b e in g  u n f a i t h f u l  to  h e r  h u s b a n d .  La te  one 
e v e n i n g ,  Kaupa,  a Keukobu l e a d e r ,  r e t u r n e d  d ru n k  from h i s  a f f i n e ' s  
v i l l a g e  and b roke  i n t o  S e s s e ' s  h o u s e .  P e t e r  awoke,  a t t a c k e d  Kaupa 
and chased  him out  o f  t h e  h o u s e ,  y e l l i n g  to  Keukobu t h a t  an 
i n t r u d e r  was i n  t h e  v i l l a g e .  He ca u g h t  Kaupa and s c u f f l e d  w i th  him 
i n  t h e  d a r k n e s s .  In  the  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  f i g h t ,  Kaupa s t r u c k  h i s  f a c e  
on a f e n c e  b a d ly  c u t t i n g  h i m s e l f .  Kaupa managed to  e s c a p e  b u t  was seen  
and r e c o g n i z e d  n e a r  Keukobu.
A f t e r  r e t u r n i n g  to  h i s  house  n e a r  Keukobu,  Kaupa emerged armed 
w i t h  an axe and s e t  abou t  t h r e a t e n i n g  s e v e r a l  men who had been  
awakened.  At t h i s  p o i n t ,  M a r t in  a p p e a re d  and d i sa rm e d  Kaupa.  P e t e r  
t h e n  accused  Kaupa o f  e n t e r i n g  t h e  house  and w an t in g  to  have s e x u a l  
i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  S e s s e .  At t h i s  a c c u s a t i o n ,  Kaupa b roke  f r e e  from 
M a r t in  and a t t a c k e d  P e t e r ,  s t r i k i n g  him s e v e r a l  t i m e s .  M a r t i n  
i n t e r v e n e d ,  o r d e r e d  e ve ryone  to  d i s p e r s e  and s a i d  t h a t  he would h e a r  
t h e  c o u r t  in  t h e  m orn ing .
The c o u r t  began  e a r l y  n e x t  morning a t  Keukobu. M a r t i n  -  f e a r i n g  
t h a t  Kaupa, h i s  r i v a l ,  would a c c u s e  him of  b i a s  -  c a l l e d  Dege to  h e a r  
t h e  c o u r t  and a c t e d  o n l y  as  a w i t n e s s  in  the c a s e .  Kaupa o f f e r e d  h i s  
d r u n k e n n e s s  a s  an excuse  f o r  h i s  b e h a v i o u r  and demanded t h a t  P e t e r  pay 
him c o m p e n s a t io n  f o r  a c c u s i n g  him of  wan t in g  to  s l e e p  w i t h  S e s s e ,  and 
f o r  t h e  i n j u r i e s  he had r e c e i v e d .  P e t e r  and o t h e r  Keukobu men o f f e r e d  
t h e i r  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e ,  and w h i l e  acknowledg ing  t h a t  Kaupa was 
i n t o x i c a t e d ,  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  h i s  t h r e a t s  and h i s  a t t a c k  of  P e t e r  demanded 
c o m p e n s a t i o n .
A f t e r  a s k i n g  M a r t in  to  v e r i f y  s e v e r a l  p o i n t s ,  Dege q u i c k l y  
r e n d e r e d  a d e c i s i o n .  He found b o th  Kaupa’ s c l a i m s  u n w a r ra n t e d  and 
Kaupa t o t a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  t r o u b l e  and o r d e r e d  him to  pay K5 
c o m p e n s a t io n  to  Sesse  f o r  e n t e r i n g  h e r  h o use ,  K10 to  P e t e r  f o r  
a s s a u l t ,  and K15 t o  be d i v i d e d  amongst  Keukobu men who had been 
t h r e a t e n e d .  Both M a r t in  and most  Keukobu men p r e s e n t  p r a i s e d  t h i s  
d e c i s i o n ,  t o l d  Kaupa th e  m a t t e r  was c o n c l u d e d ,  and warned him the  
fo rm a l  v i l l a g e  c o u r t  would impose even l a r g e r  f i n e s .  They t o l d  him 
he co u ld  pay t h e  c o m p e n s a t io n  as  soon as  he s o ld  some c o f f e e .  Kaupa, 
however ,  v e he m e n t ly  c o n t e s t e d  t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  s a y in g  t h a t  he r e f u s e d  to  
pay be c a u s e  M a r t in  i n s t r u c t e d  Dege p r i o r  to t h e  c o u r t  to  r e n d e r  a 
d e c i s i o n  a g a i n s t  him,  and t h e r e f o r e  Dege had been  b i a s e d .  D e s p i t e  t h e  
s h o u t s  o f  h i s  kinsmen to a p o l o g i z e  f o r  t h e s e  rem arks  and to  ' h e a r  the  
l a w ' ,  he p e r s i s t e d  in  h i s  a t t a c k  on Dege, c a l l i n g  h i s  c o u r t  ' r u b b i s h '  
and s a y in g  he had no r i g h t  t o  h e a r  Keukobu c o u r t s .  Dege re sponde d  to  
t h e s e  a c c u s a t i o n s  by c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  Kaupa 's  words as  b o t h  an i n s u l t  
t o  him p e r s o n a l l y  and an a t t a c k  on a l l  m a g i s t r a t e s .  He o r d e r e d  Kaupa 
to  pay t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  to  a p p e a r  i n  v i l l a g e  c o u r t  t h e  n e x t  day f o r
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Che charge of tok bilas, and then he stormed out of the men’s house.
Kaupa failed to appear in the village court and to pay 
compensation. Dege then instructed a Subagam peace officer to summon 
Kaupa to court on the next village court day. There, the case was 
heard in both 'cross’ and 'full' court. Dege and Peter acted as co­
complainants, the latter on behalf of Keukobu men's house. Martin 
and Dege both publicly stated they would not participate in hearing 
any aspect of the case. Both men, however, privately approached all 
the other magistrates present and argued that failure to uphold Dege's 
decision would harm the reputation of magistrates and the court as a 
whole. After hearing all versions of the dispute in full court, a 
presiding magistrate approached Martin and asked him whether he would 
consider fines or compensation acceptable. At this point, Martin 
approached Kaupa and told him the court’s decision would be harsh but 
that he would attempt to 'help' Kaupa by having the penalty decreased. 
He then entered the court, and participated in the decision by 
encouraging heavy penalties.
During both the full and kros courts, magistrates, by holding 
up the court manual, reading from sections of it, and displaying their 
badges of office, repeatedly stressed their rightful authority to 
adjudicate. From its outset, in fact, this case was used as an example 
of a serious attack on the authority of all magistrates. The outcome 
of the dispute was, therefore, never in question. The court awarded 
Dege K20 for the 'shame' he had incurred from Kaupa's accusation and 
fined Kaupa an additional K70 for four offences: disobeying orders, 
breaking and entering, disturbing the peace, and threatening actions. 
The court also ordered him to pay the compensation that Dege had sought 
to impose in the initial hearing of the case. Although embittered by 
this decision, Kaupa respectfully acknowledged the magistrates' 
decision and, after several weeks, raised the money to pay all these 
fines.
Case D
Dege invited some people to his house one evening to play cards. 
After playing several hours both he and his wife, Ruth, had lost about 
K10 each. The game broke up when Maki accused Gorai, Dege's 'sister' 
(FaBrDa) of stinginess; Gorai had neither paid Ruth for the use of the 
house, nor given Dege any of her winnings so that he might continue 
playing. The two women exchanged insults.
The next morning the women resumed their quarrel of the previous 
evening. As the quarrel became heated, Gorai accused Ruth of 
witchcraft, and Ruth accused Gorai of prostitution. These insults led 
to a fist fight, and then to a fence-post fight before Mamgram men 
intervened. Gorai demanded a court and informed Ruth she should appear 
at the village court being held that day. Dege appeared, however, and 
cautioned both women that the village court would impose heavy fines.
He persuaded the two women to shake hands and told them to forget the 
matter because it was family business and unworthy of a court.
Intent on legal action, however, Gorai travelled to Onama where 
she talked to a Subagam magistrate. He was of the opinion that the 
dispute was a minor affair and told Gorai to ask Martin to hear the 
case in the men's house. Gorai left the court and, believing that 
Martin would agree with Dege, his associate, she approached Kopon with
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the dispute. Kopon was reluctant to hear the case for two reasons: 
he lacked formal authority and Dege would not tolerate his intervention 
in a lineage matter. But he suggested that Gorai could take the matter 
to Local Court if she was adamant that some litigation was necessary. 
Gorai then went to her garden.
The following morning the two women again fought, the quarrel 
beginning when Gorai accused Maki of being afraid to appear at court, 
and Maki counter-arguing that the matter was finished. This fight, 
however, resulted in minor injuries to both women as they once again 
resorted to using fence posts before several Kaupagam men intervened 
and disarmed them.
Men then escorted the women to the men's house and called for both 
Dege and Martin. Gorai told her story first, and, on hearing of Dege's 
involvement in the first 'settlement' and of the card game, Martin 
immediately said that Dege could not hear the case. After listening 
to the women's and Dege's versions of the events, Martin expressed his 
reluctance to hear the dispute. Several Mamgram men then attempted 
to mediate a settlement and, having failed, suggested that Kopon should 
be called to hear the court. Martin squashed this idea by stating that 
Kopon had no power to hear courts.
People then blamed Dege for bringing the two women together when 
he knew they always argued, and for playing cards, when he, as a 
magistrate, should respect the law which forbade it. When the 
conversation developed into a general attack on magistrates and their 
inability to prevent fights and theft in the village, Martin intervened 
and silenced the Mamgram men. He argued that such talk was useless.
He then suggested a settlement: Dege to pay K5 for playing cards; Ruth
and Gorai to pay each other K5 for their insults; Ruth to compensate 
Gorai K5 for fighting; and, because she was the first to resort to 
physical violence, Gorai to pay Ruth KIO.^ He then asked each party 
if this was acceptable. Both Dege and Ruth agreed. Gorai, however, 
rejected the settlement and stated she wished to have the matter 
settled in village court, implying that Martin's decision was biased 
in favour of Dege. Martin then declared the matter unresolved and told 
Gorai she could take the matter to village court. But he cautioned 
Gorai that the village court would treat the matter seriously, and he 
listed all the offences for which she and Ruth could be fined: tok
bilas, disturbing the peace, fighting with fence posts, and playing 
cards. His decision, he suggested, was fair and the compensation small 
because the matter was between members of a single 'post' or lineage.
Regardless, Gorai decided to take the dispute to village court. 
There, as a result of Martin's warning, however, both Ruth and Gorai 
by tacit agreement restricted their accounts to the original quarrel 
over cards and to the ensuing fight. No mention of any insults were 
made, nor did the women admit to fighting with fence posts: both
explicitly denied these possibilities in response to magistrates' 
questions. Kaupagam onlookers ignored both omissions.
The magistrates' discussion, held in camera, concentrated on 
three points: Dege's involvement in gambling, the fact that the fight
was between lineage members and not 'half-fires' or subclans, and the 
fact that Gorai was a determined woman. This last consideration proved 
extremely important because, as one peace officer argued, a decision 
against Gorai might lead her to make an appeal in Local Court. The 
court officials agreed that such an outcome was to be avoided at
- 214-
all costs, for it would mean that the Local Court Magistrate would 
realize that magistrates themselves ignored the law against gambling.
In spite of these considerations, however, the magistrates believed 
it was necessary to fine the women for fighting. They ignored Dege’s 
involvement, but fined Ruth and Gorai K10 each for fighting. Ruth 
immediately paid her fine. After complaining that this decision too 
was unfair, Gorai finally paid K4, and was given two weeks to find the 
additional K6. Following the court, however, Dege and the peace 
officer approached her and said that no further payment was necessary - 
the fine would be forgotten.
The spirit and the letter of the law; abuses of power
Magistrates’ actions and decisions define, and are synonymous with, 
'law and order', as they determine not only the severity of punishment 
for particular offences, but also which disturbances of the peace 
should be punished. Thus, in Case C, even though Tonare believed the 
compensation was large, he accepted the magistrates' decision because, 
as he later told me, Martin and Dege were 'government' and must be 
obeyed. To disobey would not only be a personal impugnment on these 
leaders' authority and reputation, but would also 'ruin the law' and 
the 'law's name'. Of 300 people surveyed, 62 per cent of the men and 
and 52 per cent of the women believed that magistrates did a good job 
and that the court effectively maintained law and order (25 per cent 
of the men and 34 per cent of the women offered no response or were 
indifferent). Only 13 per cent of men and 14 per cent of women 
expressed the opinion that village courts were ineffective. When 
compared to people's attitudes toward the local government council 
(see chapter three), these figures indicate a very positive response 
to village courts. Furthermore, at national and provincial committee 
meetings occasionally held in Chuave, people expressed the opinion that 
magistrates should be given additional powers of arrest and punishment. 
Thus, men informed the Constitutional Planning Committee that they 
wanted magistrates to be better paid, that courts should be given 
vehicles like the Local Court and police, and that magistrates should 
be able to impose fines of up to K100.
Yet, even though people praise the concept of village courts, they 
criticize particular magistrates or individual court settlements. Here 
I examine the nature of these criticisms and the extent to which court 
officials abuse their power. I detail the extent to which magistrates 
behave in accordance with people's expectations of the magistrates'
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role and with the instructions set down by the village court manual 
or Local Court.
Although, by law, a lone magistrate lacks the authority to 
adjudicate in village settings, both litigants and magistrates accept 
the men's house court as an extension of the more formal village court. 
People grant a magistrate this power because they continue to emphasize 
traditional methods of dispute settlement and because magistrates 
encourage the belief that they receive better treatment in the village 
forum. In cases C and D magistrates explicitly forewarned disputants 
that the village court would impose harsher settlements than their own. 
Gorai's appeal was successful in effecting a reduction of her 
settlement only because the court officials feared a reprimand from 
the Local Court Magistrate. Almost all contested decisions are either 
upheld or result in more severe penalties because the magistrates 
believe that the appeal itself undermines their authority in the 
village. In Kaupa's case, Martin warned people that his authority 
was limited in village court where he could not hear his kinsmen's 
disputes. Those people who persisted in opposing his or Dege's 
decisions would risk severe punishment. Of course Martin did, in fact, 
hear Kaupa's case; by approaching magistrates before the court, and 
by using the secrecy of the inside court, he was able to impose heavy 
fines and thereby ensure that the decisions in the village appeared 
lenient.
Magistrates rarely need to resort to these tactics. By making 
examples of a few people, their authority to adjudicate is seldom 
questioned. Most inside courts, therefore, are neutral and magistrates 
refrain from any involvement in their kinsmen's disputes. This is 
particularly noticeable in cases brought immediately to village court 
because no prior decisions are at question. As previously noted, only 
about one-fifth of cases heard in the village and at village court are 
appeals. More commonly these dual courts involve troublesome disputes 
or disputes in which people could accuse magistrates of bias. Hence, 
the magistrate refers the case to village court, thereby absolving 
himself from responsibility. Unfortunately for magistrates, this 
strategy sometimes leads to accusations that they are unconcerned with 
protecting their kinsmen, that they are ignoring the root of the 
dispute, or that they are failing to take into account a person's moral
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c h a r a c t e r .  Thus,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a n e u t r a l  v i l l a g e  c o u r t  i s  
becoming a c c e p t e d  in  Chuave as  t h e  b e s t  way to  s e t t l e  d i s p u t e s ,  i t  i s  
f lawed i n  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to  p r o v id e  s u f f i c i e n t  t ime f o r  l e n g t h y  
d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  c a s e s  i n  a manner s i m i l a r  to  t r a d i t i o n a l  m oo ts .
Another  o p t i o n  o f f i c i a l s  have i s  t h e  s u s p e n s i o n  o r  c a n c e l l a t i o n  
o f  v i l l a g e  c o u r t  f i n e s .  P r e s i d i n g  m a g i s t r a t e s  c l e a r l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
f i n e s  c o n s t i t u t e  a f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  and s hou ld  be p a i d .  But t h e  c o u r t  
g i v e s  c o n v i c t e d  p a r t i e s  t im e  -  a s  much as  t h r e e  o r  f o u r  months and ,  
o c c a s i o n a l l y  l o n g e r  -  to  r a i s e  t h e  money. M a g i s t r a t e s  a r e  c o n s e q u e n t l y  
a b l e  to  i g n o r e  k i n s m e n ’ s f i n e s .  The most  common r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  
p r a c t i c e  i s  t h a t  a m a g i s t r a t e  ' f e e l s  s o r r y '  f o r  a p e r s o n ,  o r  b e l i e v e s  
t h e  c o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  to  have been  wrong or  undu ly  s e v e r e .  Because 
r e c o r d s  l i n k i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  o r d e r s  to  f i n e s  a r e  not  ke p t  p r o p e r l y ,  i t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  e s t i m a t e  o v e r a l l  how o f t e n  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s  a r i s e .
Of 36 Keu c a s e s  end ing  i n  c o u r t  f i n e s ,  however ,  n i n e  i n v o l v i n g  a t o t a l  
o f  18 p e o p l e ,  had l a p s e d  w i t h o u t  payment .  M a g i s t r a t e s  t o l d  me t h a t  
t h e y  b e l i e v e d  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  e f f e c t i v e l y  c u r t a i l e d  f u r t h e r  b r e a c h e s  o f  
t h e  law;  by g i v i n g  a p e r s o n  a second chance  and by making i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
f u t u r e  o f f e n c e s  would be h e a v i l y  f i n e d ,  an o f f e n d e r  was p l a c e d  on good 
b e h a v i o u r .  But t h i s  t a c t i c  i s  o c c a s i o n a l l y  a form of  p o l i t i c a l  
p a t r o n a g e .  When an o f f i c i a l  says  t h a t  he i s  ' h e l p i n g '  h i s  k insm en ,  
h i s  comment may c o n t a i n  the  im p l ie d  t h r e a t  t h a t  f a i l u r e  to  obey any 
f u t u r e  s u g g e s t i o n s  o r  i n s t r u c t i o n s  w i l l  l e a d  to  f u r t h e r  l e g a l  a c t i o n  
based  on ' d i s o b e y i n g  o r d e r s ' .  The t h r e a t  need no t  be o p e n ly  v o ic e d  
b e c a u s e  p e o p le  r e a l i z e  t h a t  o f f i c i a l s  remember t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  c o u n t l e s s  
c a s e s .  When t h e  v i l l a g e  c o u r t  e l e c t i o n s  drew n e a r ,  f o r  example ,  Dege 
s im ply  reminded  s e v e r a l  Kaupagam men t h a t  t h e y  had o u t s t a n d i n g  f i n e s .  
A l l  t h e s e  men, e x c e p t  o n e ,  t u r n e d  ou t  to  v o t e  f o r  Dege and s e v e r a l  
a d m i t t e d  l a t e r  t h a t  t h e y  f e a r e d  r e t r i b u t i o n  i f  t h e y  d i d  no t  v o t e  f o r  
him.  Dege l a t e r  l e a r n e d  t h a t  Yogo, a Mamgram man, had c a s t  h i s  v o t e  
f o r  a Tabiagara o p p o n e n t .  Dege th e n  used h i s  f i n a l  days  i n  o f f i c e  to  
summons Yogo to  c o u r t  f o r  f a i l i n g  to  pay a K5 f i n e ,  o u t s t a n d i n g  f o r  
f o u r  m on ths .  A peace  o f f i c e r  a r r e s t e d  Yogo and m a g i s t r a t e s  f i n e d  him 
K40 f o r  d i s o b e y i n g  o r d e r s  a n d ,  b e c a u s e  he was u n a b le  to  pay 
i m m e d i a t e l y ,  s e n t e n c e d  him to f o u r  weeks community work.  Although  Yogo 
b e l i e v e d  he had been m i s t r e a t e d ,  few men q u e s t i o n e d  D e g e ' s  r i g h t  to  
seek  r e v e n g e .  On th e  s u r f a c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  Dege was a c t i n g  w i t h i n  h i s  
a u t h o r i t y :  Yogo had d i s o b e y e d  a c o u r t  o r d e r ,  a n d ,  a s  Dege had never
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stated the matter was concluded, further punishment was legitimate.
Men understood that Dege had ’turned* the law in this case and that 
the matter could have been forgotten.
Such actions remind people of the options available to magistrates 
and the potential risks people take when they do not grant court 
officials the necessary degree of respect and support they desire in 
everyday affairs. Explicit demonstrations of power, based on the 
control of legal sanctions, are usually unnecessary and seldom 
articulated by people when referring to an official’s authority. When 
I asked why Dege and Martin dominated men's house discussions or why 
they were better able than other leaders to mobilize men or organize 
ceremonies and exchanges, few people mentioned their positions as 
magistrates. Both men, people said, were wise, good orators and, as 
a result, were now ’government’. Yet everyone agreed that Dege, in 
particular, had more influence now that he was a magistrate than he 
had had as a komiti; a few men specifically mentioned that Dege or 
Martin might remember any open show of disrespect or disobedience, and 
that this would harm their chances in court cases. The possibility 
was always voiced retrospectively. Thus, men tried to remember how 
they might have offended a magistrate in order to account for what they 
believed to be unfair treatment in a recent court case.
People realize that court officials respond to specific challenges 
to their authority by using the legal sanctions at their disposal, and 
that the threat of sanctions serves as a constant backdrop to all 
personal dealings with these leaders. Open assaults on a magistrate's 
reputation or on particular court cases, therefore, are rare. Only the 
most flagrant violations of an official’s responsibilities to the clan 
or community lead to immediate retribution by villagers. More common 
are indirect criticisms by way of rumour, gossip and slander, which 
councillors and other rivals use to damage the reputation of particular 
magistrates.
Bias is acknowledged as a principal fault of the village court 
and of particular magistrates. The allegation that magistrates render 
one-sided verdicts (wokim wansait kot) is most commonly heard in 
inter-clan disputes when a magistrate participates in hearings 
involving his own clansmen. In such cases, magistrates, foreseeing
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that non-agnates will accuse them of bias, often attempt to work in 
tandem with peace officers or big men of other clans, thereby sharing 
responsibility for decisions (see M. Strathern 1972b: 97-99, for 
similarities under the counc illor-k o/nifci system). When their own 
lineage or subclan is directly or indirectly involved, magistrates may 
ask a ’hidden’ komiti whom they have appointed (without administration 
approval) to hear the dispute. Magistrates select these komiti from 
minor big men of other lineages and subclans. Despite these attempts 
to demonstrate neutrality, however, magistrates can seldom avoid the 
accusation that courts are one-sided. This complaint, like accusations 
that councillors aid their kinsmen or wantoks, entails a double-bind 
for magistrates. Thus, even when onlookers believe a decision is good 
or just, the litigants themselves can often claim the settlement was 
one-sided because of countless indirect or direct relationships of 
friendship or kinship a magistrate has with the parties involved. 
Moreover, because people expect magistrates to help their kinsmen, 
verdicts are always problematic for these officials. A decision 
against the magistrate's lineage, subclan or clan ’brother’ can result 
in claims that the magistrate has forgotten his obligations or 
responsibilities to kin. Conversely a decision for kinsmen also may 
lead to the accusation of a biased court by members of opposed groups 
in the segmentary social structure of the clan. Criticism, therefore, 
is possible in almost any case where a magistrate resorts to 
adjudication. Magistrates fully realize this fundamental dilemma and 
accept the criticism as unavoidable.
There are occasional complaints about officials who too quickly 
resort to using violence or coercion. The separation of duties within 
the court allows magistrates to disassociate themselves from the use 
of physical violence. Thus magistrates tolerate, and sometimes 
encourage, beatings or physical intimidation by peace officers at 
village and men’s house courts. Youths in particular are often 
punished physically as part and parcel of their treatment, and 
onlookers to disputes accept this. However, when peace officers 
constantly resort to aggression outside of court settings, the public, 
through verbal complaints and threats of physical assault on peace 
officers, forces magistrates to take action to restrain them and 
sometimes remove them from office. The local council, on the advice 
of councillors and magistrates, dismissed five peace officers following
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villagers' persistent complaints that the men had acted like klaps 
and were 'bigheads' who too often beat or struck people during or after 
court cases. Each dismissal followed severe physical punishment of 
adults in particular court cases. Many polis have ambitions to 
become magistrates. By hearing disputes in the village or kros kot 
they can gain reputations as skilled mediators or adjudicators. Few 
polisy therefore, are willing to risk their positions and most are 
careful to obey the instructions of magistrates; consequently peace 
officers temper their aggression or resort to violence only when cued 
by magistrates.
In theory, the Supervising Magistrate may dismiss magistrates 
after a council recommendation. In Chuave, however, councillors have 
never exercised this option, though the finance committee had 
discussed the dismissal of particular magistrates following complaints 
from villagers. Both magistrates and councillors believe that 
magistrates are responsible only to the Local Court Magistrate, who 
stated that absolute proof of gross misconduct was necessary before 
any dismissal could occur. Since the implementation of village courts, 
only three magistrates have been dismissed (excluding Martin); they 
all were involved in the same offence - the rape of a woman who had 
been convicted in village court for assaulting her husband with a 
knife.
In this case magistrates used their position to threaten the women 
with a lengthy jail sentence. After convicting the woman in the 
village court, the men took her to Chuave and told her she would be 
jailed for six months to a year. In Chuave, they briefly spoke to the 
police and then informed the woman that they had persuaded the police 
to forget the matter. * In return for their aid, they suggested that 
the woman should let them 'hold her skin', that is, have sexual 
intercourse. They then took her back to the magistrates' own area 
where after constant verbal coercion, they raped her several times.
They then told her to leave her husband's clan and return to her 
father's village.
However, people saw the magistrates on their return from Chuave 
and the woman's husband, James, was informed. The next day, James 
travelled to his affines' village, retrieved his wife and returned to
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his clan where he informed his kinsmen of the rape. When two of the 
three magistrates appeared at village court two days later, James and 
several of his kinsmen immediately ambushed and assaulted them before 
peace officers could intervene. Peace officers arrested James and both 
magistrates and took them to Chuave where the Local Court Magistrate 
jailed the magistrates but released James on bail. The third 
magistrate involved surrendered to police at Chuave following two days 
of tense negotiation with the chairman of the village court. During 
this time, several clans mobilized for battle; the clans of the accused 
magistrates threatening retaliation against other court officials for 
the arrests, and James's clan along with two others, threatening 
vengeance on the third magistrate. The case was heard in Local Court 
where the presiding Magistrate reprimanded James for assault, but found 
him not guilty and released him. Two magistrates received jail 
sentences of six months, and the third nine months. Extreme cases of 
physical violence or coercion are, therefore, rare, and where they 
occur, are not tolerated by villagers.
Other complaints concern the use of court offices for personal 
economic gain. Old men, for example, argue that magistrates turn a 
blind eye to raskols and sometimes accept protection money from 
gangs. After the theft of cargo from trucks on the Highlands Highway, 
or the robbery of western and eastern highlands coffee buyers, 
magistrates and other leaders may receive a share of the booty in 
return for not taking legal action. Though this practice is punishable 
by administrative law as receiving stolen goods, few villagers consider 
it to be an abuse of power. People regard the thefts as 'fair play'
against outsiders and take action only when the theft occurs within
12the eria or when 'friendly' groups are involved. Magistrates 
go to great lengths to find and punish raskols when thefts of store 
goods or coffee occur locally. In thefts in which the aggrieved parties 
membership is somewhat equivocal, magistrates feel obliged to protect 
their eria's reputation. Thus, when Duma rascals robbed Elimbari 
and Sinasina coffee buyers, magistrates obtained money from local 
business men to repay the stolen money, but made no serious attempt 
to locate or punish the raskols involved.
Another common complaint concerns the extortion of money by 
magistrates (Hatanaka 1972; M. Strathern 1972b; cf. Westermark 1978).
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People have occasionally informed village court magistrates that an 
official has threatened to summons them to court for a dispute, and 
then he has extracted small sums of money - between K2 and K10 - 
ostensibly as a fine and allowed the matter to be forgotten. All these 
cases have involved non-agnates of the official who has then had to pay 
compensation to the disputants and has been fined by the court for 
’disobeying orders’. Villagers, however, often regard small payments 
to magistrates as pay for their aid in settling disputes. Particularly 
troublesome cases may end with the gift of small amounts of money to 
magistrates, or a portion of the compensation payment being allocated 
for the magistrates' 'hard work'. The payment may also be to 'buy the 
legs' of the magistrates: the gift is equivalent to traditional
payments to kinsmen in small ceremonies or exchanges between affines. 
Magistrates or peace officers are able to say therefore, that they 
understood the money to be a gift for services and plead not guilty to 
the charge of extortion. All those cases ending in the punishment of 
officials by the village court have been in response to specific claims 
of verbal or physical coercion or threats.
The theft of court fines is a constant topic of village rumour. 
Small fines awarded by the men's house court often do not reach the 
village court, and if they do, the clerk does not usually record them. 
Even inside court fines sometimes go unrecorded, and villagers seldom 
receive receipts. For villagers a receipt is no more than a piece of 
paper that is discarded or is shown to kinsmen as proof of particular 
court cases. Few people know that they have the right to demand 
receipts, or that giving receipts should be a part of every court 
decision ending in fines. Indeed, when I explained this to educated 
men and women, they were surprised and some began to demand receipts 
for their kinsmen in order to ensure that magistrates did not steal 
(Pidgin: kaikai, 'eat') court fines. More often, however, they did 
not request receipts and subsequently used this information to support 
allegations that magistrates stole court money.
The council is responsible for the collection of fine money which 
forms part of the council's revenue. The council clerk or DOIC takes 
stock of all village courts about once every six months. The court's 
receipt book is checked and the magistrates must pay any outstanding 
sum. The court chairman, clerk, and other magistrates usually
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distribute the money amongst themselves, and when the court money is 
down at stocktaking, magistrates simply postpone payment by saying that 
they left the money in their villages, and then quickly raise the 
required sum to be taken to the council. At one stocktaking in Chuave, 
four of eleven village courts had to raise between K.100 and K220 within 
two weeks in order to balance their books. Failing this, the council 
clerk deducts a portion of the magistrates' salary. Fines for which 
no receipts are given are unverifiable as no record is kept which 
correlates the court's order books with the receipt book - though, in 
theory, this should be done.
The degree of theft is difficult to judge. Because magistrates 
fail to record fines, a few courts actually contributed to the council 
amounts greater than their receipt book tally. Moreover, magistrates 
frequently complain that the council clerk does not give them receipts, 
and that the theft takes place at the council level. There is also 
evidence for this accusation; in at least three cases, council clerks 
have failed to give receipts for money totalling over K700.
Nonetheless, magistrates sometimes openly use small court fines, those 
amounting to less than K5, to purchase food and soft drinks on village 
court days.
Magistrates also believe they are poorly paid and say that 
occasional misappropriation of funds is no more than payment for their 
hard work. Nonetheless, poor supervision and laxity in court procedure 
ensure that the potential for theft is enormous. Several magistrates 
estimated their personal gain from court fines to be between K70 and 
K100 in one year, and I have little doubt that particular magistrates 
abuse the court system to obtain much greater sums of money.
Magistrates use this money to gamble or maintain a higher than average 
standard of living. I found no evidence that their kinsmen or core 
following directly shared court funds. Nevertheless, court officials' 
access to fines, coupled with their salaries, provides them with 
greater financial resources than other people. This income, moreover, 
in addition to coffee incomes, allows magistrates to maintain a high 
profile as wealthy men, and more easily enables them to contribute cash 
or beer to kinsmen's ceremonies.
People seldom accuse court officials directly of theft. In
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private, however, they often describe the court as a ’bank’ or a 
’store’, and the phrase bairn kot (literally, to buy a court) long 
used to describe the payment of court fines or compensation now has 
a sarcastic connotation for villagers. Even though the offence 
presents councillors with the opportunity to dismiss from office 
men who have become their principal rivals, they turn a blind 
eye to theft; in part because when accused magistrates vehemently deny 
any theft or misappropriation of court money, and in part because the 
offence is virtually unprovable. But payments to officials for their 
services in settling disputes is not without precedent: both
councillors and luluais received money in the past. Councillors and 
others accept that court officials have special access to money. While 
some segments of the population - songons or fervent Christians, for 
example - may see the theft of money as immoral, others accept the use 
of court money for personal gain as one of the several perks of office 
that these government leaders enjoy. Thus, even though men use the 
accusation of theft to damage a magistrate’s reputation, they often 
admit that, given the same opportunities, they would do likewise.
The magistrates’ power is immense and the fear of court sanctions 
certainly explains a large part of the influence these leaders have 
in dominating everyday affairs at the local level. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that by both community standards and the 
regulations of their office, magistrates abuse their power. Yet 
villagers rarely attempt to constrain the actions of magistrates and 
react to only the most serious abuses by openly confronting officials.
I know of only one Duma man who complained to the Local Court 
Magistrate that officials were stealing court funds, and only a few 
men approached the DOIC or Local Court to complain about other 
misbehaviours that villagers constantly criticized. The power of these 
officials is based on people’s respect for the law. Also magistrates 
enforce the law in accordance with community standards, and actually 
protect community members from the law. In return for this leniency 
and protection, magistrates are accorded great freedom of action.
People realize that any dispute, particularly a violent one which is 
dangerous to long term interpersonal or interclan relationships, is 
subject to punishment by magistrates. Every serious breach of peace 
results in a discussion on the need for peaceful co-operation and in
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a lecture by magistrates on the nature of the law. But magistrates 
also turn a blind eye to many offences and even allow violent disputes 
to lapse without legal action. Failure to punish disputants, 
therefore, may enhance the reputation of court officials because, by 
submitting to community expectations, the magistrate emphasizes his 
commitment to kinsmen at the expense of his official duties. One final 
case study illustrates the lengths to which magistrates go in order to 
protect kinsmen from the law.
Case E
When Andrew (see Case C) returned from Port Moresby, he heard 
rumours that his brother, Peter, had been having sexual intercourse 
with Sesse, Andrew’s wife, under the guise of ’protecting’ her. After 
verifying this, Andrew waited several days for an appropriate moment 
to confront Peter. One evening when Peter was drunk, Andrew confronted 
him saying that if Peter had money to buy beer, why had he not yet 
repaid Andrew’s K10 loan. Andrew then attacked Peter.
Peter broke free, obtained an axe from the men’s house and chased 
Andrew threatening to kill him. After Andrew sought refuge at Mamgram, 
Peter contented himself with axing the door of Sesse’s house. When
Andrew was sure Peter had gone, he returned to the house to get his
bow and arrows. He then shouted that Peter had tried to kill him and 
waited near the door of the house. After several minutes, Peter again 
returned and started to axe the door of the house. Andrew then shot 
him in the abdomen. Andrew called to his kinsmen saying he had killed 
his brother. Peter was rushed to Chuave by car where he was taken by 
police vehicle to the Kundiawa hospital. He recovered from his wound 
and returned to the village after several months in the hospital.
In the days following the assault the police, the Local Court 
Magistrate, and village court associates pressured Martin to take 
immediate action against Andrew. Keu villagers, however, considered 
the matter settled: by committing adultery with Andrew’s wife, Peter
was guilty of a heinous crime that had been avenged by Andrew’s attack.
Keukobu men threatened to resist any police arrest of Andrew. After 
days of negotiation at village court, Martin succeeded in convincing 
his fellow magistrates that he would settle the matter in the men's 
house. He told the Local Court that he would keep close watch on 
Andrew, bring him to Chuave in the event of Peter's death, and have the 
matter heard in village court.
Martin alone presided over the men’s house court heard when Peter 
returned to the village. The court concentrated only on Peter's 
drunkenness, the initial quarrel over money and the subsequent threats 
and attack. There was no mention of adultery and Sesse did not attend 
the court. Such tacit agreement to ignore the true cause of the case 
was predetermined by the severity of the sexual offence and the great 
shame it would bring to all parties if publicly discussed. Peter was 
severely admonished for his threatening behaviour. Because Andrew had
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taken the law into his own hands, however, he was fined K10, and Peter 
was awarded a small pig as compensation for his injuries.
Immediately, after the assault, however, Martin had told me that 
he would jail or heavily fine Andrew. He believed that Peter's assault 
was never serious, and that, from the beginning, Andrew had used the 
occasion to seek revenge. It later became apparent, however, that any 
severe punishment of Andrew would damage Martin's reputation as a 
Komodurumo leader. Although he saw his decision as a token gesture 
to the principle of law and order, Keu men widely acclaimed him for 
his handling of the case. Other Duma men, however, criticized his 
decision, believing he had ruined the name of the law, and that this 
case would encourage others to resort to violence.
This case and the public pressure brought to bear on the 
magistrate are exceptional. I would argue, however, that every dispute 
that comes to the attention of magistrates confronts these leaders with 
difficult choices between their commitments to the duties of their 
office and their responsibilities to members of their own clan and 
community. The magistrate's role, therefore, more than any other 
leader's, is a difficult and dangerous one. Failure to punish law­
breakers or to uphold the principle of law and order can be criticized, 
used to damage a magistrate's reputation and inevitably lead to his 
removal from office. But too stringent a commitment to law and order 
may lead to the alienation of kinsmen and, hence, to political 
downfall. I would suggest that, although the choice between these two 
commitments is difficult, most magistrates are respected because they 
attempt to adjust their decisions to the consensus of their clan and 
community, ignore a wide range of minor offences, and resort to harsh 
sanctions only when their responsibilities as government leaders make 
this unavoidable. Because they are caught between these conflicting 
commitments, magistrates are criticized for failing to meet people's 
expectations, even while they attempt to define the nature of the law 
to suit community standards.
Law, politics and the balance of power
There are indications that the existence of village courts will 
produce a shift in the institutional locus of gavmen from the council 
to village court erias. Village courts are already political, as 
well as legal, institutions. They are a natural meeting place for 
discussions by songons, councillors, and magistrates concerned with 
eria development. Because magistrates may order fines for
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transgressions of council laws, they have already succeeded in taking 
responsibility for the collection of taxes on an eria basis and have 
attempted unsuccessfully to gain a share in the decision-making process 
that allocates how this tax money should be spent. Magistrates, 
moreover, want to control the licensing of businesses and constantly 
argue that eria councils, similar to those in Kainantu, should be 
created. In 1980 a few councillors presented motions to the council 
to create eria councils. These propositions were opposed by the DOIC 
advisor and most councillors as ill-planned and financially unfeasible. 
Councillors, moreover, are hesitant to consider any plan that might 
further erode their authority at the village level. They believe that 
a committee of elected councillors should control any eria government, 
and that magistrates should necessarily be excluded from any decision­
making body.
That councillors, magistrates and provincial politicians have 
seriously considered such a proposal indicates the enormous influence 
that village courts have had in shaping people's conception of the 
eria as a political unit. Village court officials are drawn from 
different clans - in some cases, different tribes - and law and order 
has become an eria concern. Each village court decision necessitates 
that people accept the authority of magistrates who belong to foreign 
clans and these leaders, more than any others, easily establish 
reputations and become recognized throughout the eria. The potential 
significance of the village court as a political institution, however, 
is as yet uncertain. Like the village court, the introduction of 
councils was greeted with great enthusiasm. But this latter 
institution quickly faltered as it failed to meet people's unrealistic 
expectations. Given the competition between councillors and 
magistrates, moreover, there is little hope for a co-ordinated effort 
to establish such a new form of government. The desire for eria 
councils, and the significance of the eria as a development or 
political unit, therefore, may prove to be transitory.
A more obvious shift in the balance of power, however, has already 
occurred. Councillors have seen their authority as government leaders 
not only contested but also supplanted by village court magistrates; 
in many cases by men who were formerly komitis and subordinate to 
councillors in the village. On the surface this shift in authority
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seems to indicate that councillors grossly underestimated the use of 
sanctions or the control of kots as a source of their own power.
But no one was able to predict the influence magistrates would come 
to exert. Magistrates themselves stated that they first envisioned 
their positions as recognized dispute settlers responsible to 
councillors - as a komiti with an official badge and government 
salary. The development of the court as a legal institution and the 
evolution of the magistrates' authority came after the selection of 
court officials as magistrates discovered the codified powers at their 
disposal, as they saw their decisions upheld and their powers supported 
by the DOIC and Local Court Magistrate, and as they took it upon 
themselves to construct, in many cases without administration approval, 
the buildings that would become the vilis kot. The magistrates' 
authority is omnipresent - it is a rare day when these officials are 
not called on to hear one or more disputes in their community. 
Magistrates' decisions deal with issues which are critical to personal 
and inter-personal rights and goals. The councillor's participation 
in monthly meetings, and his occasional control over resources are, 
by comparison, less significant.
The magistrates' reliance on village court sanctions is not easily 
compared to the previous use of sanctions by the luluai or 
councillor, nor do people usually compare these different stages of 
legal authority or history. When pressed, people simply characterize 
the village court as harsh in comparison to the councillors' court and 
add, by mentioning the village court book, that the law in now 'true' 
and 'close' to the people. Undoubtedly, luluais and councillors 
adjudicated disputes. But it is clear that the sanctions magistrates 
have at their disposal are far greater than those ever available to 
councillors, and that the presence of written powers and laws means 
villagers have accepted a magistrate's right to impose settlements and 
to fine or jail law breakers - powers formerly restricted to the Local 
Court. Another comparison concerns the use of physical force which 
people maintain was synonymous with a luluai's rule. Not 
surprisingly, people compare some peace officers to the luluais. 
Although magistrates wield great sanctions, they seldom need to rely 
on the use of force. When physical intimidation or punishment is 
deemed necessary, magistrates depend on peace officers to implement 
force. The physically strong or 'hot' man has, in some sense, become
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an institutional role. In keeping with traditional preference, men 
who demonstrate good judgement and who balance the two sides of a 
dispute are accorded authority as magistrates; they are the true big 
men of the court. Consequently, those peace officers who wish to 
become magistrates are forced to temper their aggression and 
demonstrate more general leadership capabilities in informal courts.
Finally, magistrates must also temper their authority and bow to 
public opinion. The true balance of power is to be found in the 
constant interaction of magistrates and their followers - be they 
members of a particular men's house or an entire community. I have 
focussed on the strategies magistrates use to show how these leaders 
can assert their authority in the face of political competition and 
opposition from rivals or kinsmen. In return for submitting to this 
authority, however, people force magistrates to adjust their 
interpretation and application of village court laws. In the give and 
take between leaders and followers, a balance is struck between the 
goals and expectations of both magistrates and the public that shapes 
the particular brand of law and order at the local level.
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Notes
1. He is called the District Supervising Magistrate in the Village 
Courts Act. In Sirabu these officials are based in Kundiawa.
2. The Village Courts Act stipulates only that councillors who are 
also magistrates are prohibited from hearing cases ’brought by 
or by authority or direction of a Local Government Council’
(Division 7: Section 44). Warren notes that one Kainantu 
councillor became a village court magistrate when courts were 
introduced in 1975. However, he soon decided not to stand for re- 
election as councillor (1976: 3-4).
3. Several councillors maintained that the DOIC or Local Court 
Magistrate told them that they were ineligible to be magistrates.
I was unable to speak to the officials who were present in Chuave 
when the courts were implemented. All officials who were later 
stationed in Chuave, however, were aware that the Village Courts 
Act allowed councillors to be magistrates.
4. Martin’s dismissal occurred after I had left Chuave. Before my 
departure rumours of the dismissal had spread. My description 
of people’s reactions to the dismissal, therefore, are based on 
conversations with villagers and letters I received from people 
after returning to Canberra.
5. Newly elected magistrates select court clerks by secret vote.
6. Magistrates often give women community work such as cleaning the 
school or court grounds in lieu of jail terms. Magistrates 
believe that community work is shameful for men and, unless there 
are specific male tasks to be done such as fence building, they 
prefer to jail men.
7. Within the tribe, land mediators often work closely with 
magistrates; but magistrates do not hear inter-tribal land disputes.
8. People commonly use fence posts in fighting, but stick fights 
constitute a higher level of escalation with different weapons.
The sticks are actually special poles which are stored in the 
rafters of the men's houses. They are approximately six to eight 
metres long, and several centimetres in diameter.
9. In Table 13, I have listed these cases as a single referral 
according to where the final outcome was determined.
10. In a comparison of African and English lay courts, J. Van Velsen 
(1969) has shown that, in 'western' and 'tribal' legal systems, 
procedural flexibility allows the discussion of personal histories 
or evidence that might normally be considered irrelevant in more 
formal legal forums.
11. Even when compensation is balanced or when a smaller payment is 
'cancelled' by a larger one, both parties must raise the payment 
which is then given to the magistrates and formally exchanged 
between parties.
12. For example, raskols around Chuave justified and rationalized 
their raids on Highway trucks by arguing that 'Australians had 
insurance on the cargo'.
Chapter Seven
POLITICS AS DRAMA: THE PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
Occasionally, events arise that highlight political cleavages 
within a men's house group or community, transform covert political 
relationships into overt ones and concentrate political processes 
before the eyes of the observer. Disputes, ceremonies or Kafaina 
meetings are all such situations - examples of what Victor Turner has 
aptly called 'social dramas' (1974: 32-36, 42-43; see also Swartz et 
al 1966: 32-34). Turner notes that the distinguishing feature of 
a social drama is its temporal structure: it is a sequence of related 
events or phases that together comprise a processual unit. Different 
types of dramas, however, vary in scale and in duration.
I witnessed no event when the Simbu passion for 'playing politics' 
(Pidgin: pleim politiks) was more explicit than the first election
of the Simbu Provincial Government Assembly in 1980. I have previously 
used council or village court elections to indicate the degree of 
support particular leaders can muster or the degree of political 
competition occurring within clans and wards. But in comparison to 
these elections or other political events, the provincial election was 
a dramatic and, for particular men, traumatic event. Furthermore, as 
one example of a political process the election was exceptional in both 
scale and duration: it involved, directly or indirectly, the members
of an entire census division over the course of many months.
In this chapter I use the election as an extended case study - 
an example of a drama when political issues and behaviour are most 
explicit. My aims are comparable to earlier Papua New Guinea election 
analyses, specifically, with Epstein et al's remarks concerning the 
use of elections for the study of political change. I analyse 
psephological data, describe the style of campaigning and detail the 
issues people . believed were important. In short, I show how the 
existence of local political groups and rivalries colours the election 
outcome, and I demonstrate how men used the theme of higher government 
to generate ideas that can have a lasting influence on local political 
processes.
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The Simbu Interim Provincial Government
To a certain extent, the form of government to be elected 
predetermined the campaign issues. The Simbu Interim Provincial 
Government (SIPG) was created as part and parcel of the 
decentralization process occurring throughout Papua New Guinea (see 
Conyers 1976; Standish 1979a; 1979b). Standish has expertly analysed 
the SIPG’s troubled history, organization and practice (1979a). Here, 
as a background to the ^ election, I outline local perceptions of this 
government.
The SIPG Assembly was not an elected body; rather, it evolved from 
the Chimbu Area Authority, a representative institution first 
established in 1972, which included two members from each of Simbu*s 
nine councils and MHAs - the latter as ex officio non-voting members.
In 1976 the Area Authority established a business arm in order to 
purchase a portion of a major highlands trucking firm. This year also 
marked the formal creation of the SIPG, the election of Premier Siwi 
Kurondo - a Kerowagi councillor, ex-chairman of the Area Authority and 
ex-Minister for Forests in the third House of Assembly - and the 
selection of the Secretariat, that is, the administrative wing of the 
government. In 1977 the Simbu Cabinet was created; Launa Meule, an 
ex-president of Elimbari Council became Deputy Premier. Formal 
decentralization of national government powers began in 1978.
Standish*s analyses make it clear that ill-planning, financial 
mismanagement, and a lack of adequately trained administrative 
officials were all major problems the government confronted. No 
external agency monitored the SIPG's internal finances or its complex 
economic arrangements with the national government, both of which were 
undisclosed to the general public. The province raised about 10 per 
cent of its revenue locally. Liquor licensing, land taxes, and housing 
or trucking rentals are all important sources of revenue. The 
provincial business arm has widespread interests in trucking, real 
estate and a 40 per cent share in the Chimbu Coffee Co-operative; the 
latter, a dubious investment made in 1978, nevertheless saved the co­
operative from bankruptcy. The SIPG’s best known disaster was the loss 
of K50,000 in an aborted clothing factory scheme. Despite such 
failures, however, using business ventures to increase revenue is
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understandable and commonly practised in other provinces. But 
villagers by and large reject any government involvement in bisnis.
This is natural given the self-interest model of business men espoused 
at the local level (see chapter four), and the belief that the 
government should focus all its attention and revenue on local 
development. Chuave people also naturally assume that government money 
is stolen by politicians and public servants; failure of government 
businesses is cited as proof positive that expatriate or indigenous 
government officials are corrupt.
Villagers may overestimate the SIPG's involvement in the private 
sector, but they are well aware that most of the government revenue 
comes from national grants, and that the SIPG controls millions of kina; 
the 1981 budget, for example, totalled in excess of K4 million. People 
often fail to understand the cost of maintaining a large bureaucracy, 
and instead believe that such vast sums of money should easily provide 
limitless development and prosperity. The failure of the SIPG to 
maintain all schools or pave all roads, therefore, was proof of the 
government officials’ corruption and incompetence. Complaints that 
the SIPG spent lavish amounts to 'lift up its own name’ by purchasing a 
fleet of vehicles - each marked with the government's name and used 
by Assembly members and the public service - were also common in Chuave. 
But few people questioned the Chuave members’ use of vehicles or would 
have denied them their large salaries or expense accounts - more than 
K4,000 per year. These were all viewed as legitimate benefits of 
provincial office. However, these complaints, like others - for 
example, that members or public servants constantly spent their time 
drinking rather than working, that government offices were never open, 
or that Goroka, not Kundiawa, should be the provincial capital because 
as many as ten provincial vehicles could be seen in the Eastern 
Highlands province on any given day - were symptomatic of the 
widespread cynicism towards a government believed to be unconcerned 
with people’s welfare.
More important in people's opinions are promised government 
projects which are not forthcoming. For example, in 1977 the SIPG made 
a firm promise to build a lime cement ’factory' at a quarry located 
in Duma and Mam territories. In fact, foreign consultants studied the 
feasibility of this project in 1978 at a cost of K60,000 paid by the
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National Planning Office (Standish 1981: 9).^ The Sirabu government 
then purchased the land from local owners, thereby reinforcing people's 
expectations that the project was imminent. Local enthusiasm for this 
project, rumoured to be capable of employing hundreds of Chuave men, 
had waned by 1979 as the project failed to materialize. During the 
election campaign, SIPG supporters, including incumbent members and 
the Provincial Planner, an educated youth from Gai tribe, maintained 
that the factory would be started shortly after the election and 
publicly stated that K300,000 worth of equipment was on a ship 
travelling to Papua New Guinea from Australia. Detractors of the SIPG 
and most villagers considered this 'bullshit', believing rumours that 
K100,000 to K1 million allocated for the project had been spent on 
purchasing vehicles and building an airport in the Premier's district, 
as well as being used to prop up failing government businesses.
Standish has also shown how political infighting and patronage - 
involving Assembly members, administrative officers and national 
MHAs - contributed to the government's problems. Here again, however, 
knowledge of provincial politicians and Kundiawa politics is poor at 
the rural level. I asked 100 Keu people to identify the names and 
positions of prominent provincial politicians and administrative 
officials. Councillors and village court officials, as well as men 
below the age of 25, recognized most of the names listed. But others 
were usually only familiar with the names of the Provincial Premier, 
plus the Chuave and Nambaiyufa members. About one-third of men and 
5 per cent of women over the age of 30 correctly identified Provincial 
Secretary Barunke Kaman and the Speaker, Kuman Dai - both from central 
Sirabu.
Only the most educated and politically involved Chuave men have 
any real understanding of provincial politics. However, councillors 
and other big men often make a point of travelling to Kundiawa to learn 
the latest provincial scandal or rumours which they then pass on, 
usually in distorted form, to villagers. The central theme addressed 
by these rumours was that the administration (Pidgin: ol wokman o 
kuskus: the workmen and clerks) dominated the SIPG. Thus, the 
people believed that only the Premier had any real power, and that 
young educated public servants who controlled the government 'paper' 
dominated the Assembly at large. A corollary of this argument was that
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Kuman speakers - in particular, Barunke Karaan - dominated the 
administration, which favoured central Simbu areas and neglected Chuave 
development. Both these complaints, I believe, were in some ways 
justified; regardless of their validity, however, they were politically 
potent weapons. Moreover, the anti-Kuman and anti-Assembly themes were 
invariably used to legitimize Chuave claims that, along with 
neighbouring districts, they should form a separate Bomai province 
which would exclude central Simbu leaders and thereby assure rural 
development.
To a great extent, perceptions of the SIPG were the product of the 
personalities and qualities of the two Chuave and two Nambaiyufa 
members; Elimbari was not represented in the Assembly. These men, on 
average 55 years old, had no formal education and were illiterate.
All members, however, had extensive government experience: three had
been tultuls and luluais in the 1950s; the fourth, the Deputy 
Premier, had been a government interpreter at this time. The two 
Nambaiyufa members were both very successful entrepreneurs; in 
contrast, neither Chuave member had business interests. Although all 
of these men were well respected as traditional-style big men in their 
local communities, detractors from areas other than their own often 
criticized them as being incompetent, as having antiquated ideals and 
occasionally as being senile. People considered only two members, 
Launa Meule and Yowie Moses, Nambaiyufa's most renowned politician and 
ex-MHA for the Chuave Open electorate, to have any influence in the 
Assembly, and all members to be subservient to the Premier and 
Provincial Secretary.
In many ways, these members were representative of the SIPG as 
a whole. Standish's 1976 survey of the Assembly reaffirms the 
characterization of the average member as being a traditional-style 
leader, lacking formal education and ill-equipped to deal with the 
complexities of provincial government (1979a: 56-58; 1979b: 17). In 
Chuave few men questioned a member's ability to lead other people; 
rather they argued that members were simply too old to understand 
government finances, were easily 'tricked' by literate public servants 
who controlled government paper work and consequently, were unable to 
fight hard for the area's development. These criticisms, therefore, 
parallel accusations against councillors who allowed the DOIC or
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council clerk to determine council policy. From my discussions with 
these members, it was clear that all these men felt dismayed or 
embittered by their treatment by the educated Kundiawa elite.
Overall, therefore, the SIPG was constantly criticized for being a 
corrupt, ill-managed government. Assembly discussions were called 
meaningless 'wind talk', which did nothing to disguise the fact that 
the Premier and public service alone controlled the province. But the 
Simbu also have an abiding faith in the principle of representative 
government. Thus, the Simbu government, men argued, was close to the 
people and, unlike the national government, could respond better to 
people's requests for development. Many believed the elections would 
mark the birth of the 'true' and powerful Simbu Assembly. All that 
was required, therefore, was for people to think seriously about their 
choice of a candidate and select a strong member - a man who would 
fight hard for the electorate and not allow himself to be dominated 
by the administration or other politicians.
The 'steal campaign'
According to the Simbu constitution, the elections were to be held 
by August 1979. The Department of Decentralization, however, granted a 
SIPG request for a postponement of up to one year from this date. 
Consequently, throughout late 1979, the elections rarely figured in 
men's house or other public discussions. Two rumours circulated at 
this time: the Premier and Provincial Secretary were delaying the
elections to 'turn the paper', that is, to cover up past financial 
malpractice; and incumbent members, fearing defeat, were using the 
delay to steal government money.
Within Duma, only Martin and Kopon were definite candidates as 
early as 1979, though people considered several other men, including 
Stephen (Tiene Maima's son), Andrew (a Komogam peace officer), and Dege 
as likely candidates. During 1979 Kopon, Martin and recognized 
candidates from other tribes made monthly trips to Pangu Party 
headquarters in Kundiawa. Even though Pangu was the only party 
actively preparing for the election at this time, its operations were 
totally disorganized and its meetings dominated by grand schemes such 
as renting helicopters to drop campaign leaflets, and requesting large
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suras of money (K.10,000 to K25,000) from national headquarters. This 
only fuelled potential candidates' expectations that Pangu affiliation 
would result in lavish financial support, and that the campaign would 
be conducted with flair and elan comparable to a national election 
(see Standish, in press). Both expectations would eventually prove 
illusory.
In January 1982, following the quiescence in government activity 
which occurs over the Christmas-New Year period, election campaigning 
became a regular, if subdued, feature of rural life. Men announced 
their candidacy, campaigned covertly by criticizing their rivals or 
the provincial government and adjusted their behaviour to meet the 
electorates' expectations. The first phase of this election drama, the 
Stil kempein (steal campaign), had begun. The 'true campaign' with 
its formal speechmaking and appeals for support would begin only after 
candidates had paid their K50 nomination fee, the 'bet' in Pidgin. 
Official nominations, however, did not open until April 12, so the 
stil campaign lasted several months.
This campaign period coincided with several important events which 
later became election issues. In January a war between Kebai and 
Sinasina clans erupted along the Chuave border. It was sparked by the 
killing of a Sinasina big man during a death compensation payment.
This had been attended by the Duman (Sinasina) and Kebaimeri clans,
as well as tribal leaders, including village court officials and the 
2Deputy Premier. The confrontation, initially limited to these two 
groups, escalated to include seven Sinasina and six Kebai clans.
Despite persistent attempts by provincial politicians and public 
servants to end the war, fighting continued intermittently for six 
months, leaving seven Sinasina and five Kebai dead and many others 
injured. In addition, countless gardens and over 1,000 coffee trees 
were ruined; 200 houses, six tradestores and a church were destroyed, 
and a tavern and community school severely damaged. When a few Chuave 
and Elimbari men joined their Kebai kinsmen in the fight, rumours 
spread that any Chuave man seen on the Highlands Highway or in Kundiawa 
would be killed and that a Sinasina 'hit list' of Chuave big men 
existed. These effectively stopped all Chuave traffic to Kundiawa for 
several weeks, after which men ignored the rumours and resumed their 
journeys to the capital without incident. Yet the war had thrust the
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issue of law and order into the centre of the campaign: candidates
promised they would initiate a system of rural police posts or increase 
village court powers, and called for a return of the State of 
Emergency (see also Brown 1982: 538; Standish 1981). In Duma Martin 
made this issue the keystone of his campaign, arguing that he alone 
understood the law, and could forcefully argue in the Assembly for 
increased village court funding and powers.
In February two other important events occurred. First, Gola 
Ungan died in a road accident. He was a Sinasina candidate who had led 
demonstrations in Kundiawa calling for immediate elections, charged the 
SIPG with corruption and purported to have documented evidence of the 
government’s financial mismanagement. Chuave people believed a rumour 
that the SIPG leaders had paid a PMV driver K3,000 to assassinate Gola 
by crashing into his stationary vehicle. Gola’s death proved to them 
that SIPG corruption was rampant. Second, as I have previously noted 
in chapter four, the SIPG raised coffee buying licence fees without 
consulting councils or local business men. This led to a large 
demonstration in Chuave, renewing calls for the creation of Bomai 
province. Three entrepreneurs used the demonstration as a forum to 
announce their candidacies, and the promise to end government 
involvement in any business enterprise became integral to several 
other candidates’ campaigns.
Another event worthy of special note was the overthrow in March 
1980 of Michael Somare, the Prime Minister and Pangu leader, by Julius 
Chan (People's Progress Party) who along with Iambakey Okuk, the 
National Party leader and MHA for Sirabu province, formed a new 
coalition government. To Chuave people, Somare is both the ’first man' 
and ’first father' of Papua New Guinea. Some old men claim that 
Somare’s father, a policeman, had patrolled the highlands with Jim 
Taylor and married a Gomia women. Although Somare is rarely said to 
be the child of this marriage, his father's association with Taylor 
and men's claims to a fictive or mythical kinship relationship indicate 
that Somare himself is synonymous with government, and that they 
believe they have a vested interest in his welfare. Somare's name 
is also synonymous with Pangu and his overthrow was, to say the least, 
a traumatic episode for many villagers. Early rumours of a coup,
Somare's murder, and immediate national elections quickly died as big
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men sought additional information from myself and other educated men. 
Fundamentalist Christians rapidly incorporated this event into the body 
of revelatory signs to prove that the total disintegration of 
government and the Second Coming were both imminent.
As rumour gave way to reason and to an understanding of the 
stability of the new government, supporters of Iarabakey Okuk, now 
Deputy Prime Minister, became more vocal, arguing that the change in 
government would favour highlanders, and that Okuk would soon replace 
Prime Minister Chan. Although in the minority, they alleged that 
provincial government abuses had occurred under the Somare-Pangu regime 
and that the new Simbu Assembly, with Okuk's aid, would be a truly 
forceful body. In Chuave Okuk, like Somare, is the epitome of an 
astute, influential politician. Moreover, criticisms levelled against 
Okuk - that he is self-interested and ’hungry for power’ or has used 
government funds to start his own businesses - are more than 
compensated for by the fact that he is, above all else, a Simbu man who 
fights for regional interests. Arguments that both Somare and Okuk or 
their respective parties are responsible for development or for having 
brought independence to Papua New Guinea are seldom seen as 
contradictory.
Consequently, party affiliation became a major election issue. 
Martin and Kopon remained loyal to Somare and 'Somare’s line'. But 
other candidates showed no hesitation in switching allegiance from 
Pangu to the National Party. Conflicting signals were also common: 
several candidates used the standard National Party campaign poster, 
which made no reference to the NP label, yet they actively campaigned 
as Pangu members. Others claimed they were official members of two 
parties. Tabia Maima, an Ei candidate, said he belonged to both PPP 
and Pangu; his Ei rival, Unagi, stated he was both a Pangu and National 
Party member. Candidates themselves, though, chose their political 
party. Pangu was the only party which attempted to preselect key 
candidates, a move that failed for lack of adequate organization.
Party affiliation did not signal any difference in policy or 
platform. Rather, candidates used party choice to make vague allusions 
to what was ’good' or ’bad' government, to state they were supporters 
of the national government or its opposition, or to capitalize on the
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personality cults of the major national leaders. Several candidates, 
particularly the Pangu men, referred to an idea that the Assembly would 
be formed on a party basis, argued that Pangu would have a clear 
majority, and stated that they would more easily obtain Cabinet 
positions or be elected premier. To some voters, this was a persuasive 
argument, but by and large the possibility of the provincial government 
dividing on party lines was not understood. Moreover, in each 
electorate, several candidates stood as Independents. This not only 
freed them from having to align themselves with Okuk's or Somare's 
actions, but also allowed them to claim that the bane of Papua New 
Guinea government was party politics itself, and to suggest that the 
Assembly would be a party-free body working for all people, and not 
for particular districts or factions.
As I have previously noted, people recognize that opposed descent 
groups often vote en bloc for their own candidate (see also Parker 
1971: 315-316). By mid February, when the rumour that nominations 
would open in April was verified, candidates had an excellent working 
knowledge of the number of candidates in other clans and tribes. Duma 
men estimated that a mere 600 to 800 votes would be necessary to win 
because of the fragmentation of votes in other areas - a prediction 
that proved to be sound. I was constantly besieged at this time by 
candidates seeking population figures for all the area's tribes. As 
Duma was second in numerical strength only to Kamara, where supposedly 
ten candidates were standing, Kopon and Martin saw their chances as 
excellent. But in late February, two other Duma men, somewhat 
unexpectedly, announced their intentions to run. One was Michael 
Girimai, Martin's cousin, who had long been viewed as a possible 
candidate. Martin, however, had frequently and publicly denounced 
Michael's candidacy, arguing that he and Michael were 'true' 
brothers and that because Michael had been absent from the province for 
more than six months he was ineligible to stand. Even Michael accepted 
this last and fallacious argument. A bankmaster working in the 
Eastern Highlands province, Michael had resigned his position in 
December 1979 to return to Keu In the hope that the election would be 
delayed until June 1980. He told people that even if he could not 
stand in the election he had permanently retired and wanted only to 
help the Duma area, often stressing the need for community projects 
involving young school leavers. Thirty-three years old, he was
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slightly younger than Martin and, by Duma standards, very well- 
educated, as he was among the first Duma men to complete high 
school. After an additional two years of technical training, he had 
served four years in the army and another eight in clerical jobs. In 
February, when the DOIC assured him that he was eligible to stand 
regardless of the timing of the elections, Michael began a vigorous 
stil kempein, often giving cigarettes and beer to men throughout the 
Duma area, even as he informed them of his candidacy. Martin waited 
until after the formal nominations before appealing to the Electoral 
Commission in Kundiawa, only to be told that there was nothing he could 
do to prevent Michael’s candidacy.
The fourth Duma candidate was Joseph Dama, a Kaupagam, who like 
Michael had never stood for public office. Dama was a well-respected 
man, whose entrepreneurial skill and success in the early and mid-1970s 
had been rivalled only by those of Tiene Maima (see chapter four).
Dama's recent bisnis losses, however, had only affirmed his reputa­
tion as an impulsive and, to some people, eccentric individual. In 
1980 his business was on the verge of collapse, and Dama admitted 
uncertainty as to whether he could pay his debts of over K1,000. There 
was much debate surrounding the reason for Dama’s problems, but all 
agreed that his financial decline had begun about 1976, when he became 
infatuated with an eastern highlands woman, and sought to marry her.
Dama admitted to having given large sums of money to his future 
affines, and to having gone ’crazy’ and thrown literally hundreds of 
kina from his car in grief after the woman refused to marry him. Many 
Kaupagam believed Dama to be the victim of a witchcraft attack, and 
Dama's eccentricities - his impulsive decisions to travel to Lae, his 
explosive temper (often directed at the first of his two wives), or 
his amiability when cajoled by Korowa men into buying beer for all- 
night drinking parties - only affirmed this belief. None of these 
characteristics, however, detracted from Dama's reputation as a good 
man whose generosity was unquestionable.
The news that four Duma candidates were standing - all Keu village 
residents and members of the same subtribe - resulted in big men and 
other concerned voters attempting to preselect a single candidate in 
order to prevent the fragmentation of Duma votes and so ensure election 
victory. This tactic dates to the earliest elections in Simbu and
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elsewhere in the highlands (cf. Criper 1964: 132-133; Hatanaka 1970:
40; Reay 1964: 167-169). If national elections are any indication,
however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent the 
fragmentation of votes within different groups; each successive 
national election in Chuave has had a greater number of candidates 
than the one before. In comparison to the 1964 elections when only 
four men nominated for the Chuave open electorate, in 1982, 24 
candidates stood (see also Hatanaka 1970).^
The 1980 preselection movement was initially sparked by a rumour 
that Pangu would send a committee to rural areas to seek information 
on preferred candidates. When this did not eventuate, big men from 
within Duma took it upon themselves to approach the candidates and 
attempt to arrange a preselection meeting. All four men agreed in 
principle to this idea, but were noticeably absent when the meetings 
occurred. Michael then purchased several cartons of beer, and invited 
the other candidates to Dama's house to discuss the preselection idea. 
But he was unable to persuade any of the candidates to withdraw and, 
in the end, the men agreed only to run a ’clean campaign', free of 
defamation, and to 'play cards', that is, allow voters to choose 
between them. Martin, Kopon and Dama all agreed they would stand as 
Pangu; Michael stated he would run as an Independent.
The proponents of preselection remained undeterred by the 
candidates' agreement. In March Yowie Moses of Nambaiyufa held a feast 
in honour of his impending nomination and victory, and summoned Duma 
leaders to this event, where they delivered speeches on Yowie's 
behalf, arguing that no other Nambaiyufa man should contest the 
elections. Yowie's tribesmen reiterated this sentiment. They stressed 
Yowie's long-term government service, and publicly informed the 'king' 
that he would be his tribe's sole candidate. This meeting rekindled 
Duma men's hopes for a single candidate; they insisted Yowie had shown 
'all Duma' the proper way to play politics and scheduled another pre­
selection meeting. A week after Yowie's feast, about forty Duma men 
assembled at Keu. This time all four candidates attended the meeting.
Because of men's inability to confront publicly or to favour 
particular candidates, and the candidates' intransigent belief that 
they could win the election in the face of competition, the meeting was
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destined to fail. Although each candidate realized his own chances 
would be immensely enhanced by the withdrawal of one or more opponents, 
none could withdraw without losing face. The fact that the candidates 
were all 'brothers’ only complicated the situation, for the election 
had become a matter of relative status within the village, as well as 
within Duma. No candidate, therefore, could afford to admit to being 
inferior to his village rivals. Consequently the discussion at this 
meeting focussed on the idea that voters themselves would have to seek 
consensus in selecting a single candidate as the following speech by 
one of Martin's supporters, an educated Keu man shows.
Listen, this election is not about cutting pig. It 
is not about blood and family or wantoks. All the 
power belongs to the province now. It is made in 
Simbu now. The government cuts the money, the national 
government money, and distributes it to all the 
districts. They make us strong.
Now we are talking. Four men are standing up - three 
are Pangu and Michael - he is an Independent. You 
understand? He does not belong to a party. We know 
what Martin will do in this house [Assembly]; we do not 
know what Michael will do. We men who vote have to 
decide. When we go to the table [polling booth], you have 
to think well about who will bring work to this district. 
If you tell a man to withdraw - that is like defamation: 
he can turn around and take you to court. This is a 
free country. A man who wants to bet can bet. We 
people, all people, have the power when we vote.
Moreover, the speaker suggests that to tell a man to withdraw is 
tantamount to abandoning the principle of democracy.
In the stil campaign there was great variation in the amount 
of time candidates spent on canvassing support. Within Duma, Dama 
showed the greatest reluctance to solicit people's support, and simply 
contented himself with making people familiar with his candidacy and 
promising to work diligently on their behalf. But all candidates 
adjusted their behaviour to meet the electors' expectations. The most 
obvious modification was the assumption of a Christian outlook. To 
villagers, being a good Christian not only implies that a person is 
honest and moral but also, in the election context, that a person is 
prepared to work on behalf of all people and will not damage the 
government's reputation. Seventh Day Adventists and other 
fundamentalist Christians, who neither drink alcohol nor smoke, are
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cons idered the epitome of responsible men; coffee companies and 
councils often hire them because, unlike others, they can be trusted 
with large suras of money. It Is not surprising, therefore, that 
throughout Chuave many candidates abstained from smoking, drinking 
alcohol and card playing during the stil campaign. Some even took 
to carrying Bibles wherever they travelled.
In Duma all four candidates began to attend Lutheran services 
regularly, made a point of taking communion and confession, and with 
the aid of literate Christians, began to make references to biblical 
passages in their conversations with others. Michael, the only Duma 
candidate to abstain from alcohol, often used the fundamentalist Pidgin 
phrase, bei i kirap bek (to be reborn), as a rationale for this 
change. Martin and Kopon took a very pro-Lutheran stance at this time, 
attending weekly songon meetings and offering the use of their men's 
houses for these affairs on two separate occasions. In addition, they 
often criticized young members of the Four Square mission for their 
immoral behaviour, calling the building a 'courting house' where 
adolescents used the cover of Christianity to arrange illicit sexual 
rendezvous. Dama's new-found Christianity was perhaps the most blatant 
and uncharacteristic response, for he had rarely attended church 
services in the past, and songons had ostracized him because he was 
polygamous. Nonetheless, he made a point of saying he had found God, 
and that he did not wish to campaign or make election promises because 
he considered this sinful behaviour.
As early as 1979, Martin admitted to me that he had attempted to 
solicit the support of key groups he considered important for an 
election victory by favouring them in village court decisions. In 
particular, he wooed the Gomia men's house groups occasionally 
attending the Duma court, and the two most isolated Duma clans. During 
the steal campaign, however, he began to disentangle himself from 
village court affairs and, by March, formally announced his resignation 
as magistrate until the election was over. In fact, Martin continued 
to exercise considerable influence over village court decisions, but 
the resignation enabled him to distance himself from allegations that 
the court was biased, and to prevent alienating particular voters 
through decisions rendered prior to the voting. In marked contrast, 
both Michael and Kopon began to appear regularly at the court, using
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court days not only to talk politics to men from Duma, Ei and Gomia 
tribes, but also to act occasionally as mediators in the 'cross court', 
thereby demonstrating their skill as dispute settlers and their concern 
for law and order. Martin, in theory, could have prevented this. And 
on three separate occasions, he did ban all 'outside men' from hearing 
cases. Yet big men risk a great deal if they openly confront their 
rivals; consequently, Martin was often hesitant to make the presence 
of other candidates at court an open issue least he be accused of 
defamation or playing 'dirty politics'.
Candidates also sought the support of key big men in other clans, 
hoping that these leaders could produce large blocks of votes amongst 
their kinsmen (cf. Hatanaka 1970: 40; Reay 1964: 151-152). Candidates 
considered wanwok relationships important. Thus, Kopon believed 
councillors would support him and persuade their closest kinsmen to 
do likewise. Martin similarly approached all Duma court officials, 
as well as magistrates from other tribes, believing he could win as 
many as ten votes from each court eria outside Duma. All Duma 
candidates considered Tiene Maima’s support crucial, and therefore 
privately approached him to make both the implicit promise of future 
government grants for his many enterprises, and the explicit promise 
of Kaupagam or Komodurumo support for Tiene's son in any future 
national election.
The effect of these and other tactics - including gifts of beer 
or cigarettes to songons and men's house leaders - is difficult to 
judge. As I show below, voting patterns sometimes indicate that block 
voting within clans may have been linked to the influence of particular 
leaders. However, the majority of Duma big men publicly remained 
neutral, and stressed it was each person's right to decide on a 
candidate. Both Tiene and Dege, for example, consistently refused even 
to name their choice of candidate for fear that they would be 
criticized for influencing the vote. The two exceptions to this policy 
were Stephen - Tiene's son, who openly supported a non-Duma candidate, 
Wauri Suba from Gomia - and Andrew Wahgi who campaigned for Michael. 
Stephen made his choice both on the basis of his friendship with Wauri, 
and on his belief that this Gomia candidate was the most politically 
astute of the educated Chuave candidates. Andrew, a Koraogam peace 
officer, had initially supported Martin, but during the stil
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campaign, Andrew had attacked the council clerk and Kopon while 
quarrelling about village court salaries. Martin failed to convince 
the council that Andrew should not be dismissed, and therefore Andrew 
switched his allegiance to Michael.
Candidates also used residence and kinship ties to solidify their 
support. Kopon and Martin began affairs with Keu women, resident in 
Komogam and Subagam, respectively. This enabled them to give small 
gifts to men belonging to these groups without being accused of buying 
votes. Martin clearly sought to split Michael's Komogam support; 
although considered a Keukobu member, Michael lived with his Komogam 
wife in Aidpost village. That these relationships with women were 
politically motivated is not in doubt; both men regretted the fact that 
their wives' kinsmen resided in non-Chuave areas and mentioned that 
they were now assured of additional votes. The two men, of course, 
stopped short of claiming they had polygamous marriages; rather, they 
encouraged the belief that they were contemplating divorce. Likewise, 
three other non-Duma candidates built houses in their mothers' 
brothers' or affines' villages during the stil campaign so as to 
establish closer relationships with non-aligned groups or to split 
their rivals' votes.
A well-established political ploy - the gifts of pork, beer or 
cash to solidify kin-based support groups or to 'buy' non-kinsmen's 
votes - is now generally held in ill-favour. It is called gris in 
Pidgin, but 'bribery' by educated men. Tales of flagrant attempts to 
purchase votes in national elections are exceedingly common; for 
instance, the story of the Chuave Open member who, in 1977, threw K2 
notes or gave bottles of beer to men during speeches as he promised 
additional government wealth.^ During the provincial election, 
however, such lavish use of wealth never occurred, and people 
constantly stressed that any gift should be treated automatically as 
gris and considered sufficient reason for selecting another 
candidate. The phrase 'take the bottle and vote for someone else' 
succinctly summarized this election theme. Joseph Dama, whose business 
gave him access to wholesale beer and other consumer goods, was 
initially criticized for having used his wealth during the stil 
campaign. In fact, Dama did not use his wealth in this way, and even 
refused to offer men cigarettes least he be accused of bribery -
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behaviour which eventually gained him a reputation as a model 
candidate. Although some candidates gave small gifts of beer or cash 
during the stil campaign, they consistently refused to give even 
these gifts after the opening of nominations unless they had disguised 
them by other actions (see below).
A number of ceremonies, of course, occurred throughout this phase 
of the campaign. Duma candidates were careful to appear at all Keu 
feasts and payments, but they made only token contributions to the 
affairs. At this time, Michael alone sponsored a ceremony, a party 
given on behalf of his aged father, to which he contributed a large 
pig, eight cartons of beer and two bottles of gin. These he 
distributed along with tobacco, rice and sweet potatoes to 60 guests. 
Keukobu men and visitors placed less emphasis on Michael's use of his 
savings - rumoured to be several thousand kina - to buy votes, than 
on the fact that he was attempting to demonstrate his ability as a 
traditional exchange or 'place' leader by controlling the distribution. 
Michael refused Martin's offer to help distribute the beer and pork, 
and further slighted Martin by giving him less than a carton of beer 
when most men believed Martin should have controlled two or three 
cartons. Consequently, a somewhat inevitable, but particularly bitter, 
factional quarrel arose in which Michael's father sided with Martin 
and accused his son of incompetence by botching the distribution.
Though I believe this event had little long-term effect on the election 
results, it did momentarily contrast the differences between Martin, 
Keukobu's established big man, and Michael whom older men considered 
a young upstart, lacking expertise in everyday village affairs.
Shortly before the opening of nominations, I asked 241 Komodurumo 
and Kaupagam residents of Keu village, and an additional 140 Duma 
adults - ten each from the remaining seven clans - whether they had 
decided to vote for a particular candidate. Martin and Kopon were 
preferred by 57 and 50 per cent of their respective clans. In 
contrast, only 15 per cent of Komodurumo and 3 per cent of Kaupagam 
adults preferred Michael and Dama, respectively. In Kaupagam, 6 per 
cent of the respondents listed Dege, whom some men still wanted to 
nominate. Less than 10 per cent of each clan supported a non-agnate. 
Undecided voters totalled 17 per cent of Komodurumo and 32 per cent 
of Kaupagam.
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In other Duma clans, 87 adults (about 62 per cent) were undecided 
or claimed to be supporting two candidates. Of the remaining 53 
respondents, Martin and Michael both obtained 20 preferences, Kopon 
7, and Dama 4. Two men stated they would vote for non-Duma candidates. 
The reasons given for supporting or rejecting particular candidates 
centred on their personal characteristics or indicated aspects of 
political thought which I have characterized as pervasive in Chuave. 
Thus, people stated they would vote for Michael because he was well- 
educated, or stated they disagreed with Kopon's or Martin's attempts 
to 'double work'. Martin, Kopon and Dama were all regularly identified 
with their primary leadership roles. Respondents, therefore, stressed 
either Dama's managerial skills or characterized him as self-interested 
because of his bisnis; Martin personified the law or had 'ruined the 
law's name'; Kopon represented all that was good or bad about the 
council.
The high percentage of undecided voters was consistent with 
people's statements about the 'true campaign' determining the outcome 
of the election. Thus, people insisted that they would wait to hear 
campaign speeches and would first judge the merits of non-Duma 
candidates before reaching a decision. Consequently, I now turn to 
a consideration of the candidacies throughout the Chuave area, and 
emphasize how candidates used rhetoric in an attempt to win votes both 
within and beyond their own tribe.
The 'true campaign'
The kempein tru lasted six weeks, beginning with the opening of 
nominations requiring candidates to deposit K50 and ending with
/Ithe opening of the polls. In Chuave, Elimbari and Nambaiyufa 
electorates, 21, 15 and 10 candidates nominated respectively.^ Ogan 
Kom - a Kamara divorcee, who was Chuave President of the provincial 
women's organization, Yangpela Didiman - was the only woman to 
nominate. Ogan dismissed any illusions of winning, and never, to my" 
knowledge, made public speeches. Nor did she directly appeal to 
Yangpela Didiman or Kafaina women for votes. Rather, as she informed 
me, her sole purpose was to show women they were entitled to nominate 
for elections; a fact that Duma women, at least, were often unaware of.
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It is impossible to provide a profile of the 'average' candidate: 
their ages, educational backgrounds, government or employment histories 
were extremely varied. But candidates clearly belonged to an elite 
segment of the society; usually they were men who had special qualities 
that set them apart from ordinary villagers (see also Standish, in 
press). Five candidates were, like Ogan, called giamen (false) 
candidates; they were considered either politically uninfluential or 
having little in their background to legitimize their candidacies.
The remaining candidates were either current or ex-government 
officials, mission leaders, business men or they had, like Michael, 
qualities such as extensive education, wage labour or public service 
employment to their credit. Of the 45 men, 22 had previously contested 
council elections and ten had nominated for previous national (Chuave 
Open) elections. Nine councillors and six ex-councillors stood; three 
candidates were village court officials, and six were mission pastors 
or leaders. Eleven men were major entrepreneurs, and an additional 
ten had some business interests. However, only seven men - two mission 
pastors where were also business men, and five councillor-business men - 
had proven their ability to 'double' or combine discrepant leadership 
roles. To a great extent, then, the candidates had different 
backgrounds and represented what people saw as separate, and in some 
ways, equal models of leadership.
Overall, 21 candidates stood as Pangu representatives, ten as 
National Party and 15 as Independents. Significantly, Independents 
were on average much younger men, usually under 30 years old. In 
Chuave electorate, the combination of youth and extensive education, 
in conjunction with the Independent label, often distinguished liberal 
- if not radical - candidates from older, more conservative ones who 
were less informed about the workings of government and who saw their 
own impoverished education as a hindrance to their chances of success. 
On average, candidates had less than three years formal education.
But 12 men had completed primary school (or the equivalent in mission 
education); of these, five were high school graduates. In Chuave 
electorate three young men, Wauri, Rocky and Albert were particularly 
vocal and active in their campaigns. Older candidates labelled them 
as 'big heads' and accused them of running dirty campaigns by openly 
criticizing more established leaders. In short, the antagonism 
noticeable between Michael and his Duma rivals, primarily based on the
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threat posed by an educated man, was a generalized feature of the wider 
Chuave campaign.
The true campaign also highlighted the importance of mission 
affiliation. The nomination of SDA candidates in Kamara and Ei, both 
SDA strongholds, was natural. But candidates representing 
fundamentalist denominations also stood and these small missions took 
an active part in the campaign. Both Wauri and Albert were 
fundamentalist pastors. In addition, Togara, a Tolai who was married 
to a Kamara woman, represented himself as a pastor of the United 
Church, and - like Wauri and Albert - took an extreme mission stance.
He warned members of small Christian sects that the government would 
ban all missions except the Lutheran, Catholic and SDA, promised aid 
to build permanent-material churches, and frequently cited Bible 
passages in his speeches. Duma candidates felt threatened only by 
Wauri; pastor of the Gomia Four Square church, he was well-known in 
Duma as a good Christian and entrepreneur. The 250 or more Duma Four 
Square adherents were clearly a target of his campaign. Fundamentalist 
missions also arranged several public speaking events; ten candidates 
attended one such affair coinciding with a mass Four Square baptism in 
Duma.
The close of nominations also allowed candidates to gauge the 
importance of different political groups and to focus on particular 
areas in their campaign. I have listed the distribution of candidates, 
along with basic details in Table 14. The candidates belonged to 14 
clans; an additional 20 clans were unrepresented. Campaign strategies, 
of course, varied according to the proximity of different tribes and 
the candidates' personalities. From an Ei or Duma perspective, three 
Gomia Meri clans were believed to be non-aligned or unwilling to 
support Kuri, the Gomia Meri incumbent. Martin, Michael and Tabia all 
made patrols to various men's house groups within this tribe, 
concentrating their campaigns on those groups located adjacent to Duma 
and Ei territory. In addition, they travelled to all men's house 
groups within Duma and Ei. Kopon and Dama restricted their movements 
to Duma and Ei. Kopon frankly admitted he feared sorcery attacks from 
Gomia and Kamara if he should offend another candidate's supporters.
The distribution of candidates favoured the sole Kebai contender.
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Table 14: Chuave e le c to ra te  candidates
Tribe Clan Candidate Approximate
age
Party* Education Status
Kamara 
(7 c lans)
Kanui Baundo 36 P St 6 SDA pastor
Kami le v i 28 P St 6 SDA lead e r/ 
Former APO
Arogam E ri 44 P Mission 
3 years
ex-tu l t u l /
ex-array
sergeant
Arogara Qgan 37 P Chuave
President
Yangpela
Didinan
Ibugwagu Launa 55 NP — Deputy Premier
Ibugwagu Kbmboi 40 I St 4 ex-constable
Kaingunua Kai 25 P St 6, 
m ission 4 
years
B ap tist 
pasto r/sm all 
b is in is  nan
Puigi Kiwai 45 P 'T Peace o f f ic e r /  
small
b lsn is  nan
EXma
(9 clans)
Kaupagam Doraa 40 P m ission 
3 years
major bisnJjs 
wan
Kaupagam Kbpon 42 P — co u n c illo r
Kcraoduruno Ifertin 36 P m ission 
2 years
m agistrate
Koraodurumo Michael 34 I form 4,
techn ical
co llege
ex-army/
c le rk
Gomia Kinogu Subarao 
(3 clans)
Togara 37 I St 5 United Church
leader/wage
earner
Subarao Suba 26 I Form 4 Four Square
pastor/m ajor
entrepreneur
Arogam Whi 30 I m ission 
2 years
small b lsn is  
man
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Tribe Clan Candidate Approximate
age
Party* Education Status
Gomia Kibi 
(3 clans)
Ekimagu Rocky 27 I Form 4 major
entrepreneur/
ex-provincial
employee
Gomia Meri 
(4 clans)
Gania Meri Kuri 60 P ~ councillor/
Assembly
member
Ei(gun)
(3 clans)
Duangauvon Tabia 43 P mission 
2 years
councillor/ 
SEA. leader
IXiangauvm Unagi 43 P mission 
8 years
SDA pastor
Kebai 
(6 clans)
Kebai Kama Kayapo 28 I mission 
4 years
ex-wage
labourer
Kau
(2 clans)
Maniku Kern 35 NP mission 
5 years
ex-missionary/
ex-AFO
* P = Pangu, NP -  Ehtional party, I  = Independent
K e b a i ,  w i th  966 e l i g i b l e  v o t e r s ,  was th e  t h i r d  l a r g e s t  t r i b e ;  Duma and 
Kamara, t h e  l a r g e r  g r o u p s ,  had fo u r  and e i g h t  c a n d i d a t e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Kau and Ei p lu s  th e  t h r e e  Gomia g r o u p s ,  p e o p le  b e l i e v e d ,  were too  sm a l l  
to  e l e c t  a w inner  w i th o u t  s u b s t a n t i a l  c r o s s - t r i b a l  v o t i n g .  But Kayapo, 
th e  Kebai c a n d i d a t e ,  was c o n s id e r e d  a giam en  c a n d id a t e  and was 
th o u g h t  to  have  l i t t l e  Kebai s u p p o r t .  B ecause  o f  th e  Kebai f i g h t ,  
h ow ever ,  most c a n d id a t e s  were u n w i l l i n g  to  v e n tu r e  i n t o  t h i s  a r e a .  
Though b o th  M a r t in  and Kopon a t t e n d e d  p eace  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  n e i t h e r  man 
made s p e c i a l  t r i p s  to  i n d i v i d u a l  Kebai c l a n s .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  s e v e r a l  
Kamara c a n d i d a t e s ,  whose t r i b e  s h a re d  a b o r d e r  w i th  K e b a i ,  cam paigned 
e x t e n s i v e l y  t h e r e .  The Deputy P r e m ie r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  to o k  a v e ry  p r o -  
Kebai s t a n c e ,  a c t u a l l y  e n co u rag ed  th e  f i g h t ,  and p rom ised  t h a t  a l l  
Chuave c l a n s  would c o n t r i b u t e  to  d e a th  c o m p e n sa t io n  pay m en ts .  Baundo, 
a n o th e r  Kamara c a n d id a t e  and a l s o  an SDA p a s t o r ,  used ab o u t  K600 o f  
th e  K1265 he e v e n t u a l l y  s p e n t  on th e  cam paign  to  buy c a r t o n s  o f  t in n e d
O
meat and bags o f  r i c e ,  which he d i s t r i b u t e d  to  Kebai p e o p le .  Only 
a f t e r  th e  p o l l i n g  had begun d id  t h i s  t a c t i c  become known to  Duma 
c a n d id a t e s  who v eh em en tly  condemned i t  a s  b r i b e r y .  Baundo, how ever ,  
d e n ie d  t h i s  c la im  a rg u in g  t h a t  i t  was s im p ly  C h r i s t i a n  c h a r i t y  to
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t h o s e  Kebai who had had t h e i r  g a rd e n s  and c o f f e e  t r e e s  d e s t r o y e d .
The b e l i e f  t h a t  c r o s s - t r i b a l  v o t i n g  would be an i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  
o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n s  was,  as  I  show be low ,  a somewhat u n w a r ra n t e d  though 
u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  phenomenon. S e v e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  c a r r i e d  l i s t s  o f  men’ s 
house  g r o u p s  o r  c l a n s  who had promised  t h e i r  s u p p o r t .  These 
c o m p i l a t i o n s  o n l y  s e r v e d  to  f u e l  u n r e a l i s t i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  v i c t o r y :  
t h e  d e f e r e n c e  l e s s e r  men m a i n t a i n  t o  l e a d e r s  makes i t  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  
c a n d i d a t e s  t o  a s s e s s  a c c u r a t e l y  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  t h e i r  s u p p o r t .  On 
s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s ,  I  w i t n e s s e d  m en ' s  house  g ro u p s  a s s u r e  c a n d i d a t e s  o f  
t h e i r  t o t a l  s u p p o r t ,  o r  more commonly, s t a t e  t h a t  t h e y  would s e r i o u s l y  
c o n s i d e r  v o t i n g  f o r  them, o n l y  to  r e p e a t  t h e s e  p l e d g e s  to  a d i f f e r e n t  
c a n d i d a t e  s e v e r a l  days  l a t e r .  Save f o r  t h o s e  g r oups  who had t h e i r  own 
a g n a t e  a s  c a n d i d a t e ,  i t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  men to  deny t h e i r  
s u p p o r t  to  a b i g  man, a t em p o ra ry  g u e s t ,  w i t h o u t  r i s k i n g  o u t r i g h t  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  which  c o u ld  j e o p a r d i z e  i n t e r - g r o u p  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
In  a d d i t i o n ,  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e s s  now s t r e s s  t h e  
’ f r e e ’ v o t e ,  which  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  t r a n s c e n d s  t h e  p a r o c h i a l  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  c l a n s  o r  c o m m u n i t i e s .  The e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  words ,  spoken 
by M a r t in  t o  p e o p le  a t t e n d i n g  a Duma m a r k e t ,  was r e p e a t e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
form by o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c am pa ign .
L i s t e n ,  t h e  law does  not  f o l l o w  f a m i l y ,  b r o t h e r  o r  
s i s t e r .  The law and government  a r e  our  g u a r d i a n :  t h e y
have  o n l y  one f a c e .  A l l  r i g h t ,  you must  t h i n k  w e l l ,  
t h i n k  a b o u t  me and a bou t  Kamara and Gomia c a n d i d a t e s ,  
t o o .  T h i s  e l e c t i o n  i s  no t  a b o u t  c u t t i n g  p i g :  you a r e
n o t  to  t h i n k  abou t  b lood  and f a m i l y .  I f  you want  to  
v o t e  f o r  a [Ei jGun man, v o t e  f o r  h im.  Whatever  k ind  
o f  s t o r y  o r  campaign  he has  made, you must j udge  i t .
Who w i l l  b r i n g  t h e  work to  Duma? Think w e l l .  I f  you 
t h i n k  my campa ign i s  good ,  i f  my t a l k  i s  t r u e ,  t h e n  
g i v e  your  f u l l  v o t e  to  me. I f  you t h i n k  T a b i a ' s  o r  
K u r i ' s  i s  good ,  t h e n  you can  v o t e  f o r  him.  That  i s  
a l l  r i g h t .
There  a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  c o n f l i c t i n g  m essages  i n  t h i s  s p e e c h .  The p h r a s e ,  
'who w i l l  b r i n g  t h e  work to  Duma' ,  r e c o g n i z e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n ly  a Duma 
c a n d i d a t e  w i l l  be c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  t r i b e ' s  d e v e lo p m e n t .  L ike w ise  
M a r t i n ' s  m e n t io n  o f  two c a n d i d a t e s  whom he b e l i e v e d  had l i t t l e  chance  
o f  w i n n i n g ,  o r  more i m p o r t a n t ,  h i s  f a i l u r e  to  m en t io n  o t h e r  Duma r i v a l s  
and h i s  r e f e r e n c e  to  a ' f u l l '  v o t e ,  i n fo r m s  t h e  l i s t e n e r s  t h a t  a b l o c k
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vote for a single Duma candidate - in this case Martin - would ensure 
victory. Nonetheless, he affirms the principle of conscience or 
cross-tribal voting.
Candidates and voters alike place great emphasis on speeches. 
Without oratorical skill, a leader cannot influence the Assembly and 
bring development to his electorate. Moreover, campaign rhetoric 
necessarily concerns itself with divergent beliefs that, I have argued, 
shape people’s impressions of particular leaders and government itself. 
It would not be appropriate here to reproduce speeches in full: they
sometimes lasted a half hour or more without interruption. The 
following excerpts, however, sufficiently illustrate a number of 
recurring themes.
The first is from a speech given at Chuave market by a young, 
educated and Independent candidate. The use of English words, 
italicized in the text, is characteristic of the educated speaker.
I look at this provincial government of ours and I see 
it is not right. Inside Chuave, we do not have one 
man who works for the government - not one! I alone 
worked for the government for nine months; I worked to 
start this cement factory. They allocated K100,000 
for this factory - K70,000 they took and put in Kup 
[another electorate]; K30,000 they lost!
This was the reason I became angry and wanted to fight 
the Premier and Launa. I was angry with the Secretary 
- this Barunke Kaman. I argued with him right here.
And because of this they wanted to get rid of me. I 
was in the industrial section and anything they wanted 
to hide I took and put in an open place. They all knew 
this, and said, ’Oh fucking Rocky - we are sacking you!’ 
They did not give me two weeks early noticel
I can truthfully tell you - you cannot take money 
allocated for one project and put it to another 
project. You can’t! All right, I saw this and they 
fired me and I was angry and now I want to stand up for 
this election ....
Now I'm telling you, Siwi's government and Launa's 
government stinks. They just think of filling up their 
own pockets. They think about buying cars. They are 
still buying them. They think they are small Gods.
I alone know; there is not one man who can go there 
[Kundiawa], and talk to the cabinet as I can. I have 
played politics for seven solid years. Now if you 
elect me - if you give your vote to me I can dissolve
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your worries. I want to work a clean campaign. A 
man who gives you beer or money, he will steal 
government money. I want to be your representative 
and to carry your worries. Give your vote to Rocky, 
give your vote to Rocky only!
This pointed - often vehement - attack, which did not attempt to 
hide the candidate's personal desire for revenge against an unjust 
government, contrasts well with an older candidate's speech which 
contains a critique of younger men and only vague allusions to the 
nature of government. The speaker is Tabia, the Ei councillor.
Our wantok [the anthropologist] another skin is 
here. He knows - he is a child. His father or grand­
father, their generation alone controls his 
government. All the young men stay outside because 
they do not know people's concerns. The government 
makes laws, and people hold them strongly. If a man 
breaks the law, there is a big jail, and they are 
punished and pay large fines so that all men are 
afraid.
But our government turns and turns. It does not hold 
the people strongly, and development and government 
work do not go right. Listen. The district 
[provincial] government reports to the national 
government, the true government. Like Elimbari 
Mountain and this small Mainamo Mountain. Elimbari is 
the national government; it makes the law which falls 
down to Mainamo and from there it is thrown to all 
the places. Now Mainamo must talk strongly to the big 
government so that people everywhere can live 
well....
I feel ... when I was coming here I thought, 'Why 
doesn't the government give power to the police?' The 
police have no power. Before the Europeans were here 
and we were afraid; the luluais were here and we 
shook. Now look - if a fight like the one in Kebai 
comes up, the police just stand around and watch it. 
They don't jail and court men. Why? Because the 
district government is weak, and has not put power 
into their hands.
The third example is from a speech delivered to Duma men by 
Komboi, an ex-constable from Kamara. He first considers the issue of 
Chuave development before turning to an explicit attack on younger 
candidates. Listeners described this speech, unlike the previous two, 
as both 'sweet' and 'true'.
I was a police officer in Kerowagi. I know how the 
government works in Kerowagi. I asked where they got
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the money for all their work, and they told me they 
got it from bank loans. Chuave roads, like the Ei 
road, such roads are highways in Kerowagi. Why?
Because the Premier has helped them. When Siwi stands 
up in the Assembly and passes a motion, everyone votes 
for it. In Kerowagi tradestores and taverns are built 
close together - it is a town. But our members are 
slow and lazy. I wondered why Chuave was not like 
Kerowagi, and so I thought about helping you, and I 
resigned [my job] to stand in this election. Chuave 
is an ancestor place; we still follow the old ways.
It is like that and now I want to help you and change 
Chuave. You will say I am not a councillor - that I 
have never been a councillor or made work at my place. 
But even though I haven’t been a councillor, I know 
how to make this government work. I am thinking of 
strong government. I want to help you. I do not 
smoke or drink beer. All I want is a strong man for 
government. Now after this election, if I go to 
Kundiawa and do not drink beer, and I work hard for 
you and bring development, people will know I have 
told them the truth and they will vote for me again.
Wayne is here and in his country little children go to 
school and they get work. But it is not that way 
here. Our government is not concerned with schools.
It is true that students are at school, but when they 
leave, they only think of standing and playing 
politics and being a 'big head'. If you vote for a 
young man, he will forget about you. But if you vote 
for an older man, he will remember you. Young men 
think only of themselves. Clerks will write the law. 
All our talk comes into our heads, and is good and the 
work is good and the clerks will write it down.
Little children [young candidates] - their heads are 
not strong; their thoughts are not clear. We have 
knowledge the youths do not have. When the white 
man's government was here and kiaps and luluais 
were here, we met them and saluted them. Old strong 
men are like the luluai. You must vote for us.
They would never give the luluai's work to a child!
Now the Papua New Guinea government is here, and young 
men think they know a lot of English. They stand up 
and they have work, but they drink and look for 
prostitutes. Our members are just as bad - they are 
like women. We have given our work to a coward.
Think well, vote for a strong man. If he is selfish 
do not vote for him. If he will work hard and think 
of the people, give your vote to him.
In speeches, older candidates used the image of the luluai or 
kiap and the white man's government; my own presence, of course, 
enhanced the use of the image on many occasions. Komboi also painted a 
picture of young candidates as immoral and irresponsible. In contrast, 
the next speech by Wauri, a young candidate, while stressing government
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corruption, also contains statements that are anti-colonial and 
critical of those who idealize the expatriates' advisory role in 
current governments.
Look, our provincial government is one-sided; they 
talk and everything goes to one side, nothing comes to 
Chuave. I am telling you I can carry your burden.
I can fight hard and be your representative.
I think law and order have to come to this province - 
but who is thinking of law and order? We need police 
who live close to the people, so they can live 
peacefully. If we have peace, businesses will go 
ahead. If the law is not strong, business breaks 
down ....
Now is the time of change! Plenty of educated men are 
here; they are the leaders of tomorrow! You have to 
think what future government will be like in six or 
ten years time. Lots of men come and bullshit here 
- but I can tell you when they go to Kundiawa, all 
they say is, 'Yes master, yes master.' I do not like 
this kind of behaviour! I like to fight hard for 
everyone. I can tell you all the things we eat: rice
they make in Japan, fish they make in Australia, 
cooking grease they make in Australia. All of our 
money flows out of our country. If I win this 
election, I can tell you I will close the road by 
which our money leaves the country.
I am telling you there are 21 candidates in Chuave, 
and if there are too many cooks, the soup will not be 
good. Many men are just liars; they want to 'eat' 
your money and they give beer and money to men. I can 
tell you the truth - I have not given beer to any man. 
I am telling you there is plenty of corruption 
government today. Men will take your vote, turn 
their backs on you, and 'eat' the government's money. 
Now I am standing to fight hard for all the people. 
Think hard and vote!
Later, when addressing a Four Square audience, Wauri tailored his 
rhetoric and spoke to Christian issues.
I am not criticizing any candidates. God can choose 
from all these leaders. God talks in Romans 13: 1.
God put government on earth, and government is here to 
strengthen the behaviour of all good men. And God 
alone chooses leaders. A white man has come here to 
live with you at Keu, and he knows the news. Some 
countries in the world - like the Philippines - some 
countries are no good. Women and children - they all 
suffer. The reason is that government is not good.
It is communist and people suffer.
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In Papua New Guinea, we have good government. If I 
lived in a communist country, I could not come here to 
talk to you today. You must understand this - we must 
have a man who is on our side, who is the ’mouth' of 
all Christians. If we are not in government we cannot 
talk. Can you speak in the Assembly? If you want to 
build a church, and you want K7,000, you have to go to 
the council, the clerk, the Provincial Project 
Officer, and fill out application forms. Someone must 
be inside to support this and get you the money.
In the same way, one Christian man must support the 
work of God. So you must support a man who is a 
Christian - to stand up on the side of God. A 
'hidden' man or giaman Christian [a non-Christian or 
non-fundamentalist] supports Satan's work. If you 
vote for a man who is on Satan's side and he goes and 
drinks a bottle of beer, you have helped this man and 
you have to answer before God. That is true. You 
alone know, and God, our Father, knows. Pray to God 
and He can help you think. He will say, 'Give your 
vote to this man or that man', and you must give it - 
he is the right man.
Wauri's speech is a straightforward example of fundamentalist 
rhetoric. The references to 'communist' countries, to 'Satan's 
side', and in his first speech, the mention of 'future government' are 
revelatory - all are closely associated with visions of the Second 
Coming. These allusions are also anti-Lutheran; fundamentalists 
believed that Lutherans were pro-communist, and that songons were 
agents of the anti-Christ who will lead Papua New Guinea's first 
communist government. References to the Second Coming were more 
explicit in the speeches of other fundamentalist candidates, 
occasionally including claims of visionary skills or a direct line to 
God's words, as well as the threat, implied in Wauri's speech, that 
a vote for a Lutheran or an SDA candidate could bring eternal 
damnation.
Within Duma, Kopon and Dama rarely made public speeches; instead, 
they spoke to small groups of men, often playing the role of the 
concerned listener who would faithfully communicate people's ideas to 
the Assembly. Martin and Michael both made speeches at markets and 
other large gatherings. Their preferred method of campaigning, 
however, was to tour various men's house groups in the evenings, often 
with the aid of 'spears' or 'hidden spears', that is, men who were key 
supporters. Martin always travelled with a Kaupagam man who introduced 
him after stressing the free vote. The implication, of course, was
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that Kaupagara men were willing to support Martin, rather than their 
own agnate. Both men approached members of men's houses to ask them 
to act as 'hidden spears'. These supporters feign disinterest or 
disclaim support for the candidate, only to reverse themselves and 
argue forcefully that they have been converted by the candidate's 
rhetoric, usually after the candidate has left the men's house. The 
effectiveness of this tactic is questionable. Nonetheless, it was a part 
of other candidates' repertoire of 'tricks', and aptly illustrates 
candidates' pragmatic approach to soliciting support.
As the final two examples show, Martin and Michael were as much 
concerned with attacking their rivals as with speaking to an idealized 
version of the government leader. The first excerpt is from a speech 
Michael delivered to a Marime men's house.
It is true we are having an election for our 
government. Here, at our place we say - you and I 
talk and say - 'Oh, there is our first man, our big 
man. We have to give work to him, and he will bring 
development to our place.' We say that; we give him 
work and we see nothing.
Now if I win, I cannot quickly come and give you 
something - an aidpost or something. These things are 
not in an open place where you simply grab them! In 
this kind of [Assembly] work, everyone votes. If they 
support me - all right, I can bring things to your 
place. It is not good if I lie to you - in English, 
promise you something, ah? You alone will decide 
and vote - all of you. You alone have business, and 
if you find your money is not sufficient, you go and 
ask the government for 'half' money. Then your 
business will grow and be good. Forget wantoks - 
you cannot come to me and expect me to give you 
something quickly ....
The government sends a great deal of money to Kundiawa 
- some goes to Guraine, some comes to Chuave. That is 
how it should work, just like cutting pig, ah? Put it 
everywhere. But now the money just goes to one place 
[Kuman side].
Before you gave work to men, and they worked slowly.
Okay, now give the work to another man so it will run 
smoothly. Give your vote to one man. Before we gave 
our votes to councillors, and we have seen their work.
Now magistrates have come, and we know of their work 
too. Now if you stand up and make one kind of work 
and then want to make another kind - that is not good.
A man who is outside [the government] has space to 
hold this work well. That is excellent. Men who have
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work already - that behaviour is rubbish.
In his speeches, Michael always avoided the extensive use of 
English, so as not to acquire a reputation as a 'big head' or braggard 
among older men. Instead, he relied on his supporters to mention his 
English-speaking ability and literacy. But also, he did not correct 
errors that enhanced his reputation; when he realized that many older 
men thought he was a DOIC - and not simply a clerk - he sometimes spoke 
of his 'patrols' to eastern highlands areas, while carefully avoiding 
use of the word kiap or DOIC, which might have led others to accuse 
him of lying. Similarly, the attack on Martin's and Kopon's big man or 
'first man' status, like his comments against leaders who 'double 
work', are both overt in his speech. However, he never mentions names, 
and thus avoids any accusation of defamation.
Martin travelled to this same Marime men's house two days later 
and, in his talk, criticized Michael. In contrast to Martin's 
previously cited words, he now appeals to Duma solidarity.
The election is close now. You women who make Kafaina 
at your houses - you can talk about the election too. 
If you want to vote for me or someone else, you must 
think well. This Kafaina work - when it is finished 
or you do not have quite enough money for business, 
you can come to the government and we can help 
you ....
If a man wants to build a tradestore or church, the 
government can help him. Before, I was a councillor, 
and the council ran well. But I lost [this position], 
and now live simply. Now the elections are here and I 
am standing up. The council has not brought much to 
us - only the school and aidpost. Now this new 
government is beginning, and it will have all the 
power so we candidates are coming to talk to you. I 
am going into this government, and I will not 'eat' 
money or give it to Koraodururao. Whoever comes to me 
in the Assembly and asks about business, I will help 
you. Now think seriously about me.
A man who knows English or how to read and write - he 
is simply thinking of his own pocket. He is thinking 
about buying a car or about his affine's store.
Think! Everyone should have enough wealth to live 
well.
If government goes to another place, you will get 
nothing. Kamara, Ei - all these men are standing up. 
In Duma there are four men. If you vote for me or 
Kopon, give him all your votes and he will win. The 
power is with you people now. If the vote breaks,
- 260-
neither of us will win, and Che government will belong 
to another place.
Here Martin criticizes Michael, who helped finance his brother-in- 
law's tradestore operation, as self-interested. This, according to 
Martin, is a natural by-product of his education. Again, he left much 
unstated because everyone knows the facts of Simbu life: educated men
control the paper work, and often steal government funds. That Martin 
also promised to work the wantok system to people's benefit counter­
balances his claim that his clan will not be the recipient of government 
money. The appeal to Kafaina women who were present in the men's house 
is exceptional - Martin was the only Duma candidate and only one of 
three men in Chuave to ask Kafaina groups for support. Most candidates 
assumed, quite rightly, that women would vote as their husbands or 
agnates dictated.
The recurring themes of these speeches - the need for law and 
order, the promise of development, the need to select a responsible, 
moral candidate - are reiterated verbatim or elaborated on in informal 
conversations among voters. Dire warnings that a Christian will become 
'hungry for power' and will turn away from God after being elected 
conflict with the suggestion that only a church leader should be 
elected. Some claim that the law or the Bible forbids people to vote 
for a bisnis man; others argue that only entrepreneurs can manage 
government money. Old men argue for the importance of 'paper' and 
education, only to be told by educated teenagers that they should vote 
for an established big man. In short, confusion abounds, and people 
claim that the campaign talk has made them 'insane'.
Because of the emphasis on the principle of conscience voting, 
there is little doubt that some candidates win or lose votes by their 
words, as well as by their actions. Certainly, the power and style 
of oration, if not its substance, has an impact on voters. But because 
people belong to different political units, the need to support an 
agnate or co-member in a larger polity precludes conscience voting for 
many. The following examination of voting patterns clearly reveals 
the importance of group membership.
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The voting
Polling began in Karaara on 31 May 1981, and ended in Duma three 
weeks later. The Sirabu Electoral Law permits campaigning during 
polling, and prohibits only the canvassing of votes near polling 
stations. But candidates took the opening of voting as the end of the 
true campaign; formal speechmaking and the canvassing of votes both 
ceased. The only exceptions were three Chuave candidates who used 
coffee buying to campaign during the polling. A week prior to the 
polling, Martin obtained a Kundiawa factory vehicle and purchased 
coffee at high prices in Duma, Ei and Gomia tribes. Despite his 
attempts to recoup deficits in other areas, Martin often showed a net 
loss of factory funds during stocktakings, and after repaying losses 
from his salary was fired shortly before the end of polling. In all 
three instances, candidates used coffee buying to make their names 
known outside their own tribe, and to establish reputations as generous 
men - that is, to try to buy votes, yet avoid public criticism.
Electoral officials conducted the polling in an orderly fashion, 
albeit with minor violations of the Electoral Law. Polling stations 
often closed before the required time of 6 p.m., after big men told 
officials - all from other electorates - that no other voters from the 
community would arrive. Also, polling officials accepted food gifts 
from candidates, though they were under strict orders not to do so. 
Underage voters, often as young as 12 years old, and recently married 
women from other electorates frequently cast ballots. Candidates or 
their scrutineers did not question these infractions: all, however,
would be cited later as reasons for contesting the election results.
Candidates’ scrutineers were less concerned with these infractions 
than with appearing at polling stations to mention their candidates’ 
names as people prepared to vote. Candidates themselves disappear for 
several days prior to their group’s vote. In Duma all candidates 
avoided m e n ’s houses or slept in their pig houses for several days 
before the Duma vote, so as not to be accused of campaigning at a time 
when people are making their final choices. Likewise, candidates 
eschew polling stations. After casting their ballots, candidates 
quickly left; a few even failed to appear. Because some feel ’shame’ 
at the thought of supporting themselves, they cast their vote for a
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rival .
Voter turn-out was high in all tribes except Kebai where less than 
40 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots. Three separate battles 
raged on Kebai polling days, and many Kebai were hesitant to leave 
their villages unattended, or were otherwise too preoccupied to 
consider voting. Overall, the turn-out of eligible voters was 77 per 
cent.
Leeanne Greenwood and I accompanied the election patrol, and
electoral officials and voters allowed us to record, by clan, people’s
9choice of candidate. As the voting order followed an electoral 
roll, it was also possible with the aid of big men, to list voters 
according to subclan affiliation and, within Duma, to men's house 
residence. The final, official results are show in Table 15. These 
disguise the enormous variation in voting patterns produced by 
different contests involving candidates from separate clans or 
communities. Here, I outline only a few general trends and detail a 
few specific examples of candidates' support groups.
Differences in male/female voting, although sometimes noticeable, 
in no way affected the election outcome or the fate of individual 
candidates. Candidates who appealed to Kafaina groups faired no better 
among female voters than other candidates. Ogan Kom, who placed last 
overall, received only the partial support of her own clan. It was not 
possible to distinguish between women who were natal members of a clan 
and those who were married into it. Of 903 married women for whom I 
have accurate data, 214 (23.69 per cent) did not vote for the same 
candidates as their husbands. However, this does not mean that women 
are likely to vote for a member of their natal, rather than their 
husbands', clan. As often as not, differences between spouses involved 
a choice between candidates belonging to the same tribe or clan. A 
woman's primary allegiance is to her natal clan or, if married, to her 
husband's group. In fact, in those clans having their own candidates, 
women consistently showed a greater reluctance to vote for a candidate 
belonging to another group than did men.
At the tribal level this pattern was repeated. For example, 
55 of 557 (9.8 per cent) of Duma women, as opposed to 99 of 641 men
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(15.4 per cent), cast ballots for non-Duma candidates. Even in the 
single exception, Goraia Kibi, only slightly more women than men (45.5 
per cent as against 43.4 per cent) cast their ballots for non-Kibi 
candidates.
Table 15: Candidates’ final official standing
Candidate Tribe Clan Official Total
Baundo Kamara Kanui 584
Michael Duma Komodurumo 483
Tabia Ei(gun) Duangauwora 446
Kern Kau Maniku 411
Wauri Gomia Two Arokama 369
Kuri Gomia One Gomia Meri 365
Martin Duma Komodurumo 305
Launa Kamara Ibugwagu 285
Rocky Gomia Three Mairaagu 231
Kiwai Kamara Puigi 198
Kai Kamara Kaingunua 157
Kopon Duma Kaupagam 147
Wai Gomia Two Subamo 143
Eri Kamara Arungam 136
Dama Duma Kaupagam 119
Kayepo Kebai Kebaikama 110
Togara Gomia Two Subamo 107
Levi Kamara Kanui 106
Unagi Ei(gun) Duangauwom 97
Komboi Kamara Ibugwagu 32
Ogan Kamara Arungam 18
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Table 16 lists votes cast by people for a candidate of their own 
tribe versus those given to other tribes. Overall 800 votes or 16.48 
per cent of the total votes cast, flowed out to candidates from other 
tribal groups. Four tribes - Kamara, Gomia Two, Ei and Kau - showed 
a net gain in votes; there were more votes coming in for these tribes' 
candidates than were going out. The other four tribes showed a net 
loss. In Duma, 154 votes went to non-Duma candidates. The degree of 
tribal solidarity shown in voting was unrelated to a tribe's numerical 
strength or the number of candidates per tribe. Thus, two of the three 
tribes that had only one candidate showed the greatest willingness to 
vote for candidates in other groups. Only Kem, who polled 365 of Kau 
tribe's votes, had his chances of victory ruined, not by the splitting 
of votes by other candidates, but by the relatively small size of his 
tribe.
It is at this level that individual campaigns and the importance 
of the 'free' vote is most obvious. Candidates realize, of course, 
that tribal borders effectively divide the election into eight separate 
contests. But they also stress that vote fragmentation results in a 
narrow margin of victory and that, consequently, cross-tribal votes are 
critical to a candidate's success. Baundo, the winner, polled 584 
votes - a mere 12 per cent of the total. His exceptional success 
outside Kamara, where he polled 236 votes, was the difference between a 
first and fifth place standing. His non-Kamara support came from the 
six Kebai clans, where he polled 209 of 298 votes given to outsiders, 
and from four Gomia clans bordering on Kamara territory. His victory, 
therefore, is attributable as much to the weakness of the Kebai 
candidate, who polled only 26 per cent of his tribe's votes, as it is 
to Baundo's own campaign and personality. He had no direct ties to 
Kebai groups through his mother, sisters or wife. Kebai supporters 
stressed both his largess during the current war and the fact that, 
as an SDA pastor, Baundo was a 'good' and Christian man.
Three other candidates polled exceptionally well outside their 
own tribe: Wauri received 148 votes (40 per cent of his total); Tabia
92 (20 per cent of his total); and Launa 82 votes (29 per cent of his 
total). Wauri's votes came from 17 different clans, 14 of which had 
some Four Square members. Although it was often impossible to estimate 
voters' ages accurately, Wauri's external support was clearly comprised
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Table 16: Tribal voting
a) Distribution of votes
votes received
source of votes
Gomia 2
Gomia
385
2 Ei 
1
Kau Kamara Duma 
0 21 96
Gomia
3
1 Gomia 3 
50
Kebai
16
Total
572
Ei 0 422 0 2 16 69 0 25 534
Kau 0 0 365 9 0 0 38 0 412
Kamara 2 3 11 1228 17 35 45 241 1582
Duma 1 1 0 1 1044 13 0 0 1060
Gomia 1 1 0 0 2 22 326 4 10 365
Gomia 3 0 0 0 4 3 34 176 1 218
Kebai 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 106 109
Total 389 427 376 1270 1198 480 313 399 4852
b) Summary of tribal support
Tribe No. of 
candidates
Votes for own 
candidates
Votes for other 
candidates
Total votes
No. per cent No. per cent No. per cent
Gomia 2 3 385 98.57 4 1.02 389 99.99
Ei 2 422 98.82 5 1.17 42 7 99.99
Kau 1 365 97.07 11 2.92 376 99.99
Kamara 8 1228 96.69 42 3.30 1270 99.99
Duma 4 1044 87.14 154 12.85 1198 99.99
Gomia 1 1 32 6 67.91 154 32.08 480 99.99
Gomia 3 1 176 56.23 137 43.76 313 99.99
Kebai 1 106 26.56 293 73.43 399 99.99
* The numbers in these tables are different from official totals
because, first, I exclude votes by station workers whose home areas 
are outside Chuave and, second, I include votes that were later 
rejected in the official count.
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of young, sometimes teenage, voters who were fundamentalist Christians. 
In contrast, Launa's external support - from 13 non-Kamara clans - came 
from all generations. Those supporters of the Deputy Premier I later 
questioned often mentioned that Launa would become premier if elected, 
or they characterized him as Chuave’s true big man, comparing him to 
Yowie of Siane. Over one-third of Launa’s 82 votes, however, came from 
two Gomia clans where he had classificatory kinship relations, and had 
contributed to past ceremonies. Unlike either Launa or Wauri, most 
of Tabia’s external support derived from a single clan and community, 
Gomia Gawa, located near Ei(gun) on a tertiary road. Here Tabia polled 
68 of his 92 votes; in comparison, the Gomia candidate, Kuri, received 
53 Gawa votes. Duma and Ei candidates had campaigned intensely in this 
clan, and Tabia’s success is not easily explained. Tabia's rival, in 
Ei tribe, who won no Gawa votes, was an SDA pastor, so Tabia's religion 
could have had little influence on these voters. Gawa voters stressed 
only the Kuri had 'turned his back' on their clan, and that Tabia's 
speeches had been well-received.
On average candidates received 78.7 per cent of their own clan's 
votes. In seven instances where a single candidate per clan stood, 
candidates received between 50 and 99 per cent of their agnates' votes. 
The remaining candidates each faced an agnatic rival, thereby 
splitting the clan's votes. Baundo fared the best against intra-clan 
competition, polling 70.17 per cent to his rival's 24.56 per cent.
The poorest showing by a single candidate and by rivals combined was 
in the Kamara clan, Arungam, where Ogan polled only 13 per cent of her 
clan's votes, and her rival an additional 55 per cent. With the 
exception of Kaupagam (see below), only two instances - in Baundo's 
and Tabia's clans - occurred where rivals belonged to different 
subclans. The results of these two contests were very different: 
Baundo lost only 10 per cent of his subclan's votes, but won 50 per 
cent of his rival's. In Tabia's case, both his own and his opponent's 
subclans showed great solidarity, with less than 7 per cent of 
subclansmen selecting a candidate from the opposite door.
Candidates' maternal or affinal ties to other clans, though less 
important than agnatic support, also influenced voting. In six clans 
where voters had to choose between their own agnate and a candidate 
related through marriage, they overwhelmingly supported their own
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clansmen. Usually, only a man's mother's or wife's brother ignored 
their own agnate in these cases. The sole exception to this was the 
Kamara clan, Ibugwagu, where 21.3 per cent of voters ignored their 
agnatic candidate and instead cast ballots for two candidates who had 
maternal or affinal ties to Ibugwagu women.
Far more common, however, were situations where there was no rival 
in a candidate's mother's or wife's natal clan. In 16 such cases, 
candidates received an average of 37 per cent of these clans' votes 
- ranging from 92 per cent in a case where the candidate was also 
resident in his wife's clan to two candidates who failed to poll a 
single vote in their wives' or mothers' groups. Perhaps Baundo's 
candidacy best illustrates the relative strength of agnatic versus 
maternal or affinal ties. In Kamara Baundo polled 75 per cent of 
Kuman, his wife's clan, which lacked its own candidate and belonged 
to Baundo's community. But in Arungam - his mother's natal group, 
which had two of its members contesting the election and which belonged 
to a community several kilometres from his village - Baundo failed to 
win a single vote.
Baundo's overall support - 160 votes from his own clan, 183 from 
other Kamara clans and 236 from non-Kamara groups - epitomized the 
Chuave ideal of a man who, faced with competition from rivals within 
and beyond his clan, managed to win the free vote necessary for 
victory. Prior to balloting, voters considered Baundo an unlikely if 
not impossible winner. In Duma he was virtually unknown; he neither 
campaigned nor had kin relations within the tribe. Certainly, no 
Kamara had thought Baundo could 'steal' over 100 votes from his tribal 
rivals. Such unpredictable results only affirm men's beliefs that 
elections are free-wheeling affairs: 'card games' where luck is a
critical factor and where campaign talk or manoeuvring increases a 
candidate's odds or 'tricks' people (trikim man), thereby allowing 
him to obtain the margin needed for victory.^
Kinship ties or residence were less important in Duma where 
voters had to choose between Keu candidates. Table 17 lists voting 
for Kaupagam and Komodururao, and Table 18 the Duma-wide vote. Kopon 
won 60.6 per cent o£ Kaupagam's votes, polling the vast majority of 
Korowa - his own and Dama's men's house - as well as almost half of
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Table 17: Kaupagam and Koraodurumo voting
Men’s house 
a) Kaupagam
Kopon Dam a
Candidate
Michael Martin Non-Duma
candidates
Total
Mamgram 37 21 0 10 9 77
Aragor 8 21 0 0 2 31
Korowa 70 9 0 2 7 88
Various* 10 0 0 0 0 10
Total 125 51 0 12 18 206
b) Komodurumo 
Keukobu 0
Onama 0
Various 0
Total 0
0
0
0
0
25
45
2
72
69
19
1
89
2
0
0
2
96
64
3
163
* This category includes young voters who usually slept in two or more
men’s houses.
Table 18: Duma voting
Clan Candidate^
Kopon Dama Michael Martin Non-Duma Total
candidates
Kaupagam 125 51 0 12 18 206
Koraodurumo 0 0 72 89 2 163
Tabiagam 14 28 9 12 13 76
Koraogam 2 7 123 27 16 175
Marime 3 20 102 7 37 169
Koi 0 0 52 . 3 3 58
Supagam 0 2 100 10 6 118
Suagu 0 2 1 56 19 78
Gorugu 3 0 26 86 40 155
Total 147 110 485 302 154 1198
// From non-Duma tribes, Michael received 2 votes, Martin 3 votes,
Ko pon 1 vote, and Dama 10 votes.
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Mamgram's votes. Kopon's small subclan solidly supported him; he lost 
only two men's votes. Dama won only 45 per cent of his own subclan's 
votes. Dama won 17 per cent and Kopon 70 per cent of Dege's subclan's 
votes. Dama's best showing came in Aragor men's house where he, unlike 
Kopon, played a minor role as a ceremonial leader. Martin's hopes of 
attracting a large percentage of Mamgram's votes were clearly 
unwarranted; despite his occasional influence in Mamgram affairs, most 
people preferred to align themselves with their agnates.
Several people who were directly related to non-Duma candidates 
voted for them rather than for their clansmen. Some old men voted 
for candidates who were former luluais, irrespective of tribal 
affiliation. And a number of Four Square members gave votes to Wauri.
Komodurumo voters were forced to choose between lineage brothers. 
Martin outpolled Michael by a margin of 62 to 37 votes in their own 
subclan; in the candidates' opposite door these positions were 
reversed, with Michael receiving 35 and Martin 27 votes. To a great 
extent, these differences are attributable to men's house residence: 
the majority of the candidates' own subclan resided at Keukobu, while 
most members of their opposite door, a slightly smaller group, lived 
at Onama. As Table 17 shows, residence clearly affected intra-clan 
support. Thus, although Martin polled 71 per cent of his subclan's 
votes at Keukobu, he received only 33 per cent of his subclan's votes 
at Onama. Martin's success among Keukobu people is purely a reflection 
of his prominence in this group's everyday and ceremonial affairs.
The willingness of Onama voters (and a significant portion of Keukobu 
voters) to abandon their big man, however, foreshadowed the support 
Michael would receive throughout Duma.
In all other Duma clans, Michael polled 49.8 per cent, Martin 24.2 
per cent, Dama 7.1 per cent, and Kopon 2.7 per cent of votes. Voting 
varied considerably in different clans and communities. Martin 
outpolled Michael in Suagu - his sister's clan - and Gorugu. In both 
these clans, located furthest from Keu, Martin alone among the 
candidates had campaigned extensively. He also received the aid of 
these clans' principal big men - both village court magistrates - who 
publicly supported Martin in men's house discussions. Gorugu, Wauri's 
wife's natal group, also had a large number of Four Square adherents
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and here, Wauri polled 29 of 55 votes given to outsiders.
Marime was one of the most interesting contests because all Duma 
candidates could claim direct kin ties through their wives, mothers, 
or sisters. Nonetheless, only Michael polled well; in fact, all his 
Duma rivals combined received fewer votes than non-Duma candidates.
Here again, Wauri polled well among young voters receiving 20 votes; 
Tabia of Ei and the two incumbents split the remaining votes given 
to non-Duma candidates. Both Martin's and Kopon’s attempts to use 
women to establish ties in Komogam and Subagara had little effect on the 
voting. Kopon failed to win a single vote in Subagam. Martin 
succeeded in reducing Michael's Komogam support by a mere 27 votes, 
but these came from both Komogam men's houses, and are as easily 
attributable to Martin's reputation as a magistrate in Keu as they are 
to creating quasi-affinal links prior to the voting.
In sum, Duma results distinctively reflect the influence of 
campaigning. Widespread criticism of Dama and Kopon for being 
uninterested or lazy was common even in Kaupagam: Kopon did not even
distribute campaign posters. Dama's strength outside Kaupagam in 
comparison to Kopon resulted, I believe, from his past largess; for 
example, virtually all his Tabiagam supporters mentioned his 
generosity, free rides on his PMV to Goroka or Lae, or his previous 
contributions to ceremonies. When compared to Kopon and Dama, Michael 
and Martin campaigned extensively. Michael, who came second in the 
ballot, had his chances of victory crushed both by his inability to 
poll well outside Duma where he was virtually unknown, and by those 
votes lost to Martin within Koraodurumo and throughout Duma. But the 
Duma results also clearly indicate a preference for an educated 
candidate, or perhaps, for a man who, because he had resided outside 
the area, had few political enemies and an unsullied reputation.
The aftermath
Election interest and tension grew during the three weeks of 
voting, and peaked on the days immediately prior to and following the 
radio announcement of official tallies. Emotions run high during these 
climactic days; unrealistic expectations are raised and shattered, and 
candidates and their clans must postulate reasons for election
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failures . Using Turner’s terras, the announcement of election results 
marks the ’crisis' that is rapidly followed by a time of redressive 
action, and finally, as people force the results further into the 
background of everyday affairs, by a phase of re-integration, 
signalling a return to normal life (Turner 1974: 42-43; Swartz et ai 
1966: 32-39).
In Sinasina, an argument over the election results led to a 
confrontation involving 200 men from two candidates' clans, which left 
one man dead and resulted in the imprisonment of four others. In 
Chuave, village court officials contained most of the political 
violence. In three non-Duma areas, groups supporting unsuccessful 
candidates assaulted members of the clans of winning candidates. In 
a separate incident, a youth gang, paid by losing candidates, attacked 
and severely damaged a vehicle belonging to a new provincial member’s 
kinsmen. Though several disgruntled losers threatened to go to war 
with Baundo's clan or to attack the DOIC and government vehicles, most 
candidates urged their kinsmen to accept the results.^ In Duma open 
hostility was confined to a few fist fights or drunken brawls sparked 
by election talk between supporters of rival candidates. The Duma 
candidates themselves, however, made a point of fraternizing with each 
other.
Among Duma candidates, Martin alone reacted bitterly to defeat 
by outspokenly criticizing the public service and electoral procedures. 
With about 15 other candidates, he openly confronted the DOIC at 
Chuave, and accused him of tampering with the ballot boxes. Over the 
following weeks, he - along with three other candidates - attempted 
to lodge appeals only to be dissuaded by lawyers in Kundiawa, Goroka 
and Mount Hagen. In Duma Martin confronted Komodurumo men, accused 
them of voting for Michael, and threatened to absolve himself from 
Komodurumo affairs, adding sarcastically that Michael would not be 
around to play the role of big man because he would soon return to wage 
employment. Because Martin could not openly confront men from other 
clans, he contented himself with making vague threats of retribution.
He pointed out that he was happy with his role as magistrate, adding 
threateningly that he knew who had not voted for him and and that he 
would continue to see people in court. Of all the Duma candidates, 
Martin clearly had most invested in the election outcome - he had
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literally dreamed of being a member, of becoming Premier, and was 
absolutely convinced he would receive the majority of Duma votes. His 
poor showing in comparison to Michael was a particularly bitter pill 
for him to swallow. Within a few short weeks, however, Martin had put 
the election behind him. He was once again engrossed in Keu 
ceremonies, and, with the aid of court cases, was again acting as Keu's 
premier leader.
Other Duma candidates took the results graciously. Kopon simply 
stated that ’all Kaupagam’ had voted for him, and he believed the 
results reaffirmed his status as Kaupagam's big man. Within a month, 
assisted by the lack of written notices listing results and by people’s 
poor numerical skills, he and his supporters would claim that he had 
won, not 147, but over 350 votes. Dama maintained a low profile the 
week following the announcement, but privately admitted to me he was 
both pleased and somewhat surprised with his showing. He regretted 
only the fact that his candidacy might have cost Michael the election 
victory. Although Michael's supporters were often outraged that Duma 
candidates had spoiled his chance of victory, Michael actively 
discouraged criticisms of his rivals, never contemplated an appeal, 
and simply used the results to prove that Duma could easily win future 
provincial elections, stating he would again be a candidate in the next 
election. Michael's status within Duma, of course, was greatly 
enhanced. But the possibility of increased rivalry between himself 
and Martin was reduced when, contrary to his campaign assurances, and 
in accordance with Martin's predictions, Michael soon returned to wage 
employment in Eastern Highlands province.
The voters took comfort in the fact that ballot box totals, which 
incorporate entire tribes or groups of tribes, prevent candidates from 
learning clan or individual votes. Leaders often privately assured 
both Martin and Michael that their entire clan had given each man their 
'full' vote. Likewise, Keukobu men explicitly denied to Martin that 
they had even contemplated voting for Michael. For the average 
villager, the results were a subject of conversation for only a few 
days. People by and large ignored results in other electorates. The 
news that Yowie had been re-elected in Narabaiyufa or that Tiene, 
Elimbari Council's President, had won a narrow victory (by 61 votes) 
in Elimbari, was taken matter of factly. Antagonism towards Baundo's
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victory soon dissipated with the news that Baundo had. received votes 
in all the ballot boxes and that he was an SDA pastor.
Winning members, aided in some cases by educated men who were ex­
candidates, made attempts to form a 'Bomai Block’ government that would 
exclude Kuman speakers and so redress the injustices of the SIPG. But 
this movement, like the attempt to form a Pangu government, failed for 
want of organization and internal consensus among new members.
Instead, Iambakey Okuk gathered together a group of members who, after 
being flown to Port Moresby where they were wined, dined and promised 
various projects for their electorates, unofficially preselected 
cabinet positions and the Premier. The new Premier, Mathew Siune, was 
an educated Kuman speaker, an ex-provincial government employee and 
Iambakey’s close political ally. Yowie became Assembly Speaker, Baundo 
and Tiene the Health Minister and RIP Committee Chairman respectively.
A month after the elections results became known, the new Premier 
and Iambakey announced, via radio, the firing of the Provincial 
Secretary and accused the SIPG of gross financial mismanagement. They 
claimed the new government faced a shortfall of K2 million, alleging 
that K230,000 of SIPG funds had been illegally loaned to former members 
and officials, as well as to their kinsmen and friends (Post Courier,
25 July 1980). This news surprised no one in Chuave; rather it 
verified people's belief in the general corruption of the SIPG and its 
politicians. A new word, ’bankrupt', came into use and was used by 
new members to caution people that the new government would be hard- 
pressed to develop local areas until it first corrected the wrongs of 
its predecessor. Big men encouraged the belief that the provincial 
government was ruined and argued that Chuave or Duma alone would once 
again have to attend to its own political affairs. In short, this 
announcement effectively ended the election aftermath by reorientating 
villagers’ attention to local matters; the provincial government once 
again became an institution and an idea which had only a modicum of 
relevance for people's everyday lives.
Politics as drama
The importance of this election is to be measured, not by its aim 
or outcome - the selection of a provincial member - but by its less
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tangible consequences for the process of political change as a whole. 
Above all, the election was a medium for raising political 
consciousness: an occasion when, however momentarily, people saw
themselves not simply as members of a particular clan or community, 
but as members of the Chuave area and beyond that, a wider political 
world called Simbu province (see also Hatanaka 1970). Moreover, due 
to the lack of widespread political education programmes, campaign 
rhetoric is itself a primary means of conveying information about the 
nature of higher government and of political processes which rarely 
impinge on people's thoughts.
Campaign rhetoric also necessarily serves to differentiate 
candidates and the ideals they represent. Perhaps the most common 
campaign metaphor was the image of cutting and distributing pork. For 
Chuave people, this simple act embodies a number of important 
characteristics. Ideally, as no man butchers or eats his own pig, it 
is first and foremost a sign of a person's concern for others' welfare. 
It is also a principal metaphor for male socialization: just as old
men instruct boys in the art of 'cutting pig', so too, the defining 
characteristic of adulthood is a man's willingness to partake in his 
group's obligations by rearing pigs and giving pork to others.
Finally, pork distribution is the hallmark of political authority, of 
the right to make decisions on behalf of the polity as a whole.
It was appropriate, therefore, that this key metaphor encapsulated 
several important election themes. Thus, the retort, 'you would not 
let a child cut your pig', aptly caricatured the attempts by young 
candidates to usurp the authority of more established big men. The 
distribution metaphor also easily allowed men to understand the biased 
apportionment of wealth by the SIPG, and stressed the need to select a 
candidate who would equitably provide development throughout Simbu. 
Those who claimed that only big men had the proven ability to 
distribute wealth, of course, often confronted those who saw, not 
traditional knowledge, but the ability to 'cut the paper' as the key 
to the government's unlimited wealth. The pig metaphor was also used 
to attack the self-interested bisnis man or conversely, to argue 
that only business men had proven managerial skills or the ability to 
ignore kinsmen's demands, and thereby protect the interests of all 
Chuave people. More generally, campaign rhetoric also focussed on
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other facets of political thought I have treated throughout this 
thesis, for instance, the fundamental importance of law and order.
The use of traditional metaphors in the campaign is simply one 
example of a more general, often unconscious, process by which people 
accept innovative or foreign ideas. They lend a degree of continuity 
and familiarity to rapidly changing ideals or modes of behaviour. Some 
men’s repudiation of the pig-cutting metaphor - the suggestion that 
the elections were not about 'cutting pig' at all - best illustrates 
the discrepancy between new and old political ideals and behaviours.
In this instance, men saw pork distribution as tied to an egocentric 
kinship network; but the choice of a candidate, they argued, should 
ideally transcend the parochial interests of clan and community. In 
short, they asked people to 'judge the talk' - to choose between 
idealized models of leadership rather than make choices based on blood 
or kinship ties. Yet in the final analysis, the results are not easily 
attributed to campaign rhetoric, and they do not reflect a preference 
for any particular type of leader or set of beliefs. Thus, candidates' 
final standings did not, in any way, correlate with party membership, 
mission affiliation, government experience, business interests, or 
other key characteristics that differentiated candidates and were the 
subject of so much campaign rhetoric. Rather, one basic principle 
explains the results: the degree of political competition within the
hierarchical system of corporate political units.
This fact does not prevent men from using the relative success 
or failure of particular candidates to prove the legitimacy of certain 
ideals. To take only one example, Baundo's victory, though a result 
of the fragmentation of votes in other areas and the weakness of a 
candidate in a bordering tribe, indicated to certain men a preference 
for a Pangu candidate. Similarly, others argued that Baundo was free 
from bisnis involvement and, as he was an SDA pastor, his victory 
proved that people sought a member who was a true Christian. Baundo 
also, however coincidently, represented a compromise between young, 
educated candidates and old, traditional style big men: Kamara men
often mentioned that Baundo was a 'true' man, an adult who was also 
literate and who could in no way be tagged with the educated 'big head' 
label.
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That a percentage of Chuave people do in fact eschew clan ties 
to vote for other candidates (and here again Baundo's victory was a 
blend of new and old behaviours) only reaffirms the potency of 
political ideologies which candidates both generate and espouse during 
the course of an election drama. Thus, if the elections did not 
provide a clear decision for the concept of conscience voting, or a 
preference for one set of political beliefs over another, they were 
at least a forum for intense discussion and debate of the relative 
merits of different leaders and different political ideas. The 
relative showings of particular candidates, of course, had important 
consequences for their political futures. Some would later use the 
results to legitimize their political standing within communities or 
to challenge political rivals. For others who fared poorly, the 
election was the swan song of their political careers. These 
individual victories or defeats, however, in no way detract from the 
central contribution all candidates made. Because they represented not 
only different political groups, but also different political ideas, 
they were essential participants in the continuing process of political 
change and the vanguard of a movement, which, in seeking consistency 
and consensus from discrepant ideals, was attempting to create a new 
and better world.
One indication of poor centre-provincial relations is the fact 
that the National Planning Office never saw a copy of this report 
(Standish 1980: 9).
The payment was for a Kebai man who was married to a Duman woman 
and had died after an alleged sorcery attack by his wife’s agnates 
while he was working on a coastal plantation. According to 
eyewitness accounts, the fight began when the deceased’s sister 
attempted to grab the man's daughter from her Sinasina mother.
The Sirabu Electoral Law requires only that candidates are at least 
21 years old and are born or have continuously resided in Simbu 
for 12 months. Martin and Michael's confusion arose from state­
ments by the DOIC and others that people from other provinces could 
not vote unless they had been Sirabu residents during the past year.
The 1964 Open electorate also included part of Sinasina district, 
in addition to Chuave, Elirabari and Nambaiyufa. The numbers of 
candidates contesting national elections are as follows: 4 in
1964, 10 in 1968, 11 in 1972, 15 in 1977, and 24 in 1982.
For an excellent account of how candidates used cash and beer in 
the 1977 Simbu elections, see Standish (in press). Another 
example was the behaviour of Iambakey Okuk who was unsuccessful 
in his 1982 re-election bid in the Simbu Regional Electorate.
He gave 4,000 cartons of beer at a pre-vote rally held in Kundiawa 
(Canberra Times, 4 June 1982). As in national elections, the 
sale of alcohol was prohibited throughout the polling period.
Candidates who receive less than 10 per cent of the votes polled 
by the winning candidate forfeit their deposit.
In Sirabu a total of 235 candidates stood, an average of ten per 
electorate. Of these, six were female; most, like Ogan Kora, were 
active in the Yangpela Didiman Association (Standish 1981: 13).
Baundo was the only candidate I interviewed who kept a running 
total of his expenditures. Often men estimated they spent between 
K200 and K300 for ’food’: travel costs, beer, cigarettes, and
small cash gifts. In the three electorates, several candidates 
claimed they spent in excess of K1,000 and, in one case, K2,000. 
These claims, however, may have been sheer highlands hyperbole. 
Except for Baundo’s use of wealth which was successful (see text), 
I found no correlation between estimated expenditures and 
candidates' final standings.
As well as acknowledging the co-operation of all voters and 
candidates in Chuave, I would like to express my thanks to Stanly 
Nuna, Provincial Returning Officer; James Kenna, Chuave Returning 
Officer; and Vincent Duambo, Presiding Officer, for their co­
operation and encouragement of my study. Because few voters are 
literate, people whisper their choice of candidate to polling 
officials who then mark the ballot.
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10. The analogy is to a trik man or card shark who takes advantage 
of older men’s ignorance of cards to win at gambling.
11, The DOIC was wisely and noticeably absent from his office for two 
days following the announcement of results. Assaults on 
government officials or the damaging of government buildings have 
occurred in Chuave and throughout Simbu following national 
elections.
Chapter Eight
CONCLUSION
No person living in Chuave has been left untouched by the complex 
changes that have occurred during the last half-century. Even those 
few people residing permanently in their pig houses, outside the 
mainstream of village life, possess steel tools, tin utensils and 
western clothing - constant reminders of the imprint of an alien 
culture on their lives. For most people, however, change has been 
anything but superficial. It has penetrated the very heart of Chuave 
society and, as a result, traditional modes of interaction, insti­
tutions and ideologies have been modified, transformed and, in some 
cases, abandoned.
In this thesis I have documented various forces that have shaped 
current political action. And because change is a process that 
illuminates, rather than obscures, those practices that show 
continuity with traditional culture, I have also located the major 
sources of political stability in Chuave. I have isolated analytically 
- often in separate chapters - different facets of political life.
This has allowed me to partially disentangle the inter-related changes 
occurring in Chuave, as well as to trace systematically the development 
of new beliefs, behavioural patterns and political organizations that 
I consider most relevant to the study of current leadership. Wherever 
possible, but particularly in the preceding chapter, I have also shown 
how these different facets of Chuave politics merge or conflict in 
terms of the co-operation or competition between rival big men. In 
this conclusion I review what I believe to be the most manifest 
features of the Chuave political system as a whole.
Peter Lawrence has contrasted western state and traditional New 
Guinea stateless societies (1971: 3-6). Western society, he suggests, 
is 'compartmentalized'; the political system, largely defined by the 
state apparatus, is analytically distinguishable from equally 
specialized economic and religious systems. In contrast, traditional 
New Guinea societies were 'generalized'. In the absence of state 
institutions politics is embedded in social, economic and religious 
behaviour. Big men are 'microcosms' of their society; men who possess 
generalized skills and operate within a hierarchy of co-ordinate groups 
whose members perform the same tasks and are linked by ties of kinship,
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affinity and descent (ibid,: 14).
Co-ordinate social groups responsible for specialized functions, 
as well as mutually exclusive leadership roles, existed in a number 
of traditional New Guinea societies (see for example, Lowman-Vadya 
1971; Morauta 1973; Hau'ofa 1981). However, as one version of two 
opposed and ideal societies - simple and complex - Lawrences’ 
dichotomy is fundamentally sound. When speaking of pre-contact Chuave 
politics, for example, men often suggest that big men who possessed 
special skills or characteristics dominated particular situations.
Strong or aggressive leaders gained influence when inter-clan tensions 
ran high; ritual experts sometimes controlled initiations or other 
religious ceremonies. But all men characterize major big men as 
generalists. They argue these leaders combined ascribed and achieved 
characteristics and were equally comfortable as well as influential 
in many situations: whether settling a dispute, organizing a feast,
mobilizing men for battle, or performing a ritual. Indeed, the 
flexibility of hereditary ideology indicates men's propensity to 
generalize rather than compartmentalize traditional leadership roles. 
Thus, rather than strictly adhering to father-son succession and 
thereby isolating the status of ’first man’, men adjust their age- 
grades to allow skilled leaders to claim this lineage or subclan 
position. Traditional big men competed with rivals representing 
parallel segmentary groups and their authority was restricted to the 
patrilineal clan-village.
The contemporary Chuave political system differs from its 
traditional counterpart in three key repsects. First, Chuave is a part 
of an emergent nation-state. The political system, therefore, is 
partially defined by the presence of state institutions at the local 
level, and a great deal of political competition revolves around 
obtaining government office. Second, leaders interact within a greatly 
expanded political arena incorporating former enemy groups. These 
units are bound together not simply by ties of kinship or co-residence, 
but also through their relationship to state institutions and by men’s 
commitment to common causes and beliefs. Third, although it would be 
inappropriate to suggest that Chuave is a ’complex’ society, political 
behaviour in general and leadership in particular is, in many ways, 
compartmentalized.
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The diversity of traditional cultures in Papua New Guinea has 
ensured that local responses to the process of encapsulation have 
varied greatly. But insomuch as the forces of political change in 
Chuave - missionization, cash cropping, the imposition of a state 
organization - are common to all Papua New Guinea societies, then, to a 
certain extent, all modern political systems must share the features 
I have outlined. I believe, therefore, that a central task facing 
political anthropologists is to describe, from a village perspective, 
how the diversification of leadership roles and political offices has 
effected the differential distribution of power and authority within 
contemporary political systems integrated in the nation-state.
Political, economic and religious behaviour, of course, remain 
closely linked at the local level. Furthermore, patrilineal ideology 
and loyalty to the clan continues to colour almost every aspect of 
political behaviour. For example, it will be clear from the previous 
chapter that current politicians must adjust their behaviour to 
approximate an idea of the model Christian. Young men also recognize 
that the distribution of wealth is closely associated with political 
authority - so much so that they sponsor ceremonies during campaigns. 
More flagrantly, candidates use wealth to attempt to purchase votes.
And loyalty to clan or tribal candidates, more than any other factor, 
best explains election outcomes. However, many Chuave people now view 
a candidate’s use of wealth in election contexts, as well as a man’s 
business involvement, as a political liability. I would also suggest 
that conscience voting for politicians belonging to foreign clans and 
tribes will, over successive elections, gain credence and serve to 
decrease the importance of group membership for election results.
Morauta, in concluding her excellent analysis of local politics 
in Madang, draws a distinction between 'pragmatic' and ’ideological’ 
conflict (1974: 147-162). In the former, kin ties, co-residence and 
ceremonial co-operation bind the members of a village together in 
opposition to other villages. Ideological conflict arises between men 
belonging to the same village and simultaneously links them with those 
men in other villages who share a common cause or belief. People's 
sharing of ideological values, therefore, promotes integration between 
groups; pragmatic conflict re-inforces the pre-existing autonomy of 
traditional socio-political units (ibid.: 161).
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Morauta's principal example of ideological conflict, the oppostion 
between cargo cultists and Christians, resembles the tension that arises 
between fundamentalist sects and Lutherans in Chuave. Thus, cross-clan 
or cross-tribal commitments to fundamentalist ideology served partly 
to influence voting patterns in the provincial elections. It is 
possible to predict, with I believe a great deal of certainty, that 
fundamentalist bloc voting will increase in future. I have also noted 
that, within the village, fundamentalists co-operate in a number of 
projects rather than rely on Lutheran big men or other agnates. At 
the inter-personal level one of the most strained of all Chuave 
relationships occurs between songons and their fundamentalist 
children.
For Chuave, however, I would rephrase Morauta's distinction in 
terms of the conflict that arises between men's allegiance to agnates 
versus their commitment to men belonging to other clans. Men clearly 
recognize that clan unity, and to a lesser extent the solidarity of 
other segmentary groups, endangers area-wide integration. They attempt 
to overcome this dilemma by ensuring different groups are represented 
in any co-operative task. But at the same time, for both pragmatic 
and ideological reasons, clan boundaries are consistently threatened; 
and at least at the level of the tribe or eria, integration of clans 
into a wider political entity and inter-group co-operation in everday 
affairs are defining characteristics of the contemporary political 
system.
The persistence of clan solidarity has been a major source of 
stability in the Chuave political system since contact. Men continue 
to cling to the clan in order to orient themselves in a rapidly 
changing world and they still give clan goals priority. Thus, people 
believe that ideally magistrates should be unbiased in settling 
inter-clan disputes or that councillors should equitably distribute 
government resources for the entire Chuave area. Yet inter-clan 
competition in elections involving these offices is intense. This is due 
to the fact that it is prestigious for a clan to elect an official and, 
more pragmatically, because men realize that the behaviour of these 
officials is often tainted by their membership of particular groups. As 
re-election rests on clan-wide support magistrates realize they must 
occasionally protect their agnates in disputes; councillors do
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give priority to their agnates when obtaining government loans or 
grants for businesses or small scale development projects.
In the absence of warfare, the inflation and expansion of 
ceremonial exchange have reinforced clan unity in the face of a number 
of countervailing pressures - changes in settlement patterns, the 
introduction of missions and local government wards - which threatened 
the boundaries of this corporate unit. To date even those segments of 
clans residing in different communities have continued to co-operate 
in exchange. Intra-clan competition between men’s houses and subclans 
is still evident in Chuave. Major prestations, however, require that 
leaders representing these groups work together to protect the clan's 
ceremonial reputation. But today men belonging to different clans 
within common villages and, more rarely, the larger community, 
contribute to prestations which were once the sole responsibility of 
the clan. As yet these contributions take place on an ad hoc basis.
But because shared locality has created ties of friendship between 
men's house groups, village prestations do sometimes occur - usually 
in Lutheran-organized mortuary feasts. Other, more formal inter­
village prestations may also come to rival those exchanges that are 
currently the concern of clans.
However, men and women's interaction at markets, church services 
and village courts provides leaders with immense opportunties to 
establish reputations beyond their clan or village. All tribesmen 
respect major leaders who are often invited to the most distant men's 
houses to discuss a range of everyday matters. Rather than creating 
intra-village conflict, people's shared beliefs concerning the need 
for development, law and order, and Christian brotherhood promote 
inter-clan integration and reinforce the legitimacy of big men who act 
as recognized authorities within village court and council areas.
Thus, although people criticize frequently particular councillors and 
magistrates, they rarely question their authority. Men fully accept 
the right of magistrates belonging to other clans or communities to 
settle any dispute; councillors rarely, if ever, seek to consult other 
big men before attending council meetings.
Ideally people believe government officials should be well
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distributed in different clans and communities. Thus, while elections 
are highly competitive processes which often produce a shift in 
representation between clans, councillors often appoint peace officers 
to disadvantaged clans or villages to redress any imbalance in officials 
that successive election outcomes produce. Similarly, songons meet 
to discuss church policies for the whole eria. But they attempt to 
ensure that the opposition between different clans does not endanger 
church affairs by rotating meetings along a circuit to cover every clan 
under the church’s jurisdiction.
More rarely, co-ordinated political action by leaders belonging 
to different tribes and erias occurs. Songons from throughout 
Chuave join together to collect funds and build churches. Business 
men have arranged large demonstrations involving people from the entire 
Chuave-Elimbari-Nambaiyufa area to protest against council and 
provincial government policies which they regard as harmful to private 
enterprise. Different village courts select representatives and form 
temporary committees to mediate disputes that threaten to erupt into 
violence between clans or tribes belonging to different erias.
Such special interest action - like the suggestion that any future 
eria council should consist of select business men, songons, court 
officials, as well as councillors - points to the increasing compart- 
mentalization of leadership roles. When speaking of different leaders 
or aspects of their society, Chuave men occasionally use the Pidgin 
bureaucratic phrase narapela depatiaen (another department) to 
differentiate between ideas and actions associated with bisnis, 
particular missions or alternative branches of government. In doing 
so, they identify a leader's sphere of influence, if not discrete 
political domains. As I have maintained throughout this thesis, people 
regard these ’departments' as separate, but in many ways equal, avenues 
to power.
Certainly it is no longer possible to characterize any Chuave man 
as a microcosm of his society. The offices of magistrate and peace 
officer are, by law, exclusive. The time and energy a man must spend 
to become a successful entrepreneur or magistrate make these 
professions incompatible. The material resources the ceremonial leader
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and business man must use to gain outstanding reputations lead to a 
natural separation of these roles. And because the Lutheran church 
appointed leaders in the 1960s, songons are often middle aged or old 
men who have poor Pidgin skills and who are conservative in outlook - 
qualities that, many men argue, should preclude them from holding 
government office.
Some of these leadership roles are more easily merged than others. 
Certainly, a reputation as a group representative in ceremonial 
exchange often catapults these men to government office. Conversely, 
government officials - and, at mortuary feasts, songons - often act 
as group representatives and much more rarely seize control of 
distributions. Many Lutheran songons are also small business men.
To this extent men sometimes manage to act in several different 
capacities. Yet in selecting songons the Lutheran Church avoids, 
wherever possible, those men who are major entrepreneurs. Furthermore, 
unlike fundamentalists, Lutherans discourage even the youngest and most 
literate songons or wokman from seeking government office.
Thus, even where there are no practical reasons for men being 
unable to merge different leadership roles, political ideology often 
prevents them from doing so. Magistrates and peace officers are 
ideally associated with opposed characteristics. Men say a ’cold', 
even-tempered, and self-controlled big man is best equipped to dispense 
impartial justice; a 'hot’, strong, aggressive leader is required to 
punish law breakers or instil in people fear and respect for court 
decisions. Business men are disadvantaged in their attempts to control 
distributions or become councillors because they are criticized as 
self-interested. Conversely, a councillor endangers his chance of re- 
election if he starts a small tradestore; he is immediately accused of 
misappropriating council funds. By far the most rigid separation of 
roles occurs between court and council offices - even though the 
qualities men seek in any government official are similar. Although no 
man has yet held these roles concurrently, men have, in fact, held 
court and council offices at different points in time. Incumbent 
magistrates, defeated in election bids, have become councillors one 
month later. I have also noted how Kopon failed to obtain a single 
vote in the court election, but was re-elected unopposed at KTK ward's 
councillor.
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The separation of leadership statuses, therefore, is in may ways 
the result of personal preference and individual ambition. But the 
argument against 'double work’ is also a pervasive, potent, and 
egalitarian political philosophy. It has arisen, I would argue, from 
the interaction of big men who have been forced to map out spheres of 
influence rather than face prolonged and open confrontations with 
rivals which could damage their reputations. This process began with 
the conflict between mission and government bosbois in the 1940s.
Most recently, tension and open confrontations between councillors and 
magistrates over a number of issues - for example, the control of court 
fines, tax collection or the right to attend various government 
meetings - indicates that these leaders have yet to reach total 
agreement on their relative spheres of influence.
Viewed from a follower's perspective this political ideology 
provides men with a rationale that they can use to prevent the 
emergence of overly ambitious, self-centred or domineering leaders. 
Chuave men clearly recognize this when they suggest that those 
outstanding men who do combine roles become 'too big' within and beyond 
the clan. Thus, those peace officers who later manage to become 
magistrates are invariably men who have demonstrated that they do not 
use force excessively against men of a given community. Entrepreneurs 
who are elected to council must have proven their commitment to the 
group by using their wealth in exchange.
The combination of roles, therefore, often distinguishes exemplary 
leaders who become renowned throughout the Chuave area. More often 
than not, however, these different leadership positions are separate, 
and it is equally true that outstanding success in a given field 
compensates for a man's inability to act in other spheres. An 
experienced councillor or successful entrepreneur can gain recognition 
throughout the region even if he remains isolated from court, church 
or ceremonial affairs. In terras of everyday action, however, court 
offices involve the greatest degree of influence - though competition 
for these positions is so intense that it is exceedingly difficult for 
court officials to be re-elected. Even the magistrate, however, must 
temper his power in everyday discussions concerning council, church or 
business matters because he must acknowledge the expertise of other 
leaders.
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Because men admire success in any activity, all leaders appear 
equal in a range of everyday affairs, and men’s house discussions 
remain relatively consensual in nature. Indeed, all Chuave big men 
share certain characteristics. Above all else they are self-assured 
in public gatherings and, at least in the vernacular, skilled 
verbally. They have proven their commitment to their agnates by 
scrupulously contributing to their subclan and men’s house exchanges.
They actively take part, in co-operation with other big men, in the 
organization of ceremonies or work projects.
But beyond the clan or village, most leaders gain recognition and 
a real degree of influence only within the context of their specialized 
roles. Authority in Chuave, therefore, is often contextual and support 
is necessarily fluid. Leaders dominate, and often gain absolute 
authority over, particular events and discussions. Consequently, 
followers must be prepared to lend their support to big men belonging 
to their own and other clans and villages. Chuave men constantly shift 
their support between big men during the course of a single day or week 
depending on the context of events. They do so not simply because 
they have agnatic ties to a certain leader, but also according to whether 
or not a leader occupies a church or government office or is a recognized 
expert in ceremony or western business.
As yet I have refrained from referring to Kafaina because, as a 
syncretic movement, it encapsulates many aspects of the Chuave political 
system as a whole. The movement is exceptional and atypical to the 
extent that women isolate themselves in a shroud of Kafaina activity, 
often failing to take an active part in everyday political processes.
But Kafaina has arisen in reaction to men's domination of every avenue 
to political prominence and power in Chuave. And the movement's strength 
derives, in part, from women’s replication of male’s political processes. 
Excluded from exchange, business, councils, missions and village courts, 
women have incorporated all these facets of political life into Kafaina 
organization. Kafaina activity - however consciously or unwittingly 
- provides a caricature of men’s political behaviour. In a single stroke 
women demonstrate that they are comfortable and capable in a range of 
political situations - from organizing ceremonial exchanges to convening 
courts. It is the Kafaina bosmeri who is a microcosm of Chuave 
society: a generalist leader whose power is limited paradoxically to
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the most conceptually bounded of political domains.
Kafaina women falter only in their reliance on men’s managerial 
skill and their inability to control the businesses that their savings 
create - failings that may well prove to be temporary. But by using 
ceremonial relationships to generate cash savings, women manage to blend 
the western and exchange sectors of the Chuave economy. They thereby 
present to men a unique organizational model which may, in future, serve 
to spark other creative and co-operative efforts in local development 
between different clans and villages.
Kafaina has overcome the central dilemma of being a female in a 
patrilineal, virilocal society - powerlessness which results from being a 
class of disenfranchised and disorganized individuals rather than true 
members of a political group. Within the context of Kafaina women are 
no longer simply individuals whose marriages provide men with 
opportunities to exchange valuables and establish inter-group ties.
They have themselves created exchange networks and have thus gained 
political power. More broadly, the Kafaina movement is an excellent 
example of how shared beliefs can transcend the parochial interests 
of particular groups and promote integration within a large geographic 
area. Kafaina ideology and organization provide a framework which 
binds women - and indirectly men - residing in hundreds of men's house 
groups in different census divisions and provinces. The Kafaina 
movement, therefore, foreshadows a degree of societal integration and 
pan-regional identity which will, I am sure, produce concerted political 
action on an unprecedented scale during future decades.
I would like to conclude this thesis by returning to a point I 
raised in my introduction. There I spoke briefly of the anachronisms, 
common in Chuave, that are born of the process of rapid change. 
Alternatively, people use their knowledge of past customs to suit current 
needs and ambitions. Kafaina is a compelling illustration - one of many 
in Chuave - of how people reshape and remodel traditional practices 
to achieve present-day goals. Women combine pre-contact decorations 
with western ones to create a uniform of the Kafaina movement; they 
transform once antiquated prohibitions to protect cash savings. The 
traditional gains fresh relevance for people's lives by becoming 
undeniably contemporary in context and meaning.
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All too often anthropologists treat change as a unique phenomenon, 
as a subject that can temporarily be set aside in order to describe 
an institution or entire culture as if it existed in a pristine 
environment - the historic ethnographic present. It is my firm belief 
that anthropologists must come to grips with change - as Papua New 
Guineans have - and begin to use their knowledge of traditional societies 
as a means for the further understanding of contemporary issues and 
behaviour. Unless this is accomplished, then the people who are the 
subject of our research, and who in future will become anthropologists' 
most strident critics, will rightfully view our discipline as 
anachronistic in presenting analyses of cultures that do not adequately 
reflect current reality.
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APPENDIX
Voting patterns for the 1981 Elimbari Local Government Council 
elections
In May 1981 Leeanne Greenwood and I acted as assistants to patrol 
officer Ben Beiyo during the election of 13 Chuave councillors. The 
election of Elimbari census division councillors occurred 
simultaneously but we did not observe this. Within Chuave three 
councillors were elected unopposed. Two of the remaining ten elections 
failed to separate voters from different clans. I am able, therefore, 
to present clan voting patterns for the remaining eight wards. As 
electoral rolls were seldom used I am unable to provide a complete 
breakdown of votes by subclan or men's house composition. Just over 
one-half of all eligible voters cast ballots.
The figures and brief supplementary explanations are provided as 
illustration of the range of variation in voting patterns. Both the 
patrol officer involved and the voters themselves allowed me to record 
individual votes and so gain an understanding of voting patterns which 
ballot box totals often disguise. At each polling place I explained 
that I would not reveal individual votes and that results would be 
tabulated and publicized according to the clan as a whole. Nowhere 
did I meet opposition to this proposal, and I would like to thank the 
Chuave people for their co-operation. Tables are arranged so that the 
incumbent is always candidate A1, and A1 and A2 are natal members
of Clan A. 
Election One
Clan A Clan B Clan C Ballot Box Total
Candidate Al 14 7 20 41
Candidate B 26 45 11 82
Total 40 52 31 123*
* I was unable to account for only 123 of 141 (87.2%) of all votes
in this election.
Explanation
Candidate B received 86.5 per cent of his clan's votes in contrast 
to A1's 35 per cent. This is one example of people failing to 
support a candidate from their own clan, and several possible 
explanations can be suggested for this pattern. First, the two 
candidates were leaders of separate missions; A1 is a leader of the 
SDA mission and B is a Lutheran pastor. At least some of B's success 
in obtaining votes from A1's clan, therefore, is explained by mission 
affiliation. In later questioning men from Clan A who had voted for 
B, eight of ten mentioned B's leadership within the mission as a 
reason for their support. Second, A1 had resided with his wife in Clan 
C for over a year prior to the election. This group, who did not put 
forward a candidate, gave 20 of 31 or 64.5 per cent of their votes to 
A1. But several men from A1's clan suggested that A1 had become 
unconcerned with the welfare of his natal group, and by residing
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elsewhere AI may have lost some of his kinsmen’s votes. Finally, 
the election and appointment of village court officials occurred one 
month previous to the council election. Clan A and C had both 
succeeded in electing a magistrate, and a popular man from Clan A was 
also re-appointed unopposed as constable. Thus Clan B had no 
government representative and many voters suggested that candidate B
was elected so as to ensure that each clan had some representation: 
clans often attempt to maintain a balance of representatives within 
the ward so as to prevent conflict between groups and this was probably 
the deciding factor in the election's outcome.
Election Two
Clan A Clan B Clan C Ballot Box Total
Candidate A1 26 0 0 26
Candidate A2 59 0 10 69
Candidate B 7 145 28 180
Total 92 145 38 275
Explanation
Candidate B, Tiene Maima, is a very successful business man and 
Lutheran songon whose reputation extends well beyond his own group. 
Nonetheless he was able to win only seven of 92 votes from his 
opponents’ clan. I was unable to accurately record the names of these 
seven voters and those people from Clan C who voted for this man. 
Speaking generally, men of Clan C stated that Tiene was regarded as 
a ’good’ man and that they had given him their votes because he had 
aided them in past exchanges, or frequently donated his truck to use 
for community and church projects. While it is often characteristic 
to claim post facto support for the winning candidate this would seem 
to be an accurate rationale for Tiene's success in Clan C for he had 
no close kin relationships or a specific exchange relationship with 
men of this clan.
As is common when no candidate stands, Clan C's turn-out - 30 per 
cent of eligible voters - was low. Candidate A2 stood to contest the 
incumbency of A1 who was regarded as an inept and ineffective 
councillor. His may be regarded as a ’negative' candidacy; while he 
told men prior to the election that he had little chance of winning 
he was determined to damage the chances of his rival within the clan. 
Despite losing to Tiene therefore, his victory in numbers over A1 could 
be used as evidence of his support within his natal group and as a 
rationale for his candidacy in future elections. (No evidence exists 
for the possibility that Tiene attempted to ’front' A2 in order to 
enhance his chances. Even though he had the economic means to 
accomplish such a strategy, I believe such a tactic would be totally 
out of character in this instance.)
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Election Three
Clan A Clan B Clan C Ballot Box Total
Candidate A1 12 0 0 12
Candidate A2 66 0 0 66
Candidate A3 6 0 0 6
Candidate Bl 1 2 0 3
Candidate B2 8 28 0 36
Candidate B3 1 63 0 64
Candidate B4 _l_ 10 _0_ 11
Total 95 103 0 198
Explanation
Clan C boycotted this election because they wished to protest 
their inclusion in a ward that forced them to be separated from their 
traditional subtribe members. This example shows both the 
corporateness of clan voting, and the degree of competition for 
government positions which can arise within the clan. Clan B voted 
entirely for its own candidates. Three men in Clan A voted for 
candidates in Clan B on the basis of close personal friendships they 
had formed with particular candidates. The eight votes received by B2 
are easily explained by his residence in a men's house in Clan A - 
segments of Clans A and B share a common village and this leader,
Andrew Wahgi, a former village court constable who was removed from 
office because of his violent behaviour and an attack on the council 
clerk, moves freely between men's houses of his natal group and his 
wife's group, frequently acting as a mediator within the village. The 
successful candidate A2 was a former village court magistrate who had 
been defeated in recent elections, and was the younger brother of A1, 
the incumbent. The incumbent was 'first man' of his subclan but at 55 
was regarded as too old and an inefficient Pidgin speaker. Immediately 
after his election A2 was regarded as not only councillor but also the 
new leader of his subclan and the 'first man' of his age-grade. This 
election as government leader, therefore, both coincided with and 
marked the transition of subclan leadership. Candidates A3, Bl and B4 
were all young men less than 30 years old who had as yet failed to 
demonstrate the qualities of a big man. They were regarded as giaman 
(false) candidates, and those few votes they received came, I believe, 
from members of their own lineage.
Election Four
Clan A Clan B Clan C Clan D Ballot Box Total
Candidate A1 137 0 8 4 149
Candidate B 1 132 23 30 186
Candidate C 0 0 10 _2 12
Total 138 132 41 36 347
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Explanation
With a single exception, Clans A and B voted en bloc for their 
respective candidates. The fragmentation of Clan C's votes is to be 
explained by two factors. First, as is often the case, Candidate C 
was a giaman candidate. At the age of 31 and although fluent in 
Pidgin, he had failed to prove himself as a potential big man, and was 
regarded by his predominantly Lutheran constituency as a 'bighead' and 
outsider because he belonged to the New Tribes mission. He had twice 
stood for council election and failed each time. In such instances, 
therefore, voters do not hesitate to give their votes to 'true' big 
men of other clans, and in this situation, were encouraged to do so 
by their own group's big man, a magistrate who had no desire to run 
for council. Second, candidate B was married to a woman of Clan C, 
was resident in this group and despite being an affine was regarded 
as a minor leader of Clan C and superior to C as a recognized big man.
This election also marked the end of Al's, Kuri Mori, 30 year 
reign as a government leader. A former luluai, councillor for 20 
years, and member of the Simbu Interim Provincial Government, his power 
and reputation had waned as he grew old. Aged 60 he was described by 
many as befuddled by recent political developments and as a man whose 
reputation was based entirely on past achievements. His reputation 
and former exploits had brought great prestige to his clan and as the 
results demonstrate, they fully supported him. But men outside his 
natal group were determined to elect a new councillor. His fellow 
clansmen had sensed the possibility of his defeat and had suggested 
he retire. This advice went unheeded, however, and Kuri affirmed to the 
end his faith in government stating simply that 'the people had the 
power' to remove him and that until he lost an election he would not 
resign.
Election Five
Clan A Clan B Clan C Ballot Box Total
Candidate A1 59 14 3 76
Candidate B1 0 1 0 1
Candidate B2 2 38 2 42
Candidate B3 4 67 34 105
Total 65 120 39 224
Explanation
Here the cross-over voting between Clan A and B, a subtribe, is 
difficult to explain. While accounting for only 20 of 185 (10.8 per 
cent) of votes cast by Clans A and B, none of those factors previously 
mentioned - residence, marriage ties, religion or a desire to balance 
government positions between clans - is applicable. Because I could 
not record particular cases of this voting behaviour, I can only suggest 
that such small out-flowing of votes from the clan results both from 
personal grievances against candidates from ego's own clan, and on the 
basis of personal friendships with candidates of other groups. Because
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people also claim that they vote for men solely on the basis of ability 
and ignore agnatic relationships some of these votes may also 
approximate the western idea of conscience voting.
This election also easily demonstrates the importance of clan 
size. Clan A is comprised of 125 eligible voters versus 197 for Clan 
B. In order to have polled 105 votes, therefore, a turn-out of 84 per 
cent of candidate A 1 ’s group was necessary. In fact the turn-out was 
only 52 per cent.
Election Six
Clan A Clan B Ballot Box Total
Candidate A1 50 4 54
Candidate A2 29 0 29
Candidate B1 2 47 49
Candidate B2 0 40 40
Candidate B3 32 21 53
Candidate B4 6 39 45
Total 119 151 270
Explanation
In this closely contested election, B3 almost succeeded in 
defeating the incumbent and managed to out-poll his major rivals with 
Clan B on the basis of the 32 votes he received from Clan A - 60 per 
cent of his total votes came from outside his natal group. This 
candidate, age 40, was the only candidate who could claim a direct 
relationship with Clan A, his wife’s natal group. While resident in 
Clan B part of his success was undoubtedly due to this affinal link 
and exchange relationships he had with men of Clan B. In addition, 
as songon he could use the context of mission affairs to act 
regularly as a leader beyond his own group. With the exception of the 
incumbent, furthermore, he was the only candidate whose status provided 
him with this type of opportunity.
Election Seven
Clan A Clan B Ballot Box Total
Candidate A1 152 0 152
Candidate A2 33 0 33
Candidate B1 25 59 84
Candidate B2 4 120 124
Total 214 179 393
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Explanation
Despite losing four votes to B2 whose wife was a member of Clan 
B, as well as 25 votes to B1 who was an SDA pastor, the incumbent, a 
Lutheran, managed to mobilize his own clan and poll 71 per cent of his 
group’s votes.
Attempts had been made by Clan B to put forward only one candidate 
because it was realized that the incumbent for nine years had twice 
served on the council finance committee and managed to allocate council 
funds for several development projects. But the rivalry between B1 
and B2 could not be resolved and their dual candidacy ensured the 
incumbent's victory.
Election Eight
Clan A Clan B Clan C Ballot Box
Candidate A1 9 0 0 9
Candidate A2 11 4 1 16
Candidate Bl 1 53 1 55
Candidate B2 10 44 2 56
Candidate Cl 11 5 32 48
Candidate C2 _0 1 56 57
Total
Explanation
42 107 92 241
In this election Clans B and C once again show solid support for 
their candidates with cross-over votes totalling 9.3 per cent and 4.3 
per cent respectively. Only 47.6 per cent of Clan A, however, voted 
for their candidates, one of whom was the incumbent. The second 
candidate was not regarded as a serious contender. Once again several 
factors, including mission affiliation and affinal relationships could 
be cited to account for this pattern. But in addition to failing to 
gain the support of his clansmen, A1 also failed to mobilize his group 
- only 33 per cent of Clan A turned out to vote. Both the vote itself 
and the apathy of Clan A's members, I would argue, are explained best 
by the incumbent's failure to fulfil the requirements of his office.
He had continually promised to have an aid post built within his ward 
but had been outmanoeuvred by another councillor within his tribe. 
Within Clans B and C candidates were rivals and leaders of their 
respective subclans. On the surface, that is before the votes were 
counted, the contest had seemed perfectly balanced, each clan having 
two candidates. Candidate C2 polled only 60.8 per cent of his own 
clan's votes, and the turn-out by his clansmen was actually lower than 
that of Clan B. Yet because of the vote split in Clan B, he was the 
winning contestant. The unpredictable nature of this election, 
therefore, demonstrates the statement made by Chuave men that elections 
are truly 'like a card game'.
Summary
Together these examples demonstrate two major trends. First they 
show that the clan remains the most important political unit and that a 
candidate's primary support is within this group. But clan boundaries 
are not inviolable and a number of factors - specific affinal 
relationships, mission affiliation and the strength of a candidate's 
reputation beyond his own clan, or inversely, the weakness of 
candidates from ego's own group often lead to votes being cast for 
leaders of other groups.
Second, the degree of competition varies from clan to clan - as 
I would argue it always has. In some clans, no man chooses to stand, 
in others several men compete even when it is realized that their 
rivalry decreases the possibility of the group's electing a councillor. 
In those instances where a candidate fails to emerge within a 
particular clan, this group's votes may be critical to the success or 
failure of other candidates within the ward.
Although ballot box totals often disguise the particular voting 
patterns within the ward, people clearly perceive that votes cross clan 
boundaries. Candidates stress the voters' right to choose, by secret 
ballot, the best candidate - often encouraging people to ignore blood 
ties. In so doing, candidates and voters recognize the democratic 
process for what it is: a competitive and sometimes unpredictable
enterprise - a game of cards for the high stakes of government office.
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